Regulation and the promotion of national audiovisual content in the era of digital convergence:a comparative analysis of the United Kingdom, France and Brazil by Nazareno, Claudio
 
DOCTORAL THESIS
Regulation and the promotion of national audiovisual content in the era of digital
convergence







Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





REGULATION AND THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT IN 
THE ERA OF DIGITAL CONVERGENCE: 






Claudio Nazareno, Eng, MSc 
 
 






Department of Media, Language and Culture 






THIS RESEARCH INVESTIGATES HOW the production and distribution of nationally produced 
television programmes, films and other audiovisual content can be promoted by regulation. The 
study identifies current regulatory tools to promote national content and differences in policy 
approaches. It also identifies new issues resulting from the substantial transformation the media 
environment has undergone in recent years. The audiovisual sector today is characterised by an 
abundance of television channels and telecommunication services and by ongoing digital 
convergence, all impacting on the effectiveness and rationale of content regulation. 
 
Focused on the UK, France and Brazil, this comparative research investigates the political, 
regulatory, socio-cultural, economic, technological and market changes of the communication 
services in the recent decades and how this has impacted on the provision of national audiovisual 
content. The starting point of the analysis are the 1980s, when broadcasting started to be gradually 
liberalised, and it concludes in the 2000s, when information technologies, telecommunications and 
broadcasting converge into interconnected, complementary and supplementary services. 
 
This research offers a three step method of analysis which contributes to a new understanding of 
the mechanisms and implications involved in the production and distribution of nationally produced 
content in digital times. In the first step, the various socio-cultural aims of communication services 
as enacted in legislation are analysed. The second step explores the consequent regulatory tools 
for the fulfilment of those objectives. The third step provides a market evaluation of the audiovisual 
industries, which broadcasters and other distribution platforms provide which kind of content, and 
also looks at audiences‟ viewing preferences to get a better understanding of what type of content 
should be supported through legislation. As outcomes, this research proposes to academics, 
policymakers and regulators a new definition for national content and a series of regulatory actions 
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DIGITAL CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNICATION SERVICES, where telecommunication, 
broadcasting and information technologies are highly interconnected, complementary and 
substitutable, has arguably become a popular topic since the 1990s. This convergence 
phenomenon has been branded to consumers more vigorously by telecommunication companies 
since the 2000s with the commercialisation of bundled packages of telephony, broadband and 
paytv services. This has been taken up by the press (for instance, cover of the Newsweek 
magazine in 2005 with the title The future of entertainment) (Foroohar, 2005) and increasingly 
became the object of academic attention, for example with the bestselling book Convergence 
culture: where old and new media collide (2006) by Henry Jenkins. This is a new period in which 
video gaming consoles can be connected to the internet to watch television, smartphones used to 
watch films in transit and television sets to send emails. Recently, the British communications 
regulator has claimed that we are experiencing a “smartphone revolution”, where especially teens 
are changing their “leisure activities” (Ofcom, 2011: 4). However, as this study will show, the 
revolutionary impact of digital convergence is debatable. We have not yet arrived at a time of total 
substitution of services, or “convergence in substitutes” as argued by Greenstein and Khanna 
(1997: 203-5), where one „big pipe‟, one „big box‟ or one „big company‟ provides all of our 
communication needs. Nevertheless, we have certainly reached a point of digital 
complementarities between services, or as the above authors acknowledge, “convergence in 
complements”. 
 
In this current era of overlapping and multifunctional communication services, broadcasting 
channels still play a preponderant role. Price Waterhouse, although admitting that “making 
predictions in the uncertain world of convergence is dangerous”, envisaged, in 1995, that by the 
year 2000 the future of „home entertainment‟ could include: 
- Television will act as a movie screen, telephone, fax machine and computer, as 




borrow from the other, and your neighbourhood will likely boast two competing 
providers of full-service entertainment, media and communications services. 
- It will be a few years before you can "choose your own adventure" from your 
living room sofa. Although commercial introductions of interactive television will 
appear in the next few years, there is a tremendous amount of enabling 
technologies enhancement work that remains before widespread availability and 
adoption of interactive television can happen. 
- Consumers are soon destined for "TV overload." Television stations might number 
500 as satellite distribution of entertainment could convert completely to 
compressed digital transmission within the next five years (Price Waterhouse, 
1995). 
 
These predictions have become mainly true in the 2010s. Ofcom (the British communications 
regulator Office of Communications) lists 122 digital terrestrial FTA (free-to-air) channels and 903 
channels on cable and satellite (Ofcom, 2012a). CSA (the French broadcasting regulator Conseil 
Superieur de L‟audiovisuel), accounts for 27 national digital FTA broadcasters, 196 channels on 
cable and satellite and 55 VOD (Video on-demand) platforms (CSA, 2011: 9-11). In Brazil there are 
four national operators of paytv satellite and more than 500 terrestrial channels (Anatel, 2012a, 
2012b) forming approximately two dozen nationwide television networks. 
 
Official reports also indicate that traditional television viewing still remains an important activity in 
current times. Ofcom found that in the UK “[t]ime-shifted viewing using DVRs [(Digital Video 
Recorders)] accounted for 7% of all viewer hours in 2010” and that viewers spend an unabated four 
hours per day watching television (ibid: 6), against spending half that amount on the internet (ibid: 
74). Certainly, as digital generations become the majority, the predominance of television viewing 
(or at least how television is watched) is likely to change but it is reasonable to infer that 
broadcasting services will remain an important communication service for years to come. 
 
The era of „TV overload‟ also represents an era of global media. National broadcasters and PSBs 
(Public Service Broadcasters) have now to compete for the attention of viewers with channels 
produced by international media conglomerates and audiovisual content on other platforms offered 
by telecommunication companies. In addition, these competitors may generate more revenues 






In the UK, as I will show in Chapter 8, BSkyB, the paytv satellite operator co-owned by News Corp 
(the 4
th
 largest global media conglomerate) already generates more revenues than the BBC (British 
Broadcasting Corporation) earns from the TV license. The biggest media group in France is 
Vivendi, number six in the global ranking and their main shareholders are mainly transnational 
investors (Vivendi, 2011b). In the three countries analysed in this thesis, the UK, France and Brazil, 
it is only in Brazil where the biggest media group, Organizacoes Globo (controlled by the Marinho 
family), is nationally owned. However, of the four paytv satellite operators in Brazil, three belong to 
foreign telecommunication companies with bigger and global revenues. 
 
From an industry perspective, as noted by Cox (2004: 22) and as will be discussed in this thesis, 
these multiple options for the delivery of audiovisual media products impact on how content is 
produced, distributed and financed. From the users‟ perspective, this variety of services opened up 
more opportunities for viewers to watch more imported content. The increased availability of foreign 
content and imported cultural elements in broadcasting services brought by liberalisation sparked 
continued debates amongst media scholars. There are several views to this cultural discussion as 
the literature review will show. There are those who consider the consolidation and globalisation of 
the media as part of an American imperialism strategy, later identified as media imperialism or „soft 
power‟ domination which resulted in homogenised cultures around the world. Others minimise 
those influences and link them to processes of cultural hybridisation or heterogenisation. Those 
scholars regard viewers as active audiences who watch content produced in different parts of the 
world and only culturally assimilate those parts which they are identified with. 
 
While the implications of watching foreign content on local cultures are difficult to assess or to 
predict, viewing shares give us a more precise indication of the kind of content that attracted more 
the attention of the viewers. For instance, according to IP Network (2011: 176, 593), in France the 
most viewed series in 2010 was The Mentalist produced in the USA, and in the UK the film with the 
highest audience share was also an American film, Shrek III (Dreamworks, 2010). However, in all 
three countries studied national content still attracts considerable audiences. In general, the 
biggest audiences in the UK, France and Brazil, as this comparative media research will show, are 




programmes in all categories, nineteen and eleven programmes respectively, were nationally 
produced programmes (IP Network, 2011: 174, 572). In the same year in the Brazilian city of Sao 
Paulo, the list of the „Top 5‟ programmes (in one ordinary week) of the seven major broadcasters 
included only two imported programmes (Ibope, 2012). These examples indicate that although 
imported content is extensively offered by international and national broadcasters and, 
undoubtedly, is widely watched, national content in general still attracts the highest viewing shares. 
However, the competition with global media players, much increased by digitalisation and digital 
convergence, poses new economic challenges for national producers, broadcasters and 
distributors. 
 
To address those challenges, the aim of this thesis is to look at the current media scenario of the 
selected case studies - UK, France and Brazil – and to discuss how the production and distribution 
of national content may be steered by media policy during times of increased competition through 
digital convergence. With that focus in mind, this thesis will assess if the legal frameworks are 
adequately adjusted for the support of today‟s national audiovisual industries and market forces. 
 
This thesis is based on two main assumptions. Firstly, because audiovisual content contributes to 
the generation of culture and expresses and consolidates socio-cultural values, whilst its industry 
supply chain constitute an important economic activity, optimal cultural policy should balance both 
socio-cultural and industrial objectives. Secondly, regulation is a significant steering force that 
shapes the production and distribution of audiovisual content. Certainly there are other forces that 
contribute to a lesser or higher degree, steering those industries in different directions. However, 
regulation certainly sets the legal boundaries in which those industries can operate. 
 
This investigation will help to explore general and specific questions related to the socio-cultural 
objectives of communication services and will identify the implications of audiovisual policies for the 
market. Questions addressed will include: Does the legal framework promote the generation of 
national audiovisual production? Can regulation alter the global pressure and increase the 
competitiveness of national content? Is national legislation still effective for fostering national 




broadcasting regulation, still make sense in an era of plenty, where audiences decide what to 
watch, where and when? Are national content, culture and identities under „threat‟ with digital 
convergence and transnational media? Is regulation based on national quotas adequate to regulate 
media provision in times of digital convergence? Should national content be promoted, and if so 
why? What are the constraints, similarities and differences of the selected countries? The details of 
how I conducted this investigation and answered those questions will be provided in the 
methodological chapter. At this point I wish to present the rationale for the selected case 
studies. 
 
In the diversity of media scenarios, the UK, France and Brazil make an interesting set of countries 
as they may be regarded as having opposite approaches to audiovisual policy. As Collins (2002: 
43-4) notes about France and Britain: 
France and the UK represent, in their purest forms, the opposed visions and forces that 
have shaped EU [(European Union)] audiovisual policy...It would be too neat to state that 
the UK has been the principal proponent of liberalisation and France the principal 
opponent, not least because, for the most part, the UK’s European audiovisual policy has 
been conspicuous by its absence! Better to state that the UK has gone with the flow of the 
policies of integration and liberalisation which have been uppermost in recent EU history, 
whereas France has perceived such policies to be, at best, insufficient and at worst 
actively hostile to European interests.... 
... In contrast to the UK, France has a substantial deficit in its audiovisual trade balance. 
France invests far greater importance in the furtherance of European political union than 
does the UK ... Moreover, France unlike the UK, has characteristically seen US film and 
television programmes as so much cultural pollution. 
 
The choice of Brazil as the third case study was certainly determined by my personal and 
professional experience. My permanent residence is in Brazil where I work as a policy specialist for 
the Camara dos Deputados (the lower house of the Brazilian National Congress). However, there 
are other reasons that justify the Brazilian choice. As opposed to the selected European countries, 
Brazil is a country that, until recently, did not enforce content quotas in any form of broadcasting 
(Haje, 2009; Valente, 2008a). In fact as Sinclair (1999: 75) remarks, the main reason behind the 
major broadcaster, Rede Globo, producing most of their programming in-house is not because of 
legal impositions but due to their monolithic vertical integration. In this sense, Brazil can be 
regarded as an almost „green field‟ for any kind of policy which intends to promote national content 
in broadcasting services. As such, in a future regulatory development, Brazil could also benefit 





Another point that makes the group suitable for comparison is the size of their economy. As the 







 position in regard to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) according to the raking of 
the World Bank),
1
 it seems reasonable that policies and their effects might be comparable. 
 
Finally, language is an interesting point of comparison. As France and Brazil are not English 
speakers, their production figures can be compared against the UK, whose native language, 
English, is regarded as universal or, at least, more easily exportable. Actually, the UK‟s audiovisual 
exports is second to the USA (Chalaby, 2010; Collins, 2002: 49; Haynes, 2005: 85) which makes 
the comparison more significant. 
 
After having justified the theme of this thesis and the selected case studies I would now like to turn 
to how I conducted this research. In order to analyse the impact of the policies that introduced 
liberalisation, digitalisation and digital convergence on the promotion and the protection of national 
content I used a three-step method. In the first step I analysed the socio-cultural goals of 
broadcasting services as enacted by the regulations of each case study. As the preceding literature 
review will reveal, broadcasting services have significant socio-cultural impact on the society. 
Therefore, policymakers believe it is important to dictate certain aims and objectives to be followed 
by the various agents of the audiovisual industries. By performing this first step I identified those 
aims and the directions in which governments have steered the various communication services 
between the 1980s and the first decade of the new millennium. The second step analysed the 
obligations and incentives provided by the regulation in order to promote the production, scheduling 
and distribution of national content. Those obligations and incentives I will call „push-pull‟ 
regulations. The final third step consists of a market analysis. Using published reports and other 
secondary data I assessed how the activities involved in the production, broadcasting and 
distribution of content, as well as audiences‟ shares and preferences, have developed in recent 
times. This dual evaluation of regulation and market will indicate which regulations were effective in 
the fostering of national content. Moreover, the research model will also reveal which types of 
                                                          
1
 Worldbank‟s online database available at 




content and broadcasting services were induced by the regulatory framework and what kind of 
socio-cultural values are being fostered by policymakers. 
 
There are various contributions to knowledge as an outcome of this research. Firstly, I offer a 
new methodological approach, divided into three steps of analysis (regulatory goals, tools and 
market impact), for studying communication regulation and its impact on industry. Secondly, the 
usage of this new theoretical-conceptual method of analysis applied specifically to the subject of 
the promotion of national content added to knowledge new understandings of the implications and 
mechanisms of media regulation. The third contribution is regulatory, as in this study I have 
identified and constructed a regulatory toolkit to be used for the promotion of national audiovisual 
industries in times of digital convergence. The final contribution is informative, as little work has 
compared the developments in broadcasting in Europe to those in Brazil. Those four contributions 
should be useful to academics, policymakers and governments when designing and identifying 
policies outcomes and trends in the audiovisual sector in the near future. 
 
Concluding this introduction I would like to outline how this thesis is arranged. The work is divided 
into two parts. The first part, consisting of four chapters, contains three contextualisation chapters 
and the methodology chapter. Chapter 1 is dedicated to the academic discussions on the socio-
cultural implications of broadcasting. The themes of national culture and identity, the public sphere, 
the importance of PSBs and how the latter were affected by liberalisation and digitalisation are 
discussed here. Chapter 2 is focused on scholars‟ perceptions of the technological and economic 
implications related to the audiovisual industries in recent times, particularly digital convergence 
and the new digital audiovisual industry supply chain. Chapter 3 debates the regulatory changes of 
broadcasting services from the liberalisation of the 1980s up to the present, as viewed by 
researchers. The political changes that led to liberalise broadcasting and the national counter-
forces that reacted to that neo-liberal de-regulation (or re-regulation) are here examined. Chapter 4 
details the adopted methodology and the sources of information that were used for the research of 





Part Two of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of the three case studies of the UK, France and 
Brazil. It is also composed of four chapters. Chapter 5 offers an overview of the developments of 
the different existing communication services in the selected countries and analyses the 
predominant forces that have shaped the regulatory path after the liberalisation of the 1980s. 
Chapter 6 comprises the first step of the applied method of this research, the analysis of the socio-
cultural aims and objectives of broadcasting as expressed in regulation. Chapter 7 concentrates on 
the second step of the investigation, the analysis of the „push-pull‟ regulations. This step scrutinises 
the concrete rules and tools used for regulating broadcasting services (such as rules of access, 
ownership and broadcasting rights) and how the production and distribution of national content is 
defined, funded and financially incentivised by regulation, the „pull‟ factors. As far as content 
obligations are concerned, during this step I also assess the main „push‟ factors, the general quota 
requirements and specific content obligations, as stated in the licenses of each main terrestrial 
broadcaster. As a result of those two initial steps, the investigation of how these concepts and tools 
have been addressed in legislation over time also indicates which path is more strongly pursued by 
each country‟s policymakers, whether „socio-culturalist‟ or „industrialist‟. Chapter 8 centres on the 
third step, and analyses the target of these regulations: the impact on the market. By assessing 
various aspects of production (independent producers, films and television programmes), 
broadcasting and distribution I evaluate how those markets have developed in recent times whilst, 
at the same time, analyse the impact of the corresponding regulation. Furthermore, included in the 
market analysis is the assessment of audiences‟ preferences and habits in recent times of digital 
convergence. 
 
After the second part, the Conclusion reflects on the main findings of the policy analysis and 
highlights four policy recommendations. The regulatory toolkit for the promotion of national content 
is contained in Annex 1. 
 
After this general overview of the thesis, I will now move on to the first chapter of Part One, the 

























CHAPTER I                                                                                                                         
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF BROADCASTING 
 
 
Cultivated from Nature by human labour, culture is the 
domain of human life, produced by the hand of Man 
from the planet‟s limited wealth. Cultivation requires 
constantly returning to the land to honour the natural 
matrix of what we do… Culture is freedom, innovation 
and disruption, but also regulation and tradition, the 
sediments that constitute who we are in the deep, 
tectonic movements of what it is to be human 





As described in the introduction to this thesis, the main objective of this comparative media 
research is to analyse how the policies introduced during the liberalisation of the 1980s, the 
digitalisation of the 1990s and the current times of digital convergence influence the production and 
distribution of nationally produced content.
2
 For that understanding it is important to grasp 
beforehand the cultural and social importance of broadcasting and other new audiovisual media 
services. That is the objective of this first chapter. 
 
In section 1.2 I will explore how media researchers regard the relationship between broadcasting 
services, the production of culture and the formation of national identities. In sections 1.3 to 1.5 I 
will summarise the academic debate around the question whether the liberalisation and 
globalisation of the media „threatens‟ national cultures. Also, I will look at how transnational and 
local broadcasters have adapted their content in a liberalised and competitive broadcasting 
                                                          
2
 Content in this thesis refers to any kind of audiovisual production that can be watched on a television set or 
electronic device: films originally produced for the cinema, series, sport events, news, video clips, etc.   
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scenario. In section 1.6 I will look at the debates on the creation of a mediated public sphere and 
the usage of public service broadcasting as a democratic tool for public deliberation and for the 
creation and distribution of national culture. Scholars‟ perceptions of the effects of the liberalisation 
of broadcasting and the introduction of multichannel systems on citizenry and democracy will be 
addressed in section 1.7. Before the conclusion, in section 1.8 I will explore the academic works 
that have focused on how the internet and digital convergence contribute towards the production of 




1.2 Television, national culture and identities 
When in 1936 the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) started the world‟s first regular television 
service in London with 20,000 receivers (BBC, 2009b), perhaps no one thought that less than one 
century later, virtually all households in the country would have access to television. Perhaps even 
more unthinkable would have been the availability of hundreds of channels enabled by 
digitalisation. Less than one century after the „father‟ of the BBC, John Reith, considered television 
as an “awful snare” (ibid), 90% of British households have access to multichannel television 
(Ofcom, 2009a: 120). Also when during the Second World War the first French channel was 
launched in occupied Paris (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 35), not many people would have expected 
that it would become a popular media in that country. Later, when Assis Chateaubriand in 1950 
imported hundreds of TV sets for his initial commercial broadcast in Sao Paulo he may not have 
imagined that currently Brazil would have the same levels of TV penetration as Britain (97% 
compared to 99% for the latter) (Ofcom, 2009b: 47; Vincent, 2003: 106). 
 
Nonetheless, since its beginnings, broadcasting was identified as an important vehicle of 
communication and became a matter of national policy, arguably, when governments realised the 
potentially high impact of messages reaching every household at the same time. The evolution 
from audio to audiovisual medium, or from radio to television services, only increased the 
importance of broadcasting. Lull (2000: 53) explains this importance by highlighting the “legitimacy 
effect” of television: citizens are more likely to accept information and points of view if diffused by 
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strong and hegemonic institutions. There are many examples where television was used as a 
national integration vehicle, creating a sense of shared culture and promoting national values and 
policies. In the case of South Korea and Italy television was used to consolidate the language 
(Oren & Petro, 2004: 96-100). In Brazil the military government of 1964 realised that through 
television the continental country could be integrated, creating a strong national identity and 
consumer economy, besides controlling political information (Newcomb, 2004: 312). Even in the 
UK the PSB (Public Service Broadcasting) is in tune with some of government‟s concerns. For 
instance, in recent times, reality shows broadcast by the BBC address public health and other 
social issues fitting those programmes within an overall governmental agenda (Ferguson, 2010). 
 
These short examples indicate how television has been used in the past (and still is used) as a tool 
for integrating and shaping national culture and identities. As Morley and Robins (1995: 68) have 
pointed out, broadcasters are considered central agents of national culture. They provide a shared 
past and present by mobilising popular involvement in the calendar of national life (ibid: 65). 
 
If television plays a substantial role by enabling shared experiences, at this point its relationship 
with culture should be addressed in some more detail. Culture, we should note, is a polysemic term 
hard to define. The Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
recognised the multifaceted characteristic of culture when proclaiming the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity: 
... culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it 
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, 
value systems, traditions and beliefs, ... (Unesco, 2001: 1). 
 
Although it is possible to identify the contribution of media towards culture as defined in this 
Declaration, perhaps a more helpful definition for this thesis would be one nurtured from a 
sociological perspective. From this angle, culture may be defined as “a whole way of life” (Hall cited 
in Barker, 1999: 11). In this sense, „a way of life‟ comprises, as Hall also describes “the actual 
grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs of any specific society” 
(ibid). The impact of broadcasting on culture can be clearly identified when Barker himself refers to 
culture as a collective idea of shared meanings and experiences. Combining this definition with 
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Parekh‟s (1997: 165), which states that culture is the “beliefs and practices regulating all or major 
areas of human life”, the contribution of broadcasting to the creation and maintenance of culture 
can be extended to any other form of watching audiovisual content. 
 
Whilst the culture of a nation can be considered as the overall sum of its characteristics, as 
highlighted by Watson and Hill (2003: 71), including “language, history, traditions, climate, 
geography, arts, social, economic and political norms, and its system of values”, for Benedict 
Anderson (1991), nationalism is a cultural artefact constantly developed over time which delivers 
emotional legitimacy. In Anderson‟s concept of the “imagined communities”, the members of a 
nation, limited in space, share a communion of culture or horizontal comradeship, even without 
knowing their fellow-members (ibid: 6-7). Although his work was focused on the role of the print 
media in achieving this and mainly based on European examples, the author recognises the role of 
the institutionalised usage of the mass media in instilling nationalist ideology and promoting 
genuine and popular nationalist enthusiasm (ibid: 113-114). In the case of Brazil and other Latin 
American countries Morley (2002: 255), Lash and Lury (2007: 157) and others remark that the 
process of constructing an „imagined community‟ involves primarily broadcasting. The importance 
of the media, and in particular of broadcasting, for the crystallisation of shared cultural aspects and 
of the sense of belonging was also identified by Cannadine (1983: 158) and Hobsbawm (1983: 
263). 
 
Morley and Robins (1995: 26-7), while acknowledging the legitimating effect of the media, 
proposed the “reimagined communities” concept. They recognised that as media became global 
the formation of meaningful communities and social identities became more complex. Culture is 
thought as being under a process of transformation subject to global forces (ibid: 37). In this 
globalised world, Morley and Robins accept the force of audiovisual images in changing the way 
society perceives the spaces and places of its own. Additionally, while Morley and Robins consider 
that identities and bonding sentiments are affected by transnational networks and communication 
flows, they also recognise the trend towards regionalisation and localisation of media spaces, 
whether enforced by regulation, as in the case of the EU (European Union), or by a growth in 
decentralised programme-making possibilities and the need to appeal to local audiences (ibid: 40-
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41). However, as Sunstein (2001: 97) argues, it has to be recognised that in times of increased 
communication options and fragmented audiences, shared media experiences are less common 
and less powerful than a couple of decades ago. Scriven and Roberts (2003: 2-4, 7) argue that as 
a result of regionalisation and the increase in the number of channels, national identities in Britain 
and France are fragmenting into smaller groups of different identities in a national context. 
Nonetheless, even in recent times there are examples when broadcasting demonstrated its 
attractiveness to wide audiences. In 2009, the final episode of the British show The X Factor was 
watched by 19 million people (Hampp & Hall, 2010). This means that one out of three British 
citizens shared the same cultural experience. 
 
To conclude, those cultures or reimagined communities are formed and shaped by variable and 
interdependent image-spaces relationships which include the watching on television of local, 
adapted and imported content. Broadcasters therefore are contributing to the continuous reshaping 
of societies and identities. This means that in current times of globalised media there is still a wish 
to maintain national identities and culture, consequently corresponding broadcasting policies and 
their enforcement are crucial. Effectively, broadcasting services have been subject to many 
transformations, particularly since the 1980s, with parts of the world liberalising their services. 
During the next section I will explore the debates surrounding the effect of globalisation and the 
liberalisation of broadcasting on local cultures.  
 
 
1.3 The global ‘threat’ to national cultures 
The influence of television on national cultures raises considerable debate in the social-
communication field. One of those discussions relates to the necessity to protect local cultures by 
fostering nationally produced cultural products. However, those concerns can be traced back to the 
period before accelerating globalisation or even before broadcasting. Early last century, when 
Hollywood silent films were a success in Europe, national governments introduced protective 
policies restricting film imports (Ulff-Moller, 1998). In the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
British “half-penny” press was seen as modelled on the American “yellow-press”, introducing some 
unwanted forms of journalism (Hampton, 2004: 123-4). As Lull (2000: 58-9) reminds us, global 
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players and international trade can be traced back to the Roman Empire. The difference that 
makes today‟s globalisation so powerful is that, as the author highlights, for the first time, there are 
efficient communications systems that give corporations real opportunities to instantly manage their 
own interests around the globe. 
 
In the 1960s, when American media started to dominate the global audiovisual market, the cultural 
imperialism thesis was offered for debate by scholars such as Boyd-Barret (1977) and Tunstall 
(1977). In that view, it was thought that the American way of life was being spread worldwide for 
political and economic reasons: weakening communism and promoting American values, brands 
and goods. Behind the promotion of the free-trade of goods and ideas and by supposedly 
spreading and consolidating democracy worldwide, the neo-liberal agenda was also regarded as 
using the entertainment industry at the service of American foreign policy. This non-coercive way of 
appealing to others, coined by Nye (2006: 26) as “soft power”, proved to be effective as American 
media managed to spread around the globe. As a result of that „soft‟-domination, local cultures and 
identities were seen as weakened by the global flow of programmes which was, it was argued, 
leading to a cultural homogenising process (Boyd-Barret, 1977; Tunstall, 1977). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s as the world‟s political scenario changed with the fall of communism, and 
as the western world started to liberalise the airwaves with the advent of satellite TV, the idea of 
cultural imperialism was revisited (Biltereyst, 2001: 83-4). As there were no more political 
ideologies in dispute, the colonising effect of the media, it was noted, was not powered mainly by 
political ideology anymore. It became basically an economic affair. It was the (so-called) 
transnational corporate media imperialism (McChesney, 2004; 2009: 188-200; Schiller, 1992: 15; 
2009: 247-60; Schlesinger, 1991). However, the global flow of audiovisual content that followed the 
liberalisation of broadcasting, in some cases mostly a one way stream during the 1960s, was still 
seen by those scholars as having a homogenising effect on national cultures. Detractors of that 
view, such as Katz and Liebes (1985) or Straubhaar (2009), pondered that, even with massive 
importations of content, viewers do not passively assimilate the imported values. The notion of 
active audiences was suggested. According to these critics, viewers process and interpret the 
content in line with their own social and cultural background. As the meaning of imported content 
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was thus both transformed and incorporated into local culture, global flow could in fact be said to 
be increasing cultural diversity rather than leading to homogenisation. Whether content flows and 
liberalisation are heterogenising or homogenising processes is still debated. More certain is that 
the 1990s brought a trend for global media to adapt their content in order to succeed locally. Also, 
the directions of flows increased. These two trends will be the next topic of discussion. 
 
 
1.4 From globalisation to localisation and the increase in 
programme flows 
As highlighted by various scholars, such as Dutton and Vedel (1992), McChesney and Schiller 
(McChesney, 2009; McChesney & Schiller, 2003), since the 1970s and 1980s market-led 
technological developments, namely cable and satellite television, enabled the multiplication of 
channels. As a consequence, more content was needed to fill the airwaves. In this scenario, as 
Steemers (2004: 25), Waisbord (2004: 360-61) and Rixon (2006: 68) point out, American 
programmes originally appeared as the better alternative in terms of price and available quantity 
and many commercial channels came to fill their schedules with products from  the USA. However, 
as markets developed, local broadcasters recognized that audiences overall preferred local 
programmes and, in a strategy to maintain their viewing shares, restricted the usage of imports 
(Rixon, 2006: 186-7). It has to be noted, however, that this equilibrium was also achieved with the 
aid of regulation. In the case of Europe, by the imposition of national and European content quotas. 
 
Following the traditional local broadcasters, the robust international newcomers to local markets 
brought by liberalisation started to localise their channels too. In order to give to their brands some 
local identity and increase advertisement revenues and local audiences, they started to introduce 
local advertisements, soon changed to the employment of local presenters and then to producing 
entire programmes locally (Rooke, 2009: 6-7). In what Robertson (1994) referred to as a 
“glocalisation” process, global companies tailored their products in order to meet local specificities 
and culture. From one point of view, that practice is regarded as an Americanisation and 
homogenising process, as channels and parts (or even much) of the content were from the USA. 
But from another point of view, because the localisation process and global trading also allowed for 
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local content to be discovered and traded elsewhere, the global presence of international 
programmes could also be interpreted as heterogenising or hybridising cultures (Latour cited in: 
Dijkstra, Geuijen, & de Ruijter, 2001). Liberalisation, thus, may be responsible for two different 
trends: localisation and diversification of content flows. 
 
From the production perspective, these flows implied, in the views of scholars such as Colins, 
Seagrave and Varis (cited in Scott, 2004), a correspondent division of labour. These academics 
proposed in the 1970s that international trade of content followed a division of labour which 
resulted in a form of producing and picking content globally. According to the authors, before 
liberalisation, Britain specialised in drama, Japan in cartoons and Latin-America in telenovelas.
3
 
More recent research from Magder (2009: 150), Esser (2010), Chalaby (2010) and others, points 
out that, currently, Britain is more successful in the format business.
4
 According to Magder (2009: 
150), the UK is the top exporter of formats and British companies account for half of the world 
format‟s trade. Banerjee (2002) increases the number of players in this new division of labour by 
adding Hong-Kong and India as being the main producers of audiovisual content for Chinese and 
Indian audiences and Grant and Wood (2005: 36) add Nigeria for the African continent. However, 
Keane (2006) and Scott (2004) identify this content as peripheral productions and accessories and 
commercially dependant on a Hollywood-based global system. 
 
The rise of non-traditional audiovisual export countries might have changed the predominant (from-
America) direction of flow of programmes for some scholars. More certain is that, although the 
continuing globalisation did not diminish the demand for local content (Waisbord, 2004), 
partnerships were created between local and global companies to produce locally (Biltereyst, 2001: 
96-7). This regulatory and audience demand for local production may partially explain the 
substantial increase in the trade of formats. Instead of importing a finished program, a concept is 
acquired that can be filmed locally. By this practice, audiences are attracted and regulation is 
complied with. This new tendency is another point to be taken into consideration when designing 
audiovisual policies. A locally produced format may count as national content for quota purposes. 
                                                          
3
 Noun usually given to Latin American television serials in the category of soap operas, teleromans and the 
likes. 
4
 Programme formats are concepts, ideas or recipes of a programme that can be produced or adapted in 
different locations. More details on the definition of formats can be found in Moran & Keane (2004). 
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Nevertheless, it introduces exogenous elements into national cultures. Therefore, on one side the 
broadcasting of formats may be regarded as positive for local industry but on the other side brings 
in more exogenous cultural values. That introduction, as Waisbord (2004) maintains, may mean 
that other programmes reflecting genuine aspects of national culture will be under produced (and 
less viewed) as a result. 
 
However, it must be acknowledged that in television there is a two-way relationship between 
broadcasters and viewers. As Rixon (2006: 21-2) reminds us, it is a circular model where culture is 
consumed by audiences and their assimilations and preferences are reassessed by broadcasters 
and producers and new programmes are then fed back to the system. Therefore, audiences also 
have an active role, although not directly, in the selection process of the content actually broadcast 
and hence in the process of the generation of culture and in the formation of a country‟s cultural 
identity. In the next section I will present scholars‟ works that further discuss how audience 
preferences influenced national broadcasters‟ practices after the liberalisation of broadcasting. 
 
 
1.5 The continued strength of national broadcasters 
While the previous section highlighted scholars‟ views on how flows multiplied and how 
international channels had to adapt to produce locally in order to increase their viewing shares, this 
section focuses on how others identified that national broadcasters had a clear advantage by being 
local by nature. Sinclair (2009), for instance, remarks that in the Brazilian case, the main 
commercial broadcaster Rede Globo still accounts for 60% of television audience shares, the same 
overall level achieved by their own produced telenovelas, where each episode is watched by 40 
million viewers (Allen, 2004: 243; La Pastina, 2002). Harvey (2006) noted the same preference for 
the traditional terrestrials and main investors of national content in the UK. Even with the advent of 
digitalisation the traditional national broadcasters, including their spin-off digital channels, are still 
the most watched channels. Although that preference for national channels is backed by viewing 
shares, the appeal of national content is more debatable. 
 
CHAPTER I – SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF BROADCASTING 
19 
 
La Pastina and Straubhaar (2005), while investigating the reasons for the success of a Mexican 
telenovela in Brazil and of a Brazilian one in Italy, claim that it is not only the origin of the content 
which attracts audiences. Instead, it is a more complex set of attraction factors which defines an 
overall cultural proximity relationship with the cultural source. Again, as noted in the previous 
section, in the case of EU viewers the notion of cultural proximity is induced by broadcasting policy 
as there are obligations to broadcast programmes produced by the Member States. By this 
exposure to intra-European content policymakers expected to contribute towards the construction 
of a European awareness and European citizenship (Cosse, 2007: 54-6). However, Esser (2007) 
shows that regional trade in Europe is minimal with the majority of the legally requested content 
being generated locally (with the exception of those small countries that share a language with a 
bigger neighbour). These examples show that legislation alone cannot impose radical changes in 
audience preferences or broadcasters‟ practices. 
 
Regardless of what causes the attraction to certain types of content, scholars acknowledge the fact 
that the leading broadcasters rely on national content. According to Cajueiro (cited in Waisbord, 
2004), Rede Globo produces 80% of its scheduled programmes and the broadcaster reserves 
prime-time almost exclusively for exhibiting its own-produced programmes (and Chapter 8 will 
show the same pattern for the other two countries). Whether national content is aired for its 
commercial appeal, as in the case of Brazil, or through a combination of audience preferences and 
regulation, as in the case of the European main broadcasters, local content is still widely watched 
and continues to play a significant role in the formation of countries‟ cultural identities. As Becker 
and Gonzalez de Bustamante (2009) claim, the importance of television towards culture, politics 
and education have surpassed the influence of traditional institutions such as schools and the 
church. 
 
However, even if the main terrestrial channels still claim the biggest audience shares and 
broadcast a majority of domestically produced content, the introduction of multichannel systems 
and of international channels may be regarded as responsible for a change in the kind of 
programmes broadcast. National broadcasters had to adapt themselves in order to maintain their 
prominence by launching more channels, and thus supporting audience fragmentation (Debrett, 
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2009; Iosifidis, 2005) and by changing the type of content produced and aired in the search of 
audience ratings (Doyle, 2010; Enli, 2008). As a consequence of that search, those broadcasters 
(and especially the PSBs) are subjected to criticism from members of the public, politicians, other 
broadcasters and associations (Maggie Brown, 2010; Iosifidis, 2005). For instance, the BBC Trust 
(the governing body of the BBC) demanded that the BBC should do less “formulaic and derivative” 
programming (BBC Trust, 2010; Sweney, 2010). 
 
This discussion is important to this thesis in order to highlight the fact that, if it is desired that 
broadcasting services, national broadcasters and in particular PSBs are to expand and offer more 
channels, regulation has to not only dictate that the content produced must adhere to broadcasters‟ 
stipulated remit but also has to foresee mechanisms for creating programmes needed and 
demanded by the society. From one hand, governments have to bear in mind that national 
broadcasters must continue to have a certain degree of prominence in the broadcasting scenario 
but the content that they broadcast must also help to sustain national culture and identity. On the 
other hand, policymakers must also acknowledge the fact that „valuable‟ content can also be 
imported. 
 
Due to their historical significance, PSBs, where they exist, are the public agents usually chosen by 
governments and society to represent, foster and develop the interests and views of all segments 
of the society (Price, 1995: 21-39). Therefore, even in times of liberalisation of broadcasting, they 
continue to play a significant socio-cultural role not limited to the promotion of national content. In 
the next section I will explore scholars‟ work which discusses how PSBs are inserted within the 
wider concept of sustaining a public sphere of services and why they still are important agents for 
sustaining cohesive societies. 
 
 
1.6 Public service broadcasters and their role in enhancing the 
public sphere 
According to Habermas (cited in Price, 1995: 24), the ideal public sphere is one zone with no 
restrictions - either from government or from economic forces - for the expression and discussion of 
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opinions and points of view of members of the society. As remarked by Price, this locus, in the 
case of the media, will only be possible if every member of society has equal access to sufficient 
sources of independent information. Diverse opinions and plural sources of information, culture and 
entertainment are fundamental to the construction of a public space which is unbiased and full of 
knowledge (Price, 1995: 35-6). In the ideal space all citizens (the principle of universal service) 
should be able to engage, learn and select their sources of information, or of entertainment, from a 
whole range of opinions (principle of diversity) and produced by different agents (principle of 
plurality). In summary, it should be a place available for conscious choices. In the views of Murdock 
(2000: 55), the public sphere should be composed of a network of public institutions where 
museums, libraries, galleries, schools, universities and media, including broadcasters, will act as 
nodes securing access to the different forms of public culture. Within that conception, PSBs should 
be created and maintained. A public service using, not buildings or places, but air-waves, where 
information, education, and also entertainment, are to be produced and distributed independent 
from political and economic pressures (principle of impartiality) (Debrett, 2010: 16, 186; Iosifidis, 
Steemers, & Wheeler, 2005: 9-10; Murdock, 2000: ibid).  
 
As those values and principles, as Chapman and Kinsey (2009: 11) have noted, are associated 
with the so-called Western democracy, not surprisingly, PSBs were set up in the European 
Community, since the 1950s, and to a lesser degree in the USA (as a national network) since 1969 
(Banerjee & Seneviratne, 2006: 312; Ibarra, 2009)
5
, but also in other democratic countries 
elsewhere. Despite the differences in the characteristics of each country‟s PSB and the diverse 
obligations that were put in place, there is a common denominator of concepts that are shared by 
most of them which is derived from the original „to inform, educate and entertain‟ maxim of the 
„father‟ of the BBC, John Reith (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 55; Newby, 1997: 16; Price, 1995: 35-6). 
Debrett (2010: 19) offers a clear definition of the principles that should guide PSBs: 
universality of coverage; diversity in programming; reflection of national identity 
and culture; the servicing of minority interests; the provision of an impartial news 
and current affairs service free from the influence of business or government; and 
the delivery of innovative, ‘quality’ programming designed to inform, educate and 
entertain. 
 
                                                          
5
 In the USA PSB is named PBS - Public Broadcasting System. 
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Price (1995: 32-3), Harrison and Woods (2007: 29-30) and others argue that when PSBs are 
guided by those principles, they are informing and representing the society as a whole and they 
can be considered as instruments of democracy. In other words, if it is desired that citizens are well 
informed about global, national and local issues, and are to vote and decide about their daily life 
issues, the media system has to be reliable, impartial and diverse (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 29). 
Thus, and in direct relationship with this thesis, when governments propose new regulations for 
broadcasting services and for the production of national content, both the nature of this content and 
the role that PSBs will have for maintaining this independent, plural and diverse mediaspace and 
their contribution to democracy and citizenship should also be taken into consideration. 
 
Broadcasting, and in particular PSBs, should thus be seen as part of a wider public infrastructure 
available for all. However, the maintenance of that public space and the importance of PSBs in 
recent times have changed as a result of embracing different policies and new technologies. During 
the next section I will explore how scholars regard the effects of liberalisation and of the 
introduction of multichannel systems on the society, citizenship and democracy. 
 
 
1.7 Multichannel systems, the (neo)liberal broadcasting approach 
and its effects on citizenry and democracy 
The liberalisation of the airwaves that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s was justified by some 
policy makers as an inevitable consequence of the technological development which allowed for 
more services to be introduced, namely more channels in FTA (free-to-air) and the launch of cable 
and satellite systems (Levy, 1999: 123, 134). Thompson (1997: 48) identifies two different views on 
this process of liberalisation, either it could be seen as a process of de-regulation or of re-
regulation. The author relates the de-regulatory discourse to the, then, new right, championed by 
the Thatcher and Reagan governments, of diminishing regulations and enabling more services to 
be delivered, increasing plurality, diversity and choice in several aspects of life, including 
broadcasting. The re-regulatory discourse, on the other hand, identified a change in the ideology of 
broadcasting. By that latter view, the aim of broadcasting was shifting from being a national and 
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public interest service to a more market oriented one with a smaller public delivery (Iosifidis et al., 
2005: 10), which often required the setting up of regulatory bodies. 
 
At the audience level, one of the consequences of liberalisation and of the substantial rise in 
commercial channels, as Price (1995: 13-5) remarks, was the promotion of the culture of 
consumption. This overexposure to commercial media gave rise to concerns of new generations 
becoming more materialistic or consumerist, as found by Chia (2010) in Singapore for instance. 
Some scholars identify the profusion of new media channels with a wider process of 
“marketisation” of cultural activities, where private companies are increasing their role in society 
(Iosifidis, 2008; Murdock, 2000) and citizens are increasingly targeted as consumers (Bardoel & 
D'Haenens, 2008; Born & Prosser, 2001; Doyle & Vick, 2005). 
 
This consumer culture, as Tomlinson (1990: 29) observes, prioritizes individualism over 
collectivism. Therefore, television, which from its beginning had been an influential cultural force, 
originally controlled and regulated by the state, would continue to re-configure national identities 
but in a different way. After liberalisation and digitalisation, this reconfiguration is continuing not 
only with the aid of one or two publicly owned channels but with hundreds of commercial channels. 
 
The increase in the number of channels, notably of commercial media, affects not only viewing 
behaviour but, some may argue, could have deeper effects on society and on political systems. As 
remarked by Price (1995: 38-9), global media content is based on drama and other neutral and 
apolitical fictional genres that can easily be sold and assimilated anywhere. Not contributing to 
informing citizens to the same extent PSBs do, commercial broadcasting can be regarded as 
detrimental to democracy (ibid: 27-8). In fact, as Price puts it, global media, ironically, “may be 
welcomed by authoritarian regimes precisely because it erodes the domestic public sphere” (ibid: 
38). In the same vein Harvey and Tongue (2004) consider that the scheduling practices of 
multichannel providers - as they displace news, current affairs and serious factual programming to 
other less viewed channels - contribute negatively to democracy and citizenry. These views are 
contrary to those developed in the 1950s and 1960s by scholars such as Pye (cited in McMillin, 
2007: 29-30), who believed that promoting free flow and removing barriers would be good for the 
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promotion of democracy and for economical growth, especially in developing countries. But nearly 
fifty years after those beliefs were expressed, McChesney (2009) details the relationship between 
News Corp (owner of the satellite paytv platform Sky) and the totalitarian Chinese government, 
which allowed the company to operate in the country in exchange for delivering apolitical content. 
The Chinese example may suggest that Price‟s overall point-of-view is more correct. 
 
Critics have also pointed out that in a democracy where new channels can be easily set up, the 
increased availability of information and entertainment does not necessarily mean either diversity in 
terms of content and ideas, plurality in terms of ownership, or impartiality in terms of news 
coverage (Baker, 2007). As new channels are being created for the placement of advertisements, 
selling of subscriptions and crowding out competitors, commercial channels will only broadcast 
content that is successful with a large audience or that attracts a particular niche that advertisers 
and paying consumers are looking for (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 24-6). Being very frank in this 
approach, Arnold Becker, a senior executive of the American broadcaster CBS stated: 
I’m not interested in culture. I’m not interested in pro-social values, I have only one 
interest. That’s whether people watch the program (cited in Gitlin, 2000: 31). 
 
In this commercial model, where market forces dictate what is going to be broadcast, television is 
seen as no different to the other sectors of the economy. Using the famous quote from the FCC 
(Federal Communications Commission) chairman, Mark Fowler, in 1983, television is regarded as 
“just a toaster with pictures” (cited in Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 27). Citizens are viewed only as 
consumers and television does not have any other function than to connect products to buyers. As 
Croteau (ibid) notes, this view implies a distorted portrayal of society. If media is financed by 
advertisers, media products are primarily produced to attract advertisers as funders. Therefore, if 
there is a certain group within the society that is not targeted by advertisers, they will not find 
programmes that respond to their cultural needs. The channels will not address certain segments 
of the audience, or respond to certain public interests such as diversity. With the other system, the 
subscription model, where users pay to have access to content, the service is not universal by 
definition and obviously only those sectors of society with economic means may gain access to 
certain kind of information and cultural elements. In an extreme hypothetical case, if media is open 
to subscription services only, entire segments of the population will have no access at all to 
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information deemed vital for living in a society. Broadcasting policies have to take into 
consideration that certain cultural elements are vital for sustaining a cohesive society and that, in 
relation to this thesis, the broadcasting of nationally produced content should not be subject to a 
„media divide‟ between the haves and have-nots. 
 
The favouring of particular content due to commercial interests or, alternatively, internal censorship 
can also occur due to conflicts of interest between different companies of the same media group. 
As media is highly consolidated (the result of a continuous process of mergers and acquisitions as 
will be discussed in Chapter 2) and mainly under the control of a few global groups (McChesney, 
2009; McChesney & Schiller, 2003), the output has to respond to the market and to the 
interdependent companies of the conglomerate (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 169-89). Because of 
those interests, it is reasonable to infer that undesired (for corporations) and less popular content, 
which achieves less advertising revenue, are likely to disappear from the media. Moreover, as 
noted by Grant and Wood (2005: 51) the pursuit of maximizing profit over audience sizes “can 
easily produce the anomaly of a less popular program airing in place of a more-popular one.” The 
discourse where the market, or commercial broadcasters, will supply all sorts of content is then 
challenged. If media is commercially driven, viewers will have the option to choose between 
profitable programmes only. This is where the market model fails (Albarran, Chan-Olmsted, & 
Wirth, 2006: 681). If on the other hand media is somehow regulated in such a way that the whole 
public is represented, and programmes are not only made with commercial concerns, then 
audiences are also addressed as citizens and broadcasting is delivered as a public service 
contributing to democracy and citizenry. 
 
Acknowledging this market failure, in order to reconstruct a more cohesive society, that some may 
argue has deteriorated as a result of the liberalisation process, new broadcasting policies could be 
more focused on the promotion of values connected to citizenship. The legal framework should not 
only be concerned with increasing competition in the hope that commercial broadcasting will supply 
suitable content „somewhere in the dial‟. At this point I would like to clarify that entertainment and 
commercial media also are important parts of social activity and, therefore, I am not claiming that to 
broadcast entertainment is negative for the public interest, or that nothing can be learned from it. 




Overall, we should note that the process of introducing commercial channels and multichannel 
systems does not only have negative effects on citizenship and democracy. Liberalisation also 
permitted the rapid incorporation of technological developments into citizens‟ everyday lives with 
potentially positive effects for the society as well. Those technological changes increased the 
connectivity between broadcasting and telecommunication services, expanding the boundaries of 
media and the reach of information.
 
Moreover, that connectivity implies that broadcasters can 
interact with users by using other services diverting users from public services, and potentially from 
national content. As a consequence and in connection with the objective of this thesis, the design 
of media policies should take into consideration that the promotion of nationally produced content 
should not only be restricted to traditional broadcasting services. Issues such as advertising and 
product placement may be enhanced by interactivity, jeopardising the effectiveness of existing or 
future regulation designed for traditional television services only. 
 
Of the new platforms available for accessing audiovisual products, the internet, because of its 
increasing popularity, could perhaps be regarded as the most important. How this new media and 
the process of digital convergence are challenging the production of national culture, and their 
potentiality as important contributors towards national culture and a vibrant public sphere, will be 
examined during the next section. 
 
 
1.8  The effects of the internet and digital convergence on culture 
and the public sphere 
In the age of digital technologies and as „digital generations‟ and the so-called active users become 
the majority, it is undeniable that media will be consumed differently and „broad‟casting (as 
opposed to „narrow‟casting, where only a niche of viewers are interested in a particular content) is 
likely to be less important (Bruns, 2007; Harries, 2002; Hirst & Harrison, 2007: 9-11). Negroponte 
(1995: 169) asserts that “[o]n demand information will dominate digital life. We will ask explicitly 
and implicitly for what we want, when we want it.” However, for some that age is still to come. 
Reports indicate that even in households with personal video recorders, users watch mainly live as 
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opposed to non-linear television (Spanier, 2010).
6
 Barwise (2010), who refers to the false dawn of 
non-linear television as “waiting for Vodo”, claims that in those households, 80% of the viewing 
time is dedicated to watching live TV and the remaining 20% to „catch-up TV‟, i.e. watching missed 
aired programmes. Others like Des Freedman (2010) argue that watching television is simply still a 




It is undeniable that the internet is a powerful medium, as more and more time is spent on it. 
However, Hundley and Shyles (2010) in the USA, and Van Cleemput (2010) in Belgium, found that, 
although new electronic devices and media are displacing old technology from being the sole 
source of entertainment and information, young users still watch television while using multiple 
media. Thus, even with the internet and videogaming competing for attention (70% of youngsters 
use more than one medium at the same time) television still maintains its importance (Pan, 2004). 
In Tokyo and in London, researchers and analysts found that even when youngsters are using 
social networking sites on the internet, they more often than not comment on television content 
(Pennington, 2009; Takahashi, 2010). These findings match perceptions of other researchers who 
point out that new media supplements rather than substitutes the traditional ones 
(Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011: 110-2), despite some clear cases of substitution like in the 
case of newspapers (De Waal & Schoenbach, 2010). 
 
Because of its increasing importance, and as more users watch audiovisual content using the 
internet, the web could be regarded either as supporting national culture or eroding it. The internet 
and user-generated content (UGC) sites, such as Youtube, Myspace or Facebook, enable virtually 
any user (or „viewser‟ or „producer‟) to produce cultural products and distribute them at extremely 
low costs and with relatively simplified technology. This may suggest that the internet is a 
democratic tool contributing towards the diversification of culture. For scholars such as Compaine 
(2006) or Jenkins (2006: 17-24), the usage of the internet as a participatory media, where virtually 
                                                          
6
 According to the author only 15% of television viewing is time-shifted; video-on-demand (VOD) represents 
6% and; on-line viewing only 2%. VOD is often referred to as non-linear TV, a „television-like‟ 
telecommunication service where the user chooses the programme from a catalogue for viewing at her/is 
desired time as opposed to linear television, the traditional model, where the broadcaster sets the 
broadcasting schedule. 
7
 The author cites that, according to Ofcom, only 12% of the online population posts blogs and even less, 9% 
upload videos. 
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any user can be a journalist, an artist or a broadcaster, could also be regarded as a contribution to 
the public sphere. Therefore, media policymakers could rely on the internet as the saviour of 
plurality, diversity and the public space in digital and global media times. Ultimately, the web could 
be regarded as a cultural disseminator platform that could substitute PSBs. Jenkins (2006: 2-4), 
however, recognises that these new opportunities are not equally appropriated by all individuals. 
Corporations and more digital literate users attract more attention than others (ibid). 
 
Van Dijck (2009) is more incisive about the unlikelihood of the empowerment of citizenry by those 
tools. She believes that, as the most popular sites are developed and owned by media giants, the 
internet has limited potential to challenge their economic power or, as she puts it, “wresting power 
from the few” (ibid: 42). Along the same lines, Ritzer, Dean and Jurgenson (2012) believe that 
capitalist interests will soon dominate the “libertarian” “prosumers” that operate on the internet.
8
 
Other authors also claim that, as the internet is highly concentrated in terms of ownership, it 
replicates the same model of commercial broadcast, jeopardising pluralism and diversity and 
weakening the public space (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 256; Howley, 2005; Liu & Chan-Olmsted, 
2002; McChesney, 2000). Highlighting specific content as „spotlight‟, „recommended‟ or „featured‟, 
is a common practice on sites such as Youtube and hides a commercial strategy not transparent 
for users. Kim (2012) is more emphatic about the commercialisation of UGC sites and claims that 
Youtube was transformed, instead, into a PGC (professionally generated content) driven video site. 
According to these views, plurality of creation, and hence of views and opinions, is compromised. 
As Lull (2000: 53) pointed out while citing the case involving Sheryl Crow and Wall-Mart,
9
 
“corporate influence over popular culture should not be underestimated[.]” As currently the internet 
rivals commercial broadcasting in terms of advertising revenues,
10
 there are no clear indications 
that corporate influence will be restrained on the internet. Thus, although new technologies can be 
seen as an additional layer of the public sphere infrastructure, the validity of the internet as a truly 
independent and non commercial media is debatable. 
 
                                                          
8
 Prosumer or produser, as the authors remind, is “one who is both producer and consumer[.]” 
9
 In ‟96 Wall-Mart refused to sell a Sheryl Crow album because of a lyric that criticised the company for 
selling handguns. 
10
 According to the press, in 2007 Google‟s British branch beat ITV, the main British commercial 
broadcaster, in terms of advertising revenues (Sabbagh, 2007). In 2009, also in the UK, the internet overtook 
TV from being the first medium for advertisement expenditure (Sweney, 2009). 
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As new platforms and technologies are developed, there is another characteristic that emerges 
from this digital mediaspace. Jenkins (2006:18-9) points out that users of new media are migratory, 
without loyalty to broadcasters or other traditional media. In a spiralling cause-effect reaction, 
media owners are responding to and stimulating this shifting behaviour by developing new 
channels for the delivery of content and by enabling its flow across different platforms via 
interactive services. Doyle (2010) refers to this “reversioning” of content for new, and usually, 
interconnected platforms as a “360-degrees” approach of commissioning and distributing content (I 
will return to this point in Chapter 2 when discussing distribution windows). Enli (2008) regards this 
continuous interaction mainly as a way of maintaining viewing shares in a segmented and digital 
world. Others, such as Hirst and Harrison (2007: 315-33), see interactivity and the internet as forms 
of increasing revenues, by gaining information about users and increasing commercial surveillance. 
Thus, it may be claimed that the plethora of media options enabled by liberalisation resulted in the 
proliferation of cultural products to be consumed, i.e. not only to be watched, but also to be 
purchased, downloaded and branded, all of which increase consumerism. Moreover, that increase 
represents more competitors to national broadcasters and possibly national culture. However, it 
has to be remarked that multiplatform content was also developed by PSBs, showing that not only 
commercial television may profit from digitalisation. Perhaps one of the most successful examples 
of spawned products in the UK is the BBC TV series Doctor Who, which generated interactive 
adventures, webcasts, online games and podcasts (Perryman, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, digital convergence implies that national broadcasters and national producers, 
including PSBs, have a wider scope of products to produce, distribute and finance in order to be 
competitive and justify their existence in an era of audience fragmentation and media abundance. 
Thus, the arrival of digital convergence must be taken into consideration when national 
governments are designing their policies for broadcasting. If nationally produced content is to be 
fostered, broadcasting, and PSBs, should be regarded as part of a more complex mediaspace 
where content crosses platforms. Therefore, digital convergence raises some other questions: 
What kind of cultural products are we subjected to and which get neglected? How are national 
cultures and identities developing in this new world where global media companies are offering 
their cultural products side by side with non commercial national broadcasters, the PSBs? How do 
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the new platforms and digital convergence affect the production and distribution of nationally 
produced content? As this thesis unfolds, these interrogations will be addressed, and the reader 
will have a comprehensive understanding of the various aspects that are involved in the promotion 




During this chapter I have summarised academic works that explain why broadcasting is (still) 
important not only as a source of entertainment but also as a vehicle whose outcome influences 
and interacts with national cultures and societies. With this discussion, I explored the socio-cultural 
debates about the importance of broadcasting and how they developed in the changing media 
space of the recent times. By drawing on various scholars‟ conclusions I have shown that, besides 
entertaining, the other two Reithian pillars of PSB, to educate and inform, are essential for 
democracy and for supporting a fairer and egalitarian society. The availability of reliable, 
independent, plural and diverse information and culture for all sectors of the society should still be 
considered as vital. However, the liberalisation process of the last decades which occurred in many 
parts of the world in broadcasting services has led global media companies to grow into huge 
corporations present in almost every country. Those companies are trading major blockbusters (as 
already happened in the early days of Hollywood silent films), series, formats, entire channels and 
multichannel systems. They are also offering cultural products that are crossing through different 
media and distribution platforms. As a result, viewers receive more consumer-like audiovisual 
content rather than the traditional kind of programmes delivered by PSB to citizens. The 
discussions have also shown that, because of the, arguably, commercial characteristic of the 
internet, to rely entirely on the web to „wrest power from the few‟ and provide an independent public 
space and diminish consumerism, seems inadequate. 
 
With regards to the internationalisation of broadcasting, some scholars are still debating whether 
this has a homogenising or heterogenising effect on culture and to what extent global media 
conglomerates are dominating the output of broadcasting. Others, such as Harvey (2006), Sinclair 
(2009) and Straubhaar (2009), have argued and revealed figures showing that viewers are still 
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largely attracted to national broadcasters and content. Locally produced content may have 
imported concepts, like in the case of formats, or have been locally developed but influenced by 
foreign strategies and competition. Nevertheless, national content still has to be regarded as a 
contributor and an important shaper of local culture. Because of its importance many scholars, 
including Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1963: 50) and Croteau and Hoynes (2006: 65-71), have 
argued that broadcasting has always been, and maybe will in the foreseeable future, be an object 
of regulation. As Price (1995: 224) noted that broadcasting is the most invasive media, it is 
justifiable that national identities and socio-cultural values should be part of the main aims and 
objectives of the broadcasting regulation. 
 
Finally, the discussions of this chapter have revealed that the concepts of diversity, plurality, 
democracy, citizenry and cultural relevance may be regarded as important descriptors of the socio-
cultural aims and objectives of broadcasting services. As such, those five concepts will form the 
basis of my comparative research into national content and the socio-cultural aspects of 
broadcasting as enacted by the regulators of my case studies. Before detailing these five concepts 
in the methodology chapter, during the next chapter I will focus on the technological and economic 
aspects of the new phenomena of digital convergence and how they affect the production and 






CHAPTER II                                                                                                               
RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE DIGITAL AUDIOVISUAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 
While the Americans might need such a daft thing, Britain has 
plenty of small boys to run around with messages 
The Postmaster General 
 commenting on Bell‟s recent invention: the 
telephone 




The transformation of TV programmes or films to computer-like files, as enabled by digitalisation, 
means that this content can now be transmitted through telecommunication networks and be 
watched on innumerable devices other that the traditional television set. Alternatively, television 
sets can be used interactively and, in conjunction with telecommunication services, be used for 
other purposes than watching television. Digitalisation has thus added new instant and 
simultaneous circulation opportunities for audiovisual content around the globe whilst, at the same 
time, enabled the audiovisual industry to generate additional revenues in interconnected platforms. 
The understanding of the new high-impact economic and technological dynamics brought by 
digitalisation and digital convergence is crucial for designing media policies that will effectively 
promote the production and distribution of national content in current times. 
 
To foster understanding, this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section is devoted 
to the discussion of why the different media have gone digital and the effects of digitalisation on the 
different communication services. The second section concentrates on the debate on how 
CHAPTER II - RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS... 
33 
 
liberalisation and digital convergence have enabled the formation and consolidation of global media 
empires and affected the audiovisual economy both worldwide and nationally. 
 
 
2.2 The digitalisation of television and convergence 
In the times of celluloid, a film had to be physically copied in order to be seen in different cinemas 
at the same time. Television, which in the early beginnings was mostly live, also used tangible 
videotapes in order to broadcast content. Digitalisation changed this physical paradigm. Now 
content is electronic and can be transmitted and replicated elsewhere instantly. Or as Negroponte 
(1995: 163) remarks, in the digital world “the manufacturing of bits could happen anywhere, at any 
time.” Other authors such as Grant and Wood (2005: 46-7) have also noted that, unlike goods that 
need to be manufactured or grown to be consumed, such as cars or food, the physical 
reproducibility of the content is not necessary anymore. For instance, while a car needs a factory, 
personnel and raw materials to be reproduced, a film does not need to be shot again. Identical 
copies can be made with the only additional cost of a supporting media (a DVD disc or other 
storage device). Walter Benjamin, in 1936, described in his work The work of art in the age of its 
technological reproducibility that the industrial age made possible the reproducibility of works 
without the need (and the cost) of an artist. In the Information Age, copying electronic content, 
eliminated, in practical terms, even the reproduction cost (cited in: Doncel, 2010:2). Networks, 
connectivity and electronic files do the reproduction and distribution job almost instantly. In 
consequence, currently, cultural products are accessible through different methods of delivery. Not 
only museums or cinemas but also cable, mobile operators and websites are used for the 
consumption of cultural products and, in particular, audiovisual content. 
 
This phenomenon, in which communication services and networks have an overlapping 
functionality, are highly interconnected and are, to a certain extent, interchangeable, is referred to 
as technological or digital convergence (Pagani, 2003:4-8, 25). With digital convergence, today's 
audiences have a variety of devices to use, whether it is to communicate, to watch or to consume 
different kinds of media. However, digital convergence is not noticed by the end user only. The 
convergence of the formerly highly separated industries of computing, telecommunication 
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(particularly telephony) and broadcasting had also significant impact on all aspects of the 
audiovisual sector (Block, Houseley, Nicholls, & Southwell, 2001: 180; Langham, 1996: 51). In 
order to understand the implications of digital convergence for the production of national content, 
first it is important to understand the driving factors that scholars have identified as leading to the 
digitalisation of broadcasting services. 
 
2.2.1 The digitalisation of satellite, cable and terrestrial 
Digitalisation began in satellite and cable in the mid 1990s, nearly 30 years after the start of those 
services (Grimme, 2002: 235) mainly as a solution for the limited capacity of the analogue 
systems.
11
 As widely acknowledged, the compression of the signals allowed by digitalisation was 
the alternative to increasing the number of channels and revenues of paytv systems (Beacham 
1995 cited in: Huff, 2001: 115). The evolution of the MPEG (Moving Picture Expert Group) digital 
compression technique illustrates how digitalisation supported a multiplication in the number of 
channels. By using the MPEG-2 version, up to ten channels can be transmitted through the air 
using the same amount of spectrum of one single old analogue channel (Fischer, 2010: 3). 
Furthermore, the MPEG-4 upgrade increases that capacity by 70% (Costa & Lucena Junior, 
2008).
12
 Compression may have an upper limit as remarked by Fontaine and Pogorel (2006: 67), 
nevertheless, so far, the continuing evolution of technology is allowing the launching of more 
channels or services consuming fewer resources (Collins, 2002: 148). 
 
Besides the increase in capacity, for some as Ciciora (2004: 71-72), the driving force for the 
digitalisation of cable is considered to be the development of HDTV (High Definition Television).
13
 
According to the author, high definition was appropriated firstly by paytv services as a means to 
increase revenues by offering premium subscription content, more options for pay-per-view and, 
also, VOD. 
 
                                                          
11 
For a better understanding on the technologies involved with the transmission and digitalisation of 
broadcasting services and for a discussion on how digitalisation increased capacity and changed the scarcity 
paradigm inherent to analogue systems see Annex 2. 
12
 See Annex 2 for more information. 
13
 Although for others as, Negroponte (1995: 37-8) HDTV was developed as an evolution for FTA (in fact, as 
explained by Winston (1996: 88), the first developments of HDTV were made for analogue television and 
were conducted by Japanese PSB NHK). 




Free terrestrial broadcasting was the last broadcasting distribution technology to become digital. As 
Starks (2007: 62) explains in his book about the UK‟s digital switchover, while cable and satellite 
providers benefited from digitalisation as a source of additional revenues by offering more and 
better services, terrestrial broadcasting faced several difficulties in their upgrading path. The option 
for multiprogramming and the consequent increase in the number of channels delivered would not 
necessarily be positive for commercial and public broadcasting.
14
 With multiprogramming DTV 
(terrestrial -FTA - digital television) would increase the fragmentation of advertisement resources 
and increase the expenditure devoted to content due to the increased amount of programmes that 
would need to be purchased, or produced in-house, in order to fill the airwaves. In addition, the 
upgrade would represent substantial infra-structure expenditure for broadcasters. Without a clear 
rise in advertisement revenues or in public financing, digitalisation of terrestrial television would not 
be a feasible option. As television was already a mature medium, in terms of consumption and of 
coverage, digitalisation would have a huge impact on all agents involved, from broadcasters to 
viewers (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011: 41-2). As a result, digitalisation of this service 
implied mobilisation of efforts from the industry (transmitter and receiver industries), broadcasters 
and citizens. 
 
Because of the coordination needed, DTV worldwide was led by governmental initiative and 
actively enforced, even by supra-national influences as in the case of the EU (Grimme, 2002: 238-
239; Iosifidis, 2011). Ironically in times of liberalisation and free-market paradigm, as noted by Des 
Freedman (2008: 183), regulators had to adopt an interventionist approach and, as the analogue 
service will eventually be switched-off, oblige every citizen to upgrade in order to continue to 
receive terrestrial television. Even in the USA, where the free-market approach reigns, the FCC 
mandated in 1997 that the ten largest metropolitan areas should be digitally covered by 1999 
(Grimme, 2002:231). During the year 2000s, DTV was rolled-out in several countries, including our 
three case studies. The latest evolution in DTV was the incorporation of HDTV which is already 
taking place in some countries such as in France, New Zealand and Brazil. 
                                                          
14
 Multiprogramming is the carriage of multiple digital channels in the same „space‟ (frequency slot) of one 
analogue channel. That is the principle used to multiply the number of channels in FTA. See Annex 2 for 
more technical details on digitalisation. 




One decade into the new millennium, all three main broadcasting technologies, terrestrial, cable 
and satellite, are digital and are levelled in terms of technical quality. All three can offer HDTV and 
high quality sound. While DTV has the advantage for customers of being mainly a free-to-air 
service,
15
  cable and satellite offer the advantage of having a bigger capacity. Both the latter can 
offer hundreds of channels in comparison to dozens on DTV. As remarked by several scholars, 
including Starks (2007: 23, 80) and Hart (2004:185-6), the increase in the number of channels 
allowed by DTV was one of the objectives envisaged by policymakers in order to offer to viewers 
alternatives to paytv platforms. 
 
One of the consequences of digitalisation and of the adoption of multiprogramming in FTA DTV, 
with direct relation to this thesis, is that more content is needed. Therefore, on the one hand, 
multiprogramming could be adopted by policymakers as a form of inducing competition and 
generating more national content. On the other hand, digitalisation increases the pressure on 
broadcasters‟ finances. In addition to that, digital convergence also implies that content can be 
accessed by other means, diminishing the importance of traditional broadcasters. Different 
telecommunication services, wired or wireless, have also become capable of delivering content 
after digitalisation. These new agents are the focus of the following section. 
 
2.2.2 Telecommunication companies entering audiovisual distribution 
With the digitalisation of services, the major new entrants to broadcasting, or more specifically to 
distributing audiovisual content, are the fixed telephony operators, with some activity of mobile 
operators, especially in the so-called „branded entertainment‟ (Chandra, 2004: 92-3; Grainge, 2012; 
Gruber, 2005: 209; Pauwels & Burgelman, 2003: 64-5; Wang, Tjondrongoro, & Liu, 2007: 310-21). 
At this point it is important to note that the entrance of telecommunication companies into the 
broadcasting field is not a new phenomenon brought by digitalisation but can be traced back to the 
1920s, when the American telephony company AT&T owned broadcasting stations, or even earlier 
on when Western Union (a former telegraph company) had an exclusive commercial agreement 
with Associated Press since the nineteenth century (McChesney, 2004: 35-6; Mott, 2000: 491). It 
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 Nonetheless there are also subscription channels within the DTV platform. 
CHAPTER II - RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS... 
37 
 
seems that telecommunication companies always had appetite for other activities. However, in 
current times digitalisation elevated the integration and instantaneity to a different level, as we will 
see as the chapter develops. 
 
Telephony networks, like broadcasting, also needed to be digitalised for the delivery of audiovisual 
content. The old copper wires were only capable of transmitting at low speed, less than 56 Kbps 
(kilobytes per second), which was unsuitable for video signals (Bhunia, 2006: 70-3). Telephony 
incumbents thus boosted their copper lines adding ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) 
broadband connection in order to increase the speed (or bandwidth) needed (Keen, 1997: 345). 
With that technology, telephony companies could offer bandwidth of more than 1Mbps, being able 
to deliver VOD and IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) services (Jack, 2007: 827). 
 
Wireless operators also became digital, but using different technologies depending on the kind of 
service offered. Mobile operators use different standards depending on the platform and suppliers, 
but all high speed digital technologies capable of delivering audiovisual content are categorised 
under the label of 3G (third generation networks) or newer (Kumar, 2007: 113-6). Other wireless 
technologies are WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), WiFi (commercial 
acronym for wireless local area network) and mobile TV. While WiFi and WiMax are basically 
broadband networks, mobile TV has different alternatives for its operation. In terms of business 
models, signals can be originated by local broadcasters, as in the case of the Nippon-Brazilian 
DTV standard ISDB (Integrated Services Digital Broadcasting) or by a dedicated nation-wide 
mobile TV operator, as in the case of the technology adopted in the USA, MediaFlo (Kumar, 2007: 
4, 400). 
 
All the technologies described above may be used either to create a proprietary network for the 
delivery of audiovisual services, such as a dedicated IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) service, 
and therefore, these telecommunication companies act as broadcasters, or may simply be used for 
delivering a connection point for users to connect to the internet. In the latter case, viewers can 
gain access to audiovisual content from other sources than broadcasters. These new models of 
television viewing are named VOD or non-linear (Scriven & Lecomte, 1999: 131). Content 
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accessed from the internet can be paid for (in which case can be categorised as a broadcasting 
service, see Helberger, 2007: 80; Valcke & Stevens, 2007 for details) or free and, of course, legal 
or illegal.
16
 As a result of those various modes and technologies, several technologies compete for 
the delivery of audiovisual content. Therefore, with regards to this thesis, communication policies 
have to acknowledge that possibility and consider telecommunication and internet-only companies 
as active agents in the audiovisual industry chain and take them into consideration when designing 
audiovisual policies. 
 
All those digital networks can be seen as part of a global infra-structure for the access (from users‟ 
point of view) and delivery (from companies‟ point of view) of content. Currently, industries that 
were born half a century apart from each other are now regarded as intertwined. As remarked by 
Yoffie (1997: 160) telephony, which started in the late 1890s, television, from the late 1930s and 
personal computing, from the 1980s, are currently highly interdependent and interconnected. 
However, the extent of the substitutability or of complementarities between services and devices 
can indicate to which degree digital convergence is a reality for consumers, and how important it is 
for the companies involved (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997: 203-5). It is not the purpose of this thesis 
to comprehensively evaluate digital convergence. However, as the current reality shows us that 
users have a myriad of devices and web sites and dozens of communication services, my interest 
lies in evaluating how the policies that have enabled digitalisation and the multiplication of media 
outlets will affect the production and distribution of national content. In the search for that 
understanding, I will now direct the discussion to how, and to what extent, media and 
telecommunication services are converging in the views of scholars, and how it affects national 
content. 
 
2.2.3 Convergence of services 
The final outcome of digital convergence is hard to predict. As Longstaff (2002: 141) classified, 
visionaries of digital convergence visualise three different outcomes for this process: the creation of 
                                                          
16
 The legal issue is one of the biggest concerns brought by the digitalisation of the media and media 
producers, and rights owners are trying to impose new legislation in order to restrict illegal downloading 
practices. Although this is not a focus of this thesis, it is an aspect of huge debate in several countries with 
the approval of new laws in France in 2009 and in the UK and Ireland in 2010. 
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a „big pipe‟ (one network delivers all services), a „big box‟ (one electronic appliance for all services) 
or a „big company‟ (providing all services and appliances). If the outcome is uncertain, clearer is the 
fact that with the aid of digitalisation, communication networks became multifunctional and 
telecommunication companies started to commercialise various services using the same network 
(Ciciora, 2004: 229; Singh, Raja, & World, 2010: 9-10). This multiple offering of several services by 
the same company is a phenomenon that the industry refers to as technological convergence, 
digital convergence or simply convergence. The commercial jargon moreover refers to those 




The obvious advantage for the operator in offering bundled packages is the immediate increase in 
the ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) when the same user signs to additional services (Shukla & 
Hegde, 2007: 158). For the consumer the palpable benefit is dealing with one communications 
provider only (one bill, call centre, service and so on) and there is also the possibility of being more 
economic. However, the biggest driver for the escalade of converged services is the competition 
allowed by the liberalisation of both telecommunication and broadcasting services (D'Haenens & 
Saeys, 2001: 125). 
 
When digitalisation (and corresponding regulation) enabled cable companies to offer telephony and 
as a result, telephony companies started to lose clients, the latter started to digitalise and to 
increase the speed of their internet connections (leading to broadband) in order to be able to offer 
paytv services as well (Larouche, 2000: 328; Pagani, 2003: 65; Winder, 2001: 78). Satellite 
companies also started to offer telephony by offering tiered unbundled lines (from incumbents) to 
their existing customers (Bachelor, 2010).
18
 New technologies, such as WiMax, PLC (Power Line 
Communication), FTH (Fibre to Home) and 4G (fourth generation network of cell phones),
19
 are 
                                                          
17
 Triple play is when the company offers three services for their customers: fixed or mobile telephony, 
internet and paytv. Quadruple play is when the bundle includes four services, fixed and mobile telephony, 
internet and paytv. 
18
 Unbundling (of the local loop) is a technique (or modality) where a new operator leases the copper line - 
the so-called last mile, from the telephone‟s exchange central to the user‟s premises - from the incumbent and 
offers a telephone line to the customer. The user is still using an incumbent copper line but being customer of 
another (an entrant) telephone company. 
19
 PLC (Power Line Communication) is a technology that enables the transmission of data, and thus 
providing broadband connection through the same power cables that supply electricity to the homes. FTH 
(Fibre to Home) is the usage of fibre optics in the last mile, delivering fibre directly to customers‟ premises 
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constantly being developed and it is reasonable to infer that competition between services will 
remain in the future and that established technologies will continue to be continuously challenged 
by technological evolution. 
 
Despite repeated claims by commercial companies about the arrival of digital convergence, there is 
considerable debate as to what extent that process has become a reality for users and 
broadcasters and how it challenged audiences, businesses models and regulations (see for 
instance Barwise, 2010; Steemers, 1997; Storsul & Syvertsen, 2007; Syvertsen, 2003; Wheeler, 
2004). Chapter 8, providing the market analysis of the case studies, will give some indication of the 
stage of that trend. For now, it is important to highlight the expansion of telecommunication 
operators towards the distribution of audiovisual content. Telecommunication conglomerates and 
paytv operators are allying with content producers in order to offer customers integrated packages. 
Audiovisual producers and traditional broadcasters, on the other hand, are not offering 
telecommunication services as additional offers. This may be explained by two major 
interdependent causes. First, regulation, by limiting the scope of action of PSB (Donders & 
Pauwels, 2008; Enli, 2008; Michalis, 2002; Steemers, 1999; Van den Bulck, 2008), as will be seen 
in more detail in Chapter 3. Secondly, economics. Telecommunication companies are simply 
bigger than broadcasters (D'Haenens & Saeys, 2001: 125; Nihoul, 2004: 381-9), as the market 
review conducted in Chapter 8 will also indicate. 
 
As far as the regulatory restrictions are concerned, it is important to point out that, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the liberalisation of telecommunication and broadcasting follows a global liberal agenda 
of introducing competition into those services. Alongside this tendency occurred the relaxation of 
ownership rules which permitted the creation of vast media conglomerates. As a result, entrant 
telecommunication companies were allowed to deliver virtually any kind of service.
20
 In that sense, 
paytv operators are now telecommunication companies and not only (or mainly) broadcasters. On 
the one hand, the PSBs, the only (purely) broadcasting companies that could have the financial 
strength to compete in the telecommunication sector, were restricted by only being allowed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
which enables very fast broadband connection. 4G is the fourth generation of mobile communication, not a 
commercial service yet and as for 2011 still at the specification stage. 
20
 Entrants are the telecommunication companies that were set up to offer competition to the incumbents, the 
former monopolistic telephone companies. 
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deliver broadcasting and by being prevented from engaging in anything that could be “delivered by 
the market” (Storsul & Syvertsen, 2007). Complaints of other operators, mainly paytv, about the 
BBC‟s Iplayer and project Canvas illustrate those pressures (Humphreys, 2009a; Sweney, 2009)
21
. 
On the other hand, in the UK, paytv operators, due to the „must-carry‟ rules, are able to use PSB 
channels on their distribution platforms, which increase the attractiveness of their packages without 
having to pay for the content.
 22
 Even so they claim it is a burden (Michalis, 2002). PSBs still suffer 
the pressure from paytv operators who aim to reduce the formers‟ importance, as this speech from 
a News Corp (Sky) director demonstrates: 
... The land grab is spear-headed by the BBC. The scale and scope of its current activities 
and future ambitions is chilling.  
Being funded by a universal hypothecated tax, the BBC feels empowered and obliged to 
try and offer something for everyone, even in areas well served by the market... 
We must have a plurality of voices and they must be independent. Yet we have a system 
in which state-sponsored media – the BBC in particular – grow ever more dominant. 
That process has to be reversed. 
If we are to have that state sponsorship at all, then it is fundamental to the health of the 
creative industries, independent production, and professional journalism that it exists on 
a far, far smaller scale (Murdoch, 2009). 
 
The market tendency of offering integrated packages indicates that the provision of audiovisual 
content is key for the expansion of telecommunication companies and increase in profits. 
According to Gascon (2009), in four out of six European countries that he studied, television 
services accounted for the highest revenue shares of bundled packages.
23
 It is reasonable to infer 
that in countries where broadband and telephony are mature services, the incorporation of 
audiovisual content is the obvious route to increase revenues. An example of this tendency is the 
arrival of media giant Vivendi in Brazil which acquired, in 2009, the Brazilian entrant telephony 
company GVT (Sampaio, 2010).
24
 The acquisition was a strategic movement both for the French 
company, which could thus enter a big and expanding economy, and for the Brazilian operator who 
could not offer convergent packages because of lack of access to audiovisual content. 
 
                                                          
21
 Iplayer is a BBC video-stream internet tool that allows the access of content broadcast during the last 
week. Project Canvas is an initiative in collaboration with other companies and broadcasters in order to 
develop Youview, an internet-television standardised platform. 
22
 Must-carry rule is the legal obligation of cable and satellite (the latter to a certain extent) operators to 
distribute local television channels to their customers. For instance, in the UK BBC1 and 2, ITV1, Channel 4 
and Channel 5 have to be offered to all subscribers. 
23
 Germany (94% of the revenues were credited to paytv services), Sweden (79%), France (87%), Austria 
(48%), UK (35%, telephony 36%), Spain (28%, telephony 50%). 
24
 As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, Vivendi is the owner of Canal Plus, the third largest 
broadband provider in France and a major global media group. 
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Thus, digital convergence not only enabled new opportunities for telecommunication companies 
but also blurred the frontiers of formerly different services. Most important for the theme of this 
thesis, national broadcasters, the biggest producers and distributors of national content, now suffer 
the threat not only from global media companies but also from national and international 
telecommunication providers with revenues measured on a different scale. Therefore, if audiovisual 
and telecommunication regulation continues to be pushed towards liberalisation, regulators have to 
take into account those differences in economic power. Consolidation between both spheres could 
jeopardise national production and hamper diversity, pluralism and national identities. 
 
Having exposed how the technological developments were incorporated into a new digital 
mediaspace and the implications this has on national content, in the next section I will explore 
scholars‟ works on how digitalisation has transformed the political economy of the audiovisual 
industry and the strategies developed by media corporations in times of digital convergence. 
 
 
2.3 The political economy of the audiovisual industry 
In order to better understand the debates on the economic implications of digital convergence to 
the audiovisual industry and the production of national content, I will divide this section into four 
parts. First, I will show the discussions on the global consolidation of the media industry and how it 
created conglomerates with considerable economic resources for generating content. Secondly, I 
will explore the different activities of the audiovisual industry and thirdly, the views on how the 
media industry distributes and finances the production of content. Lastly, I will address 
observations on the impact of digitalisation and globalisation on national producers. 
 
2.3.1 Consolidation of the global audiovisual industry  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the 1980s onwards were times of liberalisation for broadcasting. The 
causes of this momentum could be found on the Western coast of the North Atlantic. The neo-
liberal American government led by Reagan, a known former Hollywood actor, nominated several 
business oriented regulators in the regulatory agency FCC (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 71; Kunz, 
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2010). Subsequently, many existing rules were relaxed and eliminated, thus allowing for more 
concentration (a single conglomerate could own more broadcasting channels nationwide and 





As claimed by Kunz (2010), Croteau and Hoynes (2006: 71), Doyle (2002: 90-2) and others, the 
relaxation of the so-called „finsyn‟ rules (according to which broadcasters had to buy content 
produced from independent companies) and ownership regulations, allowed the excessive 
concentration of media services in the USA with consequences worldwide.26 Although the market 
analysis, objective of Chapter 8, will discuss this matter in more detail, it is important at this point to 
highlight one important consequence of that regulatory move. 
 
After the relaxation, American studios and air broadcasters started to merge, resulting in what 
came to be known as the „big-six‟: Time Warner (approximate annual revenues, in 2006, of £24 
billion), Disney/ABC (£18 billion), Viacom/CBS (£15 billion), Twenty Century/Fox/Newscorp (£14 
billion), Bertelsmann (£12 billion) and NBC/Universal (£8.7 billion) (Blumenthal & Goodenough, 
2006: 129-49).
27





As Blumenthal and Goodenough (2006: 126-8) explain, those ventures follow the same common 
formula: a Hollywood studio source for feature films and series, an American broadcasting network, 
                                                          
25
 This control, where the same company owns or has financial interests in different stages of the audiovisual 
industry chain, from production to distribution (and sometimes exhibition) is called vertical integration or 
verticalisation (Turow 2009: 70). 
26
 The „finsyn‟ rules prohibited broadcasters to have financial involvement with the commercialisation of 
content produced by independent companies in other markets, besides the purchase for airing in their own 
network. 
27
 Original figures in US dollars: $42, $31, $26, $24, $20 and $15 billion respectively. I used a $/£ 0.58 
currency conversion rate obtained from www.xe.com website (accessed on 15/02/2011). The list of the top 
global media companies is different in recent times. Sony, for instance, is top on the ranking of global 
revenues since 2007 according to the European Audiovisual Observatory. Please see Chapter 8 for more 
details. 
28
 Put into the perspective of our case studies, the British BBC is financed by £4.6 billion and TF1 (French 
main commercial broadcaster) and Organizacoes Globo (Brazilian main media group and producer of the 
Rede Globo channel) had revenues of £1.8 and 1.7 billion, all in 2006, respectively (TF1, 2007, Sandes, 
2010, Werzbitzki, 2010, LaFarge, 2010: 274, Paoli-Lebaily, 2010). Same sources reported £2.2 billion in 
2008 and £3.1 billion in 2009 for TF1 and Organizacoes Globo respectively. Fluctuations are also due to 
currency exchange rates variation. 
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a paytv network and global presence. Or, as Potter (2012) remarks, those companies own pan-
platforms assuring global consumption of cultural products. This pattern is replicated by other 
transnational media conglomerates such as Vivendi (for other examples see Humphreys, 2009b: 
208; Thussu, 2007b: 90).This consolidation, as discussed in Chapter 1, has obvious consequences 
for media plurality and directly affects the production of national content. In order to better 
understand how this global verticalisation affects the various stages involved with the production 
and distribution of national content, in the next section, I will present how scholars divide the 
different activities of the audiovisual industries. 
 
2.3.2 The television industry chain 
Goldberg (1998: 12-3) suggests dividing the audiovisual industry into five activities: content 
providers; service producers (as broadcasters); network builders; network operators; and access 
applications and site equipment providers. For the purposes of this thesis, however, this 
categorisation is too broad and as I am concerned with the production of content, some parts of 
that chain, such as network builders, suppliers or manufacturers, will be of secondary importance. 
Griffiths (2003: 5) divides the industry into the following categories: ideas, rights and talents; 
programmes; channels; platforms; and viewer. This model is very similar to the one presented by 
Ofcom shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Audiovisual chain in the view of Ofcom (2007b: 7) 
 
content producers 









films, rights, etc. channels service 
users 
revenues 
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As can be seen in Figure 1, viewers (users or subscribers) interact with the last part of the chain as 
they receive the signals from the platform service provider (or distributor). It is the platform 
providers that select and negotiate the rights with the wholesale channel providers in order to 
include the channels in the packages offered to users. Those providers (or broadcasters), in turn, 
negotiate with rights holders and content producers the programmes that will fill the schedule of 
their channels. Programmes may be produced in-house by broadcasters or be bought from 
independent producers. The latter may also produce programmes commissioned by the 
broadcaster. Content producers and rights holders, located at the beginning of the audiovisual 
chain, are sometimes the same company. They produce the audiovisual content and negotiate its 
distribution on the different distribution windows. 
 
At this point it is important to expand on the concept of independent producers. As a general rule, 
producers are independent if broadcasters or major studios do not have financial interests in these 
companies (Turow, 2009: 477). As Ellis (2000: 151-2) remarks, originally, independent producers 
were regarded as small business crusaders, representing socially marginalised voices and 
production companies without editorial interference. This „romantic‟ view has changed though. 
Currently, certain British independent producers have reached the category of „super-indies‟ 
becoming global players who trade their output throughout the world (Chalaby, 2010). Returning 
our analysis to the other segments of the audiovisual chain, there are other providers that play 
important roles in digital platforms. 
 
Griffiths (2003: 60) also includes in the audiovisual vertical chain the EPG (Electronic Programme 
Guide) and interactive services providers. In fact, interactive services and EPGs are a key element 
of control in digital systems. As Starks (2007: 101) recognises, the EPG, both technically advanced 
and user-friendly, was a very important factor for the success of Sky in Britain. For public 
broadcasters the EPG is also important, as an EPG display or format may influence viewers‟ 
decisions (Harvey & Tongue, 2004). The Youview VOD platform under development by British 
main broadcasters is reportedly delayed because of disputes around the functionalities of its EPG 
(Barwise, 2010; Whitfield, 2010). As traditional broadcasters are the main deliverers of national 
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content, policymakers have to take special care to EPGs when designing broadcasting policies in 
order to assure visibility to those broadcasters in digital systems. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis and especially for the designing of an appropriate toolkit for the 
promotion of national content, I will divide the audiovisual chain between producers, broadcasters 
and distributors.
29
 In that sense, vertical integration is referred to as companies having interests in 
all those three stages and horizontal integration is related to the ownership of different media 
outlets (for further discussion on those concepts see Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 100; Turow, 2009: 
209). 
 
Another economic aspect policymakers must take into account is how audiovisual content is 
financed and distributed and how integrated media companies benefit from digitalisation. 
 
2.3.3 Distribution windows and audiovisual financing 
The audiovisual industry has several characteristics that differentiate it from other sectors of the 
economy. Amongst them, the unlimited reproducibility, also a feature of other digital industries, 
enables significant economy of scales for the owners of content distribution rights. Big media 
conglomerates, as they have access to global distribution chains, can amortise the production and 
distribution costs worldwide (W. J. Potter, 2010: 106; Vogel, 2010: 94). As Walter Benjamin already 
remarked in 1936, after sound films had been introduced (2002: 123): 
The technological reproducibility of films is based directly on the technology of their 
production. This not only makes possible the mass dissemination of films in the most 
direct way, but actually enforces it. It does so because the process of producing a film is so 
costly that an individual who could afford to buy a painting, for example, could not afford 
to buy a [master print of a] film. It was calculated in 1927 that, in order to make a profit, a 
major film needed to reach an audience of nine million .... [Sound films] consolidated new 
capital from the electricity industry with that of film. Thus, considered from the outside, 
sound film promoted national interests; but seen from the inside, it helped 
internationalize film production even more than before. 
 
Nearly eighty years later that claim is still valid. The size of the American market, the global 
audiences and the other amortisation possibilities, which I will discuss next, provide big media 
                                                          
29
 For the purposes of this research I include EPG and other interactive services as integrating parts of the 
broadcasting services which are eventually viewed or subscribed by the final user. 
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groups with enormous revenues, reducing the possibilities of independent producers to compete 
(Blum, 2001: 330). National producers that are not allied to alternative distribution chains or that do 
not export their works, instead, must finance production costs with a smaller distribution chain. The 
global circulation of audiovisual products, the need for having content produced locally and the 
naturally consolidating characteristic of this capital intensive industry explain why media 
conglomerates hold interests in virtually all segments of the audiovisual industry. With the rise of 
the internet, the consolidation process also started to include agreements with the new media and 
computing firms (Chambers & Howard, 2006: 364; Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 90). As a result, the 
internet cannot be regarded as a certain haven guaranteeing appropriate distribution for national 
content either (also see Chapter 1). 
 
The enhanced horizontalisation of the media allowed by digitalisation also enabled the creation of a 
wide range of related products that users can access by using different services.
 
Normally explored 
in sequence, these distribution (or exhibition) windows can be resumed, although not exhaustively, 
to those shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Exhibition windows (adapted from Albarran et al., 2006: 483) 
 
The duration of these windows varies. In the case of American productions: from four months for 
cinema exhibition; one to three years for American cable; up to two years for foreign markets and 
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up to six years for broadcasting (Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, & Wang, 2005: 306). The 
revenues generated by those additional exhibition windows are extremely important nowadays. 
Groening (2008) reported that, actually, cinema exhibition is now a non-lucrative window and, that 
the big media corporations generate more revenues from the other outlets. By owning different 
companies, global media achieve significant economies of scale, not available for most of the local 
producers and broadcasters, impacting on the production and distribution costs of content. 
 
Important to this research, this „windows‟ proliferation has also a negative effect for independent 
national content. Brazilian filmmaker „Caca‟ Diegues (2003: 27-8) explains that as more channels 
(and media outlets) demand more films (among other content), a higher number of films produced 
diminishes their screening period in the cinema. He continues that unless they are major hits, films 
are screened in short runs in the cinema achieving 40% of their total revenue from the first week. 
Another strategy that reduces the screening possibilities of independent productions is the „wide 
opening‟, where a large number of screens are used for the launching of blockbusters. According to 
Grant and Wood (2005: 76-8) major studios use this technique for maximising the effect of 
marketing and to catalyse attention, inducing a „herd behaviour‟ in viewers. Independent producers 
do not have the same financial strength. 
 
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to examine comprehensively the market strategies of 
transnational global media conglomerates, in order to understand the extent of the economic power 
that can be exerted by them and the consequences this may have on national production, it is 
worth examining some additional examples on how those companies finance and enhance their 
dominant position. 
 
Another strategy often used today for financing the production of programmes is „branded 
entertainment‟, which includes „product placement‟, where a company or a product is associated 
with a programme less intrusively than with advertisements (Turow, 2009: 647). With „product 
placement‟ a manufacturer finances the production of a programme in order to have their product 
featured on screen, such as in the case of the cereal Kellogg‟s in the American sitcom Seinfeld 
(Castle Rock, 1990-8) and of FedEx in the film Cast Away (20
th
 Century Fox, 2000) (ibid: 199). 
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Because of the vast distribution power of big media groups, it is more likely that manufacturers 
prefer those companies to place their products, leaving smaller producers with smaller-sized 
advertisers to increase their production budget. 
 
If global media companies developed the exhibition windows scheme to exploit their productions to 
the maximum, and often use „product placement‟ to increase revenues, they also use the so-called 
„Kellogg‟s strategy‟ in order to impose their own channels and diminish competition. Griffiths (2003: 
51) explains that this tactic was initially used by music channel MTV and consists of launching 
more and more specific music channels to keep rivals out of the music territory.  
 
Furthermore, paytv distributors incorporated what journalist and writer Chris Anderson described as 
the „long tail‟ concept which he synthesised in the following phrase in his manifesto The Long Tail 
(2004): 
Forget squeezing millions from a few megahits at the top of the charts. The future of 
entertainment is in the millions of niche markets at the shallow end of the bit stream. 
 
By that concept, several specific-themed channels are created, each of them viewed by small 
audiences. But, in total, the „long tail‟ of channels achieves a significant market share comparable 
to those of individual main channels. In addition, by targeting nearly all audiences, distributors 
increase the attractiveness of packages. This approach may be regarded as stimulating audiences‟ 
fragmentation and favouring „narrow‟casting (Medoff & Kaye, 2010: 87). One consequence of this 
multiplication of the number of channels is the increased demand that they create for the 
production of more content, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
In summary, as a result of these various financing techniques, audiovisual products owned and 
well exploited by media giants can be commercialised at a fraction of the production cost of an 
independently produced film or television programme. As an example, Diegues (2003: 31) claims 
that, in Brazil, American films are acquired by broadcasters at values as low as 3% of the average 
cost of a Brazilian production. This explains why feature films produced by media giants can cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars to produce while the biggest national hits produced by smaller and 
local groups have only a fraction of those budgets. De Vinck and Pauwels (2008: 291) exemplify 
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those discrepancies by showing that while the average film production cost of a US major was 
US$63m, those from the UK and France were US$13m and US$23m, respectively. During the next 
section I will present the academic works that further delve into the impact of global media on 
national content producers. 
 
 
2.3.4 Global media and national production in times of digitalisation 
The different financing and commercialising techniques enhanced by digital convergence may 
represent a challenge for the competitiveness of national producers. However, it should also be 
noted that the size of the internal market is also important for achieving a well developed national 
audiovisual industry. This fact was noticed before digital convergence and even before 
liberalisation. Nordenstreng and Varis (1974: 54), while conducting a report to Unesco, analysed 
the flows of content in the television industry and arrived at this surprisingly still fresh conclusion: 
It can be said that, in purely statistical terms, almost half of the self-sufficiency in 
programming is explained by three factors: population size, number of TV sets 
per 1000 inhabitants, and exports' share of the GNP (in this order of importance). 
The more population, the more TV sets and the less the share of exports in the 
GNP, the more self-supporting a country tends to be in its TV activity. 
 
The logic beneath this economic analysis still remains the same in times of digital convergence. 
The number of TV sets (now the number of electronic devices capable to access content) and the 
relative number of imports (in comparison with national production) still indicates the size of the 
internal consumer market. Therefore the size of national audiences, advertising market and 
financing availability for national producers still determines the vitality of each country‟s national 
production. This reality remains unchanged in times of digitalisation. As the academic Peter Grant 
claimed in a public hearing at the House of Lords (2010), only the USA has an internal market that 
can support the production of high cost drama. In his view, in a country with a population of over 
three hundred million people, American producers can rely on the internal market and do not 
depend on subsidies or regulations in order to have content produced. Thus, after exploiting the 
internal market, American productions can be purchased abroad at a fraction of the cost of a local 
drama. In his view, the success of those productions has only to do with economics, not with 
popularity or quality (ibid). Diegues (2003: 28), while discussing the Brazilian case, also remarks 
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that in order to be considered by film distributors, producers have to offer quantity and diversity, 
requiring from them strong economic power. Grant and Wood (2005: 30) add that to have a 
vigorous domestic industry, not only critical size is needed but also a holistic supporting 
environment. What the economists call „thick market‟, this environment includes fostering the 
establishment of creative clusters and audiovisual suppliers in specific cities which, in loop, act as 
attraction poles for more investments from the audiovisual industry (ibid). 
 
There are other factors that influence the prices of programmes though. When programmes are 
exported, they suffer the effect of the so-called „cultural discount‟. The reduction, directly related to 
the concept of cultural relevance discussed in Chapter 1, is a loss of cultural value of the content 
because, in a different culture, these programmes will not be fully appreciated (Selznick, 2008: 19). 
This loss could lead to a smaller degree of success in other markets and, possibly, reflect in a loss 
in the content‟s commercial value (ibid). Collins (1990: 191) points out that language is the major 
cultural discount factor. Therefore, programmes which are not filmed in English have a bigger 
discount around the globe, even when dubbed. In order to minimise the discount, producers use 
the co-production tool, where elements of the importing country, such as actors or locations, are 
incorporated into the work (Selznick, 2008: 19), and often these films are shot in English. 
 
Although the introduction of multichannel systems and the liberalisation of broadcasting may be 
perceived as an opportunity for local producers to export their production to virtually anywhere in 
the world, in the case of the biggest media market, the USA, the majority of the content broadcast 
still originates in the country. Kunz (2010), while analysing American television output concluded 
that there was “a total absence of finished programmes from outside the United States” and that 
the output was dominated by the big American corporations. Esser (2010), however, shows that 
format trade is responsible for a change in this scenario as increasingly more foreign formats, 
mainly from the UK, find their way into the USA. 
 
At this point I would like to comment that according to some scholars, it was not only due to cultural 
imperialism, to the well established transnational distribution networks, financing techniques and 
purely internal market economics that American companies succeeded to export their audiovisual 
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products more vigorously than their European counterparts. According to Noam (1991: 21-2), 
American productions also managed to be exported worldwide due to the kind of content produced. 
The author points out that there is a “gulf between the tastes of producers and the audience” in 
Europe. In addition, while in the USA content is designed for broader audiences, he also indicates 
that the country is multicultural and multiethnic. Therefore, if a particular content succeeds in that 
market, it should also do well elsewhere. On the other hand, he explains that European content 
does not do well in the USA because it does not meet American audience requirements, such as 
technical standards and unfamiliar accents, in the case of British content, or unfamiliar situations 
such as in French comedies (ibid). 
 
Independent of the reasons for the success of content produced by global media companies, 
countries around the globe recognise the structural and financial advantages and the market power 
of those global corporations and hence set a legal framework to foster their own domestic 
production. It is believed that, unless there is an intervention in terms of financing or in terms of 
regulation, it will be difficult for national producers to compete with globally produced content and to 
remain a choice for viewers in countries with liberalised mediaspace. In other words, as 
Nordenstreng and Varis (1974: 54) also concluded nearly forty years ago: 
... the free flow of TV material between nations means in actual fact that only 
those countries with considerable economic resources have taken advantage of 
the freedom to produce, while those with scarce resources have the "freedom" 
to choose whether or not to take advantage of the material made available to 
them. 
 
As I will discuss in Chapter 3 in more detail, several countries, even those with considerable 
economic resources, have adopted cultural policies for the protection and promotion of their 
audiovisual industries. These industries, while shaped by regulation, are also continuously affected 
by technological developments. With digitalisation, a film can be edited, animated, include special 
effects or even be entirely filmed in a different part of the world. This possibility, facilitated by 
digitalisation, may also have been exacerbated by protective policies from other countries. 
Producers may use other countries‟ financial benefits in order to lower production costs. For 
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instance, Miller et al (2005: 160-3) recognise that „runaway productions‟
30
 are quite significant for 
the British industry since 1927 and that, in 2003, 102 of the 177 „British‟ films were „runaway‟ and 
co-productions. The authors, citing a 2002 American Film and Television Action Committee report, 
claimed that this kind of outsourcing to several countries “drains” ten billion dollars from the 
American economy (ibid : 7). The authors conclude that foreign (from the USA‟s perspective) 
cultural policies managed to substitute imports and create jobs by implementing a “bourgeois 
subvention.” They also suggest that instead of empowering “true” domestic productions, 
policymakers are encouraged to outsource Hollywood productions in a new international division of 
labour (ibid: 363-4). Important to this thesis, these views show that in a global and digital world, 
cultural policies and the introduction of incentives for the production of national content have 
implications for national audiovisual industries but they may also be used to attract global 
investments. 
 
After highlighting for the reader the technological and economic consequences of digitalisation and 





Currently, in times of DTV, satellite, cable, ADSL, mobile and fixed communications, internet, hot-
spots, video gaming and other technologies, communication companies launch increasingly more 
interconnected services. As this chapter has shown, there has been a continuous approximation 
between communication services bringing global media and telecommunication companies with 
significant market power to compete with national producers and broadcasters. 
 
In the views of the scholars analysed in this chapter, in times of digital convergence the multitude 
of services and the multifaceted reach of global media groups may be sensed in all elements of the 
audiovisual chain. As this thesis is concerned with the regulatory framework for the production and 
                                                          
30
 „Runaway productions‟ are often referred to as American productions developed for initial release in the 
USA but that are filmed or produced in some stage in another country. In the UK they are often referred to as 
„inward productions‟. 
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distribution of national content in current times, this contextualising chapter was necessary to 
understand the new dynamics of the new digital audiovisual market. Various views of media 
specialists were utilised to achieve this. How content travels from one horizontal and vertical 
activity to another, which financing techniques are available, and the differences between the 
existing digital services particularly in relation to economic and market power were discussed here, 
with reference to work in the area. Digitalisation has brought more than just different services and 
countless channels. It has also brought vertical, horizontal and diagonal integration on a global 
scale in the search for economies of scale and profits. It is in this scenario that national producers 
and PSBs have to survive and compete. 
 
Adding to this panorama of the economic aspects involved in the production and distribution of 
national content, in the next chapter I will discuss scholars‟ perceptions of how political forces have 
shaped recent developments of broadcasting and telecommunication regulation. The chapter will 
show that regulators, either by fostering or by being pushed by market forces and technology, have 
attempted to achieve a dual mission. They have kept an eye on the continuity of the services, 
assuring universality and maintaining a certain space for the public interest, but also allowed and 






CHAPTER III                                                                                                                     
THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS DIGITAL CONVERGENCE 
 
 
The politics of regulation nowadays often occurs in 
complex multi-level arenas, where some actors can 
play simultaneously at several levels. The goals of 
these multi-level actors are often obscured from 
observers who focus their attention on only one arena 
of policy-making 




Broadcasting legislation, as with legislation associated with other services, has continuously been 
adapted through time. History shows that new acts were passed not only to allow the introduction 
of new technologies but also as a response to market forces and demands. Since the beginning of 
broadcasting, national governments used the service for the promotion of national industries. 
Scannell and Cardiff (cited in Gorman & McLean, 2003: 53-4) saw the start of radio broadcasting in 
the UK, in the 1920s, as an agreement between the government and radio-manufacturers for the 
creation of a market for selling radio apparatuses. Despite being often regarded as using 
broadcasting as a tool for promoting French culture, as highlighted by Hutchison (1999: 209-11) 
amongst others, France also promoted industrial interests as demonstrated by the launch of Canal 
Plus in the early 1980s (Kuhn, 1995: 180). More recently, in 2007, one of the main reasons for the 
Brazilian decision to adopt the Japanese DTV standard was because of the expected economic 
opportunity it would generate in the medium and long term (Bolano & Brittos, 2007: 176-7). 
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The discussion about whether the media should be unregulated, subjected only to market forces 
with no governmental interference or if it should be regarded as a different kind of industry, with 
regulations not only limited to services‟ technicalities but also to content, is ongoing. The cultural 
implications of broadcasting were already discussed in the first chapter, whilst the intertwined 
technological and economic aspects of the audiovisual industry were explored in the second. As 
already pointed out in those chapters, despite the controversy between liberals and 
interventionists, media is regulated to some extent in different parts of the world, normally 
according to the type of media, the historical institutions in place and the dominant political 
ideology. This third chapter, drawing on a variety of media policy scholars, will demonstrate the 
political and market forces that have shaped the changes in broadcasting and telecommunication 
legislation since the liberalisation of the 1980s and led to the implementation of protective 
measures for cultural products. The chapter will help the reader understand how regulation, within 
certain limitations, steers the development of communication services and supports the production 
of national content. 
 
Before the chapter is outlined I would like to clarify what is meant by regulation. I will use the 
concept defined by Longstaff (2002: 33). The author describes regulation as being “any limitation 
on the choices of persons (individual or corporate) who control any of the components of a 
communication process.” Therefore during this discussion I will not limit myself to regulatory 
instruments but will also include the political disputes between the different groups and nations with 
interests in the audiovisual industries. 
 
In order to help the understanding of the implications of the changes in regulation, based in 
academic work in the field of media regulation, this chapter will initially show in section 3.2 how the 
liberalisation of broadcasting services changed the focus and the timing of the regulators‟ actions. 
As will be highlighted by work in the area, while in the 1980s and 1990s competition was fostered 
and digitalisation was promoted by frameworks focused on liberalising broadcasting policies, 
currently, stakeholders are increasingly concerned with regulating competition. 
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After grasping this new approach adopted by regulators, the chapter will then detail how the 
different communication services were affected by liberalisation and how this process influenced 
changes in policies regarding the production and distribution of national content. Following that 
logic, section 3.3 illustrates the changes in telecommunication regulation and how the integration 
with broadcasting services have been regarded by academics. Because the liberalisation of 
broadcasting and of telecommunication allowed transnational companies to compete with local 
broadcasters, protective measures for national content were introduced at regional and national 
levels. Section 3.4 is centred on how media researchers have analysed the international 
negotiations and pressures for and against the protection of national cultures. Section 3.5 shows 
that despite the level of protection agreed, at the national levels commercial media continued the 
strain on PSBs. 
 
As this thesis is concerned with the production of national content and because films are important 
ingredients of television schedules, the relevant regulatory attempts for fostering both production 
activities will be discussed in this chapter. During the last sections I will discuss scholars‟ 
perceptions on the implemented cultural policies for the protection and promotion of national 
content, the so-called „push-pull‟ policies. Section 3.6 will explore how scholars have assessed the 
content quotas for broadcasting services and cinemas and section 3.7 the existing cultural policies 
regarding to film production. 
 
 
3.2 The new focus of regulation in the new millennium 
A problem which arose with the blurring of the frontiers between the various communication 
services which followed liberalisation, and was increased with digital convergence, was how to 
identify, measure and control companies‟ market power and hence how to properly enforce 
competition (Goldberg et al., 1998: 14). According to Longstaff (2002: 49), when several networks 
were opened for competition in the 1980s, such as railroads and electric grids (besides 
broadcasting), everyone predicted more providers and lower prices, but few predicted a decrease 
in quality and consolidations. Perhaps even fewer people foresaw that originally different and 
separated markets and industries would converge in twenty years time and compete amongst each 
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other. For instance, a foreign electricity company providing broadband connection or a 
multinational bookstore offering films on VOD.
31
 Therefore the regulation that introduced 
competition and liberalised broadcasting in the 1980s and 1990s had to be adapted to cope with 
the new realities created by more companies competing for the distribution of audiovisual content. 
 
As digital convergence increased, and because media groups have interests in several activities, 
services, such as FTA and paytv, could not be analysed separately anymore. Regulators thus 
concentrated on controlling the gatekeepers and the bottlenecks of the market (Gibbons, 2004: 59; 
Goldberg et al., 1998: 21). Gatekeepers, as Goldberg et al (ibid) define, are institutions that 
“prevent access to the services of competitors”. For instance, a gatekeeper can occur in the form of 
a broadcaster not buying or scheduling programmes from a particular independent company, or a 
film distributor not dealing with works from a particular director. In times of digital convergence the 
authors (ibid: 127) list the broadcasting technological bottlenecks as being the “conditional access 
systems [paytv platforms], subscription management systems and EPG.” But bottlenecks can also 
be related to the access to DTV platforms or other incumbents‟ infrastructure, also known as 
essential facilities (Levy, 1999: 80; Longstaff, 2002: 70), or be related to other content issues as will 
be discussed later on. Callanan (2004) considers that EPGs are crucial bottlenecks as they 
influence audience‟s decisions, since users and distributors can customise channel listings 
favouring some broadcasters to the detriment of the others (ibid).
32
 Access to digital multiplexes 
(the distribution platforms of DTV) is also crucial for broadcasters and viewers, as the denial of 
access to some platforms may exclude particular audiences and regions from important channels 
and content, jeopardising the universality purpose of broadcasting (ibid). This change in the focus 
of regulation from liberalising and introducing competition to regulating bottlenecks and 
gatekeepers was followed by a shift in the timing of the regulatory interventions. 
 
In principle, legislators and regulators can set overall services‟ rules, from a set point in time (for 
instance the enactment of an act), anticipating situations. Those rules are so-called ex ante 
                                                          
31
 Electricity providers may use the PLC (Power Line Communication) technology where broadband 
connection is provided by the same lines that delivers electricity to the houses. In another example of this 
trend, the (formerly book) internet retailer Amazon acquired in 2011 the company LoveFilm and is currently 
renting films by downloads which can be watched, for instance, with the help of videogame consoles. 
32
 Callanan reminds a disagreement in 2003 between the BSkyB and the BBC over the distributors‟ EPG (the 
sides reached an agreement without regulatory intervention). 
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regulations. Alternatively, regulators can analyse the market‟s characteristics and companies‟ 
practices after a particular event and only then intervene proposing corrections (regulatory 
remedies) when applicable. Those methods are called ex post regulations. Normally ex ante tools 
are used for issues of structure and ex post for issues of behaviour (Scriven & Lecomte, 1999: 
135). Typical examples of an ex ante approach are ownership rules, for instance preventing foreign 
ownership of the media, and of the ex post, the investigation of anti-competitive behaviours of a 
particular media company (Seabright & Hagen, 2007: 316). When a behavioural control finds a 
misuse of a market-dominant position, the regulatory agency may impose structural measures to 
correct the issue (Berger & Schoenthal, 2005: 7-10). Those policy regimes are often used in 
complementary terms. In fact, as Helberger (2004: 35) explains, ex post legislation alone is not 
advisable: 
While ex post structural remedies might be a way to effectively remedy anti-competitive 
behaviour, this approach too has its disadvantages. Examples are the lack of guidance and 
legal certainty for the parties involved, and the uncertainties that are inherent in 
competition procedures as well as the time problem. Also, the decision to divest a 
successful enterprise is not easily taken, and in practice it can be very difficult of practical 
and political reasons to dismantle anti-competitive structures once they have been 
established. These problems could be adverted by preventing the creation of anti-
competitive structures ex ante. 
 
Many scholars, like Wheeler (2002, 2004) and Humphreys and Simpson (2005: 93), claim that 
currently in broadcasting there is a tendency of providing a pro-competitive, and increasingly ex 
post, regulation. Because of this concern of promoting competition, regulators, such as the EC 
(European Commission), when analysing mergers between the media and telecommunication 
sectors, assess if consumers‟ choices may be undermined in the case of the resulting media 
conglomerate holding too much of the most attractive content (Wheeler, 2002). That would be the 
case of creating a gatekeeper which would endanger competition (ibid). In fact, according to La 
Porte et al (2007), one of the major concerns of the EC is to promote the free market by mitigating 
possible gatekeepers in broadcasting, distribution and production activities. The authors claim that 
the EC‟s audiovisual regulatory efforts are focused on guaranteeing external pluralism.
33
 Therefore, 
in the views of these scholars, the Commission, while pushing for competition, also recognises that 
the diverse production of national content still is one of the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting 
                                                          
33
 During the first chapter I used the term plurality instead of external pluralism. For the purpose of this thesis 
both concepts are equivalent as they refer to the usage, by broadcasters, of programmes produced by multiple 
and independent companies. 
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services. However, Bustamante (2004) notes that the guarantee of external pluralism is 
increasingly difficult as regulators have to combine different actors, such as PSB and commercial 
broadcasters, with conflicting interests in an ever increasing commercial environment. As the 
author explains, while public broadcasters have stronger public obligations including the promotion 
of pluralism (by acquiring and commissioning from independent producers), commercial media 
tend to consolidate the agents involved, diminishing pluralism. 
 
Another cause that may hamper pluralism is inherent to digitalisation. Seabright and Weeds (2007: 
47) explain that due to the lower market entry barriers enabled by digital technologies, “rents 
[revenues] in broadcasting will increasingly come from control of scarce content rather than from 
control over means of transmission [or distribution]” which will tend to consolidate. By changing the 
traditional market bottleneck from transmission (an entire channel) to content rights (a particular 
programme, for instance sporting events), that situation may lead to different anticompetitive 




The increased financial importance of content is regarded, by some, as an issue that should be 
better handled by regulators. Ofcom, is regarded as not having sufficient expertise and will to deal 
with the subject of content (Harvey, 2006). Critics of the French CSA, like Meirieu (2007: 87-8), 
claim that the institution does not deal seriously with the social implications of the content 
broadcast and is only concerned on “calculating the speech time of politicians” or placing violent 
American content late at night but not ensuring the broadcast of important programmes during 
prime-time. Michalis (2002) points out that the EC places too much emphasis on competition and is 
weak in dealing with issues of content. Ostergaard (1998: 104-6) remarks that this change is a 
consequence of digital convergence and suggests that regulators are shifting the social objectives 
of their policies to be more focused on industrial issues. These regulatory difficulties resulting from 
convergence are also addressed by Trappel (1998: 191-2), who attributes current regulatory 
difficulties to, among other issues, the augmented political influence of global companies. 
 
                                                          
34
 As will be seen on Chapter 6, broadcasting rights are increasingly the object of attention of regulators. 
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From this condensed account of how the regulatory concerns have changed after the liberalisation 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and in order to be able to properly identify and design regulations for the 
promotion of national content, it is important to retain two key aspects highlighted by various media 
policy scholars. First, as consolidation has blurred the boundaries of both services and companies, 
regulators are now focused on assuring customer choice, instead of re-regulating and re-defining 
new scopes and obligations for services. The main parameter currently used by regulators for 
assuring this consumer choice is the assessment of the external plurality in terms of broadcasters 
and distributors. The instruments for enforcing competition are regulating access to content and to 
distribution platforms, by avoiding the formation of bottlenecks, for instance in terms of distribution 
platforms, and regulating gatekeepers, as holders of attractive content. The second shift, but also a 
consequence of the first tendency to regulate for competition, is that policy stakeholders are 
avoiding interfering with the market and are increasingly using ex post analysis and proposing 
remedies only when considered necessary. 
 
During the next section I will present the academic perceptions of how the regulation of the 
telecommunication sector changed with the privatisation of those services and with the introduction 
of competition, and how that industry and broadcasting became increasingly interdependent. 
 
 
3.3 Regulatory changes in telecommunication 
In times of digital convergence, when broadcasting and telecommunication services are interacting 
more so than ever with each other, it is important to look at the regulation of both sides. In this 
section it will become clearer to the reader that, as viewed by scholars, telecommunication 
regulation was adapted first for enabling privatisation, secondly for enabling competition and thirdly, 
amongst other issues and with particular interest to this thesis, for disciplining the access to 
broadcasting channels, the biggest distributors of national content. 
 
While in the 1990s new channels and technologies were introduced in the broadcasting field, 
telephony was also under great transformation. The 1980s were times of privatisation of national 
incumbents and of countries‟ telecommunication infra-structures. The UK started this process by 
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partially privatising British Telecom in 1984 and by introducing competitors, or entrants, to 
telephony (Parker, 1998: 27-8). It was the end of the monopoly in telephony as it was the end of 
the duopoly of the BBC and ITV in the broadcasting service. When privatisation swept across other 
European countries, in France, due to unions‟ opposition and a governmental hesitancy (or fear) of 
losing control over their important asset, privatisation was postponed until 1997 (Thatcher, 2004). 
While British Telecom was wholly private by that year, by 2002, France Telecom was still 55% 
owned by the state (ibid). For the Western European countries, the push to privatisation was also 
driven at the supra national level. 
 
Whilst the European Parliament was concerned with developing a strong audiovisual industry in 
times of globalisation, the EC and to a lesser extent the ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union) were pushing hard for the introduction of competition to telephony (Hopper, 2007: 62; 
Humphreys & Simpson, 2005: 148; Parker, 1998: 28). While global audiovisual groups were 
pressing for the liberalisation of broadcasting, technological developments, such as digitalisation, 
cable, fibre optics, satellite and mobile, introduced cheaper competitors to traditional telephony 
companies (Parker, 1998: 27; Wheatley, 1999: 145). These new alternative technologies rendered, 
for some, telephony networks‟ monopoly unnecessary and it was understood that prices could drop 
if competition was introduced into telecommunication (ibid; ibid). It was with the Green Paper on 
the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment of 1987 
that the EC set the pace for the liberalisation of European telecommunication markets (Venturelli, 
1998: 113). Five liberalising directives followed that initiative and the Full Competition Directive of 
1996 dictated that the telecommunication market was due to be fully competitive by 1998 (OECD, 
2000: 300). 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Brazil followed those liberal recipes quickly. Struck by the State‟s 
lack of investment power and by high inflation rates, the former leftist president Cardoso (1995-
2003) decided to follow the neo-liberal approach and to privatise several assets, including the 
telecommunications sector (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2003: 13-4). As a result of the privatisation 
process, the infrastructure was passed to foreign companies. The same companies that were 
partially or fully privatised in Europe had major investments in Brazil, such as Telefonica (Spanish), 
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Portugal Telecom, TIM (Italian) and France Telecom (OECD, 2007: 286-287). The same 
stakeholders had relevant positions on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
In Western Europe, after the introduction of competition and as digital convergence started to 
become more significant, in 1997 the EC submitted a Green Paper on Convergence in an attempt 
to approximate broadcasting and telecommunications regulatory regimes (Humphreys & Simpson, 
2005: 126-31; Storsul & Syvertsen, 2007). However, due to strong opposition from broadcasters 
the consultation did not succeed and in its place a more modest Consultation on ICT (Information 
and Communications Technology) was launched ending in a Communication Review Paper 
excluding the subject of broadcasting (Humphreys & Simpson, 2005: 126-31). According to Storsul 
and Syvertsen (2007), the opposition was mainly due to the defense of PSBs. Drawing from the 
Norwegian and British examples, the authors noted that national governments regarded PSBs as: 
the most flexible and appropriate instruments for realizing national digital ambitions. 
Private broadcasters, in contrast, neither have the capital nor are willing to take the risks 
involved in developing innovative content and services 
 
Simpson, on the other hand, claims that the retraction of the Green Paper was also due to internal 
differences within the EC where the former Directorates for competition (DGIV) and for 
telecommunication (DGXIII) had different objectives than the ones from the audiovisual field (DGX). 
 
In 2002, explicitly excluding any change in broadcasting services, the EC introduced a new 
regulatory regime for the telecommunication sector (Campbell, 2008: II/18-9; Lloyd & Mellor, 2003: 
35; Van Eijk, 2003: 6).
35
 The new framework was regarded as necessary because the 
transformation that followed the liberalisation of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors 
introduced, together with competition, highly verticalised companies which in turn could jeopardise 
the same competition they were supposed to create (Helberger, 2004: 28). As an example of the 
new directives, the Access Directive established “the obligation to provide conditional access on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms” (ibid). Digital convergence was regarded as 
enhancing the conflicts of interests between distributors (defined in regulation as transport level), 
                                                          
35
 As Van Eijk remarked, the new package was meant to be technologically neutral and aimed to further 
liberalise the telecommunication market, allowing for more convergence but excluding explicitly any 
discussion about broadcasting and content. Besides the general Directive that sets the framework, the other 
instruments concerned to: i) the licensing scheme; ii) fair access and interconnection; iii) universal service 
obligations; iv) data protection and; v) competition. 
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which could also have interests as broadcasters, and other independent broadcasters (defined as 
service level) (ibid). The expansion of telecommunication firms into broadcasting was 
acknowledged as potentially dangerous for pluralism but would be analysed by ex post 
interventions, if necessary. 
 
As digital convergence allowed the transmission of broadcasting channels by different 
telecommunication services, the rules concerning the access and distribution of those channels 
may be regarded as of increased importance. Initially restricted to „must-carry‟ regulations, this set 
of rules was enhanced to also include „may-carry‟ and „must-offer‟ conditions. „Must-carry‟ 
obligations are strongly linked to the universal aim of broadcasting and are widely held in Europe, 
although being challenged by digitalisation and digital convergence (Valcke, 2005: 31-2).
36
 „Must-
offer‟ rules, where broadcasters have to offer their channels to be carried by distributors, were not 
enforced in many countries (amongst those that were, the UK and France) (Vogelsang, 2010: 154). 
„May-carry‟ rules allow operators to distribute channels from different regions provided that the 
transmission does not clash with broadcasting rights acquired by local broadcasters (Helewitz & 
Edwards, 2003: 127). Despite Brazilian regulatory agency Anatel (Agencia Nacional de 
Telecomunicacoes) having analysed the other alternatives, Brazil (probably due to the influence of 
commercial broadcasters) only implemented „must-carry‟ rules (Hoineff, 2001; Pieranti & dos 
Santos, 2008). 
 
At this point it is important to include in this discussion of telecommunication regulation one 
alteration of the broadcasting legislation triggered by the telecommunication sphere: the 
development of non-linear services. The proliferation of those new audiovisual services, such as 
IPTV, internet webcast and VOD, led the Commission to include that category of services in the ten 
year statutory revision of the TWF (Television Without Frontiers) 1989 Directive that occurred in 
2007. The amended directive exempts websites that distribute user generated content but not 
those that offer a selection, or catalogue of programmes to paying subscribers, in other words a 
TV-like service on the web. With this rule, at the same time that non-linear services can be left in 
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 In the case of „must-carry‟ obligations being in place, telecommunication operators have the obligation of 
distributing to their base of subscribers, all of the traditional FTA broadcasters. 
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the telecommunication „world‟, regulators have implemented a clear clause for this separation. If 
those services start to behave like broadcasters, they will be subjected to broadcasting regulation. 
 
As shown in this section, on the telecommunication side liberalisation forces prevailed, in general, 
without opposition from governments. Besides some initial reluctance from France, the countries 
analysed here opted for having commercial operators running telecommunications. FTA 
broadcasting, on the other hand, still has strong national groups as the national panoramas 
provided in Chapter 5 will show in detail. When the EC tried to eliminate barriers between both 
spheres, Member States strongly opposed this, mainly to protect their PSBs as indicated by media 
scholars. In Brazil, a similar reaction occurred and foreign capitals were restricted to the 
telecommunication sector only. 
 
With the aid of technology and of a more liberal ex post regulation, the telecommunication sector 
increased their capability of offering audiovisual content and became more integrated with 
broadcasting. Consequently, those companies are continuously growing in importance and size. 
New “must-carry” and “must-offer” rules were enforced, and currently non-linear services may be 
subjected to regulation. As seen in Chapter 2, telecommunication services rely on audiovisual 
content, mainly produced by broadcasters, for increasing their revenues. Hence, with regards to 
the objectives of this thesis, a successful promotion of national content in times of digital 
convergence has to take into consideration that services other than broadcasting, mainly coming 
from the telecommunication and information technologies sphere, distribute audiovisual content. 
 
In the next section I will discuss the academic research which analyses how world trade 
agreements and negotiations and European organisations have shaped transnational instruments 
of audiovisual regulation. 
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3.4 The development of the transnational legal framework for 
audiovisual content 
Having shown the views on how telecommunication regulation was transformed due to market and 
political forces, in this section I will discuss how that same liberalising discourse was also active 
when promoting the free-trade of cultural products and weakening protective measures for national 
content. 
 
International flow of content has been a matter of concern well before the liberalisation of 
broadcasting that started in the 1980s. Without going too far into the past,
37
 it can be found in the 
report conducted for Unesco by Nordenstreng and Varis (1974) and in the works of Schiller (1985), 
Morley (1995) and continued in the last decade, in the works of Rixon (2006), Esser (2007), 
McChesney (2009), Straubhaar (2009) and Kunz (2010). As a consequence of the struggles faced 
by national producers and the cultural concerns raised by the airing of imported content, several 
nations tried to restrict the free influx of programmes and films and promoted the production of 
national content and channels. Those restrictions and incentives did not start with broadcasting 
though. Cinema received protection from national governments from the 1920s when Hollywood 
films started to „flood‟ some countries of Western Europe. The French Minister of Fine Arts, in 1927 
expressed his concerns by stating: “[W]e would soon be colonized by foreign motion picture 
interests if we do not do something about it” (cited in Ulff-Moller, 1998). 
 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, audiovisual services impact on national culture and identity and 
also are capital intensive. Therefore, national governments have devoted considerable regulatory 
efforts addressing both cultural and industrial aspects of that activity. However, to handle both 
aspects in a balanced way has proven to be difficult as regulation is constantly changing and new 
arrangements are regularly being proposed. Possibly, as Voon (2007: 67-8) remarks, the different 
approaches derive precisely because of that inherent dual characteristic of cultural products. As the 
author continues, there is a thin balance between cultural policy and protectionism. As will be 
discussed later on in this section, positive discriminatory cultural policy measures may be accepted 
in the international sphere and by multilateral institutions as long as they are also justified on 
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 Concerns with the introduction of media originated in other parts of the world can be traced back to the end 
of the Middle Ages with the rise of mass media as a printed material. See McQuail (2010: 24) for details. 
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economic grounds. In the case of the EC, regulators are struggling to balance the increasingly 
conflicting nature of promoting competition and economic competitiveness with the cultural aspects 
inherent to audiovisual products (Wheeler, 2004).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the contribution of audiovisual content to culture is acknowledged and 
has been a matter of serious international politics for some time. During the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations in 1993, a block of developed countries led by the 
USA and representing the interests of transnational media conglomerates, urged for the global 
liberalisation of commerce for all goods (Levy, 1999: 22). As a counter move, the French-
Canadian-led block raised the principle of l‟exception culturelle for audiovisual media products 
(ibid). The arguments to exclude audiovisual products from free global trade followed the 
justification of protecting national identity and culture (Voon, 2007: 24). The following quote 
synthesises the rationale used by those supporters nicely: 
Culture is not like any other merchandise since it extends beyond commercial 
aspects: cultural goods and services convey ideas, values and way of life which 
reflect the plural identities of a country and the creative diversity of its citizens 
(Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 250). 
 
After intense negotiations, cultural products were excluded from the free-trade agreement 
(Trebilcock & Howse, 2005: 637). Or, as Voon (2007: 25) remarked, the blocks “agree-to-disagree” 
on that matter. As a result of that „agreement‟ national protective policies were allowed. Amongst 
the instruments cleared by this outcome were the quotas for European content such as the one 
from the TWF Directive. 
 
The Directive, originally proposed by the European Parliament in 1989, was preceded, in the same 
year, by the Council of Europe‟s European Convention on Transfrontier Television in what can be 
regarded as the first European broadcasting regulation that attempted to protect national cultures. 
The TWF however, can be traced back to the 1984 Green Paper on the Establishment of a 
Common Market for Broadcasting, or even further to the negotiations on the EU that culminated in 
the 1992 Maastritch Treaty (Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 251). The TWF went further than the 
cultural objectives established by the European Convention and might be considered as the most 
important single policy for the pan-European market (Sarikakis, 2005). With the aim of improving 
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the European audiovisual industries‟ competitiveness by creating more demand for their products, 
legislators of the European Parliament proposed European and independent content quotas for 
broadcasting (Besio, Hungerbühler, Morici, & Prario, 2008; Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 252). 
However, the quota system is considered to be weakened by the fact that US production firms with 
a basis in the EU, plus imported formats (but filmed locally), could be considered as contributing to 
European content (Waisbord, 2004; Wheeler, 2004). Chalaby (2006) remarks that the protection 
achieved with the TWF was, in fact, unnecessary as the premises of European culture being under 
threat of „Americanisation‟ “have proven unfounded”. Another strong critique of quotas is the fact 
that the defence of national products may protect low quality, albeit nationally produced, content 
and restrain consumer sovereignty (Kuhn, 2000: 294). 
 
While the quota created a demand, a „push‟ measure, for EU audiovisual industries, as a „pull‟ 
instrument, the TWF was complemented by the creation of various funding initiatives such as the 
MEDIA (Incentives and Development Measures of the Audiovisual Industry) programme. The main 
purpose of that particular initiative was to promote the “dissemination of audiovisual works” in the 
EU (Collins, 2002: 17).
38
 Currently in its fourth version, the programme, since the 1987 pilot, has 
invested over €1.7 billion supporting both the development and distribution of Member States‟ 
works (De Vinck & Pauwels, 2008: 289).
39
 However, De Vinck and Pauwels (ibid) rightly remark 
that the amount is small when compared with other EU funded programmes. The authors quote 
Casado (2006: 55) who emphasizes: 
It seems naive to think that with an annual budget of €80 million (the budget of 
some American super-productions), a programme can have any real impact on the 
audiovisual industries of 15 countries producing more than 600 films per year. 
 
Returning our discussion to the transnational pressures, the truce that protective policies obtained 
from the GATT outcome revealed itself to be temporary, as the pressure for liberalising audiovisual 
commerce remained strong. As cultural products grew in importance in foreign trade, multilateral 
bodies, such as the WTO (World Trade Organisation) and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development), started to question whether national content policies were in fact 
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 The authors list the specific focus of the programme as being “training, preproduction, multi-lingualism of 
programmes, use of nex [sic] technologies, distribution and commercial promotion, the creation of a second-
market and easy access to venture capital” (ibid). 
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 According to the authors the current MEDIA 2007, which ends in 2013, has a budget of €750m. 
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illegal subsidies (Neil, 2006). Outside the EU, other national governments were also struggling with 
the consequences of the liberalisation of cultural trade. In the Canada-USA periodicals WTO 
dispute,
40
 in 1997, the panel ruled in favour of the American interests but recognised that the 
decision was made based only on the analysis of the GATT rules for the commercialisation of 
goods, and that the aspects of protection of cultural identity were not under consideration 
(Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 12; Weber, 2008: 837). After the WTO favoured the USA in two more 
cases, against Turkey and Canada, in 1997 and 1998,
41
 the Minister of Canadian Heritage 
promoted a meeting in 1998 with 16 other countries in order to discuss alternatives for the 
maintenance of the cultural exception for the audiovisual industries (Aylett, 2010; Weber, 2008: 
837-8). 
 
Naturally, the appropriate multilateral institution which would „shelter‟ those concerned with the 
effects of the excesses of the commercialisation of cultural products would be Unesco. In fact, as 
noted by Voon (2007: 66), Unesco‟s legislative activism has always been characterised by claiming 
the need of preserving spaces for all cultures of the world. In 2001, a Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity (Unesco, 2001) was issued as a starting point for a broader convention that 
would set the legal grounds for national protective policies. In 2005, the vast majority of Unesco‟s 
member states approved the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions. Only the United States and Israel voted against it (Neil, 2006). The 
Convention ratified the cultural exception status of audiovisual products and gave power to nations 





As discussed in this section, antagonistic forces have influenced the current state of audiovisual 
regulation. On a transnational level, the GATT agreement was updated (without consensus), in 
1993, and a Unesco convention was proclaimed (without the support of the USA), in 2005. On the 
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 “Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals” WTO dispute settlement case (DS 31/1, from 1997). 
41
  “Turkey - taxation of foreign film revenues” (DS-43/3, in 1997) and “Canada - Measures Affecting Film 
Distribution Services” (DS 117/1, in 1998). 
42
 Amongst other rules, the following guiding principle of the Convention is clear: “Article 1 – 
Objectives...(h) to reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement policies and 
measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions 
on their territory;...” (Unesco, 2005). 
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regional level, protective measures for national content were introduced in the EU in 1989, by the 
TWF and were maintained by the succeeding AVMS (Audiovisual Media Services) Directive. 
During these processes, as academic work has shown, there have been disputes between liberals 
and protectors of national cultures in both international forums, the WTO and Unesco. At the 
European level the „dispute‟ may be identified between the European Commission „versus‟ the 
European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Member States. 
 
This section is important as it illustrates to the reader the dissent between protectionists and 
liberals with regards to the international trade of cultural goods. Those negotiations lead to a 
transnational level of agreement which, eventually, granted legitimacy to national and regional (in 
the case of the EU) protective measures. Therefore, the introduction of national instruments for the 
promotion of national culture has to take into account those transnational agreements and the 
limitations they set to international trade. During the next section I will explain how media 
researchers have interpreted the consequences of global media pressures on the national level 
and how it affected the development of national broadcasting regulation and in particular the PSBs 
of our case studies. 
 
 
3.5 Growing pressures on national broadcasters 
As the GATT and WTO cases eventually legitimated protective policies at the transnational level, 
national governments were able to incorporate that protection into national legislation. However, in 
an increased commercial mediaspace, and with the constant pressure from competition with other 
services, national broadcasters, and especially PSBs, had to sustain and reposition themselves. 
 
As seen in Chapter 1, many scholars highlighted the fact that one of the consequences of the 
technological developments of broadcasting was the appearance of numerous television channels 
in a very short space of time, competing for space with well established PSBs. As an 
understandable consequence of that competition, in 1996 commercial broadcasters from five 
different Member States of the EU filed cases against PSB dual funding systems that occurred in 
some countries (license fee and advertisements) and against the launch of new digital channels 
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(D'Haenens & Saeys, 2001: 111). These complaints resulted in the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol on 
PSB. As Humphreys (2009a) remarked “[d]isappointingly for the private media complainants”, the 
treaty recognised the importance of the public services and granted special protection for PSBs. As 
the author explains, the Protocol guaranteed that as long as the new activities are clearly defined in 
public broadcasters‟ remits and are publicly accountable and controlled, they are permitted. State 
funding for PSB was also confirmed by the Protocol. As D'Haenens and Saeys (2001: 113) and 
Steemers (1999) moreover pointed out, the usage of digital technologies by PSB for enlarging 
audience figures and providing wide, plural and diverse programming was also considered 
legitimate by the Member States. Even so some scholars, like Donders and Pauwels (2008), see 
the European executive, the EC, as a watchdog of commercial media supervising the Member 
States and disallowing the expansion of PSBs when not explicitly authorised by broadcasters‟ 
remit. 
 
Following the treaty‟s endorsement, in the new millennium, with the adoption of new regulation and 
the launch of DTV, PSBs expanded their services and launched new channels increasing their 
portfolio (D'Haenens & Bardoel, 2007: 89; Debrett, 2009; Hujanen, 2005: 69-71). Logically, that 
expansion conflicted with the interests of commercial media. While PSBs were delivering a public 
service in an enhanced (digital) mediaspace, commercial media was looking for more revenues. 
 
As commercial media became more active in broadcasting, an increase in the regulatory control of 
public services associated with “cutting new public sector initiatives” has been noted (Brevini, 
2009). The Public Value Test suggested by the EC and implemented in the UK and Germany for 
assessing whether or not a new service should be implemented by the BBC, ARD and ZDF (the 
two German PSBs), and hence financed by TV license payers, may be regarded as one of the 
results of those pressures (Debrett, 2009; Donders & Pauwels, 2008). An example of the outcome 
of this requirement is the application, by the BBC Trust, of the test to evaluate broadcasters‟ on-line 
activities. As a result, the governing body denied permission to expand video news online. It 
regarded those activities as exceeding broadcasters‟ remit and as having a negative impact on the 
market (Brevini, 2010). 
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The TV license has also been under increased criticism as a result of digital convergence. During 
the 2006 European Media Forum the license was the object of debates. While scholar David Levy 
defended it by stating that the contribution was a “direct public hypothecation link” for sustaining a 
public service, academic Mark Armstrong suggested that “people will increasingly choose what 
they want to watch at a time that is convenient to them” (cited in Boyfield, 2006: 37-8). Armstrong 
suggested that the BBC should move to a subscription-based model where payers will not have to 
pay for content never actually seen. One of the conclusions of that event suggested that the BBC 
could diminish its scope by offering only BBC 1 and BBC 2 on FTA and the other channels and 
services via subscription (ibid: 43). 
 
Whereas in the UK and France broadcasting services are also framed by the EU legislation, in 
Brazil, there is no transnational body dictating internal regulations. As a result, the considerable 
political power of national commercial broadcasters allowed them to maintain a comfortable 
situation with a legislative framework that dates back to the 1960s (Bolano & Brittos, 2007: 44-5). It 
has to be noted that the laissez-faire attitude of Brazilian policymakers, where they had chosen not 
to intervene in FTA broadcasting, can also be regarded as a form of regulation. As Singh and Raja 
(2009: 28) correctly remind us, not to intervene is also a political decision. Sinclair (2010: 511) is 
more emphatic and claims that the almost unregulated environment led to a “‟savage‟ or primitive 
capitalism” where broadcasters developed a symbiotic relationship with the government which 
allowed, mainly Rede Globo, to construct verticalised and dominant companies. 
 
From these discussions, it can be inferred that, depending on the policies implemented commercial 
forces can have different effects on PSBs. While in Brazil commercial media reigns and there is no 
transnational regulation dictating any internal legislative changes for the main broadcasters, the 
European countries suffered a bigger regulatory change as a consequence of market forces and of 
the European Commission action. However, as shown in this section academic research has 
remarked that PSBs were still able to maintain a significant role in broadcasting services even in 
this new liberalised and digital convergence era. This section has also pointed out, as identified by 
scholars and in direct relation to this thesis, that even in times of increased competition, protective 
measures were introduced in order to restrict possible negative effects on national broadcasters 
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and on the production of national content. The next section will focus on researchers‟ perceptions 
of, arguably, one of the most relevant policies for the promotion of national content, the national 
and specific content quotas. 
 
 
3.6 Content quotas in television 
One of the regulatory tools used for sustaining the production and distribution of national content 
are the content quotas. By dictating the amounts and kinds of particular content that have to be 
scheduled, channels‟ identities (and national broadcasting landscape) are deeply affected by 
regulation (Messerlin, Siwek, & Cocq, 2004: 4; Ostergaard, 1998: 96-7). In this regard governments 
have different approaches to content rules and, overall, their actions reflect each country‟s 
historical approach to regulation and the steering power of their institutions. 
 
France is a country which is regarded as having spent considerable effort protecting its national 
culture and film industry (Gillespie, Jeannet, & Hennessey, 2010: 78; Steele, 2006: 122). They 
have the highest national content quotas in broadcasting services. This approach is regarded by 
some as protectionist (Machill, 2008: 218), elitist (Harris, 2004: 71) and unnecessary (Chalaby, 
2006). In the British case (apart from the European quota due to the TWF/AVMS Directive) there 
are no national content quotas in legislation. Instead, the focus is on independent content. The 
British independent quota is considered to be successful and responsible for creating a thriving 
industry in the country with, also, high exports (Chalaby, 2010; Ellis, 2000: 154). Another regulatory 
move that was considered beneficial for boosting independent production was the disaggregation 
of rights, which allows independent producers to keep hold of the secondary rights to a programme 
(Haynes, 2005: 89-90).
43
 Interestingly, Chalaby (2010) claims that, alongside other characteristics 
of French media, such as direct intervention from central government and lack of dialogue with the 
industry sector, it was precisely the disaggregation of rights which enabled the international 
success of British independent producers. I will discuss these rules in more detail in Chapter 7.  
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 Secondary rights are the other rights not sold to the primary purchaser. For instance, if a FTA broadcaster 
purchases the content for their channel a secondary right could be a paytv channel. 
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On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brazilian nation is regarded, arguably, as “the only country in 
the world where the government has never considered mediating the relationship between the two 
industries [(broadcasters and independent producers)]” (Diegues, 2003: 30). Whereas in the EU 
the obligations imposed at the Member State level resulted in the creation of well developed 
television and film production sectors, Brazil opted not to apply noticeable quota rules for 
broadcasters (Diegues, 2003: 30; Hoineff, 2008; Mattelart & Mattelart, 1990: 25). As a result of that 
lack of enforcement it could be expected that Brazilian channels would be „flooded‟ by imported 
content. However, this is not the case, as home-made telenovelas are often regarded as one of the 
causes of commercial broadcasters‟ high viewing shares, especially Rede Globo‟s (Blumenthal & 
Goodenough, 2006: 491; Sinclair, 1999: 71; 2009; Stroud, 2008: 80). 
 
The Brazilian case may indicate that „push‟ policies for including national content are not necessary 
for attracting the attention of viewers for content produced locally. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it 
seems that it is not only the nationality of the content which matters to the audiences, it is a more 
complicated set of values (La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005). As Straubhaar (1991) expressed early 
on, it is related to the cultural relevance or proximity of the programme. In a similar vein, Barthel-
Bouchier (2011) concluded that international audiences were only attracted to French films if they 
fitted the expectations of what a French film should look like. Broadcasters and governments try to 
address the cultural relevance of the content in their policies and guidelines (Collins, 2004: 39-40; 
Roscoe, 2004; Steemers, 2010). However, to properly establish a set of values which represent the 
essence of the nationality could be a matter for huge debate. Consider for instance the following 
summary of British values compiled by the UKFC (2009: 22): 
tolerance, fair play, decency, honesty, reticence (e.g. about contentious issues such as 
politics, religion, sexuality) to which might be added understated patriotism, and gallantry 
or self-sacrifice (in war and in extremis). 
 
Certainly, for some, that list may not accurately describe „Britishness‟ (or „Scotishness‟, etc) and 
surely there is content made elsewhere in the world that shares some of those attributes. 
Therefore, as Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail, regulators regard the cultural relevance of 
national content as being mainly related to industrial aspects, such as how those programmes are 
produced and which resources are employed. 
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National content policies receive criticism not only from those advocates of free trade and 
consumer choice, there are other arguments against broadcasting quotas. De Cock Buning (cited 
in Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 249) claims that quotas have limited value in broadcasting 
(probably less for VOD) and that, instead, financial subsidies should be used. Verhulst and Price 
(2009: 144) and others also believe that the „plentiness‟ of digitalisation diminishes the 
effectiveness and necessity of content regulations as the abundance of channels diminishes the 
influence of individual content. Agreeing with that line of argument, Iosifidis et al. (2005: 13) and 
others note that digital channels are contributing towards the fragmentation of audiences while 
within a strategy of targeting different group of viewers. Quotas on traditional channels may, 
therefore, be skipped. 
 
This section focused on, arguably, one of the most debated policies for the promotion of national 
audiovisual industries: the quotas for national content in broadcasting services. Scholars regarded 
quotas as maybe successful but they have to go along with financing schemes. Others regard 
these measures as inefficient. It was shown that EU countries use the instrument and still find it 
necessary and adequate in times of digital convergence, despite some degree of criticism. As one 
of the objectives of this thesis is to evaluate the best methods available for the promotion of 
national content, because of its relevance, as shown by the academic works here discussed, 
content quotas have the potential to have a significant role in this design. Therefore, those 
requirements will be carefully analysed in Chapter 7 during the second part of this thesis. 
 
As films are an important component of broadcasting schedules and important contributors towards 
national culture and identities, the next section will present the academic debate on the regulations 
for the development of the film industries. 
 
 
3.7 Film policies 
As the film industry has the potential to generate considerable economic revenues for the country 
that produces it - by generating considerable amounts of tax revenues from internal distribution, 
exports and high quality jobs, promoting tourism and other acclaimed benefits - governments are 
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increasingly treating the developing of national content as an industrial strategy (Harvey, 2006; 
Oxford Economics, 2007: 1-7; Throsby, 2010: 14-28). This section will discuss in broader terms the 
cultural policies with relation to film production and the increasingly intertwined relationship 
between film and television industries. 
 
According to Grant (House of Lords, 2010), several countries, including Canada and Australia, 
pursue the development and establishment of creative clusters as part of their industrial policy for 
the production industry. In fact, the availability of many skilled workers such as writers and 
composers is also useful for supporting other cultural industries, not only films. In the UK, as 
Dickinson and Harvey (2005) describe, the UK film policy had mostly an “industrialist” approach 
and currently it foments both cultural and economic goals. Although the authors criticise the fact 
that governmental agencies, who should balance those mixed objectives, are run predominantly by 
business leaders. In line with that view, De Smaele (2007: 119) remarks that the UK leans more 
towards an economic approach to cultural policy and, conversely, the author believes that France 
is more culturally oriented. 
 
Throughout their book Blockbusters and trade wars Grant and Wood (2005) describe the Canadian 
“cultural tool kit” as a successful recipe for promoting national industries. According to the authors, 
the „push-pull‟ measures should include: the correct assessment of the nationality of the work; the 
usage of PSB for promoting national identity; content quotas; establishing minimum spending rules; 
supporting national ownership; promoting competition policy and; granting subsidies. During 
Chapter 7 I will analyse most of those tools in detail. For now I will concentrate on screens quotas 
(for cinemas), as discussed by other scholars. 
 
According to Baker (2002: 232-3), by creating a demand, a „push‟ factor for national films, screen 
quotas contribute to the production of more indigenous films. Nevertheless, Lee (2009), while 
analysing the Korean screen quota system, found that the policy was more effective if associated 
with broadcasting quotas, because of the interdependency existing between the film and television 
industry. Returning to the countries which are the focus of this study, while Britain does not adopt a 
screen quota for national films, Brazil and France (although without enforcing) do (Collins, 1986: 
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298; Johnson, 1987: 184-5; Ulff-Møller, 2001: 144). Hill (1996: 99-101) remarked that quotas and 
the cinema agency were scrapped by the Thatcher administration while inserted in a discourse of 
“do away the paraphernalia of Government intervention” but also recognised that, ultimately, 
screen quotas were not stimulating the production of films. The Brazilian governmental approach 
also had similarities with Britain. Although not scrapping the screen quotas, president Collor also 
abolished the film agency and in the early 1990s the country‟s production dropped dramatically 
(Moises, 2003: 6-7). 
 
The screen quota in France is also an object of criticism. Jackel (1996: 88) inserts the French 
quota requirement within an overall policy for the protection of national culture. The author also 
acknowledges, although in another work (1999: 181), that more important for the French cinema is 
the comprehensive financing scheme set up by the French government since the 1950s. 
 
The French integrated framework for both film and television may be a response to the fact that, as 
highlighted in Chapter 2 when presenting the different exhibition windows of audiovisual content, 
films are important ingredients of television schedules. Therefore, the development of the national 
film industry is also dependant on national broadcasting. As Mazdon (1999: 74) claims: 
One thing which is certain is that the relationship between cinema and television, in 
France, Britain and indeed the United States is now undeniable. Indeed, it is fair to say 
that in Britain and France cinematic production could no longer survive without the 
support of television companies. 
 
That assertion might also be applicable to other countries. Mazdon (ibid: 80) concludes that 
“[c]inema is now dependent upon the television companies for financial support but equally 
television turns to the cinema for a significant proportion of its programming.” In a similar line of 
argument, Ostrowska (2007: 38) also remarks that cinema is increasingly depending on television 
for funds and thus the cinematic production is more oriented towards the television needs. 
 
Although an in-depth analysis of the financing schemes is included in Chapter 7, at this point it is 
important to note the following points. The more comprehensive financing scheme in France is 
regarded by some, like Guerrieri, Iapadre and Koopmann (2005: 35) and Leveratto (2007: 187), as 
being too focused on protecting the language and captured by film-makers and big cinema 
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distributors. On the contrary, the British policy is considered too centred on commercial issues 
(Newsinger, 2009) and too concerned with bringing in foreign investment (Harvey, 2006). Finally, 
the Brazilian approach could not refrain the economic power of Organizacoes Globo to extend their 
dominant position to the film activity as well, as remarked by Santos (2009). 
 
In times of digital convergence and global ownership, and with content being made with a view to 
comply with quotas but also to the international market to amortize production investments, the 
introduction of cultural policies for fostering indigenous productions has to take into consideration 
the interdependency of both services and global markets. In fact, as will be seen in Chapter 7, 
cultural policies are integrating film and audiovisual developing strategies into single frameworks. 
 
This section on film policies ends the discussions on the regulatory developments of recent times 




During this chapter I have explored the academic perceptions and the industrial and political 
discourses regarding the recent developments of broadcasting and telecommunication regulation. 
Additionally, this chapter has summarised the debates around the cultural policies of television and 
film industries. There is a consensus that the first tendency of liberalising broadcasting and 
privatising telecommunication of the 1980s and 1990s, changed to a continuous promotion of 
competition, in and between services, which led to a process of digital convergence. The new 
scenario impacted the regulatory aims and concerns and resulted in the usage of different 
regulatory tools. The objectives shifted from liberalising and de-regulating commercial 
communication services to regulating for competition, opening technological bottlenecks, mitigating 
gatekeepers and also re-regulating PSBs in continuously increasing commercial mediaspaces. 
 
While during the first period (1980-2000) regulation was focused on ex ante rules inducing a new 
communication scenario, during the second period (2000-onwards) regulators are increasingly 
acting ex post, monitoring the market and only proposing remedies when, in their views, the 
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market‟s normal development could jeopardise consumer choice. As remarked by researchers, 
policymakers acknowledged that the consolidation of the market that followed liberalisation and 
digital convergence brought problems of pluralism of the media, particularly in broadcasting, which 
could in turn diminish competition. Moreover, as digital convergence blurs services and companies‟ 
interests, communication authorities‟ main regulatory action is to assess and propose measures 
assuring the continuity of competition. The convergence era is also the era of competition 
regulation. 
 
The discussion has also shown that whilst from the telecommunication side there are no actual 
forces hampering the progress of digital convergence, from the broadcasting side there is still 
strong opposition to „borderless‟ services. Member States and national broadcasters, especially 
PSBs, still „waive the flag‟ for the separation of the services. Broadcasting and cultural products are 
still seen as important deliverers of national culture and contributors to identities. Regulation, 
although with varying intensities between countries, imposes rules for the protection and 
development of national content. Not only „push-pull‟ policies, such as broadcasting quotas and 
financing schemes, are implemented. In addition, more comprehensive regulatory toolkits, which 
are useful for boosting television and film production, are set in place by national governments to 
achieve both cultural and industrial goals. 
 
As seen from other scholars‟ works presented in this chapter, those are controversial policies for 
the promotion of national industries and for assuring distribution means for local content. The 
extent and the impact of those regulations on national industries will be the subject of my research 
during Part Two of this thesis. 
 
The first three chapters of Part One have served as a literature review and as a contextualisation of 
the cultural, technological, economics and regulatory aspects of audiovisual content. Chapter 3 in 
particular was important to show to the reader that, as regarded by academics, policies aimed at 
fostering national content have implications in various fields and activities. In the second part of this 
thesis, I will perform a dual analysis of the legislation and of the communication markets of the 
selected countries. This double assessment will enable me to identify the key elements present in 
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regulation that boost the production of national content. First though, the next and final chapter of 
Part One is devoted to explaining the methodological and theoretical framework that I have applied 
for the comparative media research of the case studies. The chapter will detail the media policy 
analysis that will be undertaken, the regulatory acts and databases that will be used, and the 
theoretical concepts and ideas that will guide this research concerned with the promotion of 
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THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
 
"I know that I know nothing" 
Attributed to Socrates 
 
“I know nothing” 
Manuel (Andrew Sachs) 




As a reminder of the objectives of this thesis, this comparative media research is concerned with 
the understanding of how the policies enacted in the recent era of digital convergence and of global 
media affect the production of national content. Thus far, in order to contextualise this research 
focus, I have used this first part of the thesis for guiding the reader through the various aspects 
involved. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the production of audiovisual content encompasses 
sociological, cultural, technological and economic aspects that are highly intertwined. As a result of 
those interactions and of the political struggles between the different agents that comprise the 
audiovisual industry chain, a certain level of agreement is transubstantiated in each country‟s 
legislation and overall regulation. In Chapter 3 I have shown how after liberalisation national laws 
and transnational agreements were drawn up in order to accommodate traditional broadcasters 
and telecommunication companies in the new digital media world. After this contextualisation, the 
current chapter details the research framework used throughout this research in order to identify 
how the production of national content is affected in the current scenario and how regulation is 
used and can be used for its promotion. 
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The methodology used to perform and guide the research involves a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the study will be divided into 
three steps, where both the legislation and the market will be scrutinised. The first step analyses 
the socio-cultural aims of broadcasting as enacted in legislation. The second step focuses on the 
regulatory tools of the communication legislation, including quotas and funding, the so-called „push-
pull‟ regulations. The third and last step of this research evaluates the results or the possible 
consequences of that legal framework by performing a market analysis of the audiovisual activities 
of the selected countries. 
 
This chapter is divided in two main sections. Section 4.2 describes those three steps in detail, 
clarifies the definitions and concepts, and indicates the data sources used throughout this 
research. In section 4.3 I raise awareness about the limitations of the proposed research method 
and the applicability of possible extrapolations to other countries. 
 
 
4.2 Methodological approach 
In order to correctly understand the developing path that led to the current times of digital 
convergence, it is necessary to trace the changes in legislation back to the start of the liberalisation 
process, when more channels and delivery systems started to open to the public. Therefore, as I 
will describe later on in more detail, I will analyse the legislation from the 1980s to 2011. 
 
Before detailing the three-step analysis that will be followed in this research, I would like to clarify 
how I define three important concepts that will be used throughout this thesis: 
 PSB – The public service broadcaster, (in some cases) owned by the government or by the 
public with a level of independence from the national government. In this synthetic 
conception, the PSBs of our case studies are: the BBC (UK), France Televisions (France) 
and the EBC (Empresa Brasileira de Comunicacao and producer of the channel TV Brasil). 
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 Traditional (or main terrestrial) broadcasters – The original broadcasters available in the 
analogue mode and which are freely received through the air (free-to-air services - FTA) 
and included in paytv platforms as must-carry obligations.
44
 
 Broadcasting services – Different modalities (or platforms) of distribution of broadcasting 
channels, which include: FTA (analogue and digital); paytv (mainly cable and satellite) and; 
non-linear services (such as VOD and IPTV). 
 
4.2.1 Step 1 – Analysis of the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting 
services as expressed in legislation 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the regulation of the production and distribution of 
audiovisual content is directed by broader socio-cultural objectives. My research is based on the 
assumption that regulatory tools present in legislation are supporting the achievement of higher 
socio-cultural goals for the different broadcasting services. The first step of the research, objective 
of Chapter 6, will analyse how those objectives are addressed by broadcasting legislation. The first 
step of analysis, together with the second step that I will describe later on, should indicate which 
approach, whether cultural or industrialist, is favoured by the legislation of each country. Figure 3 
below indicates the model of analysis proposed for the first two steps of this research. 
 
                                                          
44
 In the UK: BBC 1, BBC 2, ITV 1, Channel 4 and Channel 5. In France: TF1, France 2, France 3, M6 and 
Canal Plus (albeit the latter is a subscription-over-the-air channel, because it is part-time open to the public 
and is an important component to the French scenario it is included in the hall of traditional broadcasters). In 
Brazil: SBT, Record, Globo, Band, TV Brasil (although there are other networks available in several 
localities such as Rede TV). Please see Chapter 3 for explanation on must-carry rules. 




Figure 3- First and second steps: evaluation of objectives and tools in regulation 
 
As represented in Figure 3, the first step will evaluate the selected legislation against specific 
concepts that, arguably, define the socio-cultural aims of broadcasting as envisaged by 
policymakers. Those concepts and their definitions (extracted from the discussions of the previous 



























































STEP 1 STEP 2 
PROMOTION OF NATIONAL CONTENT 
 UK  France  Brazil 
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Table 1 – Step 1 – socio-cultural objectives found in legislation 
Objectives Definition 
Diversity Provision of a broad range of information, views, and of content (diverse 
programming) adding richness and variety to cultural and social life 
(McQuail & Siune, 1998: 42-3). 
Plurality Different sources of information (different ownership) and the existence 
of autonomous and independent media(McQuail & Siune, 1998: 42-3); 
concept related to „ownership pluralism‟ (Kuhn 1995: 50) or „external 
pluralism of ownership‟ for the balance of opinions (Levy 1999: 28). 
Democracy Usage of the media as part of the public sphere and as a democratic tool 
for participation and for public debate; integrated with the political 
system and without censorship (Price, 1995: 23). 
Citizenry 
Usage of the media for the promotion of ideas of belonging, identity and 
participation (Morley & Robins, 1995: 74; Price, 1995: 17) and of PSB 
for the Reithian ethos “to educate, entertain and inform” (cited in Wise & 
Steemers, 2000: 90). 
Cultural relevance Usage of mass media for the support of national values and authors 
(Oren & Petro, 2004: 99). The support of the public interest by 
disseminating cultural goods, sharing a cultural heritage and “securing 
channels for reaching people with artistic cultural experience” (McQuail, 
1992: 284). 
 
This step will not attempt to quantify broad and polysemic concepts such as democracy, citizenry 
and cultural relevance but, instead, evaluate how broadcasting services are related to those 
aspects, as addressed by legislation, and how those objectives have changed through time. Within 
the concepts presented in Table 1, I would like to draw the attention to diversity and pluralism. 
Those two ideas had shown some discrepancies in their definitions according to different authors 
and, also, regulations (see Annex 3 for detailed examples of those differences). During this 
research I will relate diversity to „a whole range of opinions and of types of programmes‟ (internal 
pluralism) and plurality to „plurality of ownership‟ (external pluralism). 
 
A second qualifying remark I wish to make about this proposed approach is that most of the socio-
cultural concepts analysed here are in fact inter-related. Although I drew boundary lines as clearly 
as possible in order to isolate the different objectives, some regulations may be classified by other 
researchers as supporting different concepts and hence the objectives fostered could be 
interpreted differently. 
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As to the pieces of legislation studied, I will include in my socio-cultural analysis regulations from 
two originally different spheres: FTA broadcasting and telecommunication providers (distributors of 
cable, satellite and on-demand platforms). A summary of the pieces of legislation that will be used 
in this research is given in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 – Main regulatory instruments analysed 
UK France Brazil 
Broadcasting Act 1981, 
1990 & 1996 
Broadcasting Act 1982 Broadcasting Code 
4117/62 and Decree-Act 
236/67 
BBC Charter and 




1986 (and amendments 
1994 to 2007) 
Federal Constitution 
1988 
Communications Act 2003 Cable Act 8977/95 
PSB Act 11652/08 
Paytv Act 12485/2011 
 
As the reader can see from Table 2, I included in this analysis the broadcasting acts that started 
the liberalisation of broadcasting in the 1980s in the European countries. I decided to start my 
analysis in that decade because the current media landscape and the majority of the existing 
traditional channels in Europe were deeply influenced by the reforms initiated in that period. For the 
Brazilian side, in order to maintain a cohesive analysis between the three countries, the starting 
point will have to date back to the Broadcasting Code 1962, as it was the broadcasting act in vogue 
in the 1980s (and still is). 
 
In this step I will analyse the acts that introduced in Britain and in France the new broadcasters 
Channel 4 and Canal Plus, in 1981 and 1982 respectively. In the British case, the analysis includes 
the reforms of 1990, 1996 and 2003 and concludes with the BBC Charter and Agreement of 2006. 
It is important to note that in the British case, the Broadcasting Acts 1990, 1996 and the 
Communication Act 2003 are still valid and, therefore, need to be interpreted jointly.
45
 In France the 
broadcasting analysis will be continued with the ongoing Freedom of Communications Act (FoCA) 
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 See Annex 3 for more information on the legislative amendment process. 
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1986, including its amendments. In order to understand how the broadcasting sector is organised 
in Brazil, it is necessary to include the Federal Constitution 1988 as it is the instrument that sets out 
the overall aims of broadcasting services in that country. The other pieces of legislation for the 
Brazilian broadcasting analysis are the PSB Act 2007 and the Paytv Act 2011. 
 
From the telecommunication side of regulation, the second sphere aforesaid, the legislation will be 
analysed only topically, focusing exclusively on the access rules and universal obligations. Those 
obligations were initially set in the cable and satellite legislations of the 1980s and later 
incorporated in broader broadcasting acts, in the case of the European countries. In Brazilian 
regulation, those rules were foreseen in the Cable Act 1995 and later transferred to the newest 
Paytv Act 2011. The universal obligations that were introduced in later reforms in Europe were 
incorporated on the British Communication Act 2003 and on the FoCA 1986 for the French case. 
 
In order to assess whether more attention is given to the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting 
or, alternatively, if regulation is solely employed to discipline the industrial and commercial aspects 
related to the production and distribution of domestic content, this step is complemented by the 
second step. 
 
4.2.2 Step 2 – Analysis of the Regulatory tools for the promotion of 
national content 
The second step of this research, objective of Chapter 7, is the analysis of the regulatory tools 
supporting the production and distribution of national content, both for television programmes and 
films. This step focuses on the tools relating to the economic, technological and content aspects 
which are detailed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Step 2 – regulatory tools analysed 








Ownership rules Clauses in regulation relating to the ownership of broadcasting 
channels and limits to cross-media ownership. 
Nationality of the 
content 
Systematic adopted by regulators for establishing the nationality 
of the produced content (film and television). 
Funding Schemes foreseen in regulation for financing national productions 
(tax reliefs, levies, funds and public subsidies) 
Commercial rights Rules regarding the commercialisation of broadcasting rights, 











Rules of access Existence of offering rules (must-carry, must-offer and may-







Cinema quotas Screen quotas and film diversity in cinema screens. 
Broadcasting and 
non-linear quotas 
National content quotas and quotas for specific types of 
programmes (such as educational or news). 
 
The tools related to the economics of the media, listed in Table 3, regulate the relationships 
between the different activities involved with the production and distribution of audiovisual content 
and with questions of nationality. The technological tools are mainly related to the rules of access 
to the main terrestrials. This is a matter of increased importance with the roll-out of DTV. The third 
category, tools related to content and normally expressed as quantifiable quotas in terms of 
percentages and hours of specific types of content, indicate which types of content are being 
fostered and attract more the attention of policymakers and regulators. The quota analysis will 
trace the historical development of the various content quotas foreseen by regulation. The size of 
those obligations for broadcasting services, cinema screens, independent productions and the 
different kind of content enforced by regulation will be identified and quantified. That evaluation will 
enable a direct comparison between the three case study countries and analyse how the socio-
cultural objectives identified in broadcasting regulations are promoted throughout the period 
analysed. 
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Quota obligations are foreseen in the broadcasting acts listed in Table 2 and these regulations 
comply with the TWF/AMVS Directive which will also be object of study. The requirements are 
further detailed in broadcasters‟ licences for the case of the European countries. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, in the case of Britain there is only a European content rule imposed by the TWF/AVMS 
Directive. France has that same regional quota complemented by their FoCA 1986 which 
establishes additional national content obligations. Brazil does not have a national content quota 
for commercial FTA broadcasters. 
 
Independent productions quotas are set by the same European Directive and by the broadcasting 
acts already mentioned in Table 2 for the European countries. Brazilian obligations are set both in 
the PSB Act 2008, and therefore only valid for the PSB, and in the Paytv Act 2011, in this case 
valid only for paytv channels. 
 
Specific content obligations are set in each broadcaster‟s license in the case of the European 
countries. As it would be impractical to analyse the licenses of all existing broadcasters, this 
research will concentrate only on the main terrestrial broadcasters. Specific content obligations 
impose on broadcasters the funding and scheduling of specific types of programmes, for instance: 
films; news; children and educational. Those obligations (set in terms of percentages and of hours) 
are detailed on broadcasters‟ licenses and, in the case of PSBs, agreements. 
 
The cinema (screen quotas) activity will be included in this analysis because of the close 
relationship and dependence (in terms of financing and of distribution opportunities) between film 
and television production. For cinema production the main existing obligations to be scrutinised are 
the screen quota and the diversity agreements with cinema operators. As the UK abolished screen 
quotas in 1985 (J. Hill, 1996: 101), I will analyse the Brazilian and French decrees that establish 
screen quotas. With regards to diversity of films in cinemas, these are agreements only present in 
the French case. 
 
A significant part of the regulatory instruments that will be analysed in Step 2 is that used in Step 1 
and listed in Table 2. However, for the analysis of how the nationality of the content is assessed 
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and the funding mechanisms in place, the Acts contained in Table 4 have to be added to the 
investigation. 
 
Table 4 – Additional regulatory instruments relating to the definition of national content and its 
financing 
UK France Brazil 
Films Act 1985 Films and Audiovisual 
Diffusion Decree 90-66 
(and amendments 1992, 
2001 & 2004) 
Cultural Patronage Act  
 (Rouanet Act) 8313/91 
Financing Act 2006 Production Financing 
Decrees 95-110, 99-130, 








In the British case both aspects of nationality and funding mechanisms are present in the Films Act 
1985 (and 1999, 2005 and 2006 amendments).
46
 For the French case the financing is foreseen by 
the FoCA 1986 and implemented by the Decree 95-110 which is regularly updated.
47
 The legal 
instruments that set the grounds for classifying the content as French are set by the Decree 90-66 
and the CSA Norm from the 21/May/1992. Brazil defines the nationality of the content by the 
Ancine Provisional Measure 2228-1/2001. The tax relief regimes and other incentives are 
established by the Audiovisual Incentives Acts 8313/91 and 8685/93, both of which have been 
amended several times. 
 
Whilst the first step indicates how governments are shifting the different socio-cultural aims of 
broadcasting services, this second step is aimed at clarifying how the socio-cultural concepts are 
being promoted by policymakers and regulators to sustain national audiovisual industries in recent 
times. Therefore, the combination of these two initial steps will indicate whether policymakers and 
                                                          
46
 The actual procedures are detailed on the Film Production Company Manual from the Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs which will not be analysed because tax technicalities are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The 2005 and 2006 amendments were introduced by the Finance Act 2006. 
47
 The act created the SOFICA (Societes pour le Financement de l‟Industrie) and the COSIP (Compte de 
soutien à l‟Industrie des Programmes Audiovisuels), which are important funding mechanisms that will be 
described in detail in Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER IV – THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
91 
 
regulators are actually connecting the socio-cultural objectives of communication services with the 
designed regulatory tools. This analysis will indicate whether regulation is pursuing „cultural‟ or 
„industrial‟ approaches while promoting the development of national content and national 
audiovisual industries. 
 
4.2.3 Step 3 – Analysis of market data 
The third and last step of this research and the objective of Chapter 8 is the market evaluation. The 
main parameters concerning audiovisual media services will be evaluated using reports from the 
broadcasting sector, regulators and other third party databases which will be specified later on 
during this section. In this (recent) historical assessment the figures that will be quantified are listed 
in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 – Third step: the market analysis 
Production market Broadcasters Distribution market Viewers 
Number of 
companies 





Viewing shares of 
main and digital 
channels 
Total production in 
hours 
Hours produced and 
commissioned 
Ownership Origin of the most 
viewed content 
Types of programmes 
and films produced 
Programme schedules Combined revenues Origin of most 
viewed film in 
cinemas 
Combined revenues Origin of 
films/formats 
Public investment Revenues/Funding 
Exports/ Imports 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, the market analysis will be divided into the same activities as those 
presented in Chapter 2, while describing the industry chain segments: producers, broadcasters, 
distributors, and viewers. The variables analysed for the production activity will indicate the 
fulfilment of socio-cultural objectives and assess the economic development of that particular 
sector. Within the socio-cultural aspects, the degree of diversity will be indicated by analysing the 
combination of the number of companies in activity with the total production in hours. The cultural 
output, and therefore an indication of the cultural relevance, will be measured by analysing the kind 
of content produced and viewed in the country. The impact on the national economy will be 
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considered by assessing the public investment (in terms of grants, direct funding and tax reliefs) in 
conjunction with the exports results. 
 
For the broadcasting activity the cultural relevance will be assessed by combining the analysis of 
the kind of content being broadcast and its nationality. As formats are currently a considerable part 
of the broadcast content, the nationality of the actual origin of the format will also be scrutinised. 
The contribution of broadcasters to the overall audiovisual sector will be quantified by analysing the 
investment diverted to production, whether in-house or commissioned. Moreover, the financial 
strength of the activity will be evaluated by assessing its economic size (revenues or financing in 
the case of PSBs) and the result of international trade. 
 
As an indication of the degree to which digital convergence is being achieved in each country, the 
distribution segment will be assessed succinctly by analysing the ownership of the major 
distribution platforms and its penetration. This analysis will indicate whether telecommunication 
companies may represent a relevant competitor to broadcasting services and if foreign companies 
are important deliverers of national culture in times of digital convergence. 
 
Completing the market analysis, viewers‟ preferences will be evaluated. This assessment will be 
used as a parameter for measuring the effectiveness and the desirability of public policies 
concerned with the promotion of national content. The viewing shares may be regarded as a 
justification of the public effort in regulating and funding national content. In the extreme 
hypothetical case, it would be useless to produce and exhibit content not watched by anyone. 
Therefore, during the investigation of this segment of the „market‟, the viewing shares of the main 
channels and the nationality of the most watched content will be analysed. Formats are also of 
particular interest for this research because imported cultural concepts may be used while still 
complying with national content quotas. By analysing the origin and genre of the most desired 
content it will be possible to conclude if quota policies are responsible for generating and 
maintaining certain socio-cultural aspects and the local industry. In addition, it allows us to see 
whether that industry and regulatory effort is valued by the citizenry. As mentioned before, because 
CHAPTER IV – THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
93 
 
of the close relationship between cinema and television industries, audiences‟ preferences on 
cinema screens will also be studied. 
 
As to the data used for this third step, the parameters for the market analysis, listed in Table 5, will 
be sought in secondary sources. The main ones are presented in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6 – Industry data sources 
Type UK France Brazil 
Regulatory 
agencies 
Ofcom CSA (broadcasting) Ancine (film production) 




Barb, EBU, Eurostat, Mediametric Abta (paytv), Abert 
(broadcasting), Portal do 
Cinema and Filme B 
(films) 
Broadcasters Annual reports, Press releases 
Industry 
(other) 
Reports (Pact, Grupo de Midia); Reports in relevant trade journals such as Screen 
Digest, Broadcast; Newspaper articles 
Academic Academic journals and library databases (Ebsco, Sage, Jstor, Muse, eThos, Nexis 
etc) 
 
The regulatory agencies are vast sources of information for the production, broadcasting and 
telecommunication sector as well as covering topics regarding users‟ preferences and viewing 
habits. For the British case, Ofcom reports will be used for the information regarding broadcasting 
and telecommunication services and the BFI (British Film Institute) for the film production activity. 
As shown in Table 6, France will be analysed by using two agencies (the CSA - Conseil Superieur 
de L‟audiovisuel - and the CNC - Centre National du Cinema et de l‟Image Animee). For the 
Brazilian case, Anatel will be used for telecommunications and Ancine (Agencia Nacional do 
Cinema) for audiovisual production. The governmental information will be complemented with tier 
party reports. Documents produced by research associations, commercial industry bodies, and 
relevant government bodies (non-regulatory) will be used for the market analysis. The data will be 
completed with information provided in relevant trade and academic journals and newspaper 
articles. 
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At this point it is important to mention that although the regulatory analysis will commence with the 
instruments of the 1980s, because of the lack of consistent available information, the market 
analysis will be performed with data starting from a later period and will vary according to the 
activity and source used. For instance, the assessment of the quota obligations will start in 1987 
(for the French case) and 1993 (UK), data regarding broadcasters‟ activities will start in 1993, 
independent production from 2003 and audience shares from 2000 onwards (for more detail on the 




With the completion of this third step, I will identify the results of the policies analysed in the 
previous first and second steps. This third step will indicate the extent of the development of 
national audiovisual industries and indicate if national production and the socio-cultural values 
fostered by regulation attract the attention of the viewers. The market analysis will address three 
main questions. First, if the production and distribution of national content is maintained within 
desirable (and regulatory) levels allowing the maintenance of national culture and identity. 
Secondly, whether national content attracts considerable audience share. Thirdly, what kind of 
national content is more prominently watched. The analysis of those three questions will enable me 
to assess, critically and evidence-based, the effectiveness of the regulatory framework approach of 
regulation and whether it has a „cultural‟ or „industrialist‟ bias. That is the purpose of dividing the 
research into three steps. 
 
After discussing the methods and the sources of information, the next section will elaborate on the 
limitations of the proposed research. 
 
 
4.3 Limitations of the proposed methodology 
Besides the lack of availability of data for all the period which is covered by the legislative analysis, 
as discussed in the previous section, the proposed methodology does have other drawbacks. The 
first one, and perhaps the most obvious, is that there are other parameters which are not analysed 
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 It is important to note, however, that this gap between the years of enactment of the legislation and the 
market data is also necessary in order to allow the changes in legislation to have a noticeable impact on the 
markets. 
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in this research but that also influence the performance of national industries. The overall economic 
strength of the country, currency exchange rate fluctuations, the success of a particular show and 
other numerous and unaccountable varied factors may substantially alter an industry‟s 
development and growth. For example, not only is the success of content unpredictable, as Grant 
and Wood (2005: 48-9) remind us, the „nobody knows factor‟, but other unforeseen factors such as 
the scriptwriters strike in the USA in 2007-2008 may also play a role. In the latter case for instance, 
the event had a positive impact on British exports of formats, as suggested by Esser (2010). 
Nevertheless, the legislative framework analysis is still significant as the legislation sets the overall 
direction and level of development desired by national governments for their own audiovisual 
industries. 
 
Davis (2008: 53-4) notes that the rationale behind this kind of research, which he categorises as 
being under the domain of media political economy, is that cultural output is shaped by a country‟s 
overall set of conditions, including legislation. The author notes that whilst some researchers 
explain the cultural production by focusing on the consequences of advertising or of media 
concentration, others link the development to politics, policy and regulation, as in the following 
quote (ibid: 54): 
Laws governing such things as media ownership, cultural content, licensing and levels of 
taxation are all likely to have a bearing on cultural outputs. In these accounts cultural 
outputs are in part shaped as a consequence of political and economic conditions. The 
negotiations and decisions of individual politicians, regulators and business owners and 
advertisers filter through to influence the choices and methods of those who make, edit, 
produce and distribute cultural products. 
 
As can be seen from the preceding quote, a political economy approach placing a particular 
emphasis on legislation is not regarded as inappropriate or overestimated, rather it is a valuable 
angle from which to understand and suggest alternatives for the development of national cultures. 
Nevertheless, I acknowledge the fact that the analysis performed here will be influenced by my 
personal professional background. Having been working as a policy specialist, I may have 
developed a tendency of overestimating the driving force of regulation. On the other hand, this 
professional experience was an important asset in digesting the arid legislative texts and intricate 
proceedings which is certainly a limiting factor in undertaking this kind of research. 
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On a final note, comparative media research is often acknowledged as being better executed by 
„native scholars‟ (Verhulst & Price, 2009: 142), which is clearly not the case in this research when 
analysing Britain and France (albeit I have been based in the UK during this research). However, 
the methodology here proposed - by dissecting the regulation into socio-cultural objectives and 
regulatory tools and complementing this analysis with an evaluation of the different segments of the 




The creation of a supportive environment for the development of the various activities related to 
audiovisual content is a goal constantly sought by national governments. Some countries may be 
more open to foreign companies and to imported cultural products, while others may have a 
tendency to absorb more eagerly those produced by local companies. Moreover, the ideas 
supported by legislation might favour the empowerment of local values and culture or simply reflect 
an industrialist desire of developing a particular economic activity. Therefore, the ideal policy could 
be regarded as the one that balances those two goals, cultural and industrialist, generating a 
virtuous cycle for the production, distribution, maintenance and flourishing of national cultures 
alongside a healthy development of national audiovisual industries. 
 
The methodology proposed is expected to elucidate which kind of national content and socio-
cultural concepts and, overall, of audiovisual sector each of the selected countries are 
implementing and fostering. The first step will indicate which socio-cultural goals are deemed as 
important by policymakers. The research of the second step will show how socio-cultural values 
are promoted by the regulatory tools concerned with the production and distribution of national 
content. Together, both steps will indicate if „push-pull‟ policies are adequate for fostering and 
developing the production of national content and whether the setup valorises in a balanced way 
both „cultural‟ and „industrialist‟ sides needed for the audiovisual industry in times of digital 
convergence. The final step will provide evidence of the impact of the regulatory framework setup 
and the actual audiovisual development through time. 
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As discussed in the introduction to the thesis, there are several contributions to knowledge offered 
by this research. Based on the evidence gathered with the three step analysis proposed, the 
regulatory elements that positively and negatively affect the development of national audiovisual 
industries will be identified. In this media political economy analysis, the exploration of the current 
developments and the different regulatory perspectives implemented by the selected countries will 
contribute to generate an informative picture of the latest trends in those significant countries. In 
addition, as those countries are relevant for the international economy and for the overall 
policymaking process, the approaches and tools developed and used there may also be useful for 
a comparative media analysis with other countries. Alongside this panorama, the research will 
enable the identification of a relevant toolkit for the promotion of national content, useful for 
regulators and policymakers. With the combined method proposed here, the socio-cultural 
concepts enforced by specific quotas will be assessed against concrete parameters of market 
performance. As a consequence, the identification of the elements that positively contribute 
towards the production of national content will be based on evidence. Due to this systematic 
approach, I believe that this three step method could be applied to other countries with a certain 
degree of success, clarity and verifiability expected. 
 
Part Two of this thesis will focus on the research conducted on the three case study countries. The 
first chapter, Chapter 5, will examine the recent changes in the communication landscapes of the 
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" „Forget everything that I wrote‟, I never said to 
anybody...It happened the other way round...There was 
an evolution, in some points, but the basic way of 
looking to the world remains the same” 
former President and sociologist Fernando Henrique 






As the globalisation process is aided with the speed of electronic communication, there may be a 
general feeling that the world is constantly becoming more connected, inter-dependent and the 
media systems more similar. The first three contextualisation chapters have already shown the 
similarities and the closeness of the events, trends and forces that shaped the mediaspaces in 
recent years, notably liberalisation, digitalisation and the ongoing process of digital convergence. 
The purpose of this chapter, the first of the second part, is to elaborate on the recent history of the 
communication services in each of the three case studies comparing their broadcasting landscapes 
and how they were modelled by changes in legislation. This up to date panorama is one of the 
contributions to knowledge of this comparative media research. 
 
The chapter starts with section 5.2 comparing the models and general setups of the broadcasting 
systems of the three case study countries. After this initial appraisal, sections 5.3 to 5.5 will 
illustrate how regulators in Britain, France and Brazil gradually licensed the spectrum to different 
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and, in some cases, complementary broadcasters and how their channels started to compete with 
paytv platforms. Before the conclusions, section 5.6 will summarise the major legislative 
developments and illustrate the current broadcasting landscapes of the case studies. 
 
 
5.2 Brief contextualisation of the different media systems of the UK, 
France and Brazil 
As one of the purposes of this thesis is to suggest a regulatory toolkit for the promotion of national 
content and as traditional broadcasters play a significant role producing and distributing national 
programmes, an initial comparison between the broadcasting systems is necessary. This 
contextualisation will indicate the applicability of the transposition of different regulatory solutions 
not only with regards to our case studies but, also, with other countries. As Browne (1989: 60) 
remarks: 
An understanding of [the factors that influence broadcasting systems] should make it 
easier to observe how and why systems resemble each other and differ, and what each 
might profitably learn from another’s perspective. 
 
Broadcasting systems are different around the world and the causes of these variations may be 
traced back to their creation. In the case of the UK, in 1925 the (parliamentarian) Crawford 
Committee, appointed by the British Postmaster General, concluded in its report that “the United 
States system of free and uncontrolled transmission and reception was unsuited to Britain” and that 
broadcasting should be a monopoly of one entity (Commons, 2004: 56). During the proceedings it 
was suggested that broadcasting should be delivered by “a public corporation which should act as 
a trustee for the national interest” and not directly by the government (Banerjee & Seneviratne, 
2006: 22). In accordance with the Committee‟s suggestions, the BBC (British Broadcasting 
Corporation) was then established for the provision of a public service at an arm‟s length from the 
public administration, minimising direct interference from the government or from private 
companies. 
 
Conversely in France, broadcasting was subjected to strong political control until the end of state 
monopoly in 1982 with the election of Mitterrand, the first leftist president of the Fifth Republic (i.e. 
since the end of World War II) (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 35; Kuhn, 1995: 165). At the other extreme 
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of governmental control, Brazilian television services were always characterised by weak state 
broadcasters (Conniff & McCann, 1991: 231; Lash & Lury, 2007: 160). In Brazil the consolidation of 
nationwide commercial broadcasting services was allowed and incentivised as long as television 
acted in the service of political objectives, dictated by the military regime of the 1960s (Becker & 
Gonzalez de Bustamante, 2009; Leal Filho, 1988: 31-3; Newcomb, 2004: 313; Porto, 2007; 
Thussu, 2007a: 95; Waisbord, 2000: 55). 
 
Although with different timing and intensity, all three countries have reached a similar media 
development and independence from the government. However, there have been episodes where 
the media have still shown some fragility in their independence. The BBC was accused of being 
partial in several episodes, more recently in 1991 and 2003 (Harrison, 2006: 121; Montgomery, 
2006).
49
 In the French case, according to Kuhn (1995: 185-95), until the end of governmental 
monopoly, partiality was an inherent characteristic of French television. After experiencing around 
twenty years of relative independence from direct governmental action, in a recent legislative 
change, as will be seen later on during this chapter, Sarkozy re-introduced some degree of state 
interference as the head of the PSB is directly appointed by the presidency of the republic. In the 
Brazilian example, although led by commercial groups, perhaps the most notorious episode of 
media bias was the coverage by commercial broadcasters, particularly TV Globo, of the 1989 
presidential debate between Lula and Collor. That event is considered to have overturned the 
results of that election, the first direct election since the 1960s, which resulted in the election of 
Collor, and is often referred to as the most partial and unfair coverage in Brazilian broadcasting 
history (Goulart, 2008; Straubhaar et al., 1993 cited in: La Pastina, 2004; Miguel & Simões, 2000). 
 
There are elements other than political independence that should be observed in the different 
media systems in order to understand the different broadcasting setups. Several academics, most 
notably Siebert et al. (1963) and Hallin and Mancini (2004), have developed different models of 
classification (see Annex 4 for the application of those models to the case studies) and the 
                                                          
49
 In 1926 the BBC was accused of both supporting the government and the unions during the Great Strike. 
During World War II it did not broadcast allegedly “state propaganda” and during the 1991 war with Iraq it 
was accused by the government of being sympathetic towards Iraq (Harrison 2006: 121). More recently, in 
the episode known as the Gilligan case, in the build up to the 2003 war with Iraq, the corporation broadcast a 
governmental dossier containing allegedly known false information supporting the governmental view that an 
invasion was needed (Montgomery 2006). 
CHAPTER V – RECENT CHANGES IN THE COMMUNICATION LANDSCAPES... 
102 
 
proposal of new classifications is still ongoing (see for instance Curran & Park, 2000 and; Engesser 
& Franzetti, 2011). Even though for the aims of this thesis a comprehensive discussion of those 
models is not relevant, it is important to notice that, although those scholars propose different 
classifications based on diverse concepts and dimensions, media systems have common and 
overlapping components which can be identified in each country‟s system. In fact, the changes in 
the world‟s political scenario, with the fall of communism in the late 1980s and the global shift, with 
few exceptions, towards neoliberalism may be regarded as reducing the diversity of broadcasting 
models (McQuail & Siune, 1998: 1-2). Or, as Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2011: 84) 
summarised, most countries are adopting a market-led American broadcasting philosophy. 
 
In our particular case studies, all three media systems may be summarised as being free (as 
opposed to censored), having a coexistence of public and private broadcasters and with some 
extent of social responsibility. Therefore it is reasonable to generalise that those media systems 
are converging into the „liberal model‟, under the classification of Hallin and Mancini or into the 




As those models are characterised by being predominantly and increasingly market oriented, but 
maintaining certain social responsibilities, a concept inherent to democracy, the comparison 
between the UK, France and Brazil will be useful and the conclusions applicable for other countries 
with similar models and political systems. After having contextualised the different broadcasting 
systems, the next sections, starting with the UK, will analyse in more detail each country and how 
the broadcasting services were implemented since the liberalisation of the 1980s. 
 
 
5.3 UK – consistently increasing competition 
One of the consequences of the technological evolution and of policy changes was the appearance 
of numerous television channels in a considerably short space of time. Although, the finite nature of 
the spectrum restricted that initial increase to cable and satellite.
51
 Perhaps due to the long tradition 
                                                          
50
 See Annex 4 for details on the classification of the media systems. 
51
 FTA broadcasting could only cope with up to 6 channels in the VHF band. The VHF channels were used 
by the former analogue channels (channels 2 to 13). For more technical details see Annex 2. 
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and prominence of the BBC, the UK opted for an even more restricted airwave occupation. Until 
1982, viewers in Britain only had three channels: BBC1 and 2 and the commercial ITV.
52
 In 1981 
policymakers decided to include another channel which would compete for advertisements. The 
Broadcasting Act 1981 was aimed to redress the balance of the broadcasting duopoly and Channel 
4 was created (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 24). The solution found by the British government was 
singular. As the existing channels were perceived as not serving minority tastes and audiences, 
Channel 4 was created as a public service and state-owned by the IBA (Independent Broadcasting 
Authority) (ibid). The channel‟s purpose was to “provide a national service for the social and 
cultural needs of so-called minority and specialist groups” (ibid). 
 
It was in this mediaspace, with public broadcasting (the BBC), one commercial channel (ITV) and 
Channel 4, also public but with advertisements that cable and satellite emerged. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the 1980s were times of liberalisation in several activities of the economy and 
broadcasting was one of the sectors where competition was introduced. Under the rules of the 
Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, by 1985, eight regional companies were offering cable 
nationwide with 20 channel packages and, in 1989, Sky satellite television services started with 
four channels (Crisell, 2002: 229-30; Robins & Jones, 1997: 175; Starks, 2007: 25). 
 
The liberalised multichannel, but still analogue, broadcasting environment triggered concerns of 
possible negative effects of media concentration and of foreign ownership (Conboy, 2010: 62). The 
Peacock Report
53
 of 1986, commissioned by the Thatcher government, criticised the BBC and ITV 
as inefficient and insulated from open competition. As a result, the main liberal and market oriented 
approach of the report was reflected in the subsequent Broadcasting Act (BA) 1990 (Conboy, 2010: 
62; Coppens & Downey, 2001: 333; Hutchison, 1999: 131; McDonnell, 1991: 164). Two new rules 
introduced by the new act are directly related to this thesis. First, the act mandated a 25% share of 
independent programming in broadcasting services (down from the 40% suggested in the Peacock 
report) and, secondly, a series of cross-ownership rules preventing media concentration both in 
broadcasting and, horizontally, with other media (Debrett, 2010: 39). Amongst the various 
ownership rules, national newspaper owners with a market share exceeding 20% could not hold 
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 ITV is a regional channel networked nationally for the broadcasting of certain programmes such as news. 
53
 The report of a parliamentarian committee. 
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licenses of ITV or Channel 5 (Barendt & Hitchens, 2000: 248; Parr, Finbow, & Hughes, 2005: 86). 
Another feature of the act that increased competition and that will be extremely relevant in the 
digital future, was the enabling of cable companies to offer telephony services (Crisell, 2002: 230). 
At this point it is important to mention that the fifth channel only started to broadcast seven years 
after its legal creation (and 15 years after the creation of Channel Four), which may indicate that 
the advertisement market was not big enough for sustaining another commercial channel at the 
time legislators created it. However, it was precisely during that hiatus between the 1980s and late 
1990s that paytv multichannel systems consolidated and matured in that country. Namely Sky 
emerged as the satellite operator and NTL and Telewest consolidated as the major cable 




It was under the rule of the BA 1990 that the different services started to digitalise and converge. In 
a „new multimedia environment‟ restrictive cross-ownership rules such as the existing ones were 
regarded by some (and by the operators) as negative for investment in new technologies. The 
argument for reducing restriction was the possibility of creating media conglomerates which could 
invest in digital technologies and compete in global markets (Doyle, 2002: 90-2; Wise & Steemers, 
2000: 105). Existing ex ante rules designed to promote domestic plurality, media groups were 
arguing, was incompatible with the maximisation of the economies of scale and scope of the, then, 
new multimedia possibilities (Doyle, 2002: 90). The subsequent BA 1996 was then introduced with 
the declared purpose of enabling digital terrestrial broadcasting (Gordon, 2009: 53-4). However, 
the new act also abolished limits on the number of licenses allowed in commercial broadcasting 
(Scriven & Lecomte, 1999: 9) and, instead, replaced them with a maximum cap of 15% share of 
total television audience (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 25). However, newspapers with more than 20% 
of national market share could still not hold television licenses (Scriven & Lecomte, 1999: 9). 
Nevertheless, those restrictions did not apply to Murdoch‟s interests, namely Sky, because, despite 
its critics, the satellite service was interpreted by policymakers and regulators as non-domestic. 
Actually, News Corp influence seems far from being diminished in current times. As Des Freeman, 
Benson, Gerbaudo, Garcia, Parthasarathi, Chan and Thompson (2012) acknowledge, “[News 
                                                          
54
 In fact, BSkyB (the merger between Sky and BSB (British Satellite Broadcasting) ) is the operator of the 
Sky brand in the UK. 
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Corp] has a presence in all the major media markets and a major influence on politics, business 
and everyday life.” 
 
As a result of the relaxation enabled by the BA 1996, a succession of takeovers took place. After 
only one year of the new act, the original 17 ITV licenses were shared by only three companies 
(Conboy, 2010: 62; Coppens & Downey, 2001: 338). The act also permitted a further increase in 
the number of channels by separating FTA broadcasting into two services, transmission and 




Digital terrestrial television started transmission in 1998 with 12 channels as a Carlton and 
Granada paytv service branded as Ondigital (Starks, 2007: 47-48). However, the isolated digital 
initiative could not compete with cable and satellite. In 2000, before the collapse of the digital 
system, but with clear signs already of its commercial failure, a coalition of regulators, 
broadcasters, manufacturers and viewers established a roadmap for the completion of a 
coordinated switchover, from analogue to digital, that would include all broadcasters (ibid: 87-92). 
Freeview was proposed and the service was launched in 2002, at the same time that Ondigital was 
discontinued (ibid: 83-4). 
 
If from one side DTV consolidated as a competitive option to paytv, the other platforms sought 
integration in order to remain competitive. One of the most prominent examples of this strategy, 
arguably, is BSkyB. Controlled by American News Corp, the British company appears as a highly 
integrated audiovisual company as it commercialises a platform, the Sky DTH service, acts as a 




That opening of new channels and of distribution platforms brought consequences for the amount 
of national content needed. Although those new outlets represented new opportunities for national 
producers, many of those offerings relied on imported content (and, in the case of overall Sky 
packages, on football). It was in this scenario where national content had to compete to be included 
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 See Annex 2 for technical details. 
56
 Using unbundled incumbent‟s copper lines. 
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in the new channels offered by Freeview, cable and satellite that the last piece of broadcasting 
legislation was introduced in the UK: the Communications Act (CA) 2003. 
 
The new statute consolidated the preceding BAs 1990 and 1996, the Telecommunications Act 
1984 and the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984. The timing for the introduction of this new norm 
came from the EU as a result of the new telecommunication framework approved in 2002. 
However, the UK used it to further liberalise the existing framework. The new act increased the 
relaxation of the ownership rules set by the previous acts and reinforced an ex post approach to 
media concentration, as the act allows the Secretary of State to intervene in the case of mergers 
endangering the public interest (Parr et al., 2005: 85). The act liberalised the ownership of Channel 
5, but still maintained a set of rules for the holders of ITV licenses: a holder cannot own a 
newspaper with more than 20% national market share and a holder cannot own any newspaper 
with more than 20% of the local market share in any area of the license (ibid: 87). 
 
Another important feature of the CA 2003 is its joint remit concerning matters of both broadcasting 
and telecommunications. For these purposes the act created a new unified regulatory agency, 
Ofcom, substituting five existing bodies that used to regulate broadcasting and telecommunication 
services (National Archives, 2003).
57
 As a result of this condensation, and more importantly with 
regards to national content production and distribution, all agents involved with the audiovisual 
industry, independently of the distribution technology used, have to comply with one piece of 
legislation and one regulatory body only. The BBC is the exemption: Ofcom do not regulate its 




Robertson and Nicol (2008: 883) remark that the CA 2003 had two distinct purposes: the protection 
of citizens‟ interests, with regards to the access to high quality audiovisual services, and the 
protection of consumers, by ensuring competition in all communication services. However, the 
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 The existing bodies were: i) Broadcasting Standards Commission (with responsibilities for standards and 
fairness in broadcasting); ii) Director General of Telecommunications (responsible for Oftel -Office of 
Telecommunications); iii) Independent Television Commission (authority for licensing and regulating 
television services in the UK, including cable and satellite); iv) Radio Authority (similar to ITC but for radio 
services); and v) Secretary of State (with respect to spectrum management). 
58
 In the British legal system, the license of the BBC is granted by Royal Charter and the public remit, where 
content obligations are detailed, is settled directly with the Secretary of State. 
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introduction of the act, the creation of the converged agency Ofcom and the overall tendency of 
promoting digital convergence were also regarded by some, like Des Freedman (2008: 95) and 
Murdock (2000: 39), as being pro-market policies with the objective of diminishing PSB‟s role in the 
digital convergence era. In fact, the CA 2003 diminished the distinction between public and 
commercial providers, as the new act levels all traditional terrestrial channels (BBC, ITV, Channel 4 
and Channel 5) into one general and broad category of PSBs, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 in 
more detail. Nevertheless, as will also be seen in that chapter, the act also contains specific 
clauses that are considered as crucial for the development of national content industries. 
 
 
5.4 France – competing models within terrestrial broadcasting 
As already mentioned in this chapter, until the 1980s broadcasting in France was a state monopoly. 
While in Britain in 1982 Channel 4 was being created, the socialist president Mitterrand reformed 
broadcasting legislation and ended that monopoly (Des Freedman, 2003: 1-3; Kuhn, 1995: 172-3). 
The new broadcasting statute of 1982, while opening the broadcasting market to private 
companies, also rearranged the state broadcasting companies and created a new regulatory 
authority to supervise broadcasting (Kuhn, 1995: 172-3). As a result of the end of monopoly, in 
1984 the subscription channel Canal Plus, controlled by the French publishing group Havas, was 
launched (ibid: 178). 
 
Although the number of channels of FTA broadcasters in France then equalled the existing ones in 
the UK, the channels had dissimilar characteristics. In France there were three PSBs: TF1 and 
Antenne 2, with nationwide programming, and the regionalised France Regions 3. All three 
channels were financed by a mix of TV license and advertisements. Contrary to the British BBC-
ITV duopoly with distinct origins of income, in France state broadcasters competed for audiences 
and for advertisement, hampering potential newcomers. With the end of state monopoly, Canal 
Plus was launched as a subscription alternative to the existing public broadcasters. Whilst in Britain 
Channel 4 was a state-owned publishing house for the delivery of different kind of programmes 
produced by independent companies and was not to compete with the established channels, in 
France Canal Plus concentrated on feature films (with a high regulatory commitment to national 
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productions as will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7) and football (Kuhn, 1995: 180). Mitterrand‟s 
liberalisation of the airwaves was completed with the launch of privately owned La Cinq and TV6 in 
1985 (Regourd, 2001: 256). According to Coleman and Rollet (1997: 35-36), the doubling in the 
number of air channels by using commercial media was highly controversial as the Italian media 
mogul Berlusconi and other “friends of the French government” were initially awarded these 
licences. 
 
In contrast to the British case, Mitterrand‟s arrangement allowed for the new over-the air paytv 
broadcaster to be nationally controlled. While in Britain BSkyB is controlled by an American-based 
company, in France Canal Plus (owned by global, albeit French-based, Vivendi) still maintains a 
high proportion of national shareholding (for details on corporate information see Vivendi, 2011b). 
 
In 1986, as a result of a turn to a new right wing government, a new act was proposed for 
broadcasting. Prime Minister Chirac introduced the Freedom of Communication Act (FoCA) 1986. 
Among other things, the Act allowed for the privatisation of the most important broadcaster, TF1, 
controlled by the national group Bouygues, and reorganised the regulatory authorities, creating the 
CNCL (National Commission for Communication Liberties) which would regulate 
telecommunications and broadcasting (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 35-6; Kuhn, 1995: 191-2). The 
government also negotiated with the broadcasters of La Cinq and TV6 (afterwards renamed as M6) 
and a compromise solution was found which allowed the revoking of the licences and reassigning 
them to new owners, but with Berlusconi still having a stake in the latter channel (Kuhn, 1995: 188; 
Regourd, 2001: 256). Because of political interference, among other reasons, the CNCL shortly 
gave way to the current CSA (Kuhn, 1995: 105-6). Broadcaster La Cinq faced major financial 
difficulties, as it did not manage to compete with TF1, and could not establish itself as a specialist 
upmarket channel. In 1992, it ceased broadcasting (Kuhn, 1995: 200-1) and the transmission infra-
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 Arte is a bi-national channel owned by France (50% - France Television (22.5%), government (12.5%), 
Radio France (7.5%) and Institute Nacional de l‟Audiovisuel (7.5%)) and Germany (50% - ARD (25%) and 
ZDF (25%)) (Arte, 2012). 
CHAPTER V – RECENT CHANGES IN THE COMMUNICATION LANDSCAPES... 
109 
 
As in the other countries, during the 1980s and 1990s cable and satellite were also developed in 
France. The popularisation of both technologies was initially sponsored by the government but 
achieved low success due, partially, to lack of interest from audiences in paying subscription fees 
in times when the availability of free channels was increasing (Dutton & Vedel, 1992; Kuhn, 2000: 
326). 
 
There were still other minor amendments to the FoCA 1986. One led by a right-wing government in 
1994, which relaxed the ownership rules, changing from 25% to 49% the maximum interest a 
single stakeholder could hold in a broadcasting channel (Regourd, 2001: 257). It has to be 
remarked that this relaxation, as in the British case, was aimed to increase the economic strength 
of private media players in times of increasing transnationalisation of the media (Kuhn, 2000: 331). 
The year 2000 was a time for rearranging the public sector. The left-wing parliament reorganised 
the French public channels under a new conglomerate France Televisions (Regourd, 2001: 257). 
However, at the same time that a major national entity was created, the new arrangement also 
aimed to diminish PSB‟s relevance in the national advertisement market by reducing their 
maximum advertising times (ibid). 
 
Four years after the creation of the new PSB, the roll-out of digital television was decided in 
France. As was the case of the CA 2003 in Britain, the adoption came as a result of the new 
European telecommunications framework (Regourd, 2007: 172). Four new laws were enacted in 
2004 and among them the Confidence in the Digital Economy Act and the Electronic 
Communications and Audiovisual Communication Services Act modified the FoCA 1986 (ibid). The 
aim of these alterations was to support the digital switchover and to “modernize and harmonise the 
conditions of regulations by the CSA” (ibid). While these 2004 reforms can be considered as 
technical measures in order to solve conflicts between regulators and gaps in legislation due to the 
new services enabled by digital convergence, the introduction of DTV was significant. As Starks 
(2007: 176) noted, France was a late entrant to DTV, only launching its system, branded plainly as 
Television Numerique Terrestre (TNT), in 2005. Iosifidis (2011) attributed the delay to the long 
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discussions over the standard to be adopted and the implications on national industries.
 60
 Four 
years after its launch, according to the CSA (2009b), DTV take-up in France, in 2008, was still 
increasing and had a lower penetration figure than in the UK. However, the same effect of 
containing the increase of paytv (in its various forms) is also noted in that country, as will be seen 
in more detail in Chapter 8. 
 
A last significant amendment to the FoCA 1986 was introduced by the 2009 reform conducted by 
the right-wing presidency of Sarkozy. The new rules progressively eliminated advertisement from 
PSBs with the expected complete elimination in 2011, and re-introduced the appointment of the 
head of the broadcasting company by the Presidency (Ibarra, 2009). Surprisingly that practice 
dates back to the 1960s „fashion‟, when president De Gaulle appointed the head of the ORTF 
(Office de Radiodiffusion-Television Francaise), the former public broadcasting conglomerate 
(Kuhn, 1995: 122-5). 
 
 
5.5 Brazil – perpetuating commercial prominence 
The Brazilian governments adopted a liberal policy in regard to licensing broadcasters from the 
beginning of television. Brazil, which is a federation of states, uses a media system similar to the 
one used in the USA (and in Britain in the case of ITV), where licenses are issued per city (or 
locality) to local bidders subject to certain media ownership limitations.
61
 Thus, in order to form a 
network and gain national coverage, broadcasters have to construct commercial agreements with 
other broadcasters in other cities, the affiliates, in order to retransmit their programming. As a 
result, when the 1980s arrived, Brazil already had six FTA networks with fairly nationwide 
coverage, licenses granted during the military regime of the 1964-1985 period (Lash & Lury, 2007: 
156; Leal Filho, 1988: 31-3) and unchanged legislation dating back to the Broadcasting Code 1962 
and the Decree-Act 236/1967 (both still in place). Unlike the EU members which constructed strong 
PSBs over a period of time, Brazilian FTA broadcasting is overwhelmingly dominated by 
commercial media. In the 1980s there were five major commercial networks operating in the 
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 France has a history of developing alternative standards as was the case with the Secam colour television 
system and Minitel, arguably, a precursor of the internet. 
61
 The Decree-Act 236/1967 allowed a maximum of five commercial television broadcasting licenses per 
broadcaster in the VHF band. 
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country- Globo, SBT, Record, Manchete, Bandeirantes -, and one regional channel owned by the 
state (as the federated state), normally networked with the federal channel Radiobras (Bolano, 
1999). In fact, the federal presence in broadcasting was so weak that, in 2007, when the new 
federal PSB was created (TV Brasil), it absorbed a legacy of only three stations from Radiobras 
(Valente, 2008b). 
 
Returning our analysis to the 1980s, while in the UK and France governments were opening the 
remaining spectra up to competition, during the 1980s and 1990s Brazil was consolidating 
networks and introducing paytv systems. In fact, the first encrypted-to-air broadcasting channels 
(similar to the Canal Plus model in France) were allowed in 1988 for national media players 
(Caribe, 2010). The service had very timid and local success though. 
 
What enabled the Brazilian authorities to maintain the same broadcasting legislation since the 
1960s was the introduction of new paytv services without interfering with existing commercial 
broadcasters‟ businesses. In fact, the 1980s guaranteed a continued protection to commercial 
broadcasters. The constitution enacted in 1988 in the re-established democracy forbade foreign 
ownership of broadcasting and granted explicit space for private broadcasters as it stated, in Article 
223, that the licensing of broadcasting “should observe the principle of complementarities between 
private, public and state-owned systems” (Planalto, 1988). 
 
The regulatory standstill state continued until the neo-liberal reforms arrived in Brazil with the 
presidency of Cardoso. The first change was the 1995 amendment in the Brazilian constitution 
which separated FTA broadcasting from telecommunication (E. O. Nunes, Nogueira, da Costa, de 
Andrade, & Ribeiro, 2007: 143). That segregation enabled two things: the privatisation of telephony 
without limits to foreign ownership and enabling those companies to operate paytv systems. The 
second change, from the same year, was the introduction of onerous public biddings for the 
licensing of commercial channels (Lima, 2007). Those two alterations were beneficial for the 
already established networks as the auctioning process increased the entry barrier for new players 
to broadcasting. Additionally, the new rules were also beneficial to commercial broadcasters 
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because, although the new rules enabled the (inevitable) entrance of paytv systems, FTA services 
remained locked to foreign ownership. 
 
Although cable started in Brazil with local operations in 1989 (Possebon, 2009: 25), it was only 
after the constitutional amendment that cable was regulated with an specific piece of legislation. 
The Cable Act 1995 limited foreign ownership to less than 49%. Not surprisingly, the most 
significant consolidated national operator that emerged from those rules was Net Servicos, owned 
by Organizacoes Globo owner of TV Globo, the most powerful local media conglomerate.
62
 Thus 
while the opening of paytv allowed the entrance of international channels, the biggest producer of 
national content was in a very advantageous position. However, that prominence came at a huge 
price. Globo‟s venture almost bankrupted the broadcaster in the late 1990s (Possebon, 2009: 175). 
At a time of high inflation rates and after a substantial devaluation of the currency, Globo, which 
had invested in cable infra-structure with the aid of foreign loans, was forced to sell their stake in 
Net Servicos by 2004 (Lash & Lury, 2007: 161; Possebon, 2009: 207-10). The cable operator is 




But the launch of cable also allowed the creation of new broadcasters with a focus on citizenship. 
The Cable Act 1995 was responsible for the creation of a legacy of numerous community and 
university channels throughout the country. It created, as must carry, channels for the local 
assemblies, the Lower House (Camara dos Deputados), the Upper House (Senado Federal), the 
Supreme Court, universities, educational and community. However, due to a lack of funding 
opportunities most of these channels only exist on cable. As for the educational channels, cable 
distributors normally use governmental owned broadcasting stations which usually retransmit 
programmes generated by the federal government broadcaster Radiobras (later to be changed to 
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 The biggest Brazilian broadcaster group Organizacoes Globo, or simply Globo (or „a Globo‟ as they are 
known in Portuguese) is a Brazilian media group owned by the Marinho family and is the holding company 
of Rede Globo (the FTA broadcaster), O Globo (newspaper), Globofilmes (film producer), Globosat (paytv 
wholesale broadcaster) and is a stakeholder in Net Servicos (cable) and Sky‟s (satellite) operation in Brazil. 
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 Originally the Mexican telephony incumbent, now a global conglomerate whose owner, Carlos Slim, is 
considered the richest man in the world by Forbes Magazine (as in 2011). 
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TV Brasil as will be discussed below) or by regional state broadcasters, such as TV Cultura (Sao 




In 1996, satellite paytv broadcasting (DTH) started in Brazil. As it was considered a 
telecommunication service and not ruled by the Cable Act 1995, total foreign ownership was 
allowed without the need of any new act. It was started by the American company Direct TV, 
associated with Venezuelan Cisneros, Mexican MVS and Brazilian group TVA, the latter owned by 
the major publishing company of Latin America, the Brazilian Grupo Abril (Beceiro, 1999; Sinclair, 
1999: 72). Rapidly, Globo associated with Sky and Mexican Televisa and launched another DTH 
operation in the country (Beceiro, 1999). In 1997 another paytv encrypted system over the air was 
also launched: the MMDS (Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service). Different from the 
encrypted monochannel introduced in 1988, this terrestrial platform used the airwaves to distribute 
up to 31 encrypted channels to subscribers (Possebon, 2009: 72). The major player for this system 
was again TVA (Sinclair, 1999: 72). However, as this latter system was a competitor to cable and 
satellite, and in the absence of effective competition enforcement, Globo and all their related 
content was systematically denied to these operators. I will return to this point shortly. 
 
With all major distribution technologies in place, but still in the analogue world, the late 1990s and 
early 2000s were times of consolidation of broadcasters in Brazil. The first major change could be 
considered the acquisition of TV Record in 1990 by a Pentecostal religious group (Mariano, 2004). 
This event is particularly important because of the different source of financing available for this 
commercial network. In addition to adverts, this network relies on religious donations. As the 
second major national move, after bankruptcy TV Manchete was sold to Rede TV in 1999 (Pieranti, 
2006). In the DTH service, business consolidation and repositioning also occurred. All involved 
Globo and their channels, the nation‟s television channels with the highest audience ratings (and, 
notably, the owners of the distribution rights to football). Later on in 2004, as a result of commercial 
agreements, Direct TV remained the sole DTH operator in Brazil (although using the Sky brand and 
with Globo channels‟ in their line-up). In the late 2000s, telephony incumbents also launched their 
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 Brazil is a federation of States. TV Cultura is owned by the Sao Paulo state and is often referred to as the 
precursor of PSB in Brazil due to the existence of a curator board. TVE was owned by a public charity 
foundation ACERP (former Fundacao Roquette Pinto) based on the Rio de Janeiro state. TVE and ACERP 
were later absorbed by the EBC (TV Brasil), the new federal PSB. 
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own branded DTH services using practically, in terms of audience shares, the same channels as 
the ones existing on Sky, i.e. with Globo channels, and, of course, football. Currently Globo is 
reducing its participations in paytv distribution services. While still holding a small share, the 
Brazilian broadcaster sold its cable operations to Telmex, as mentioned earlier on, and their DTH‟s 
to Direct TV (Churchill, 2009; Lash & Lury, 2007; Rosa, 2010: 161). 
 
It is important to note that, as already shown with the examples of Sky in Britain and Canal Plus in 
France, securing football is also „key‟ in Brazil. However, as in the latter country there are no must-
offer rules, paytv companies not affiliated with cable Net Servicos (mainly MMDS operators) took 
Globosat (Globo‟s company that produces their paytv channels, including sports) to the Brazilian 
competition authority in order to gain access to their channels. In the proposed Term of Adjustment 
Agreement, in 2006, nearly twenty years after the launch of DTH and MMDS, the council ruled that 
Globosat must offer their channels without discrimination and under a fair, but nevertheless 
undisclosed, pricing (Telesintese, 2007). The decision which could have rebalanced the paytv 
services, levelling access to the most desired nationally produced content came maybe too late as, 
in 2008, the main MMDS operators were bought by Sky and competition with that service was 
finished (Telesintese, 2008a). 
 
One of the last developments of broadcasting in Brazil was also digitalisation. While on paytv 
platforms digitalisation was left to the operators, and can be regarded as a simple implementation 
of the natural technological and market evolution without interference from the government, on the 
FTA broadcasting service it was an intricate decision where broadcasters once again needed the 
help and protection from the state. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the Brazilian government 
eventually decided to give the go ahead to DTV in 2007; two years after France and five after the 
UK‟s re-launch. However, as for 2011, the Brazilian legal model did not allow multiprogramming for 
commercial broadcasters and hence the new platform was blocked to possible new entrants. It is 
uncertain if multiprogramming will ever be allowed in commercial FTA in Brazil. It is not in the 
interest of commercial broadcasters to divide the advertisement revenues with newcomers 
(Cavalcanti, 2009; Tavares & Paz Filho, 2009), as it is not on the government radar to make DTV 
compete with paytv. However, on the side of the state-owned channels, multiprogramming is being 
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developed as a form of increasing coverage while reducing roll-out costs. Currently TV Camara 
(Lower House) and TV Senado (Upper House), and to a minor extent the TV Justica (Supreme 
Court), have FTA channels in some of the Brazilian capitals and, in association with the local and 
regional assemblies, are launching DTV multiprogramming ventures in major Brazilian cities 
(Camara dos Deputados, 2011; SET, 2008). 
 
The Brazilian implementation has some similarities to the European cases discussed. Like France, 
Brazil is a late entrant to this technology and, as in the French case, profited from the evolution of 
the technology. Also, like France and Britain, FTA television is very present in households. Hence 
the switchover is expected to have a high impact on the population. The similarities nevertheless 
finish at this point. In Brazil the implementation of DTV does not have the objective of increasing 
the number of broadcasters. DTV was not designed to be a competitor to paytv. Moreover, the new 
frequencies were given free of charge to established broadcasters and without any commitment of 
usage or of coverage. 
 
On the contrary, the Brazilian choice for adopting the Japanese ISDB as their DTV standard is 
another example that illustrates the power of commercial broadcasters. The government, after 
extensive testing and consultations with manufacturers and broadcasters and after long 
negotiations with representatives of the other standards (the European DVB and American ATSC), 
decided in 2006 for the Japanese-based system. From the broadcasters‟ point-of-view, the choice 
was regarded as more appropriate, as it would incorporate MPEG-4 allowing HDTV to be available 
from the service‟s launch. Also, broadcasters and government were looking for a mobile television. 
The European standard, which could be operated by telephony companies, was considered a 
menace for broadcasters, as it could introduce telecommunication giants into the broadcasting 
field.
65
 From the government‟s point of view, the Japanese system was also considered the best 
option in terms of transferral of technology, with the possibility of building a semiconductor industry 
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 As the Japanese system transmits the mobile content from within the same DTV channel, broadcasters 
could transmit both signals without the need of additional frequencies or tier operators. 
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in the country and with Japan agreeing to incorporate Brazilian innovations, such as the Ginga 




One year after deciding the go ahead for DTV, the public administration also chose to launch the 
new federal PSB, although using the old analogue technology. Again, without altering FTA rules, 
and without provoking any spat with commercial broadcasters, the „rulers‟ of FTA, the Brazilian 
government under the presidency of left-wing Lula, decided to implement an improved federal 
public broadcaster. In 2007, the EBC, a PSB with a certain level of editorial, administrative and 
financial independence, although funded directly by the government, was eventually created. At 
least as foreseen in the legal provisions, the new PSB was launched, not to be another new state-
owned governmental broadcaster but to provide for a genuine public service. It has a board 
(appointed by the government) and a governing structure which could be inspired by European‟s 
PSBs. Lula, who suffered from TV Globo in the coverage of the 1989 presidential debate, offered a 
public counterpoint to the power of the commercial broadcaster. Nevertheless, some voices of the 
press regard the creation of the EBC and their channel TV Brasil as a step backwards to state 
intervention, demagogy and propaganda (Azevedo, 2007; L. Nunes, 2008). The facts are that the 
governors are appointed by the head of state, albeit with a fixed mandate, and its budget is far 
more modest than, for instance, Rede Globo‟s: £130m against £3 billion, in 2009 (EBC, 2009; 
Werzbitzki, 2010).67 
 
Another implication that derives from that small budgetary commitment is the small coverage 
expected from the new public channel. Despite the fact that the PSB was created nearly two years 
after DTV‟s launch in that country, the PSB Act 2008 ignored the social concern of digital coverage. 
Actually, the act ignored even setting analogue coverage obligations, perhaps due to the fact that 
the old system would be phased-out in the medium term, in 2016 (for details see Lauterjung, 2008; 
Martin, 2008). 
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 The Brazilian choice proved to be influential. Several other Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, 
Peru and Venezuela) also adopted the standard. Furthermore, in 2010, according to the Brazilian Ministry of 
Communication declarations, the 14 countries of the Southern African Development Community decided to 
review their decision on DVB and would assess the ISDB (Proenca 2010). 
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 Values for Rede Globo include other revenues from the parent organisation Organizacoes Globo. 
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Certainly there is a political component that partially explains why commercial broadcasters are so 
influential in Brazilian policymaking, and why new services were included without jeopardising their 
leadership. There are well known strong ties linking broadcasting and politicians. Actually, many 
politicians are broadcasters themselves, in a practice called coronelismo eletronico or „electronic 
clientelism‟ (Bignell, 2004: 80; Fox and Waisbord, 2002: 10, cited in Sinclair, 2010: 512).
68
 This 
practice leads to the extremely controversial issue of members of the congress, who may be 
regarded as public agents as they are invested in public authority, celebrating contracts (legally, 
licences are contracts) with the public administration (signing, hence, for both sides). Despite the 
legal discussions, the ownership links between politicians and broadcasting companies in Brazil 
have been broadly reported, and there is an outcry at the impropriety of law makers being in a 
position of being able to control the media. According to Christofoletti (2003), a quarter of 
broadcasters are owned by politicians and during the 1999-2001 period, almost 80% of the 
licenses were granted to members of the congress. In a report conducted by an independent 
agency, 5% of the state deputies, almost 10% of federal deputies and nearly a third of senators 
held interests in broadcasting companies in 2006 (Castilho, 2006; Castilho & Amaral, 2006). 
Certainly, political ownership has a crucial impact on democracy and media impartiality. 
 
Although FTA is still governed by the 1962 legislation, there is a perception from some sectors of 
the society that this situation should change. A national consultation process (Confecom - National 
Communication Conference), sponsored by the federal government and held during 2009, 
indicated the need for regulation introducing regional, independent, cultural and educational 
content in all forms of broadcasting (Charao, 2009; Haje, 2010). Another suggestion for a change 
of attitude towards unregulated broadcasting was the approval of the bill that proposed new rules 
for paytv, the so-called PL-29. The bill was discussed from 2007 to 2010 in the Lower House by 
four Committees and, after more than one year of negotiations in the Senate, the bill was finally 
approved, receiving the Presidential seal in September of 2011.
69
 The Paytv Act 2011 which scraps 
any limit to foreign capital in any paytv distribution technology, involved intricate negotiations 
because of the quota system for national content that was included during its proceedings (that will 
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 It has to be remarked that, according to Brazilian legislation, politicians are allowed to own broadcasting 
companies. What is not allowed is to hold a managerial position in those companies. 
69
 Paytv Act 12.485/2011. 
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be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7). The move received heavy opposition from national 
broadcasters and international channels who lobbied against its approval (Haje, 2009). 
 
Both the approval of the paytv bill and the Confecom may be a sign of change for Brazilian 
broadcasting policy. However, the political influence of commercial broadcasters should not be 
underestimated. In another even earlier legislative action, the Lower House, as early as in 1991, 
had approved a bill which introduced content rules for FTA broadcasting.
70
 However, since 2003 it 
rests “in peace” in the Senate. Brazilian broadcasting history shows that there is little room for 
radical changes without colliding with the interests of major networks. 
 
After having discussed the countries of these case studies separately, the following section will 
summarise the main characteristics of each country‟s broadcasting landscape. 
 
 
5.6 Summary of developments 
Table 7 summarises in chronological order the changes that occurred in the broadcasting 
legislation in each of the selected countries. 
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 Bill PL-1135/1991 proposed by Deputy Jandira Feghali. 
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Table 7 – Relevant regulatory instruments and their related main purposes of the selected 
countries 
Period UK France Brazil 
-1980s   Broadcasting Code 1962 and 
Decree-Act 1967 (*) 
 Broadcasting Act 1981 
(creation of Channel 4) 
Broadcasting Act 1982 
(end of monopoly, start of 
Canal Plus, La Cinq and 
TV6) 
 
 Cable and Broadcasting Act 
1984 
Freedom of Communication 
Act (FoCA) 1986 
(privatisation of TF1) 
Federal Constitution 1988 
(definition of private, state-
owned and public 
broadcasting) 
1990s Broadcasting Act 1990 
(allocation of Channel 5, 
introduction of cross-
ownership rules) 
1994 FoCA Amendment 
(relaxation of cross-
ownership rules) 




 Broadcasting Act 1996 
(DTV, relaxation of cross-
ownership rules) 
 Cable Act 1995 
2000s  2000 FoCA Amendment 
(reduction of 
advertisements in public 
channels) 
 
 Communication Act 2003 
(further relaxation, ex post 
regulation) 
2004 FoCA Amendment 
(new regulatory regime) 
E. Comm. And Audiovisual 
Comm. Services Act 2004 
(DTV) 
DTV Decree 2007 
 
  2009 FoCA Amendment 
(end of advertisements 
and presidential 
appointment of head of 
PSB) 
PSB Act 2007 
(creation of PSB EBC, 
producing the TV Brasil 
channel) 
2010s   Paytv Act 2011 
(foreign ownership in 
paytv) 
Note: (*) Those legal instruments from the 1960s needed to be included as are the codes governing 
broadcasting services in Brazil throughout the analysed period. 
 
The overview of Table 7 shows that while both European countries experienced roughly the same 
timing and purposes for the introduction of new legislation leading to new channels, in Brazil the 
privatisation of telecommunication and cable was introduced later on. With regards to DTV there is 
an eleven year gap between the introductions of that platform in all countries, with the UK being the 
earlier adopter. Additionally, in Britain more liberal ownership regulations started to be introduced in 
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1996, while France re-introduced a degree of state intervention and potentially restricted the 
financial sources for their PSB. In the late 2000s and during the current decade, Brazil modified the 
broadcasting landscape, strengthening the PSB and introducing national content policies in the 
same period which liberalised foreign ownership to paytv services. 
 
The charts represented in Figure 4 show how similar the regulatory setups of our case studies are. 
The PSB executives are appointed by the government in all three cases, although in Britain the 
indication has to be, eventually, approved by the parliament.
71
 All three countries have a 
specialised agency for the film industry, but it is only on the Brazilian case that the institution has to 
monitor national quotas for the paytv services. Additionally, in terms of the differences between 
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 It has to be noted that, unlike in presidential countries, the government must have the majority of the 
parliament. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a proposed candidacy for the governing body would be 
overturned by the parliament. 
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Figure 5 - Start-up of main terrestrial channels by country 
Sources: broadcasters‟ official websites and (5) (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 34); (6) (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 
35; Kuhn, 1995: 109) and (7) (Bolano, 1999; Mariano, 2004; Pieranti, 2006). 
Notes: (1) Date of privatisation. (2) Started as TV Tupi and after several changes running as SBT from 1981. 
(3) Started as Radiobras, transformed into TV Brasil since 2007. (4) Started as TV Manchete and changed to 
Rede TV since 1999. (P) National PSB. 
 
As can be seen from the preceding Figure 5, the increasing occupancy of FTA broadcasting has 
certain resemblance between the countries. Although Brazil is a later entrant to the service when 
compared with its counterparts, by 1983 the country already had more networks in place than the 
UK and France. From that year onwards until 2002, the year of the British re-launch of DTV, the 
occupancy of the airwaves was fairly similar amongst the examples. As was discussed in Chapter 
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exponential growth, and since then the UK has had more channels than France and substantially 
more than Brazil. However, as a general rule, it is reasonable to summarise that as a result of the 
liberalisation of the service, in all three countries there is a coexistence of public and private FTA 
broadcasters. Nevertheless, the relative importance (both in economic and viewing terms) of those 
broadcasters varies significantly between countries, as will be seen in Chapter 8. 
 
Although the market assessment will discuss audiences‟ shares in depth, a snapshot of those 
figures will help in this final comparison of different broadcasting systems. As with digitalisation and 
digital convergence, TV channels may be accessed by different technologies and Table 8 shows 
the most watched TV channels independently of the distribution platform used. 
 







Channel Share (%) Channel 
Share 
(%) Channel Share (%)5 
Traditional 
FTA 
BBC 1 (P) 21.3 TF1 24.5 Globo 46.6 
ITV 1 18.3 France 2 (P) 16.0 Record 17.8 
BBC 2 (P) 6.7 France 3 (P) 10.7 SBT 13.7 
Channel 4 6.0 M6 10.4 Band 5.5 
Channel 5 4.5 Canal Plus 3.1 Rede TV 2.6 
  
Arte (C) 1.6 TV Brasil (P) - (4) 




ITV 2 2.0 France 5 (P) 3.2 
  ITV 3 2.0 TMC 3.3 
  BBC 3 (P) 1.3 W9 3.0 
  Cbeebies (P) 1.3 Gulli 2.2 
  E4 1.2 France 4 (P) 1.6 
  Sky Sports 1 1.1 
    Total 8.9 Total 13.3 
  Smaller 
channels 
and other 
media Others 34.3 Others 20.4 Others 18.0 
Sources: author‟s adapted from sources as indicated: (1) (BARB, 2010); (2) (IP Network, 2011: 172), (3) 
(Grupo de Midia, 2011: 294)  
Note: 
(4) TV Brasil started in December 2007 and does not have national coverage yet. 
(5) Excludes other uses of the television set (videogames, internet, etc), measures broadcasting 
channels only („pure TV‟). 
(P) PSB; (C) Co-owned by French and German PSBs (see note 59). 
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As seen in Table 8, the traditional FTA channels are still the most viewed channels. That assertion 
is in line with Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2011: 171), who note that in the age of digital 
convergence it is the content that counts, not the distributing medium. Table 8 also shows another 
characteristic of digital times, which will be analysed in detail in Chapter 8: PSBs in the UK and 
France have taken advantage of the „long tail‟ enabled by digitalisation. Their spin-off channels 






During this chapter I have shown the recent developments in the mediaspace of the selected 
countries. I have discussed how the country‟s media systems are converging into a similar model, 
where there is a coexistence of public and private broadcasters competing for the attention of the 
viewers on different delivery platforms. All three countries are going digital and there is a 
proliferation of channels and services. The discussions have suggested that while there is an 
overall liberalisation of broadcasting, PSBs are still important agents, and policies still reflect this 
reality. As the following chapters unfold, it will become clearer to the reader that, in this competitive 
model, policymakers are tightening the regulation of PSBs whilst liberalising the media overall. 
Most importantly for this thesis, perhaps, the analysis of the regulation will also indicate to what 
extent national content is fostered in current digital times. 
 
The next chapter will start the three step analysis of the content-oriented regulation, as devised in 
Chapter 4. The first step, focus of the next chapter, will examine how the socio-cultural objectives 
of broadcasting services are promoted by the enacted legislation. By studying the actual terms of 
the regulations, I will identify the socio-cultural concepts and objectives conceived by policymakers 
for the development of broadcasting services which will, ultimately, influence how national content 
is produced and distributed. 
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 As already mentioned, Brazil is starting to use multiprogramming on their state-owned channels but not by 
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And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There 
are individual men and women, and there are families. 
And no government can do anything except through 
people, and people must look to themselves first. 
Margaret Thatcher, 1987 




During the first part of this thesis, in the literature review, I highlighted how it is widely believed that 
governments, and, overall, societies benefit from broadcasting as a powerful communication 
source, capable of delivering education, knowledge and entertainment, bonding citizens and 
helping to create a sense of belonging and wellbeing. With those capabilities in mind, policymakers 
of each country steered the overall broadcasting services‟ aims and purposes accordingly. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, those objectives may be used as a means for achieving „higher‟ socio-
cultural goals, but they can also be helpful to accommodate industrial and commercial interests. 
Ideally, governments would like to see both sides being developed at the same time. The following 
comparative research will analyse which goals are predominantly stated in legislation and clarify 
which emphasis is given by policymakers. As this research is concerned with the impact of the 
current digital scenario on the production of national content, the analysis should clarify whether 
regulators are still fostering and nurturing socio-cultural objectives or simply using broadcasting 
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services as an economic activity which generates revenues, employment and cultural goods for 
consumption. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the investigation into the promotion of national content will be divided 
into three steps, which for the sake of clarity will be repeated here quickly. The first step will 
analyse how the selected socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting were defined in communication 
regulation, and how those concepts have developed in recent times. The second step will examine 
in detail the tools in the regulatory framework specifically concerned with promoting and fostering 
the production and distribution of national content, the „push-pull‟ policies. The third step will 
perform a market analysis of the audiovisual industry (producers, broadcasters and distributors) 
and of viewers‟ preferences and habits with regards to television. This chapter is entirely devoted to 
the first step. 
 
From the review conducted in Chapter 1, the five concepts identified - diversity, plurality, 
democracy, citizenry and cultural relevance – may be regarded, arguably, as essential descriptors 
of the socio-cultural aims of broadcasting. Therefore, the ways and intensities in which these 
concepts are transposed in legislation, and later enforced by regulators, ultimately affect the overall 
objectives of broadcasting services, channels‟ identities and, last but not least, the national content 
being produced. 
 
During this introduction I would like to highlight the following points. First, „universal access‟ will not 
be analysed as another socio-cultural objective in this thesis but as a legislative tool for the very 
subsistence of broadcasting and from which all the other goals will be constructed. Therefore, rules 
related to the access to traditional broadcasters will be included in Chapter 7 exclusively devoted to 
the regulatory tools. Secondly, although British and French legislation have specific clauses 
relating to their constituting nations and territories, the large amount of regulation at the country-
level being analysed justifies the exclusion of the discussion of these specificities from this 
research. The kind of regulations that are beyond the scope of this thesis are, for instance, the 
British provisions for a Welch channel run by an independent authority (S4C – Sianel Pedwar 
Cymru) or the French documents relating to the overseas territories and regional languages. Even 
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though these particularities could be approximated to the discussion of regionalisation and 
citizenry, those regulations will not be analysed. 
 
Lastly, as discussed in Chapter 4, in order to understand the development that led to the current 
period of digital convergence, it is necessary to retrace the regulatory path back to the Acts that 
were in vogue when the liberalisation of broadcasting started back in the 1980s. Therefore, the 
research had to include the Acts shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 – Timeline of the regulatory acts under analysis 
Notes: BA (Broadcasting Act); CA (Communications Act); BBC C&A (Charter & Agreement); 
FoCA (Freedom of Communications Act); Financing Decrees (95-110, 95-110, 99-130, 2001-
609, 1332, 1333 & 2002-140; and BC (Broadcasting Code). 
 
1980s 1990s 2000s 




BBC C&A 1981 BBC C&A 1996 BBC C&A 2006 




BA 1982 FoCA1986 
Film & AV Decree (19)90-66 
Financing Decrees (19)95-110... 
BC 1962 & Decree-Act 1967 
Constitution 1988 
Cable Act 1995 










Ancine PM 2001 
Audiovisual Acts 1992 & 1993 
Rouanet Act 1991 
Paytv 
Act 2011 
Finance Act 2006 
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It is important to note that, as Figure 6 indicates, in the case of the UK parts of the BAs 
(Broadcasting Act) 1990 and 1996 are still valid, even after the enactment of the CA 
(Communications Act) 2003. They were not completely repealed by the new legislation, as with the 
other countries. The Freedom of Communication Act (FoCA) 1986, instead, is being constantly 
amended and consolidated and is therefore the one that governs broadcasting services in 
France.
73
 In the Brazilian case the figure shows that the main broadcasting legislations, the 
Broadcasting Code (BC) 1962 and the Decree-Act (DA) 1967, have an ongoing validity throughout 
the period analysed, although for the FTA broadcasting service only. 
 
Each of the five socio-cultural goals will be the objective of individual sections during this chapter. 
Before starting, I would like to remark that throughout the discussions of this chapter I will reference 
the findings to the actual clauses of the piece of legislation from which they were extracted. For 
further reference and checking, Annex 5 lists in a summarised form all the clauses of the regulatory 
instruments used in this step. For reminders of the definitions please see the box at the beginning 





As discussed in Chapter 4, diversity and pluralism in academic literature are terms with varied and 
often overlapping definitions. In legislation unfortunately these terms are also sometimes used 
synonymously. For instance, the BA 1996 disposes that broadcasters shall provide “a range and 
diversity of independent productions” (s.19.2.b).
74
 In fact, the introduction of a „diversity of 
independent productions‟, an ownership policy for de-verticalising the industry, increases pluralism 
in broadcasting, not diversity. The French FoCA 1986, on the other hand, expresses that 
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 In the French case there are other independent pieces of legislation such as the Electronic Communication 
Act 2004 and the Digital Economy Act 2004 and the Telecommunication Public Service Obligations Act 
2003. However, as those acts directly amend the FoCA 1986 when dealing with the broadcasting field, they 
will not be analysed separately. 
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 Note that British legislation is divided in sections (s) whereas French and Brazilian are divided into articles 
(Art.). 
Provision of a broad range of information, views, and of 
content (diverse programming) adding richness and variety 
to cultural and social life (McQuail & Siune, 1998: 42-3). 
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communication shall respect “a character pluralist of the expressions of currents of thought and of 
opinion” (Art.1). Notwithstanding these confusing usages, the essence of the ideas for diversity and 
plurality as used in Chapter 1 and 4 can be identified in legislation. As a reminder, diversity in this 
thesis will be related to a whole range of opinions (also called internal pluralism) (for details see 
Chapter 4 and Croteau & Hoynes, 2006: 20, 34-5; Kuhn, 1995: 38, 54) and to the diversity of media 
products and range of programmes. Plurality, on the other hand, will be related to plurality of 
ownership (also called external pluralism). 
 
The legislative provisions with regards to diversity can be regarded as being constantly increasing 
in complexity in the British legislation. Initially, by means of the BA 1981, diversity was promoted by 
a general clause in which services should provide a “proper balance and wide range of 
programmes to appeal to a variety of tastes and interests” (s2.2.b). To increase diversity was also 
one of the purposes for the creation of Channel 4 by that act. The new state-owned broadcaster 
should deliver programmes “to appeal to tastes and interests not generally catered for by Channel 
3” (s11.1.a).  This general aspiration of increasing the diversity of the broadcast content was 
extended to include the other types of media by the successive Acts. The BA 1996, for instance, 
included that “diversity in the sources of information available to the public and in the opinions 
expressed on television or radio or in newspapers” was in the “public interest” (Schedule 2, s11 
amending the BA 1990, Part IV of Schedule 2, s13.1.a.ii). This growing concern with diversity can 
be regarded as a counterbalance to the liberalisation process. As revealed in Chapter 5, the BA 
1996 relaxed several ownership rules and there was the fear that liberalisation and the resulting 
decrease in plurality could hamper diversity.
75
 In that sense, to include more provisions sustaining 
diversity could be regarded as a remedy for maintaining a healthy media system in times of 
loosened ownership control. Currently, with the enactment of the CA 2003, the duty of maintaining 
diversity is shared by all the main terrestrial broadcasters, consequently the BBC, Channels 3 
(ITV), 4 (Channel 4) and 5 (Channel 5) are all labelled “public service broadcasters” (s264.12) and 
“relevant television services” (s.264.11). The Act dictates that, as a whole, those broadcasters have 
to “secure that programmes dealing with a wide range of subject-matters are made available for 
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 Concentration of ownership may lead to a concentration of sources of information reducing diversity and, 
overall, competition in broadcasting (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion and Baker, 2007: 67, 
Puppis, D‟Haenens and Saeys, 2007: 67). 
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viewing” (s264.4.a). Therefore, the duty of sustaining diversity can be seen in legislation as being 
transferred from the original PSB (the BBC) to the extended family of „PSBs‟, the main terrestrial 
channels. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, liberalisation and the increase in the number of channels are regarded 
by advocates of public service as diminishing the importance of PSBs. However, at the same time 
that the number of commercial channels considerably augmented and paytv systems started to 
offer hundreds of channels, diversity in FTA services was also fostered as a result of digitalisation. 
Close to the launch of DTV and Freeview, more public channels catering for different audiences 
were also granted by policymakers. Public channels that had been previously granted by the 
unusual instrument of “Letters” in 2001 (Jowell) and 2002 (Jowell)
76
 – namely BBC 3 (for younger 
adults), BBC 4 (cultural), Cbeebies (young children), CBBC (pre-teen children), News and 
Parliament - were consolidated by the BBC Agreement 2006. Each of those services was designed 
to complement the range of the output of the public service delivered by the BBC (s11). Even 
considering that the opening of those channels may be regarded as a PSB strategy to crowd out 
competitors from the new „spaces‟ created by digitalisation, the increase allowed the creation of 
niche channels. Increased diversity as a result of digitalisation was, therefore, not only available to 
paytv subscribers but also extended to the wider society. 
 
Compared to Britain, in France diversity was a belated concern for legislators. The FoCA 1986 
gave to the national regulator the mission of protecting the “plurality of opinions” (Art.1). However, 
as that same act also privatised TF1, the country‟s most watched channel, concerns that cross-
media concentration would jeopardise the diversity of views increased (Kuhn, 1995: 192-3). 
Therefore, policymakers included an obligation for public broadcasters to ensure the “plurality of 
information and of programmes” (Decree foresee in Art. 62). The word „diversity‟ was only 
introduced in the FoCA in 1994 as one of the objectives of the audiovisual regulator (CSA), without 
a proper definition however (Art. 1). With that amendment, the overall purpose of guaranteeing 
freedom of expression and diversity of opinions was maintained (although using the confusing 
terms “pluralist expression of the currents of thought”). But the need for developing a “diversity of 
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 The legal documents granting permission to launch the new channels were letters from the Culture 
secretary to the chairman of the BBC expedited on 13th/September/2001 and 17th/September/2002. 
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programmes” was clearly inserted within a new concern for “developing the national industries” and 
“stimulating competition” (Art. 1). As in Britain, competition did not only mean more commercial 
channels. Diversity was also fostered by an increase in freely available public thematic channels 
like the Parliamentarian Channel (FoCA amended in 1994, Art. 45-1) and Arte (FoCA amended in 
2000, Art. 45). With digitalisation and the rearrangement of France Televisions in 2005, other public 
channels were also offered, such as Gulli (children), France 4 (entertainment and younger adults) 
and France 5 (knowledge). 
 
In the Brazilian case, the analysis of the selected pieces of legislation did not show any prescription 
for or definition of diversity until the introduction of the Paytv Act (PA) 2011. This may be explained 
by two main reasons. First, by the already referred to lack of will or power to include content 
regulations for commercial broadcasters in a liberalised service (see Chapter 5). Secondly, by the 
low budgets spent on public broadcasting compared to the revenues of commercial broadcasters. It 
is easier and cheaper for governments and PSBs (than creating more channels and diversified 
content, at least in the short term) to include, instead, objectives relating to citizenry (as will be 
discussed later on). In fact the federal PSB only delivers one channel FTA.
77
 These aspects 
partially explain why low audience figures are a well known characteristic of public broadcasting in 
Brazil and why there is usually only one public channel FTA per locality.  
 
The PA 2011 explicitly introduced the diversity concept to Brazilian legislation. The Act, whose 
original purpose was just the opening of paytv services to foreign ownership (as will be discussed 
later on), includes amongst the objectives of those services the promotion of diversity of culture 
and information (Art. 3.ii). Moreover, the Act relates those objectives to Unesco‟s Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Art. 3.1). By including an 
explicit reference to the promotion of diverse national cultures and anchoring that on an 
international convention, Brazilian legislators were careful to liberalise paytv but at the same time 
signal that to offer diverse national content is considered an important objective for those services 
and would be promoted as part of an international consensus. This rule also demonstrates another 
characteristic of the selected socio-cultural concepts, that they are highly intertwined. As will be 
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 Although, as discussed in Chapter 5, there are other publicly owned channels by other government 
institutions which are available on cable and satellite and in some cities as FTA. 
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discussed below, the Brazilian constitution of 1988 implicitly embraces the diversity concept while 





As discussed in Chapter 1, plurality of ownership is also referred to as external pluralism. Also as 
noted in the previous section, sometimes the term diversity of sources is used in legislation to 
describe pluralism. In this thesis I will use pluralism in the sense of external pluralism. Although 
pluralism is a concept closely related to ownership, I will leave the discussion of the specific 
ownership and cross-ownership rules to Chapter 7, which is entirely devoted to the regulatory tools. 
Here I will concentrate on the main objectives of pluralism as addressed by legislation. 
 
Pluralism was fostered in Britain in the early 1980s by enforcing the de-verticalisation of production. 
The BA 1981 stated that a “suitable proportion of programmes” should be supplied by other 
companies (s12.3.b). That proportion was set at 25% by the following BA 1990 (s16.2.h, s25.2.f 
and s186.1) and was maintained throughout the period under analysis. However, the obligation is 
reduced to 10% in the case of digital channels (BA 1996, s19.2).
78
 In the case of Channel 4 the de-
verticalisation has been complete since its creation (CA 2003, s295.1). 
 
Another arrangement for the purpose of enhancing plurality which is unique to the UK (amongst the 
selected countries), is the appointment of an independent news provider for Channel 3 (ITV). In an 
attempt to dissociate the interests of commercial broadcasters from the views expressed by their 
own news programmes, the BA 1990 set a limit of individual ownership to 20% of the news 
provider and a cross-ownership limit of 50% with Channel 3 itself (s32). Later on, with the 
enactment of the CA 2003, that cross-ownership limit between the independent news provider and 
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 In the case of the BBC‟s digital channels the broadcaster agreed on maintaining the same level of quotas as 
will be seen in Chapter 7. 
Different sources of information (different ownership) and 
the existence of autonomous and independent media 
(McQuail & Siune, 1998: 42-43); concept related to 
„ownership pluralism‟ (Kuhn, 1995: 50) or „external pluralism 
of ownership‟ for the balance of opinions (Levy, 1999: 28). 
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Channel 3 was scrapped. The initial objective of dissociating news provision from possible „in-
house‟ commercial interests was, thus, eventually abandoned. Furthermore, the consolidation 
process amongst the ITV companies (as described in Chapter 5) allowed by the CA 2003 raised 
concerns about possible homogenisation of news throughout the country and of consequently poor 
regional coverage (Harrison, 2006: 86). 
 
The increase in concentration allowed by legislation was mitigated by policymakers by introducing 
more competition tools to broadcasting. In the CA 2003 the competition approach was further 
enhanced. Part 5 of the CA 2003, constituted of seventeen sections, named “Competition in 
communications markets” deals exclusively with the competition functions of Ofcom and how 
media mergers should be jointly dealt with by the regulatory agency and the Office of Fair Trading 
(s371.1).
79
 Nevertheless, there is a clause in regulation that conditions the promotion of 
competition to a greater „public interest‟ concept. Legislation mandates that, when analysing media 
mergers between newspapers and television channels, the public interest “need[s]” “accurate 
presentation of news”, “free expression of opinion”, “a sufficient plurality of views in newspapers” 
and “a sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media enterprises” (s375.1). With these 
provisions regulators related competition purposes to higher public interests considerations without, 
however, interfering ex ante with the market. 
 
Plurality of ownership is, thus, pursued by “adopting a „light touch‟ approach” (Parr et al., 2005: 
481) and there are many critics of this line of action. Doyle and Vick (2005) anticipate that these 
mechanisms are unlikely to “play an important role in media ownership policy” as they were 
included as a political compromise “only to win passage of the Communications Bill in the House of 
Lords.” In the same vein, Rowbottom (2010: 190) highlights that, as those interventions are 
subjected to discretionary powers (a Minister of State initiates and terminates the process), they 
might be subjected to corporate lobby. Feintuck and Varney (2010: 159), describe a case where 
BSkyB bought ITV shares only to block an alternative bid from its rival Virgin Media. They also 
remark that, as lengthy processes, ex post regulation may simply serve corporate strategies. 
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 Even the BBC is subjected to monitoring from the competition authorities since the BA 1990. The Office 
of Fair Trading is officially responsible for analysing the relationship between the BBC and independent 
producers (s186.4).   




In France competition regulation was also introduced in the broadcasting industries with 
liberalisation. The French regulator has a duty to promote competition in communication (FoCA 
1994, Art. 1) and since the 2004 FoCA amendment, the regulator has to promote the development 
of audiovisual production (Art. 1) and regulate “free-competition” and “non-discriminatory 
relationship between broadcasters and distributors” (Art. 3-1). However, unlike in the UK, plurality 
in France is not fostered by a quota for independent productions but, instead, by economic 
contributions
80
 from the different broadcasting activities towards the production industry both in film 
and television (Art. 71). This duty of stimulating competition, without setting an independent quota 
is coherent with an industrialist approach. Income is guaranteed to sustain the production of 
content but without a concern for guaranteeing their output on the screens. It is a plurality in 
production but not necessary beneficial to the viewer. This approach may also reflect the political 
power of film production agents in France when it comes to audiovisual policymaking. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the regulatory setup of diverting part of broadcasters‟ revenues to 
the production industry may be too focused on cinema production. Some attribute that emphasis to 
a long tradition of supporting the film industry. Others, simply to the political influence of big 
national film production and distribution companies (Guerrieri et al., 2005: 35; Levy, 1999: 20-2). 
 
Unlike the British case, changes in French regulation with regards to plurality were not profound. 
France did not change from the rigid ex ante approach towards a liberal „act if necessary‟ ex post 
regulation. This may be due to the main concern of protecting language and culture. However, 
while comparing the French rule with the British setup, it has to be considered that the state 
monopoly of the media only ended in 1982, nearly thirty years after the BBC‟s monopoly ended in 
the UK. Therefore, as noted by Kuhn (1995: 235), French media groups only started to diversify 
into broadcasting after that reform. French governments recognised that some degree of 
diversification and, as a consequence, of concentration was needed in order to create robust 
national media groups to compete with international conglomerates (Kuhn, 2000: 294). Therefore, 
increasingly more licences and bigger audience shares were allowed for single groups by the 
reforms carried out in the 1990s and 2000s, as will be discussed later on. In summary, as ex ante 
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 The contributions are a legal obligation (levy) calculated in terms of companies‟ revenues, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
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limits were not dropped in French legislation, plurality and the fear of the internationalisation of the 
media remained a bigger regulatory concern in that country throughout the period analysed. 
 
In Brazil plurality is approached mainly by dividing broadcasting into three different spheres. The 
Constitution of 1988 foresees broadcasting as an activity to be delivered by private, public and 
governmental broadcasters (Art. 223). This external pluralism rule is similar to the „three thirds‟ rule 
used in France for guaranteeing internal pluralism (or diversity of opinions) in news coverage (La 
Porte et al., 2007).
81
 However, despite the constitutional guaranty of pluralism in Brazil, the „space‟ 
occupied by each of those broadcasting agents is far from equitable. The disproportionate size (in 
terms of budgets, revenues and audiences) of Brazilian commercial broadcasters in comparison to 
the other two segments, public and governmental broadcasters, shows how unbalanced the 
service is. Moreover, media concentration was allowed in cable as well and is highly consolidated, 
like in other countries.
82
 As in the case of not allowing multiprogramming in order to favour 
established FTA broadcasters, regulators directly favoured the monopolistic nature of cable. Those 
facts shows how the “goals of pluralism and diversity are difficult to operationalise into effective 
laws” as remarked by Bardoel and D'Haenens (2008). However, when the PA 2011 replaced the 
Cable Act 1995, a general principle was included stating that those services should promote a 
“diversity of sources of production” (Art. 3.ii). 
 
With regards to independent production, Brazilian legislation does not actively promote it in FTA 
broadcasting services. Although the development of independent production is one of the purposes 
of the broadcasting service (the Constitution dictates that broadcasters shall “stimulate 
independent productions” (Art. 221)), it was only in 2008 with the introduction of the PSB Act 2008 
(and hence only valid for the public channel) that a quota of 5% for those works was introduced 
(Art. 8.ix). As there is no quota for, or direct financing from the commercial sector, production is 
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 According to the academic, the „three third rule‟ is used in France by the CSA to oversee if broadcasters 
divide news time equally between the government, parliamentarian situation and opposition. 
82
 Intended to increase competition and plurality of ownership in paytv, the Cable Act 1995 foresaw that 30% 
of the capacity of the cable network should be leased to other companies which, in turn, could offer different 
services to customers (Art. 41). However, the regulation was never enforced. The intention of that regulation 
was to create a multi-purpose and shared network in order to develop competition in cable services and to 
create new services using a single network. Cable capacity was always used for increasing the channel line-
up and when cable-telephony started, cable operators, naturally, did not want to share that new and promising 
source of revenue with tier operators. 
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mainly vertically controlled by broadcasters, resulting in a timid independent production sector, as 
the market analysis in Chapter 8 will show. 
 
The PA 2011 also includes a quota for independently produced content. However, the quota is 
timid. Paytv channels (excluding news, teleshopping and other specific niche channels) shall 
broadcast independently produced content, at least, for one hour and 45 minutes per week (Art. 
16).
83
 Although  the quota corresponds to less than 1% of the „air-time‟, the inclusion represents a 
political breakthrough which may have consequences for FTA broadcasting in the medium term. In 
addition, in an attempt to introduce competition within traditional FTA broadcasters, the Act 
included a rule stipulating that all subscribers should receive at least two independent channels 
(Art. 17.4).
84
 Certainly these quotas are small considering that paytv packages offer hundreds of 
channels. It seems that more needs to be done if Brazilian regulators want to alter the highly 





The usage of broadcasting as a tool for promoting and supporting democracy is strongly related to 
the support of the public sphere. Therefore this section will focus on rules such as news coverage 
and impartiality. 
 
In Britain, news impartiality is a constant legislative concern. The BA 1981 dictates that news 
should be presented with “due accuracy and impartiality” (s4.1.b) and the BBC‟s Agreement of that 
year stated that the broadcaster must treat “controversial subjects with due impartiality” both in 
news services and with programmes dealing with “matters of public policy” (Annex). It is interesting 
to note that whilst at the time the Thatcher government indicated that the PSB should maintain a 
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 The instrument includes a national content quota of 3.5 hours per week, of which half should be 
independently produced. 
84
 The channels shall be independent both from FTA broadcasters and from paytv distributors. 
Usage of the media as part of the public sphere and as a 
democratic tool for participation and for public debate; 
integrated with the political system and without censorship 
(Price, 1995: 23). 
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certain political detachment from the turmoil of controversial policies, such as privatisations and the 
closing of mines, the broadcaster‟s independence was mentioned neither by the Charter nor by the 
Agreement introduced in 1981. Independence was explicitly included in the next Agreement in 
1996, however. The PSB would be “independent in all matters concerning the content” (s2.1) but 
would also need to “treat controversial subjects”, such as “matters of public policy or of political or 
industrial controversy”, “with due accuracy and impartiality” (s.5.1.c). Independence was explicitly 
granted but the broadcaster was then officially „reminded‟ that political issues should be covered 
with special care. 
 
It is important to note that before the 1996 BBC‟s new charter and agreement, perhaps already as 
a result of the politicisation of the country due to the aforementioned country‟s transformations, the 
BA 1990 introduced an obligation for the main commercial channels to broadcast party political 
programmes (s36). That political engagement of broadcasting was maintained by the transitional 
BA 1996 and was further detailed by the CA 2003 (s.333). The latter Act, which became law in a 
different and „calm‟ political scenario, incorporated the guarantee of “an appropriate level of 
freedom of expression” (s3.4.g) and added, as a general rule, that the main terrestrials should 
“facilitate civil understanding by providing fair and well-informed debate on news and current 
affairs” (s264.6.c). These impartiality and democracy-related dispositions highlight how the British 
legislation in this respect has become more descriptive and prescriptive, while liberalising 
broadcasting and having to deal with more and diversified news providers. 
 
In France, the act that ended the state-monopoly in broadcasting, the Audiovisual Communications 
Act 1982, perhaps reflecting a concern that a liberalised media could have an uncontrolled political 
bias, stated that in the public interest the public service should ensure “honesty, independence and 
pluralism” (Art.5.1). The act also included a paragraph granting right of response and the obligation 
to cover political campaigning (Arts. 6 and 33). A commission for guaranteeing the independence 
of the PSBs was also created (Art. 12). The succeeding FoCA 1986, which privatised TF1, included 
within the objectives of the regulator the duty to maintain pluralist expressions in political 
programmes (Art. 13). Additionally, in order to prevent the commercial channel from abandoning its 
social missions, an obligation to broadcast news and current affairs was also included (Art. 64.6). 
CHAPTER VI – STEP 1: ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL OBJECTIVES... 
138 
 
These impartiality - and political - related prescriptions remained in the following FoCA 
amendments, although not only for TF1. Currently, main terrestrials should be independent, 
impartial and “favour the democratic debate” (FoCA as amended in 2004, Arts. 3-1 and 43-11). 
Arguably, one of the main outcomes of this disposition is the „three thirds‟ rule (equal time to the 
presidency, majority and opposition) already mentioned. However, even that simple rule may be 
jeopardised. Following a complaint from the socialist opposition, the CSA modified the principle in 
2009 in order to distinguish the President‟s usage of the media as the head of the state from when 
he was speaking as the head of the party (Marin, 2009). Moreover, the regulator determined that 
the opposition should have at least half of the air time accumulated by the presidency and by the 
political majority (ibid). Despite the legislative effort granting balanced political space on television, 
the effectiveness of this must be questioned. Kuhn (2007) remarks that political debate 
programmes became less common on the main terrestrial channels and politicians are using 
alternative media, such as celebrity magazines, to reach the contingents of uninterested voters. 
 
In Brazil, the broadcasting role of supporting democracy was defined by a leftist Presidency which 
enacted the still valid Broadcasting Code 1962. Very different from the tendency of the following 
decades of not intruding on the content delivered by commercial broadcasters of that country, the 
code included a quota of 5% for news programmes (Art 38.g) and, 90 days prior to each election, 
two hours daily of free-of-charge political campaigning (Art. 39). In spite of the military overthrow of 
that government in 1964, the political campaigning and the news quota were maintained in the 
reform introduced in 1967 by the de-facto government. Since then, the official start of each 
electoral campaign is marked by the „season‟ of those political programmes which became so 
associated in voters‟ minds with elections that these programmes, to this day, are an obligation 
which politicians heavily rely on. 
 
Apart from assuring freedom of expression, an aspect not mentioned by British and French 
legislation is censorship, especially governmental censorship. However, in Brazil, the Constitution 
enacted in 1988, after the military returned the power to civilians in 1985, strongly stated, 
understandably, that censorship was forbidden in all social communication forms (Art. 220). Also 
partially understandable, out of the fear of being accused of using authoritarian tools, the new 
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government did not intrude and dictate new dirigiste rules for the usage of the media. The 
Constitution thus did not include further objectives for commercial broadcasters. Conversely, the 
Cable Act 1995, reflecting the bill‟s passage through the national congress, included civic purposes 
for the, then, new service. The Act stated that the service should promote political pluralism (Art. 3). 
More than a decade later, the PSB Act 2008 that created the federal PSB determined that the 
public broadcaster was independent from the government and mandated representatives from civil 
society to be included in its curator body (Art. 2.viii, ix and Art. 15). The Act also stated that the 
broadcaster should be used as a space for “debate and democracy consolidation” (Art. 3). A few 
years later, the PA 2011 included another democracy-related rule inspired by a Spanish regulation, 
as acknowledged by the Brazilian Deputy Bittar (2007: 21).
85
 Each subscriber that subscribes to 
one news channels must have available, at least, another news channel for subscription. This 
pluralistic democratic move received much approval from organisations willing to diminish the 
dominance of Rede Globo‟s news channels and, certainly, from their direct competitor Rede 
Record, who have a similar news channel and would certainly welcome more distribution 
opportunities. 
 
The inclusion of clauses supporting democracy may be regarded as a natural consequence of the 
relatively new Brazilian democracy. One indicator of the freshness of Brazilian democracy is that 
free political campaigning is not only mandatory in FTA, but voting is also obligatory. It is important 
to note however, that whilst obligatory voting has been a theme of constant debate in the congress 
(Lumier, 2009), free electoral campaigning on TV is firmly maintained in legislation. This 
preoccupation with the usage of FTA as an important deliverer of information is not restricted to 
democratic purposes only. As will be seen in the following section, the related citizenry objective is 
also highly valued by Brazilian regulation. 
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 Deputies are members of Brazilian parliamentarian lower house, as in France and are the equivalent to the 
Members of Parliament in Britain. 





The usage of broadcasting to foster citizenship values is closely linked to the, arguably, 
paternalistic educational objectives of PSBs, which can be traced back to the original Reithian triad 
„to educate, to inform and to entertain‟ (cited in Wise & Steemers, 2000: 90). Additionally, part of 
PSBs remit is to represent all segments of society. Possibly one of the most important outcomes of 
promoting a broad citizenship, and therefore including the interests, beliefs and values of all 
segments of the society, is that broadcasters develop in audiences a sense of belonging and 
participation. However, to typify interests, tastes and values in legislation could be regarded as 
intrusive in democratic societies and seen as excessive control, on the verge of, if not, censoring 
broadcasting services. Therefore, the instruments that can be used are vague when defining what 
kind of content is regarded as positive for society and what should be banned. Only general 
concepts are included in a kind of loose or ex post control. 
 
For instance, in the CA 2003 there is only a general rule for protecting the public from “offensive 
and harmful material” (s3.2.e) and, what some may regard as a consequence of times of media 
overexposure of celebrities, “against unfair treatment and infringements of privacy” (s3.2.f). 
Perhaps in an attempt to restrict pornography, only the international channels are regarded as 
potentially dangerous to citizenry as they are still mandated to refrain from broadcasting content 
that “offends taste or decency” (s329) (a clause in place in the BA 1981), while national channels 
do not have this restriction. 
 
What is more consensual than including specific positive-content clauses in legislation is the 
inclusion of the general objectives on the „public remit‟ of PSBs. In Britain, the Reithian values of 
PSBs providing “information, education and entertainment” were included in the BA 1981 (s2.2.a). 
As with the other concepts already discussed, this one was also adapted through time and in the 
CA 2003 it includes explicit obligations for PSBs to deliver “science, religion, social issues, matters 
of international significance or interest and matters of specialist interest” (246.6.f). The BBC‟s 
Usage of the media for the promotion of ideas of belonging, 
identity and participation (Morley and Robins 1995: 74; 
Price 1995: 17) and of PSB for the Reithian ethos “to 
educate, entertain and inform” (cited in Wise & Steemers, 
2000: 90). 
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Charter of 2006 expanded the public remit of the broadcaster including “sustaining citizenship” 
(s4.a). Religion is also included as a value related to citizenship. These programmes must be 
treated with “responsibility” (s319.2.e) and “not involve abusive treatment of religious views and 
beliefs” (s319.6.b). Thus, as legislation has become more explicit, and with it more prescriptive, it 
may be argued that media legislation is also receding towards paternalism. 
 
Having catered for the representation of the regions in the regional licensing model of ITV and of 
minorities in the case of Channel 4, and with the increase in the number of channels, legislation 
addressed the issue of the production of regional content. The BA 1990 mandates the inclusion of 
“sufficient amount of time” for regional programmes and news of particular interests for local 
audiences (s16.2.c.i and ii). The CA 2003 reserves a specific purpose service aimed at local 
communities, the “local digital television services” who should contribute with economic and social 
benefits to their localities (s244.5). With a similar purpose the CA 2003 maintained Channel 4‟s 
remit foreseeing that programmes shall take into consideration that Britain is a “culturally diverse 
society” (s265.3.b). 
 
On the other side of the English Channel, French legislators foster citizenship values differently. In 
line with the „culturalist‟ focus which might be expected from policymakers from the La Manche 
side, one of the purposes of the PSB as stated in the French Audiovisual Communication Act 1982 
is the formation of “cultural, social, professional and philosophical communities” (Art. 5.4). The 
Reithian triad is also slightly modified in France: the FoCA 1986 determines that PSB should 
comply with educational, cultural and social missions (Art. 36). In addition, reflecting the catholic 
legacy, albeit of a secular country, the social remit includes the transmission of religious 
programmes on Sundays mornings (Art. 56). On the other hand, there is no paragraph restricting 
the broadcast of content which may offend „taste or decency‟. On the contrary, one of the 
objectives of the broadcasting regulator since the initial version of the FoCA is to “guarantee to the 
citizenry access to free communication” (Art. 3). That is understandable for a country where, until 
the 1980s, the government was the only licensed broadcaster. Perhaps due to the emphasis on 
impartiality, there are not as many prescriptive rules of what should be or should not be broadcast 
in the French FoCA. However, there are some examples. Since an amendment made to the FoCA 
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in 2000, broadcasters must include anti-doping programmes in their schedules (Art. 20-3). Being 
less specific and more in tune with the multifaceted characteristic of current societies, and 
especially after the 2005 riots, the FoCA  was also changed in 2006 to include, for the PSBs, the 
role of “promoting social cohesion” and “fighting against discrimination and delivering programmes 
reflecting the cultural diversity of French society” (Art. 43-11). 
 
However, in times of satellite broadcasting, channels generated abroad may pose problems to the 
integration pursued by policymakers. In 2004 the Lebanese based, and allegedly linked to the 
Hezbollah political party, satellite channel Al-manar was forbidden to be distributed in France 
because of anti-Semitic programmes (see for instance AFP, 2006; Chrisafis, 2011). 
 
In Brazil the relation between broadcasting and citizenship was modelled by the military‟s reform of 
the Broadcasting Code 1962, introduced by the Decree-Act 1967. The amendments included a 
similar ban to the (democratic) British clauses regarding „taste and decency‟ or „inciting crime‟, 
although with stronger wording. The stipulations included typical concerns of dictatorships, such as 
banning content related to war, political or social subversion, indiscipline and against national 
defence (BC 1962, Art. 53). Important to note is that, as in the British case of „taste and decency‟ 
and „inciting crime‟, these „crime containment clauses‟ are still not repealed. Additionally, the 
military government subordinated information, entertainment and advertising in broadcasting to 
higher educational and cultural goals (BC 1962, Art. 38.d). In fact, the reform introduced specific 
educational channels (DA 1967, Art. 13), in practice state-owned channels, without adverts, and 
instituted an educational quota of five hours per week of educational programmes for commercial 
broadcasters (DA 1967, Art. 16). 
 
The democratic constitution of 1988, commonly called „the citizenship constitution‟, softened the 
general aims of broadcasting by dictating that television shall comply with “preferences to 
educational, artistic, cultural and informational goals” and with “respect to ethical and social values 
of individuals and families” (Art. 222). The Cable Act 1995 went further into the content issue and 
stated that the service should promote universal and national culture, leisure, entertainment and 
social and economic development (Art. 3). The Act also introduced new governmental channels in 
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order to increase transparency and to actively promote social development. Those channels were 
further increased in number with the subsequent PA 2011. Currently there are ten citizenship-
related channels that must be offered (besides the FTA channels) to every subscriber (PA 2011, 
Art. 32).
86
 That number is often criticised in the press as being a burden for paytv distributors. 
 
Between those two latest Acts, the PSB Act 2008 enacted a set of clauses for the promotion of 
“educational, artistic, cultural, scientific and informational goals” (Art. 2.iii) for the newly created TV 
Brasil.
87
 In addition, the PSB shall contribute towards the development of critical conscience and 
the promotion of citizenry (Art. 3.ii and vii). However, according to the same regulation, these 
objectives should be pursued whilst also seeking to broaden PSB‟s audiences (ibid). What is 
peculiar in the objectives of Brazilian PSB is that entertainment is explicitly left outside of the scope 
of broadcasters‟ remit. Implicitly, however, entertainment is acknowledged as the broadcaster has 
to search for broader audiences. 
 
As can be seen from the Brazilian provisions, on the one hand, citizenship values form a core part 
of PSB‟s remit and, in general, of broadcasting services‟ objectives (including cable). On the other 
hand, the promotion of the closely related objective of promoting diversity is not explicitly 
addressed by regulation. This may reside in the fact that to encourage diversity – implied in 
diversifying the types of programmes and channels - is more costly to broadcasters, as more 
channels and different kind of programmes have to be generated catering for different interests of 
specific segments of the society. Instead, it is easier and cheaper to promote citizenry values by 
producing a balanced news broadcast, debate programmes or traditional educational programmes 
following the easy recipe of using low-cost programmes, a common practice of state-owned 
channels in that country. Not surprisingly, the state-owned broadcasters are recurrently referred to 
be as hosts of “boring content”, even by their own chief executives (Carmona, 2006), and costly 
entertainment is left to the powerful and influential commercial broadcasters. 
 
 
                                                          
86
 Distributors have to include dedicated channels from the following organisations/orientation: educational, 
university, legislative, judiciary, community, citizenship and other federal government agencies. 
87
 As a reminder, the broadcaster is the EBC (the company), TV Brasil is their channel. 
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6.6 Cultural relevance 
 
Closely related to the concept of citizenry and its aspect of building a sense of community and of 
belonging is the concept of the cultural relevance. However, to identify which content is relevant for 
a particular country or community in times of increased fragmentation of interests and of 
multifaceted societies may be as difficult as establishing what offends taste or decency. One 
particular category of content is identified as relevant, though, and these are the events of major 
public interest. As commercial and in particular paytv systems increased in popularity and 
importance, there has been a rising concern with those events, mainly sports, of being excluded 
from FTA as a result of exclusivity contracts with paytv platforms. It is important to note that these 
events cannot be simplified to sports only though. The royal ceremonies in Britain, the carnival in 
Rio or major political announcements in France are other events of national importance that would 
prompt a large public outcry (maybe to a lesser extent in the French example) if they were closed 
for subscription only. Despite the fact that that content may be highly culturally relevant for large 
parts of the population, as the coverage of these events are increasingly important economic 
assets, they will be closely examined in Chapter 7 when dealing with broadcasting rights. This 
section will focus instead on how regulation fosters national culture in general. 
 
Perhaps the first characteristics of content which may be directly related to the concept of cultural 
relevance are the nationality and language. In the UK, the BBC‟s 1981 Agreement considered that 
“proper proportions of matter” should be of “British origin” (Annex). The BA 1990 and 1996, 
reflecting the TWF Directive already in place, stated that a “proper proportion” of programmes 
should be of EU origin (because of the TWF/AVMS that proportion has to be, at least, the majority 
of the content) (BA 1996 s19.2.a, s16.2.g, s25.2.e, and s29). The CA 2003 furthermore includes a 
concern with regionalising production by mandating that a “suitable range and proportion of 
programmes” should be made outside the M25 (the motorway that delimits the London area) 
(s.264.6.j, s286.1, s286.3 and s288). This regionalisation rule can also be related to sustaining a 
„regional diversity‟. Conversely, in the current legislation there is no obligation stating that a certain 
Usage of mass media for the support of national values 
and authors (Oren and Petro 2004: 99). The support of the 
public interest by disseminating cultural goods, sharing a 
cultural heritage and “securing channels for reaching people 
with artistic cultural experience” (McQuail 1992: 284). 
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amount of content should be British. Perhaps there is no such rule sustaining „national diversity‟ 
because the main broadcasters already heavily rely on national content, as will be seen in Chapter 
8. 
 
If from one side currently in the UK there are no apparent concerns with the nationality of the 
content, the BA 1981 foresaw that for “programmes of merit” “wide showing” shall be secured 
(s2.2.c) and that British programmes shall be scheduled in “proper proportions” (s4.1.c). There was 
also a concern that the content should appeal “to the tastes and outlook of the persons served by 
the station” (s4.1.d). These concepts were adapted and, according to the BBC Agreement 1996, 
content should stimulate the performing arts and “reflect the lives and concerns” of both local and 
national audiences (s3.2.b and g). This latter scope was further enhanced by the CA 2003 which 
included, for the main broadcasters, the need to reflect the different communities, cultural interests 
and traditions within the UK (s264.6.i). It is inevitable to relate those dispositions to a broader 
purpose of sustaining diversity of programming. However, the prescriptions show how legislators 
„remind‟ broadcasters how they have to be connected to local culture. 
 
To define what is local or national is a difficult task though. The Finance Act 2006 that introduced a 
“cultural test” by amending the Films Act 1985, which will be discussed in the following chapter, 
determines that, for a film to be categorised as „made in the UK‟, regulators have to evaluate if the 
content is based on a “British story” and uses a British language.
88
 Those changes in British 
legislation show that the cultural relevance concept in British regulation is distancing itself away 
from rigid definitions of the nationality of the content and, instead, fostering a connection with local 
interests. Possibly, this is a reflection of the relatively multi-cultural nature of the country and the 
considerable proportion of the population with foreign background, especially in the bigger cities. 
 
In the case of France, since the Audiovisual Act of 1982, the cultural relevance is strongly related 
to the promotion of the French language and culture, in France and worldwide (Art. 5). The act also 
states a special concern to represent the needs of its “composing population” (ibid). Those main 
objectives were maintained by all the versions of the following FoCA 1986 with a particular stress 
                                                          
88
 The test in detailed in the Statutory Order 643/2006. 
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on the “protection” of the language (the original Art. 3), later changed to “promotion” (amended 
Arts. 3-1, 20-1, 43-11). The “regional languages”, as part of the diversity of the linguistic patrimony, 
are also to be promoted (Art. 43-11). Additionally, the concern with the nationality of the content is 
more strongly incorporated into French regulation. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, when 
analysing the quotas, the FoCA 1986 explicitly included the obligation to broadcast French content 
(Art. 64-2 in the original act). 
 
As will also be analysed in more depth in the following chapter, the nationality of the content in 
France is important not only for quota purposes but also for receiving public funds. In order to be 
entitled to receive public financing, the cultural relevance of the content is evaluated by a „cultural 
test‟. Similar to the British case, the industrial and financial aspects of production are assessed. 
However, unlike in the UK, there are additional and specific grants given based solely on the 
content attributes and cultural relevance which are assessed by concepts not explicitly stated in 
legislation. Britain prescribes in legislation what should be produced and broadcast, instead of 
using economic contributions to be administered by the government later on. French government 
has thus more power to directly intervene in production and does not heavily rely on legislative 
prescriptions. A closer look at the content quotas (that will be performed during the second step of 
the research, in the next chapter) will reveal the real intensity by which cultural relevance is 
pursued in each country‟s broadcasting services. 
 
In Brazil cultural relevance was ignored in broadcasting legislation, as would be expected in a 
country which is characterised by a lack of interference with the content delivered by commercial 
broadcasters. It was only when the Cable Act 1995 was enacted that an obligation to broadcast 
national independent productions was included (Art. 31.iv). The new PA 2011 enhanced those 
rules by mandating the inclusion of at least two channels with a majority of Brazilian and 
independently produced content. The Act also included a clause similar to the French philosophy, 
where paytv shall promote Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language. 
 
If on the one hand the Brazilian communication authorities refrain from intervening in FTA 
broadcasting, on the other hand, cultural relevance is strongly promoted by the cultural policy 
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emanating from the governmental agents responsible for culture,
89
 and also by a broad clause 
contained in the Constitution.
 
The Brazilian Magna Carta states that social communication shall 
comply with the “promotion of national and regional culture” (as well as art and news) (Art. 221). 
The Rouanet Act 1991, that instituted a national cultural programme and fund, dictates the 
protection of the “cultural expressions of the groups that form Brazilian society and are responsible 
for the pluralism of national culture”, the preservation of “material and immaterial cultural and 
historical assets” and the stimulation of regional and local cultural and artistic productions (Art. 1). 
Similarly, when the film agency was created by the Provisional Measure 2228-1 (Ancine PM) of 
2001, its remit included the promotion of national culture and language (Art. 2.i and ii). 
 
At this point it is important to note that, contrary to the French case, in Brazil language and culture 
are promoted by the film agency which does not have the legal remit to regulate FTA. In France 
that promotion is the obligation of French cinema regulator (CNC) and includes broadcasting. 
Eventually, with the enactment of the PSB Act 2008, cultural relevance was also included as a 
concept for broadcasting but, obviously, only for the PSB. The newly created broadcaster shall 
cater for the promotion of national and regional culture (Art. 2.iv and v). It is also important to 
remark that despite the lack of obligations to promote national culture on television and the 
practically non-existent national content quotas, commercial broadcasters invest and heavily rely 
on Brazilian content (see Chapters 7 and 8). This comes as a result of its continued appeal to 
audiences. The most visible examples of this are the telenovelas and miniseries,
90
 overwhelmingly 
based on Brazilian stories and literary works respectively (Brasil Junior, Gomes, & Oliveira, 2004; 
Conversani & Botoso, 2009). The practice does not necessarily imply the promotion of diverse 
cultural values or of society‟s diverse representation though. It only shows that national content is 
scheduled in Brazilian broadcasting without the need of regulatory support. 
 
 
                                                          
89
 As examples of the different spheres of influence to which those organisms are subjected to, artist Gilberto 
Gil was Ministry of Culture whilst Helio Costa, who admitted of his own accord a connection to broadcasters 
(Cruz 2008: 92), was appointed as Minister of Communications. 
90
 Telenovelas and miniseries have different lengths. The former is divided into 200 chapters (as the late 
2000s average indicates), and the latter into 20 chapters (Conversani and Botoso 2009). 




The objective of studying the audiovisual legislation of the selected case studies was to identify the 
different directions taken by policymakers in the implementation of socio-cultural objectives for 
broadcasting services. 
 
The socio-cultural goals of diversity, plurality, democracy, citizenry and cultural relevance were 
chosen in order to identify whether or not those broader goals were being strengthened, or if they 
were changed for the accommodation of economic and industrial forces. As expected, the analysis 
did not deliver a clear answer. Both emphases are present in legislation. Even so, some 
conclusions may be drawn from the research. 
 
Diversity, plurality and citizenry are issues on which both European countries spent considerable 
regulatory effort. Citizenry objectives have become more prescriptive for the broadcasting services 
in all three countries. The promotion of competition tools may be regarded as the chosen 
apparatuses for achieving not only competition per se but to fulfil bigger socio-cultural values, such 
as the delivery of content that addresses the objectives of diversity, democracy and citizenry. In the 
particular case of the UK, if the regulatory distance between the BBC and other commercial 
channels is diminishing, the analysis of the legislation suggests that the legislative prescriptions of 
the traditional broadcasters and the diversity of publicly-owned channels are being consistently 
increased through time. 
 
In France a recent concern with issues of citizenship and political debate can be identified. These 
two issues are more prominent in the current Acts, as a result of the amendments of 2006, than, for 
instance, the objective of diversity. This void related to diversity may negatively impact the cultural 
relevance of the kinds of cultural products being produced too. Although there is a broad principle 
to schedule culturally relevant content in all three countries, the possible implications of that void on 
the production of national content will only become clearer as the next steps are performed in the 
following chapters. 
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Brazil, possibly because of the strong blocking power of commercial broadcasters, did not 
significantly alter the aims and objectives of broadcasting, which have remained unchanged since 
the military amendments of 1967. Cable, satellite and DTV were adopted with independent pieces 
of legislation, and even a new federal PSB was created, without altering the rules for commercial 
broadcasters. As a consequence, new socio-cultural goals for broadcasting services, arguably 
needed in any democratic and lively society, have been partially implemented. This situation is 
even more significant in a country where FTA broadcasting is the major deliverer of audiovisual 
content in terms of audience shares and, for vast proportions of the population, the only source of 
information. Moreover, in the Brazilian case a clear distinction was also seen between the 
objectives of subscription services, mainly for entertainment, and PSB, focused on education and 
information. As the former president of the extinct Radiobras (the former state-owned broadcaster 
that gave place to the EBC) very directly stated on broadcasting entertainment: “public TV does not 
do, should not say that do and, afterthought, should openly declare that does not do 
entertainment”
91
 (Bucci, 2006). The PSB‟s Reithian triad does not apply for the Brazilian case. 
 
These observations lead us to the following generalisation. British legislation may be regarded as 
having strong cultural and social goals pursued by economic tools. France has strong economic 
tools for the pursuit of not always clear cultural goals. The analysis also confirmed the assumptions 
that France has a more dirigiste approach, while the UK has a more liberal one. Brazil, on the 
contrary, has a light-touch regulation with the government leaving to the market the task of finding 
the optimal solution. 
 
These tendencies could certainly be regarded as an oversimplification. However, that observation 
leads us to an obvious conclusion: this legislative assessment only accounts for half of the story. 
The evaluation of what kind of broadcasting services and as a consequence the types of national 
content produced and distributed could only be assessed by investigating what kinds of content are 
actually being broadcast. Perhaps these regulatory emphases on diversity in Britain and political 
debate in France are not achieved and, conversely, perhaps Brazilian broadcasting is generating 
culturally relevant content as a result of audiences‟ tastes and desires. 
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 “A TV Publica nao faz, nao deveria dizer que faz e, pensando bem, deveria declarar abertamente que nao 
faz entretenimento” (original quote). 




Adding up to this legislative conceptual analysis, the next two steps, the regulatory tools and the 
market assessment (Chapters 7 and 8), will provide additional elements to assess whether 







CHAPTER VII                                                                                                                  
STEP 2: ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY TOOLS 
 
 
No government can order a great film to be made, or to 
coerce audience from attending a movie that people 
perceive to be good 
(Motion Picture Association of America's former 




Throughout the second part of this thesis, thus far, I have investigated the developments of 
broadcasting services from different angles. In Chapter 5, as a contextual chapter for the three 
case study countries, I discussed how changes in legislation have supported the developments of 
audiovisual services, notably through the opening of new television channels and distribution 
services. In Chapter 6, while performing the first step of the analysis, I indicated how the socio-
cultural objectives of these services were addressed through time by policymakers. However, in 
order to truly achieve those socio-cultural goals, regulators have to translate those aspirations into 
effective, measurable and enforceable rules. For instance, in order to contribute to democracy and 
citizenry, the main terrestrials, as the most viewed channels, must be available for all members of 
society. Therefore, the rules of access and the coverage of those channels have to be properly 
addressed by regulation. Moreover, if there is a concern in sustaining national cultures and 
identities in times of global media and increase in imported channels, national content must be 
incentivised, funded and circulated. Therefore, regulators have to implement certain mechanisms 
enabling the production and distribution of national content. Those regulatory tools are usually 
referred to as „push-pull‟ regulations and this chapter is entirely devoted to that analysis, the 
second step as defined in Chapter 4. 




As this thesis is concerned with the promotion of national content, the regulatory „push‟-tools (the 
„sticks‟) that I will concentrate on are the rules concerning media ownership, rules of access to 
broadcasting channels, broadcasting rights and content quotas. On the „pull‟ side of the regulations 
(the „carrots‟) I will analyse the incentives and funding policies for the promotion of national content. 
Certainly there are other tools present in regulation that influence the production of content, such 
as competition rules, advertisement, licensing and taxation. However, for obvious practical reasons 
I will concentrate only on the tools mentioned, as they are more specifically related to the traditional 
channels which have a higher influence on the production of national content and a stronger legal 
remit to sustain the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting services. 
 
This chapter begins with sections 7.2 to 7.4 analysing three tools that are not directly applicable to 
the content itself but, instead, regulate the relationship between the different agents involved with 
its production and distribution and, therefore will be discussed more succinctly. In section 7.2 I will 
study the rules that govern the access to the main terrestrials, the biggest deliverers of national 
content, by the various distribution technologies. In section 7.3 I will analyse the developments in 
ownership regulations and, lastly, in section 7.4 I will examine how regulators are dictating the rules 
concerning broadcasting rights. 
 
Before starting with the analysis of the tools directly linked to the production and distribution of 
national content, i.e. the funding and incentives and the quota, it is important to establish how 
national content is defined in regulation. Hence, section 7.5 will study the regulatory tools for the 
assessment of the nationality of the content. As a result of that analysis, in that section I will also 
indicate my own suggestion for the definition of national content. After understanding the complex 
array of production characteristics evaluated by regulators, in section 7.6 I will show the different 
types of financing schemes (the „pulling‟ tools) that are available for national content producers in 
each of the countries of this comparative research. 
 
Lastly, section 7.7 will focus on the regulatory push, the quotas. By creating a demand (or 
guaranteeing a distribution „space‟) for national content, quota regulations dictate the amount of 
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specific kinds of content that must be delivered by the different broadcasters in order to fulfil the 
socio-cultural objectives analysed in Chapter 6. The quota set either in terms of minimum numbers 
of hours or in percentages, may refer to genres such as news, current affairs, films and children 
programmes, as well as national content and independent productions. 
 
The analysis performed in this second step will complement the one performed in Chapter 6, the 
first step, and together they will provide further evidence of which of the socio-cultural objectives 
are more actively promoted by regulators. In addition, at least two other main outcomes of 
regulation will also be identified. First, the types of content fostered and secondly and finally, the 
differences in purpose for each of the regulated channels. 
 
 
7.2 Rules of access 
With the start of cable and satellite, clauses regulating the access to FTA broadcasting channels 
were introduced both for distributors and broadcasters. These access rules are important 
instruments in two ways. On the one hand they grant traditional broadcasters (prominent producers 
of national content) free-of-charge access to paytv platforms (and subscribers). On the other hand, 
the inclusion of those channels adds to the viewing options of subscribers and potentially increases 
the national content available. Thus, by sharing the same national programmes, the „bonding‟ effect 
propitiated by the main terrestrials may be increased as the other segments of the society are also 
included. Therefore, the understanding of the rules of access - which helps to maintain diversity, 
plurality, citizenry and democracy - is necessary in times where national broadcasters and, overall, 
FTA channels might be lost in the digital „vast land‟. 
 
For those purposes, must-carry rules, the obligation to carry the traditional FTA broadcasters, are 
adopted in all our case studies.
92
 However, in the Brazilian case, if the conditions of the new PA 
2011 are maintained, must-carry will be transformed to „must-offer‟ after the analogue switch-off 
(Art. 32).
93
 With that change, the new act may be regarded as reinforcing and strengthening well 
                                                          
92
 Must-carry regulations are stated on the CA 2003, s64.3 (UK); FoCA 1986, Art. 34.1, 98-1 (France) and 
PA 2011 Art. 32 (Brazil). 
93
 See Chapter 3.3 for „must-offer‟ definition. 
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established and highly desired broadcasters, as those channels might obtain better financial deals 
from distributors. Nonetheless, the outcome of that strategy brings some degree of uncertainty 
because of the differences in market power between broadcasters and distributors in some cases. 
 
As the digitalisation of FTA involves large amounts of capital expenditure in the upgrade, and 
satellite covers the country with virtually any „holes‟ or „shadow areas‟, there was a concern in the 
UK that digitalisation could lead to a „digital broadcasting‟ divide and poor accessibility to the main 
terrestrials, especially the PSB. Hence, a concern with geographical coverage was included in the 
DTV roll-out in Britain (BA 1996, s76.4).
94
 Not only was there a preoccupation with accessibility to 
the new digital channels by viewers, but there was also a related concern with guaranteeing that 
the main terrestrials would be distributed by those new systems (the mitigation of potential 
gatekeeping). Therefore, besides promoting better coverage, transmission „space‟ was reserved in 
the multiplexers securing access to the traditional FTA channels (s28.2 and BBC Agreement 2006 
s12.1). 
 
The same care with coverage and availability for the main terrestrial channels was also identified in 
French legislation, and coverage clauses, too, were included. Since TF1‟s privatisation, the new 
owners have been forbidden to diminish its coverage (FoCA 1986 Art. 62). With digitalisation, in 
2007, an obligation for all main terrestrials to cover 95% of the population was included by a 
schedule to be monitored and reviewed by the CSA (FoCA 1986 Art. 96-2). 
 
These access and coverage related issues brought by the new distribution systems and by 
digitalisation are not present in Brazilian FTA broadcasting legislation, as the service‟s framework 
dates back to the 1960s, prior to the arrival of cable and satellite in that country. Even DTV was 
rolled-off without challenging commercial broadcasters (and not changing the Broadcasting Code 
(BC) 1962). The government opted for monoprogramming (Decree 5820/2006)
95
 and broadcasters 
were able to compete with newer paytv systems, without having to face new broadcasters in the 
                                                          
94
 The BA 1996 split the broadcasting service between multiplexers (the transmission companies) and digital 
programme services (the content providers, i.e. the former analogue channels) (s1) and broader coverage was 
one of the factors to be considered in the bidding processes for awarding the multiplex licenses (s8.2). 
95
 See Annex 2 for details on monoprogramming and multiprogramming. 
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new digital mode. As additional benefit to commercial broadcasters, no coverage obligations were 
imposed when granting the new digital licenses. 
 
At this stage, I would like to comment on a few more points regarding access which are directly 
related to the arrival of the new distribution technologies. Just as important as assuring access for 
viewers and for distributors to the FTA channels is access to the listings of channels available on 
the decoders, the so-called Electronic Programme Guides (EPGs). Directly linked with must-carry 
obligations, a position on the EPGs is fundamental for achieving visibility to broadcasters. As 
currently paytv systems offer hundreds of channels to subscribers, a relegation to the bottom of the 
list could directly affect viewing shares. Additionally, there are concerns, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
that commercial systems prioritise commercial channels against PSBs. Therefore, in Britain, the 
CA 2003 included clauses regarding to the EPGs (s232). Legislators mandated Ofcom to foresee a 
“degree of prominence” for FTA channels in EPGs (s310.2). Similarly in France, EPGs have also 
been object of similar regulation, since an amendment was introduced in the FoCA in 2009 (Art.34-
4) which ordered that national channels must be numbered and listed in the same hundred. In 
Brazil, the PA 2011 also dictates that must-carry channels must be listed in the same sequential 
order as given in the FTA service (Art.32.6). While in the European countries, the technical 
measure is linked to sustaining the social aims of broadcasting and securing prominence for the 
PSBs, in Brazil is certainly a matter of protecting national FTA commercial broadcasters from being 
diluted in a multichannel environment. 
 
With regards to the internet, the new medium is addressed in legislation as an additional 
distribution platform at the service of broadcasting services (hence, convergence in complements 
as discussed in Chapter 3). However, in the case of the UK, the BBC Agreement 2006 (that 
granted the on-line service BBCi (later named BBC iPlayer)), conditioned the service to a higher 
cost-effectiveness goal (s12.1). In the British case the internet is seen as a service complementary 
to the core business which is broadcasting. However, as Chapter 8 will show, on-line viewing of 
television content is becoming increasingly popular, and broadcasters and legislators may have to 
reconsider that the internet is simply an auxiliary service. 
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Contrary to the UK, where internet viewing of the BBC programmes is not allowed outside of the 
country (probably to facilitate exports by BBC Worldwide), in France the internet is regarded as a 
contributor towards the promotion of French language and culture (FoCA 1986, as amended in 
2009, Art.44.IV). As a consequence, the programmes are available on-line, worldwide, potentially 
contributing to the global spread of French audiovisual products. 
 
In contrast to these explicit dispositions, Brazilian legislation does not address the internet except 
for the PSB Act 2008 that mandates the PSB to develop interactive content for the internet (Art. 
3.ix). The later PA 2011 left on-demand and on-line activities completely de-regulated (Art. 19.vi). 
Perhaps that oblivion reflects the low importance of the internet as a deliverer of audiovisual 
content, a result of the low broadband penetration figures, as Chapter 8 will reveal. 
 
After having analysed how policymakers regulate the access to the main terrestrials, helping to 
maintain broader concepts as diversity and pluralism, the following section will discuss how 




7.3 Ownership rules 
Although digitalisation has the potential to reduce the costs of most of the audiovisual related 
activities, audiovisual industries, as discussed in Chapter 3, and more significantly the distribution 
sector, are dominated by big companies. In order to mitigate higher concentration and possible 
monopolistic practices by companies with significant market power, policymakers periodically 
readdress ownership rules in the different communication services. Although a comprehensive 
study of the ownership regulations is detailed in Annex 6, in this section I would like to summarise 
these complicated and extensive rules and relate them more closely to the debate on the 
production of national content. 
 
Overall, a tendency towards a relaxation of the ownership rules can clearly be identified in all three 
countries but to a higher degree in the UK. Another general rule that emerged in the new 
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millennium, cross-ownership and mergers are a matter of competition authorities, and therefore 
subjected to ex post regulation, rather than directed by established rules in regulation. However, 
there still are explicit limits when newspapers are involved. In the UK, cross-ownership between 
that medium and television channels is limited to 20%, in the case of ITV (CA 2003, Schedule 14, 
s2.1), and there is a similar clause in French legislation for national broadcasting licenses (Art. 41-1 
to 41-2-1). In Brazil there are no limits with regards to the press. Perhaps this is due to two facts. 
First, the Brazilian newspaper market is considered, arguably, a local phenomenon with few 
newspapers achieving significant sales outside their editing city. Secondly, in market terms, 
newspapers are a far less important medium than broadcasting. 
 
Limits to mono-media ownership have also changed: from rigid numerical limits on the maximum 
number of licenses allowed for the same group, to limits on the overall audience share allowed for 
receiving new licenses. In the UK these limits where scrapped by the CA 2003 almost completely, 
and in France restrictions are applied when the national audience shares exceeds 8% (FoCA 1986, 
Art. 39). Brazil still controls the number of licenses per group regardless of the audience shares. By 
those dispositions it can be inferred that plurality of the media is more strongly pursued by the 
European countries. 
 
On the other hand, Brazil is the only country in this case study that imposed a clear cross-
ownership limit between telecommunication and broadcasting. The PA 2011 establishes that 
telecommunication companies cannot hold more than 30% of the shares of production companies 
or paytv channels and, vice-versa, those companies cannot hold more than 50% of the shares of a 
distributing company (Art. 5). 
 
Although cross-ownership limits directly affect media plurality (and hence democracy), they do not 
necessary imply a negative effect on the production of national content, unless the main 
broadcasters are global companies, which various scholars argue may favour imported content 
(see, for instance, Biltereyst, 2001: 89-90; Herman & McChesney, 2001: 52; Hopper, 2007: 62; 
McChesney, 2009: 189-90). That might have been the purpose of Brazilian cross-ownership 
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regulation. Whilst paytv was completely liberalised to foreign capitals, the production of content 
mainly remained under the control of nationals. 
 
As foreign groups may favour international content, perhaps more directly related to the production 
of national content are the regulations with regards to the nationality of broadcasting ownership. 
These rules were also object of relaxation through time. In the EU media ownership rules are set 
by each Member State and, although there have been attempts to implement transnational 





The CA 2003 dropped all restrictions to foreign ownership (s348.1). That relaxation is in line with 
an overall ex post approach to regulation. On the contrary, to take the opposite path and impose 
nationality clauses of ownership on broadcasters could cause a significant impact on the British 
broadcasting „landscape‟, with the potential to trigger heated political debates and controversies. 
For instance, the Sky conglomerate, controlled by News Corp, would be the first obvious hit. 
 
In France foreign ownership (excluding EU nationals) is limited to 20% of the shares of the 
broadcasting channels (Art. 40), and to 5% in the case of TF1 (Art. 61).
97
 Since the privatisation of 
that channel, there is a specific set of ownership rules where a single company can only hold up to 
50% of its shares (Art. 58).
98
 These rules have remained unchanged in the period under study. As 
a result, as seen in Chapter 5, the main broadcasters, distributors and content producers are 
mainly of French origin, with Vivendi the biggest player holding interests in all segments. 
 
In Brazil, broadcasting has always been conceived as a national business reserved for locals 
(Grant & Wood, 2005: 237). Foreign ownership of broadcasting companies has been prohibited in 
Brazil since the start of the service (Lash & Lury, 2007: 160). Restrictions to foreign ownership 
                                                          
96
 Important to note at this point is that, because of the lack of economy of scale, small countries often adopt 
the most liberal policy with regards to foreign ownership, such as the Netherlands where there is no 
restriction in place (Campbell 2008: 53). 
97
 Art. 40 exempts previous treaties, therefore EU nationals are exempted from that limitation (In the original: 
“Sous réserve des engagements internationaux souscrits par la France”). 
98
 The shares of TF1 were divided into three blocks for privatisation: 50% to be acquired by one group; 40% 
as a public offer and 10% to the employees. 
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were kept for FTA broadcasting channels and newspapers, although slightly liberalised by the 1998 
Constitution up to the limit of 30% (Art. 222).
99
 However, since the enactment of the PA 2011, there 
are no more foreign ownership limits in any paytv distribution service. The Act only prescribes that 
those services should operate without monopolies or oligopolies (Art. 3.vi). That principle is 
obviously easier to state than to actually implement and enforce. As a result of the regulatory 
framework, cable is consolidated nationwide by Net Servicos, partially owned by Mexican Telmex, 
and satellite is dominated by DirecTV (using the Sky brand). The Act, nevertheless, did include a 
foreign ownership limit for quota purposes, valid only for paytv. 
 
In order to be considered as a Brazilian channel (and therefore count for the purposes of the paytv 
quota); at least 70% of the shares of the paytv channel have to be held by Brazilian nationals (Art. 
2.xviii). The approval of these rules may represent a regulatory obstacle to Vivendi, as it invested in 
Brazil by acquiring the entrant to telephony GVT,
100
 as mentioned in Chapter 2, while also being a 
content producer (albeit not reportedly in Brazil). If from one side the new regulation could block 
Vivendi‟s potential interests in producing content in Brazil (while being also a telecommunication 
provider), the approval of the new rules are beneficial for Rede Globo. According to what has been 
widely reported in newspapers (see for example Rosa, 2010), with the abolition of limits to foreign 
ownership in cable, the company was able to transfer their remaining shares in the cable operator 
Net Servicos to Telmex and concentrate on FTA broadcasting and content production, Globo‟s 
forte. 
 
As a result of the ownership framework of our case studies, the French mediaspace has a 
preponderance of national media groups and in Britain there is a more noticeable co-habitation 
between national companies and international groups. In Brazil national ownership is zealously 
maintained for the FTA service, while consolidation and foreign presence is the characteristic of 
paytv services. 
 
                                                          
99
 Moreover, in FTA broadcasting managerial and editorial positions of “journalistic companies” have to be 
held by Brazilian nationals (Decree-Act 236, Art. 38 and Federal Constitution 1988 Art. 222). 
100
 Entrant in telephony are those companies that compete with incumbent operators either using the same 
network or building one of their one, as is the case of GVT and others in Brazil. 
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If from one point of view the relaxation of ownership rules is partially responsible (or a 
consequence, depending of the perspective adopted) for digital convergence and for increasing the 
power of global media corporations, from another point of view this re-regulation (or de-regulation) 
brings telecommunication companies closer to the broadcasting sphere. At this moment I would 
like to remark that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the approximation was not triggered by changes in 
broadcasting regulation. Telecommunication technologies were enhanced and currently several 
services have audiovisual capabilities and distribute broadcasting content. Hence the push from 
the industry to change regulations. As a result of those processes of approximation with (the capital 
intensive and transnational) telecommunications companies, and the liberalisation of broadcasting 
and of ownership, the distribution of national content may be negatively affected (as pointed out by 
scholars and that will be analysed in the market assessment of Chapter 8) and media plurality, in 
practical terms, diminished. 
 
After having analysed how the plurality and the nationality of the media, which might impact on the 
production and distribution of national content, are regulated, the third set of tools to be analysed 
are those concerned with broadcasting rights. 
 
 
7.4 Broadcasting rights 
The acquisition of appealing content became „key‟ to attract the attention of subscribers and their 
willingness to pay for broadcasting services. As discussed in previous chapters, securing 
exclusivity deals for broadcasting football championships was behind the successes of BSkyB in 
the UK, Canal Plus in France and Organizacoes Globo in Brazil. For some, sporting rights are the 
„king of content‟ and as Haynes (2005: 6) highlights: 
Sports, more than any other form of media content, has been used as a weapon to 
break into new markets, undermine competitors and ultimately dominate certain 
sectors of the media industry. 
 
Actually, the regulation of the practices surrounding the acquisition of broadcasting rights has 
become vital for regulating broadcasting and audiovisual industries in recent times. The CE official 
Ungerer (cited in Feintuck & Varney, 2010: 92) declared that the securing of “intellectual property 
rights [for sporting events] are the name of the game.” Albeit the discussion of the regulation of 
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distribution rights might be included within a greater debate over intellectual property law, for 




When regulatory bodies, especially in the EU (with an amendment in 1997 in the TWF Directive), 
started to limit the exclusivity deals in broadcasting, regulations were explicitly based on socio-
cultural grounds. Some events were declared as being of cultural relevance and of major interest to 
society. However, due to the rise in the value of those deals, the prescriptions increased in 
complexity in a struggle to secure both broad viewing (by FTA channels) and economic value (to 
paytv channels and platforms). As examples, according to the Daily Mail online (Todd, 2011), 
football rights of the Premier League were sold to BSkyB in Britain for £302m for a period of five 
years in 1992, and the last contract, for the period 2011-2013, was sold for £1,782m.
102
 Putting that 
value into perspective, this value would represent more than 20% of the yearly budget of the BBC 
(TV license revenues of £2.7 billion according to Ofcom (2010c: 134)). In France, the situation 
follows a similar increasing pattern. According to Maxifoot (Letennier, 2011), football rights for 
Ligue 1 rose from €0.8m in 1985 (for one year) to €668m in 2012, always with Canal Plus having 
the biggest share. Perhaps surprisingly for Canal Plus, for the period 2012 to 2016, Vivendi‟s 
company will face the competition of Al Jazeera, based in Qatar, who paid €60m per year for 
showing six games per week (RTL Sport, 2012). Drawing from another example of a major event, 
the Olympics, competition also arrived in Brazil leading to an increase in prices too. As broadly 
reported by the press (see for instance Araujo, 2007), the Brazilian broadcasting rights for the 
games held in Beijing in 2008 were bought by Rede Globo for US$ 12m (approximately £8m), 
whilst the following games, in London where bought by the competitor Rede Record (the network 
owned by a Pentecostal group as mentioned in Chapter 5) for US$ 60m (almost £38m). 
 
These substantial figures justify why regulators were forced to abandon socio-cultural arguments 
and instead used different degrees of economic interventions. However, inevitably, those kinds of 
involvements often attract criticism. As the scholar and media specialist Keller (2009: 434) states: 
                                                          
101
 A discussion on intellectual property law has several implications such as copyright issues (challenged by 
digital technologies), and social and political demands such as the cultural exemption debate (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) (for more details see Morris and Meadows 2003; Lessig 2004; Haynes 2005; Voon 2007). 
102
 According to the news article, the rights were bought by ESPN and SKY whilst the share of the latter was 
over £1.6 billion. 
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These measures [on sport rights] were a direct interference with commercial 
transactions involving highly valuable content rights and were, in effect, a barely 
disguised subsidy for the public service media who tended to be the major 
beneficiaries. 
 
Currently, the CA 2003 divided those events into two groups: “A” (for more important events, as the 
Olympics), and; “B” (such as cricket test matches) (s299).
103
 For “Group A” the principle was the 
same as before, i.e. not permitted exclusivity deals to paytv if not offered on fair and reasonable 
terms to traditional broadcasters (DCMS, 2001; Ofcom, 2012b). However, for “Group B” a lighter 
control was introduced. Exclusivity could be granted if the other segment (FTA or alternatively 
paytv) could cover the same event by highlights or delayed coverage (s300). The events are listed 




Unlike in the British case, in France the events are ex ante listed in the Decree 2004-1392 (Art. 3).
 
105
 This different solution to the issue is in line with overall regulatory tendencies. France adopted a 
more rigid regulation for a wider variety of sports and Britain allowed exclusivity deals for what they 
considered as „not-so-important‟ content without the need for the prior approval of regulators. 
Nevertheless exclusivity for listed events in France is not allowed if not offered to FTA channels in 
“equal, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions” (Decree 2004-1392, Art. 5), 
because of the high figures involved, regulation did not prevent national football championship to 
be screened almost exclusively by paytv channels. 
 
                                                          
103
 Group A: The Olympic Games, The FIFA World Cup Finals Tournament, The FA Cup Final, The 
Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland), The Grand National, The Derby, The Wimbledon Tennis Finals, The 
European Football Championship Finals Tournament, The Rugby League Challenge Cup Final, The Rugby 
World Cup Final. 
Group B: Cricket Test Matches played in England, Non-Finals played in the Wimbledon Tournament, All 
Other Matches in the Rugby World Cup Finals Tournament, Six Nations Rugby Tournament Matches 
Involving Home Countries, The Commonwealth Games, The World Athletics Championship, The Cricket 
World Cup - the Final, Semi-finals and Matches Involving Home Nations‟ Teams, The Ryder Cup, The Open 
Golf Championship. 
104
 Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events. 
105
 The French listed events are: Summer and Winter Olympic Games, French national football team, 
Opening, Semi-finals and Final of the Football World Cup, UEFA Final if a French team had participated, 
Champions league Final, French Football Cup Final, Six Nations, Semi-finals and Finals of the Rugby World 
Cup, Final of French Rugby championship, Final of the Europe Cup of rugby if a French team had 
participated, Finals single Roland Garros, Semi-finals and Finals of Davis Cup and Fed Cup if French team 
had participated,  French F1 Grand-prix, Tour de France, “Paris-Roubaix”(cycle), Finals of  Europe‟s and 
World‟s Basketball and Handball Championships and the Athletics World Championships. 
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The Brazilian approach to listed events is neither ex ante nor ex post. It is, not surprisingly, laisez-
faire. As a result, Organizacoes Globo and their affiliates, Rede Globo (FTA) and Sportv (paytv 
channel) have the exclusive rights to the majority of the main events, a situation which (in football), 
according to the sports newspaper Gazeta Esportiva (2011), dates back to 1997. This state of 
affairs led to those paytv operators not affiliated to Net Servicos, formerly a Globo owned company, 
bringing the case to the attention of the competition authorities. As a result of several processes, 
CADE, the competition agency, decided that football clubs should not give preference to Rede 
Globo during the bidding process (ibid). In spite of that ruling, Rede Globo still holds the rights to 
the Brazilian championship, at least until 2014. However, as already mentioned, the acquisition by 
Rede Record of the broadcasting rights to the Olympics Games in London, in 2012, for the 
Brazilian market, could be interpreted as a sign of Globo loosening the incontestable dominant 
position. The liberalisation of paytv for foreign ownership could also bring in new competitors, 
challenging the purchasing power of Rede Globo. Although, in a very clever move in the Lower 
House, the broadcaster directly benefited from the insertion of a clause in the proceedings of the 
PA 2011. The rule forbids telecommunication companies to acquire broadcasting rights to “events 
of national interest” (Art. 6). 
 
While the issue of sports-related content - which because of the financial and audience implications 
has a great impact on the capacity for the production of national content - confronts FTA 
broadcasters with paytv operators, regulators also introduced new rules separating the commercial 
interests of broadcasters from those of independent producers. As discussed in Chapter 3, in order 
to increase diversity and to develop national audiovisual industries, regulators introduced 
independent content quotas. However, the introduction of a quota without actually regulating the 
economic relationship between producers and buyers led to a situation where the latter could freely 
exercise their significant market power over the production companies. As a result, the expected 
economic benefits of the quota were not spread evenly throughout the audiovisual industries. 
 
Possibly because in Britain the independent quota is higher (than the one imposed by the EU) and, 
hence resulted in a greater independent sector, new rules were introduced  as a result of lobbying 
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by independent producers (Chalaby, 2010).
106
 The CA 2003 regulates the commercial relations 
between broadcasters and independent producers, in what is considered a major breakthrough for 
developing the independent production sector in the UK (Chalaby, 2010; Haynes, 2005: 89-90). 
According to the new clauses, programme commissioning shall follow a code, approved by the 
regulator, which has to state the different categories of rights purchased and the duration and 
exclusivity clauses contained in each contract (s285). As mentioned in Chapter 3, this 
disaggregation of rights, where each distribution market is specifically negotiated, enabled 
independent producers not only to retain and to negotiate secondary rights with other companies 
but also to export their content, which Chalaby (2010) argues is one of the reasons for the success 
of the exports of British formats.  
 
On the same issue, French regulation, since an amendment of the FoCA introduced in 2001 and 
regulated by the Decrees 2001-609, 1332, 1333 and 2002-140, also mandates that the 
relationships between independent producers and broadcasters shall be accountable. According to 
these rules, a production company can be considered independent if commercialisation deals 
comply with several conditions, which include: broadcasters cannot hold broadcasting rights of the 
purchased content for longer than 18 months; no secondary rights (for other segments such as 
cinema or other channels) can be purchased by the broadcaster; and not more than 80% of the 
output of the producer can be purchased by the same broadcaster (FoCA Art. 71, Decree 2001-
1332, Arts. 6 and 11 and similar clauses in the other before mentioned Decrees). These clauses 
have the purpose of limiting the economic power of broadcasters. By limiting the duration of the 
exhibition window and by forbidding the purchaser to retain commercialisation rights for other 
markets, clear boundaries have been set as to what the broadcaster is paying for. It also enables 
the producer to further commercialise their output with other companies. On the downside, the 80% 
rule allows a disproportionate dependency on one single client which might be reasonable for small 
companies that produce few programmes but not for those with a broader production. For those 
different situations an ex post solution would be more adequate. 
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 According to the author, the PACT (Producers‟ Alliance for Cinema and Television) association, that 
gathers independent producers in Britain, championed these aspirations. 
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Although these ex ante French rules impose a specific degree of disaggregation and independence 
in the production sector, as opposed to the non-prescriptive and loose ex post British legislative 
approach, the French independent production industry is smaller than its British counterparts (see 
Chapters 1 and 8 for further discussion on cultural discount factors and exports performances and 
Chalaby, 2010; Grant & Wood, 2005). 
 
In Brazil, no clauses can be found in legislation dealing with the commercial deals between 
broadcasters and independent producers. As a result, national content is mainly produced by the 
formers. The new paytv act may change this situation. As will be discussed later on, the PA 2011 
includes quotas for national and independent content and channels. However, the instrument does 
not deal with the disaggregation of rights, nor does it determine a maximum output that 
broadcasters can acquire from single producers as in the French case. Although the act also 
creates a „pull‟ mechanism financing independent industries, as will be seen later on, the weakness 
of the quotas suggests that the independent industry will struggle to flourish in the near future. 
 
The solution for dealing with broadcasting rights has also shown varied approaches among the 
countries under study. Britain, while relegating some events as being of a „minor importance‟, could 
be interpreted as having accommodated the interests of paytv operators allowing more events to 
be covered with exclusivity. Thus favouring a more economic (or industrialist) approach and 
disregarding the socio-cultural implications of concentration of revenues with other groups than 
national terrestrials, with consequences as to the capability of generating national content. French 
policymakers, on the other hand, included a broader range of sports, none of which can be denied 
access to FTA broadcasters. Brazil, our last case study, has to break commercial monopolies with 
the aid only of national judicial and competition authorities. Brazilian regulators do not count on the 
legal support from supranational directives as the European countries do. As a result, although 
parts of major events are still freely available on FTA, they probably only still are because it 
remains more profitable to have them on FTA than on relatively low uptake services, as is the case 
of paytv in that country. There are signs, however, of increased competition for these events in 
France and in Brazil. 
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Now leaving behind the tools that govern the relations between the different activities of the 
audiovisual industries, the following sections will be more focused on the rules directly related to 
content. The next section will analyse how the nationality of the content is assessed. 
 
 
7.5 Defining the nationality of content 
Because of the various activities involved in the production of a film, important ingredients of 
broadcasting schedules, to assess its „nationality‟ is somehow complicated. For instance, long 
before digital convergence, Bridge on the River Kwai (Columbia, 1957) was filmed in Sri Lanka, 
with a British director, American financing and script, but based on a French novel (Grant & Wood, 
2005: 139-40). Currently that mosaic can be even more scattered, with digital work being carried 
out virtually anywhere. Television programmes, moreover, pose other challenging questions when 
it comes to the cases of formats. Endemol (NL), the original licenser of the reality show Big Brother, 
formed an equitable joint-venture with Rede Globo, Endemol Globo, to produce their global 
products in Brazil (Endemol, 2009). Because of that arrangement, is the resulting Big Brother Brasil 
as „Brazilian‟ or as culturally relevant as a Brazilian story as retraced by a telenovela? Should these 
hybrid productions count as national content and therefore suitable for fulfilling quota 
requirements? And should that content be produced with the aid of public grants, financed by 
national taxpayers or by the TV license? The difficulty of assessing whether the content is national 
and hence should receive financial benefits is not an easy task, and countries‟ solutions to the 
question vary substantially. Overall, as funding mechanisms and incentives are increasingly 
important for the production activity, the identification of the nationality migrated from a cultural 
consideration to a comprehensive economic assessment of the produced work. However, because 
these evaluations are vastly detailed, I will not describe them in this section (see Annex 7 for 
details on those regulations). Here I will concentrate on the major implications of the adopted 
policies. Before starting that analysis it is important to clarify the regulations at the European level. 
 
Television programmes produced in European countries follow a European framework, in which 
programmes from any country which is a signatory of the 1989 European Convention on 
Transfrontier Television or other nations which have co-production agreements with the EU are 
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considered as „nationals‟ (Grant & Wood, 2005: 162). In addition to that convention, as Harris 
(2004: 21-2) reminds us, since 1994, there is the Council of Europe‟s Convention on 
Cinematographic Co-production. The convention grants national status to co-produced films as 
long as national companies contribute at least 20% of the production costs (ibid). As of 2011, the 
instrument has been ratified by more than forty countries including France and the UK (Council of 
Europe, 2011). As Harris (ibid) continues, the convention stipulates a „cultural test‟, where points 
are awarded if the person in each of the evaluated categories is an EU national. As will be seen in 
the following sub-sections, the test is similar to those used in France (albeit slightly modified in the 
case of television programmes) and in the UK. The categories are: director (3 points); scriptwriter 
(3), composer (1), first role (3), second role (2), third role (1), director of photography (1), sound 
recorder (1), editor (1), art-director (1), shooting location (1), post-production (1). To pass the „EU 
nationality‟ test the film has to achieve 15 out of 19 maximum points. 
 
Two other points need clarification prior to the case study analysis. First, at the national level, the 
assessment, both of films and of television programmes, is normally defined by the same rules. 
Brazil is an exception. As that country does not have national content quotas for commercial 
broadcasters, there are no rules defining what is national for the purposes of FTA services. 
Secondly, in order to simplify the description of the rules, when referring to national productions I 
am also referring to those co-productions made with countries which have signed co-production 
agreements. After these initial remarks, I will now discuss how regulators have changed the 
assessment tools used in each of the three case studies. 
 
Before the introduction of the „cultural test‟ in Britain in 2006, and up until 1999, the existing rules 
were concerned with expenditure in the country (at least 70% of the production costs) and filming 
locations (no more than 20% filmed outside the UK). The latter condition, it could be argued, 
marginally touches on a cultural concern. In 1999, that location limit was scrapped. The Minister for 
Tourism, Film and Broadcasting Janet Anderson argued that the main purpose of the, then, new 
rules was to create a “film industry that contributes fully to the national economy as well as to our 
national culture” (Draft films (Modification of the definition of 'British Film') Order 1999, 1999). In 
practice that approach meant that as long as the minimum production costs were spent within the 
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UK, the content could be shot anywhere, no matter the leading actor, the director or even what the 
story was about. Or, as Anderson also declared, “ensuring that we retain the lion's share of the 
economic benefits” (Draft films (Modification of the definition of 'British Film') Order 1999ibid) the 
film would be considered British. 
 
The adoption of the „cultural test‟ (with alterations introduced in the same year, in 2006) increased 
the importance of cultural aspects (a „British story‟) which could benefit local and authorial 
productions.
107
 However, the complexities of the whole film policy framework (which include tax 
rebates and credits), make it difficult to be equally understood and used by small and big 
producers. As a financial and business advisor firm concludes: 
Overall it appears to us that the new provisions, as set out in FA06 [the Financial 
Act 2006], should ultimately benefit the UK film industry focused on producing 
commercially successful films. It should also be of benefit to the post production 
houses and studios that work on larger, US in-bound productions (Thornton, 
2011). 
 
Agreeing with the business advisor, as the act only considers two categories of films, naming those 
with less than £ 20m as “limited-budget films” (Finance Act 2006, s34.2), the British system seems 
too focused on big projects.
108
 But many film producers might find that limit far from being a limited 
budget. The ceiling seems too high for small projects which, it could be argued (as will be seen in 
the Brazilian discussion), are usually more related culturally to the local scene. More expensive 
films, on the other hand, possibly with global themes, and related to bigger and mostly international 
producers, could find other ways of financing than by supportive regulation.
109
 The introduction of 
such a high ceiling for receiving the maximum benefits foreseen in the legislation could be 
interpreted as simply offering a competitive environment for attracting big and „runaway‟ 
                                                          
107
 The test is foreseen in the Finance Act 2006 which modifies the Films Act 1985 and is regulated by the 
Statutory Instrument 2006/643. 
108
 Regulators focus on big budgets is perhaps a consequence of British producers trying to break into the 
American market and of the high influx of American productions which are produced in the UK due to the 
tax incentives, as will be seen in Chapter 8. 
109
 For instance, according to the IMDB database,  the Hollywood backed (and an „inward production‟ in the 
UK) War Horse (Dreamworks, 2011) was reported to cost more than £40m while Route Irish (Sixteen Films, 
2010), a UK film financed by Film 4 and France 2, had a budget of just £3m as reported by an on-line 
reviewer (Punch, 2011). 
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productions to be produced in the country.
110
 As seen in Chapter 2, that is a practice the UK 
historically promotes. 
 
On the French side, the current system for classifying content as „French‟ originates in the 
Freedom of Communication Act (FoCA) 1986, as amended in 1989, which mandated that the 
majority of films and audiovisual works should be of “French original expression” (“d‟expression 
originale française”, Art. 64.2) and should originate in the EU (Art. 70.2). However, the Act did not 
actually determine what that „French expression‟ should be. In the following year, the Decree 90-66 
filled that void and determined that works made entirely in the French language, and with script and 
dialogues written in French, would be considered as being of French original expression. France 
adopts cultural tests since the Ordinance of Ministry of Culture and of Communication of 
21/May/1992. Some may relate the adoption of these tests to the political debate of those years, as 
noted by Vembulu (2003: 192), where Europe was seen „threatened‟ by Americanisation and as 
being in a profound cultural identity crisis. 
 
Important to note in the French approach is that, according to the Decree 90-66, in order to be 
considered as a national film, the only requisite is to be filmed in French (with original script also 
written in French). However, for a work to be considered European the „cultural test‟ is applied. It 
means that a film produced by a foreign company with foreign actors but from a French script and 
with dialogues in French can be „stamped‟ as French but not as a European work. One possible 
conclusion that can be drawn from this rule is that France is more focused on supporting the 
language and national culture, whereas if the project is from the EU then the economic benefits of 
being filmed in the country will then be assessed. The only cultural relevance clauses in favour of 
the French rules are that the film must be filmed in French, whereas in the British case the 
language is not important at all. These rules indicate that those countries are not highly concerned 
about foreign projects – with potential foreign cultural relevance – being classified as national. 
However, at the same time, those legislators impose much stricter rules for content made 
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 Runaway (in their country of origin) or, alternatively, inward production (in the country that receives the 
production). The BFI (2011: 145) defines it thus: “an inward feature is defined as a feature film which is 
substantially financed and controlled from outside the UK and where the production is attracted to the UK 
because of script requirements, the UK‟s infrastructure or UK tax relief.” See Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue. 
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elsewhere in Europe. This difference is similar to the case of British legislation which is only 
concerned with foreign satellite channels as potential offenders of „good taste and decency‟. Films 
from other European countries need to fulfil a stricter regulation, while as long as it is shot in 
France the content is not relevant. This implies that for the French case it is not only about 
retaining the „lion‟s share‟ but also about showing off the country and probably benefiting from the 
tourism industry as well. 
 
In fact, „screen tourism‟ and „TV tourism‟ is recognised as having a substantial impact on the 
national economy (for a detailed assessment of the economic impact of film production see Oxford 
Economics, 2007). For instance, the St. Sulpice Church and the Louvre museum in Paris are 
reported to have received record visitors after they appeared in the Da Vinci Code (Columbia, 
2006) (UKFC, 2007b: 60-1), ironically for this discussion, an American production. 
 
It is worth noting that these nationality assessment criteria are those used for quota purposes. 
Therefore, although it is true that regulation promotes the French language, it might also be argued 
that the national quota might not be promoting cultural relevant content but simply promoting the 
industrial production of content in France. Whereas the conditions for the content to be recognised 
as of French origin are simple, in order to receive public subsidies from the French government the 
works have to pass a more complicated test applied by the film agency, CNC. Therein lays the 
main difference between the French and the British system. Whereas in Britain the cultural 
relevance is inserted within an overall quantitative evaluation of the work, in France there are 
several tests (baremes) which are only focused on the production aspects. The cultural relevance 
aspects are reserved for a different level and entitle the work to receive additional kind of benefits, 
not available in the UK. 
 
In the Brazilian case, as there were no national quotas until recently, there were no definitions for 
„Brazilian‟ content to be applied to broadcasting services. When the cinema regulator, Ancine, was 
created by the Provisional Measure (PM) 2228-1/2001,
111
 the concept of national work was 
developed in legislation. There are two main differences in the definitions in relation to the other 
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case studies. Firstly, the expenditure of the production costs is not assessed and, secondly, the 
„cultural test‟ is not broken up into smaller categories. According to Brazilian regulation, as long as 
the company is owned by Brazilians and uses a majority of Brazilian nationals during the 
production of the audiovisual content, including the director, the work will be considered as 
national. It does not matter which language is used, where the script, story or the main artists come 
from. Other economic aspects of production are also irrelevant, such as studios used or shooting 
locations. In that sense, the cultural aspects of the content are irrelevant. It seems that Brazilian 
policymakers rely solely on the director for introducing Brazilian related aspects into the cultural 
products. The lack of more detailed descriptions and the disregard for the economic impact of film 
production shows that Brazilian regulation lags behind the European cases. However, it might also 
be due to the fact that it is not needed, as the majority of the films are local productions with limited 
budget as will be seen in Chapter 8. 
 
As in the case of the other two countries studied, after an audiovisual work qualifies as „Brazilian‟ 
the producers can gain access to different funding schemes. However, the major difference with 
regards to the production lies in the purpose of why national content is produced. As will be seen 
below, In Brazil there are virtually no quotas in FTA broadcasting and, only since 2011, a timid one 
for paytv. Therefore, the main purpose of having a „Brazilian certificate‟ is to gain access to 
financial incentives. 
 
As seen in this section all countries have different assessment criteria in place. The industrial 
aspects are more or less similarly addressed by each country‟s legislation. In a „seesaw‟ regulatory 
movement, Britain started with weak cultural pre-requisites, changed to an industrial evaluation 
and, shortly afterwards inserted a cultural relevance sub-category within the overall „industrial‟ test. 
In France the regulatory „barricade‟ is focused on protecting the language. Relevance is not 
measured for quota purposes, just the French language and filming locations. Although other 
cultural related aspects are assessed by the CNC, in a second stage, they only are for the 
purposes of receiving public funds. One step behind, Brazil uses a rough criteria for evaluating the 
nationality of the content which does not take into consideration production or labour costs and 
does not elaborate on cultural aspects either. However, it must be pointed out that there are calls 
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for applications (for funding) from different cultural agencies and private companies that take into 
account cultural aspects. 
 
The European cases have shown that the main reason for fostering the production of national 
content is the generation of revenues in the country. Perhaps policymakers believe that the cultural 
relevance will come as a natural by-product of using all those economic pre-conditions. There 
might be some cultural aspects related to that approach though. For instance, the promotion of the 
French language and the scoring of points if dealing with a British story are items clearly related to 
the cultural relevance of the film. 
 
As this investigation suggests, the promotion of the various socio-cultural values analysed in 
Chapter 6 is not intensively promoted in the regulatory definition of national content. However, this 
might be the case with specific content quotas. If that is the case, both tools are used in 
complementary terms: the regulatory definition addresses the economic impact and the quota the 
socio-cultural aspects. Nevertheless, this solution is not appropriate for the film production activity 
as there are no content quotas for films and I am not proposing them either. Additionally, the 
fulfilment of the socio-cultural goals should be analysed for the objective of receiving public 
financing. Therefore, I believe that there should be a definition for national content, valid for both 
activities, which should take more into consideration the socio-cultural aspects of communication 
services alongside the economical assessment so well detailed and implemented in European 
regulation. Regulators should value the cultural relevance of the content to national audiences, as 
well as supporting the reflection of societies‟ diversity, maintain plurality of production and 
distribution and sustain citizenship, and democracy. 
 
After detailing the different approaches to the definition of what constitutes a content nationally 
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7.6 Funding mechanisms – the regulatory ‘pull’ 
While the evaluation of the nationality of the content shifted from loose and simple statements such 
as “British origin” (Broadcasting Act 1981, s.4.c) or “French original expression” (FoCA 1986, as 
amended in 1989, Art. 64.2) to a more complex appraisal of human resources, locations and cost 
evaluations, the funding mechanisms and incentives also increased in complexity. As such, the 
production of national content is incentivised by different financing schemes which include tax 
breaks, public and private loans and grants. Adding to this environment, countries and cities 
frequently compete for international producers, leading to the creation of developing agencies, 
such as the Film London Agency, Paris Film and Riofilme (in Rio de Janeiro). Although the 
incentives vary substantially across the different countries, they are implemented as economic 
tools whose main focus is to attract companies and investments, but also to develop local 
companies. The incentives that will be analysed in this section do not address the socio-cultural 
objectives behind the production of cultural products. They are, instead, explicitly concerned with 
generating a favourable and competitive economic environment for the development of a particular 
industry. In this case, the audiovisual industries of both segments: film and television. 
 
7.6.1 UK – relying on broadcasters 
Between 1957 and 1985, the public financing of the British film industry was based on the already 
mentioned Eady Levy. Within the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s, the Film Act 1985 abolished the 
levy (s2) and privatised the national film agency while still financing it for the following five years (J. 
Hill, 1996: 101). The arrangement left the film production sector at the mercy of the market, and 
from 1985 to the mid-nineties cinema releases stagnated at around 50 films per year (BFI, 2006: 4; 
UKFC, 2007a: 8). It was only after seven years of virtually no public funds that the situation was 
changed. Under a Labour government, with the introduction of the Finance Act 1997, a tax system 
was put in place for financing the production of British films; the „sale and leaseback‟ system. By an 
intricate financial engineering procedure, producers were able to sell the rights to a leasing 
company and lease them back with the aid of investors and a loan from a bank. Under this scheme 
100% of the liable tax was deducted and producers usually kept 12% profit of the original sale (for 
details see Alberstat, 2004: 216-24). Between 1997 and 2006 releases increased (although not 
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substantially) to an average of approximately 80 films per year (UKFC, 2007a: 8). The system was 
stopped in 2006 because of allegedly “widespread abuse of the tax-break by increasingly 
sophisticated investment schemes” (Davies & Wistreich, 2007: 106). 
 
With the new dynamics introduced by the Finance Act 2006, films currently have to pass the 
„cultural test‟ described before. With the „Britishness‟ approved, the production company is entitled 
to a tax relief system, in terms of income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax.112 This system, 
which is currently in use, foresees that producers will receive back from the government (by means 





As with other countries, while the regulation creates the incentives for those who invest in 
productions, there are two main sources of funding available: public grants and broadcasters‟ 
commissioning. The primary source of public grants is the Film Fund which has a yearly budget of 
£15m and is administered by the BFI with resources derived from the National Lottery (UKFC, 
2011). Within the same budgetary scale, the film arms BBC Film and Film4 Productions (owned by 
Channel 4) invest around £10m-£12m each per year (Lords, 2010: 35). However, more significant 
than those resources given to the film industry is broadcasting commissioning for the production of 
television content. 
 
As already discussed, UK legislation mandates that at least 25% of programming should be 
produced by independent companies. As a result, broadcasting commissioning feeds a strong 
independent production sector. For example, the BBC invested £460m on independent productions 
and Channel 4, £578m, in 2010 alone (BBC, 2010: 23; Channel Four, 2010: 9-10).  
 
However, the blossoming of independent production in the UK was not only due to the investments 
from broadcasters. As previously discussed in this chapter, as a result of the CA 2003, 
independent producers are now allowed to keep the secondary rights to a programme. While under 
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 The tax relief scheme is currently dictated by the Finance Act 2006. A detailed description of its 
mechanisms is beyond the objectives of this thesis. 
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 According to the authors, for larger budget films – over £20m – the maximum net benefit is 16%. 
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the previous regulations broadcasters could use their significant market power to force the selling 
of all secondary rights to them in the commissioning process, now producers are free to negotiate 
these rights with other companies, nationally and abroad. This legislative provision was regarded 
as fundamental to the vigorous growth and exports achieved by the sector (Chalaby, 2010; 
Haynes, 2005: 89-90) However, that approach can also result in deficit revenues for broadcasters 
and funding for producers.
114
 These impacts will be revealed in the market analysis in Chapter 8. 
 
7.6.2 France – automatic revenues for established filmmakers 
France is usually cited as the country where more regulatory effort has been spent to support 
national content, with particular emphasis on fostering the film industry (see for example Levy, 
1999: 20-2). The French approach to supporting film production and distribution is based on the 
construction of an elaborate support framework. A so-called „structured financing system‟ is based 
on aid from the CNC (which uses the Cosip – a public fund formed by a special tax on basically 
every service related to the distribution of content) and support from Sofica (Societe pour le 
Financement de l'Industrie Cinematographique et Audiovisuelle - special companies set up 
exclusively for financing and commercialising the audiovisual production) (Jackel, 1999: 181). 
Besides those to paths there is broadcasters‟ commissioning in two forms: (1) legal obligations (the 
contributions, discussed in more detail later on), and; (2) voluntary (free-market agreements, albeit 
regulated). The compulsory contributions are directly stipulated as a percentage of television 
companies‟ revenues. Therefore, the main difference between the French and the British setups is 
that in France, alongside a monetary obligation for broadcasters to invest in production, there is an 
ongoing levy on cinema admissions, telecommunication services and electronics. In the UK there is 
no such legal levy (or a set financial obligation to invest in production). As a result, the French 
cinema agency, CNC, administers a substantial annual budget as will be seen later on. 
 
Another relevant difference between both countries is that in the French case there is automatic aid 
available for national content purely based on an economic assessment (the one used for 
evaluating the nationality of the content, described on Chapter 7.5) and a selective subsidy which is 
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granted on the basis of other qualitative and cultural aspects decided by a commission appointed 
by the CNC (Davies & Wistreich, 2007: 332).
 115
 The automatic aid was envisaged to increase the 
dynamism of the French industry, entitling registered producers to receive direct financing 
proportionate to the performances of their previous works (CNC, 2007: 5). Initially restricted to the 
cinema, it now includes television and home video performances as well. Alternatively, the 
selective subsidy for films is an interest-free loan as advance-on-receipts (Davies & Wistreich, 
2007: 332). Digital media and innovative production techniques are also financed by selective aids 
by recent modifications introduced in the system (CNC, 2011e: 15-8). 
 
These financial aids administered by the CNC date back to 1959 and passed through several 
reforms (CNC, 2007: 5). In 1985 the Sofica was created (Act 11-07-1985). The system enabled 
private investors to deduct from the liable taxes the sums invested in Sofica companies, which in 
turn are obliged to invest all the resources in the production of French works (Eling, 1999: 112). 
 
As for the financing of television programmes, public funding is done by the taxation that forms the 
Cosip (Compte de Soutien à l'Industrie des Programmes Audiovisuels). The fund, created in 1986, 
is also administered by the CNC and the resources are used for the production of television films 
(38%) and for television programmes (62%) (Brochand, 1996: 58). The Cosip is divided into 
automatic and selective tranches too. The former is used by independent producers that already 
had productions aired by broadcasting channels and the latter for independent companies new in 
the market. 
 
I will return to the theme of independent producers later on, but for now it is important to highlight 
that the automatic aid mode which was introduced in 1989 by the Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, 
amid the so-called Plan Lang. This reform is often regarded as being at the “heart of French film 
policy” (Cocq & Messerlin, 2003: 12). Designed for providing steady and continuous public 
subsidies for the production sector, mainly the film industry, the scheme was regarded by some as 
beneficial for big media groups only as it favoured big-budget and successful pro-market films 
(Guerrieri et al., 2005: 32-4). On the other hand, the selective aid is regarded by some as a vicious 
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circle where the commissioners (who decide the grants given) are from the same industry “which it 
claims to control” (Leveratto, 2007: 187). I would like to remark that in France, the socio-cultural 
aspects which may be taken into consideration by the commissioners when analysing projects for 
selective aid are subjective and not clearly stated. 
 
Thus, in France, the subsidies are either granted for established filmmakers, in the case of the 
automatic aid, or by a subjective evaluation of a commission, in the case of the selective aid, which 
may or may not take into consideration socio-cultural concerns. However, that uncertainty is not the 
case for the Cosip (the fund for television programmes). The resources can only be applied to 
works with cultural, social, technological, scientific or economic related content and exclude reality 
TV, games and other similar programmes from being financed by public moneys (CNC, 2011g: 3). 
Those restrictions have clear implications for often formatted „light entertainment‟. That difference 
indicates that French legislators are not concerned with the kind of content produced when funding 
the film industry but have put some restrictions in place when it comes to television content. 
 
Returning to the analysis of film financing, while the funding might be mainly appropriated by big 
groups, as was also noted in the case of the British setup, the sources of the French funding 
system are different. In Britain there is a small amount derived from the lottery and the biggest 
share comes from broadcasting commissioning. In France too, broadcasting commissioning is 
significant. However, funds from the Cosip are responsible for 11% of the resources of the 
independent sector (CSA, 2009c: 12-3). The „pot‟ managed by the CNC as a result of the 
comprehensive levies accounts for, in 2011, €580m due to the Cosip (or 80% of the total 
approximately), €130m due to cinema tickets and €38m due to home-video (Senat, 2011). An 
overwhelming difference compared to the British Film Fund of around £15m as mentioned 
previously. 
 
From one side the French scheme is regarded by some as a heavy „subsidiser‟ of the film industry 
and a result of the political power of big national studios. Although, from the other side, it may also 
be regarded as a cross-subsidy derived not only from broadcasters but also from foreign films. As 
Czepek, Hellwig and Nowak (2009: 269) acknowledge, the more success a film has, the more it will 
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contribute to public funding. As the authors remark “[t]he Cosip can be ironically described as a 
system through which American cultural imperialism nourishes French cultural diversity” (ibid). 
 
With the introduction of new distribution technologies and digitalisation, the support given to 
national film industries in France is far from being diminished. Instead, economic contributions 
began, in 2001 and 2002, in a first stage of integrating both television and film industries‟ funding 
policies. French legislation included these developments into the CNC administered film financing 
scheme with the enactment of specific production financing decrees for each of the different 
distribution services.
116
 French regulators also decided, when enacting these decrees, that the 
different broadcasting and telecommunication services would have different contribution levels 
(those percentages will be discussed later on in this chapter). 
 
A second stage of integration between both cinema and television policies was introduced in 2004. 
The Finance Act 2004 extended the tax credit system, originally given to the cinema industries, to 
television production companies as well (Regourd, 2007: 172). This movement may be regarded as 
reflecting the inter-dependency between television and cinemas industries discussed in Chapter 3. 
Moreover, it also indicates that French policymakers are turning their attention to the television 
industries too. At this point it is important to remark that not only the film industry benefits from the 
CNC‟s funding. The television independent production sector also receives funding from the CNC 
via the Cosip. However, because of the independent quota being implemented in terms of 
percentage of programming expenditure (FoCA as amended in 2000, Art. 71) instead of 
programming hours as in the British case, the funding might be used inefficiently. 
 
As it is, the French independent quota might be regarded simply as an expenditure target with no 
relation to the amount of hours actually produced. In other words, as long as the broadcasters 
spend 10% with independent productions, no matter the broadcasting time, the quota is fulfilled. On 
the other hand, economic efficiency, or the so-called „value for money‟, arguably a fundamental 
principle so well rooted in British culture and policymaking process, favours the quota in terms of 
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hours of output as is the case in the UK. Possibly, the British implementation may be responsible 
for the better results of the independent production sector in that country. 
 
Notwithstanding that critique, the CSA, the broadcaster regulator, reported a robust result of that 
mixed source of financing and redistribution. The independent production sector totalled a turnover 
of €1,100m in 2006-2007 (CSA, 2009c: 12-13). As Chapter 8 will show, that total is comparable 
with the one related to the British independent sector. However, those numbers also show that 
while the CNC relies heavily on resources from the Cosip (80% of CNC budget as mentioned 
earlier), the television production industry depends on governmental funds only marginally (11% as 
mentioned before). This difference might be attributed to the increase of scale of the broadcasting 
business (due to liberalisation, digitalisation and digital convergence). The film agency, CNC, in its 
2010 annual report praised the fact that the French industry produced a record 261 new films 
(almost double the British official figures) with total investments of €1,400m (CNC, 2010b). 
Approximately half of that investment (almost €750m) came from the different broadcasting 
services. The same report also remarked that broadcasters spent €793m (a similar figure to the 
one diverted to the film industry) in television programmes which should be, actually, their core 
business. The French subsidising system corroborates the perception, as noted by for example 
Levy (1999: 20), Jackel (1999: 175) and Collins (2002: 55), that French policy stakeholders 
prioritise cinema as a „higher‟ culture as opposed to mass-media television. 
 
7.6.3 Brazil – broadcasters’ limited contribution to the independent 
sector 
Arguably the first influential Act that dealt with the financing of culture in Brazil was the Sarney Act 
1986, which included a scheme for the patronage of the arts. Under these provisions any company 
could declare donations to cultural projects as expenses and could deduct up to 100% of that value 
from the liable taxes (Art. 1). Because of its broad scope and loose definitions, it is estimated that 
the Act generated more than £40m in tax evasion during the four years that it lasted (Franca, 2005: 
37). The Act was revoked and replaced by the Rouanet Act 8313/1991, still partially in place. 
Instead of allowing direct contributions to cultural projects and deducting these from taxes, the Act 
creates a cultural fund (Fundo Nacional da Cultura - FNC), with a specific category for the 
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audiovisual sector (Fundo Setorial do Audiovisual - FSA), which manages the donations from 
companies and citizens in a scheme similar to the French Cosip.
117
 The Act also creates a network 
of funding companies similar to the French Sofica, the Ficart (Cultural and Artistic Investments 
Funds), which are tax free companies for the financing of cultural projects (Art. 8). 
 
With the new presidency of Itamar Franco, two years after the Rouanet Act, a specific financing 
scheme for developing the independent television industry was introduced without obligations – 
and financial contributions - to commercial broadcasters. The Audiovisual Act 8685/1993, enables 
tax payers to invest in independently produced works for television and film (Art. 1 and 1-A).
118
 
However, in order to not repeat the same errors of the Sarney Act, the scheme only allows 
deductions on projects approved by the Ministry of Culture, later transferred to the duties of the film 
agency Ancine. 
 
When the cinema agency, Ancine, was created nearly a decade after the enactment of those rules 
another scheme for financing independent productions was introduced. The fees that are normally 
owed when registering imported films and television programmes are exempted if the owner of the 
rights invests in independent productions (Art. 39.x).
119
 The last major alteration in the production 
legislative framework was introduced in 2002 when the Audiovisual Act benefits were extended, 
allowing for more deductions from income tax (Art. 3).
120
 A limit, however, was included in the 
projects and, currently, each project can receive deductable donations up to the limit of £2.7m (Art. 
2.2.ii). On the one hand, compared to the British legal limit of £20m for low budget films, Brazilian 
legislation may be more in tune with small projects, but it may also be uncompetitive to attract big 
or inward productions. On the other hand, two of the biggest national hits, Dois Filhos de Francisco 
(Columbia, 2005) and Tropa de Elite (Elite Squad, Zazen, 2007), had budgets of approximately 
£2m and £2.5m according to the IMDB database. Those values suggest that the regulatory limit 
might be adequate for national films. 
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 Up to 70% of the investments can be deducted from income tax. 




As a result of these incentives, the film agency collected, in 2010, £42m to be used for the 
promotion of national content (Ancine, 2010b).
121
 Comparing with French funds that amount is 
meagre. However, it almost triples the amount available to the British agency, BFI. On the other 
hand, in the same report the agency also states that Brazil sends abroad approximately £600m per 
year to international rights owners due to the exhibition of imported audiovisual works in the 
country. This disparity shows that international rights owners invest in the country less than 10% of 
the revenues actually sent abroad. Brazil needs to re-equilibrate this trade and obviously the 
schemes available will not be enough. At this point it is fair to point out that, similar to the other 
countries, there are additional public grants available for productions, awarded by Ancine and by 
the Ministry of Culture (Ancine, 2011b; Ministerio da Cultura, 2011). Although, as already 
commented, the budgets of those agencies are far smaller than the ones handled by the French 
CNC. 
 
That situation was changed slightly in 2011. The PA 2011 contributed to a significant breakthrough 
with regards to production financing. The act diverted 10% of the annual inspection and licensing 
fees, to be paid by all telecommunication and broadcasting companies and administered by the 
telecommunication agency Anatel,
122
 towards the production of national content (Art. 28) and is, 
therefore, managed by the cinema agency Ancine. According to Federal Deputy Jorge Bittar‟s
123
 
declarations (Mazza, 2007), this contribution may inject up to £110m per year towards national 
production. However, this is only a potentiality. Because of a past of high international debt and 
periods of high inflation, the national government, using its discretionary power, diverts taxes and 
levies originally created for specific purposes to finance the state-debt. This is a recurrent and 
historical practice and is subject to a continuous debate in Brazilian society. There is no evidence 
so far that it would be substantially different for this specific fund. 
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 The annual inspection fee is due by all communication companies, including telephone companies, 
broadcasters and internet providers and is directed towards the Fistel (Fundo de Fiscalizacao das 
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 Deputy Bittar was responsible for the first report on the bill in the Communications and Technology 
Committee (CCTCI) in the Camara dos Deputados (Lower House) and the approved act is a result of his 
report and redesign of the bill. Amongst the suggestions introduced were the national content quotas. 




As the reader will have noticed, the funding schemes are varied and complex. Hence, in the next 
section I will summarise those mechanisms. 
 
7.6.4 Summary 
Two different approaches can be identified with regards to the funding of national content, both 
films and independent television programmes: public funding and commissions by broadcasters. 
Figure 7 shows the existing mechanisms used by the selected countries. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Different mechanisms for financing independent productions 
 
Although Figure 7 fails to indicate the relative importance of each of the funding mechanisms for 
each country, it indicates which funding paths are used in each country. The UK and France rely 
mainly on broadcasting commissioning for the production of independent content and national 
governments strongly intervene by prescribing the conditions of those commercial relations. Brazil 
has a production sector strongly dependent on broadcasters and the public administration chose 
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France and Brazil enabled the creation of specific companies for investing in the production of films 
and programmes with tax incentives (the Sofica in France and Ficart in Brazil). All three countries 
have public funding available for production as indicated in Figure 7. However, only France collects 
financial resources from broadcasters, whilst both France and Brazil impose a levy over other 
communication services directed towards the production of independent content.
124
 Those two 
countries embrace that approach with different intensity though. While France has a strong, 
wealthy and comprehensive scheme of taxation for funding films and independent producers, Brazil 
modestly taxes telecommunication services.
125
 Brazilian legislation, moreover, does not impose 
any levy on commercial broadcasters‟ revenues in order to finance independent productions as the 





Having discussed the „pull‟ policies for the production and financing of national content, the next 




The analysis of Chapter 6, while performing the first step of the research, highlighted the different 
socio-cultural objectives given by policymakers to broadcasting services during recent years. 
However, the overall aims given by the legislation may be reinforced or eased depending on the 
specific content obligations contained in the licenses of each broadcaster. Legislation might 
promote the production of national content that propitiates debates on current affairs (British CA 
2003, s264.6.c), social cohesion (French FoCA 1986, as amended in 2006, Art. 43-11) and 
national culture (Brazilian Federal Constitution, Art. 220). But those aims, if not properly enforced, 
can become nothing more than mere aspirations. This section will discuss the different quotas 
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 As mentioned in this chapter, Brazilian broadcasters pay a small levy towards production, derived from 
the regulator‟s inspection fee, and unrelated to their revenues. 
125
 According to estimates of telecommunication magazines, nearly a half of the fund corresponds to levies 
on mobile phones (Telesintese, 2008). 
126
 For instance, a special tax exemption was included in an amendment to the Federal Constitution (Art. 
155), in 2003.The article exempts broadcasters from paying sales taxes, due to the States (the ICMS tax, 
equivalent to the VAT), on advertisement revenues, which would be the highest source of income for those 
companies. 
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prescribed for the broadcasters of each of the selected countries for the fulfilment of those socio-
cultural objectives highlighted in the first step. The analysis of this section will highlight what kind of 
content and which types of (television) schedules are designed by policymakers for the main 
terrestrial channels. By analysing these quotas the investigation will indicate how and to what 
extent the production of national content is promoted. Additionally, the analysis will indicate what 
type of programmes and socio-cultural objectives are fostered by regulation. 
 
Before analysing how the quotas have developed in the selected countries, first the types of quotas 
need to be introduced. In all countries these obligations are set either in terms of minimum number 
of hours per year or in terms of a percentage of the total television output, as listed below: 
a) Programme types with quotas in terms of minimum number of hours per year: arts, 
education, children, religion, national and regional news, current affairs and citizenship, 
regional programmes and sport; and 
b) Quotas established in terms of % of the total television output: independent productions, 
original productions, regional programmes, programmes produced outside the main 
producing area,
127
 maximum share of sports programmes and feature films, proportion of 
budget spent on content. 
 
In theory, by dictating different types and quantities of content obligations, regulators shape 
channels‟ output and create a broadcasting system which is diverse and complementary. Both 
categories of quotas can be related to the intertwined socio-cultural aims analysed in Chapter 6 – 
diversity (children, art, original productions, maximum sports and feature films, expenditure), 
plurality (independent productions, regional programmes), democracy (national and regional news), 
citizenry (education, current affairs and citizenship) and cultural relevance (original productions, 
arts, religion and sport). Alternatively, the second category, the percentage quotas, is used more 
for the economic development of the production industries. 
 
                                                          
127
 In the UK, the main producing region is referred to as outside the M25 (the motorway that circumvents 
the Greater London area). 
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Another point that needs clarification before entering into the discussion of each case study is the 
EU legislation with which the UK and France must comply. Specifically related to this research, the 
countries follow the already mentioned AVMS (the former TWF) Directive 2007. With regards to the 
distribution of national content, this legal document states: 
Member States shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that 
broadcasters reserve for European works a majority proportion of their 
transmission time, excluding the time allotted to news, sports events, games, 
advertising, teletext services and teleshopping. (Art. 16) 
 
In addition, the Directive states that at least 10% of the time or of broadcasters‟ budget should 
consist of “European works created by producers who are independent of broadcasters” (Art. 17). 
For further reference, the tables containing all the regulatory quotas used in this research are 
available in Annex 8. 
 
7.7.1 The British licensing system 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, since the Broadcasting Act (BA) 1990 the BBC (s186.1), ITV (Channel 
3) (s16.12.h), Channel 4 (s25.2.f) and Channel 5 (s29.2.b) have to include in their schedules 25% 
of independently produced content. In addition, the following BA 1996 included a 10% independent 
production obligation for all digital channels (s19.2). The Communication Act (CA) 2003 extended 
the 25% independent production obligation to “every licensed public service channel” (s277) and 
the 10% quota to “every digital television programme service that is not comprised in a licensed 
public service channel” (s309). Although there is no clear definition in the act of what constitutes a 
“licensed public service channel”, the 25% rule applies to BBC 1, BBC 2, ITV 1, Channel 4, 
Channel 5 (and the Welsh S4C); to all other digital channels available without subscription the 10% 
rule would apply. Ofcom closely monitors the main terrestrial channels with periodic reports (see 
Ofcom, 2010b). However, there is no data available from Ofcom on the compliance of the digital 
channels. 
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Apart from these independent production obligations, further specific content quotas are set in each 
channel‟s license.
128
 The following table shows the different hourly quotas for each main FTA 
broadcaster in decreasing order. 
 
Table 9 – Stipulated content quotas in total hours by channel per year in 2009 by decreasing order 
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182 Religion 55 Total 2,021     
Religion 55 Total 5,309       
Arts 45         
Total 10,634         
Source: Annex 8, Tables 56 to 63. 
Note: The categories are not exclusive, i.e. one programme can be classified in more than one category. 
Therefore, the total amount of quotas is higher than the actual air-time in the case of the BBC 1. 
 
Table 9 shows that for all but Channel 5 regulators stress the importance of FTA for informing the 
audiences, as the biggest obligation for these channels is the delivery of news. Although these 
channels are often classified as generalist, the snapshot of the latest obligations also indicates a 
different orientation for each channel. The BBC 1 is strongly focused on news and regional 
                                                          
128
 As mention in Chapter 5, the main statutory instrument that governs the BBC is the BBC Royal Charter 
granted by the head of state (originally granted by the King George V and currently by the Queen Elizabeth 
II) and detailed by an Agreement (which serves as a license) between the Secretary of State and the 
broadcaster. Both the charter and agreement are renewed periodically and the present ones are valid for the 
period 2007-2016. Because of the legal power of the Royal Charter, the CA 2003 dictates that the regulatory 
powers of Ofcom towards the BBC are limited “to the extent that provision for them to do so is contained in 
– (a) the BBC Charter and Agreement, and...” (s198.1). In practice, this arrangement gives the BBC Trust the 
task of regulating the content delivered by the BBC and leaves Ofcom more directed to regulate the 
technicalities of the delivery of the service. However, as foreseen by the current charter and agreement, the 
content broadcast by the BBC also has to comply with the CA 2003 (as is the case, for instance, with the 25% 
independent content rule). 
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programmes that shall be included in all its twenty regional variations. On BBC 2, although there 
are regional content obligations, children, education and arts programmes form a significant 
proportion of the obligations. Channel 5 has considerable obligations to children, ITV has no 
significant secondary focus (besides news) and for Channel 4, sustaining citizenry is as important 
as delivering news to audiences. 
 
The total obligations also vary significantly between channels. Of the commercial FTA channels, in 
2009 Channel 4, being state-owned, has smaller content obligations, and Channel 5, privately 
owned and profit seeking, the most. The increased control on Channel 5 might be explained by the 
low short-term commercial success expected when the license was awarded (Crisell, 2002: 237; 
Franklin, 2001: 62). That concern could have driven regulators to tighten the rules regarding which 
kind of content should be used on that particular channel, in order to mitigate possible widespread 
use of cheaper imported programmes and „light‟ entertainment and make sure it would broadcast a 
diverse range of programmes. But if from one side the channel was heavily regulated, from the 
other side, by the original production quota as will be pointed out later on, while discussing Table 
10, the channel was also the least regulated. 
 
The BBC‟s channels have, as expected, the most extensive obligations. In fact, without considering 
the other quotas from its spin-off digital channels, the PSB has to comply with four times more 
quota obligations in terms of air-time than the other main terrestrials.
129
 This disparity has 
increased through the period under analysis as we will see later on. 
 
DTV opened the opportunity for the creation of new channels, but it is only the BBC that has 
specific content quota obligations for those newly created digital channels. Among other 
obligations, BBC 3 has 125 hours quota for educational programmes and BBC 4 has to broadcast 
a minimum of 20 new films per year, 100 hours of arts and 110 hours of educational programmes. 
The children‟s channel CBBC has an obligation to broadcast more than 1,000 hours of educational 
and specific children‟s programmes. The news channels BBC News and BBC Parliament also have 
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 It must be noted that some quotas may count for more than one category. For instance one educational 
programme, targeted to children and regionally produced would count for all the three different quotas. In 
addition, the BBC 1 has twenty regional variations where the quota should be included. 
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specific content to deliver. BBC News has a specific obligation of covering a minimum of 100 hours 
of sports news and the parliamentarian channel has to cover regional and European parliament 
(260 and 100 hours respectively). The other main terrestrials‟ new spin-off digital channels, such as 
ITV 2 to 4 or 5 USA or 5* (from Channel 5), do not have specific content quotas and only have to 
comply with the general quotas set as percentages of television output (see Annex 8, Tables 58 to 
60). 
 
It is important to note that since the year 2002, the BBC issues a Statement of Programme Policy 
which details the different quotas agreed for each of its channels on a yearly basis. Before 2002, 
the commitments stating the minimum production of specific content, if any, were not published. 
The annual reports only indicated the total amounts of television output per genre. This point 
indicates that the PSB was more loosely regulated externally in terms of official quota requirements 
than the other broadcasters which had explicit obligations in their licences. However, the analysis 
of the output of the BBC, as stated in their annual reports, shows that the broadcaster did comply 
with higher proportions of the same kind of content that were prescribed as obligations for the other 
main terrestrials. It seems that the broadcaster did not need to be closely regulated; they internally 
agreed to pursue socio-cultural goals. For instance, while ITV had a total obligation of 806 hours in 
1993, as shown in Figure 8, the BBC produced more than 8,000 hours of these same kinds of 
content (Annex 8, Table 56). 
 




Figure 8 – Total hours of quotas per year of British main terrestrial channels 
Source: Annex 8, Tables 56 to 63. 
 
Figure 8 shows the total amount in hours of content quotas per year for each broadcaster. The 
graph shows that throughout the period analysed, there has been an increase in the BBC‟s content 
obligations, particularly after the rollout of the new digital channels which started in 2003. 
Regulators thus, at the same time that they granted more services to the BBC, tightened their 
control. While for the other channels the total amount of specific content required has been relaxed, 
particularly in the case of Channel 5. 
 
The decreasing obligations towards Channel 5 may be explained by economic and regulatory 
reasons. The initial license for the newest of the main FTA channels, Channel 5, stated that the 
output should consist of “high quality” programmes (ITC, 1996a: 34). However, as when discussing 
what offends „good taste‟, „quality‟ is a relative and difficult concept to prescribe in legislation and 
even more difficult to assess by regulators. In addition to this vague obligation, as the channel 
experienced the expected initial problems, in 1998, the chief executive David Elstein declared that 
there was a difficulty in achieving the regulatory goals: 
We live in two realities...the economic one and the regulatory one... we aim for 
good quality and occasionally high quality...High quality on Channel 5 is relatively 
rare (cited in Goode, 2007: 119-20). 
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Or as the programme director Dawn Airey had described more plainly earlier on, instead of 
complying with specific content, the channel offered “football, films and fucking” (cited in Goode, 
2007: 118). Reflecting this regulatory and economic struggle, in an attempt to reach an optimal 
balance between the amounts of the specific content that should be broadcast, since the first 
license was issued in 1996 until 2001, the channel applied for, and was granted with, seven 
variations of the license. Eventually, in 2001, the regulatory body decided to diminish the 
obligations and, instead of dictating more than 8,000 hours in specific content obligations, reduced 
the quotas to just over 2,000 hours, setting another 600 hours as additional “indicative targets” 
(ITC, 2001). The failure of the regulatory arrangement envisaged for Channel 5 suggests that the 
establishment of obligations is not a guarantee that the broadcaster will meet those specific 
standards, attain a certain identity or deliver certain socio-cultural goals. 
 
The second sets of rules, the proportional quotas established as a percentage of the overall 
television output have also shown some differences between the channels as Table 10 shows. 
 
Table 10 – Proportional quotas in 2009 for main terrestrials 
Category 









Original productions (%) 70 70 65 80 56 51 
Regional production in the area (%) 95 95         
Producing programmes outside the 
M25 area (£%/h%) (1) 30/25 30/25 35/35   35/35 10/10 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Source: Annex 8, Tables 56 to 63. 
 
Although Table 9 indicated that Channel 5 has more content obligation than the other terrestrials in 
terms of stipulated hours (apart from the BBC), the proportional quotas shown in Table 10 indicate 
that Channel 5 may operate with fewer resources. Channel 5 needs to acquire, proportionally, 
fewer original productions and has a smaller obligation to invest outside the London area. In 
contrast, the other broadcasters have to invest outside the capital, proportionally, three times as 
much. Additionally, in the case of the BBC, it is the only national broadcaster with an obligation to 
produce regional programmes in the area of broadcast. While the decentralisation of production 
facilities complies with broader objectives of increasing diversity and plurality, the regionalisation of 
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production may increase the production costs and, therefore, is a measure that commercial 
broadcasters may oppose. In another quota, maximum repeats (not listed in Table 10), Channel 5 
is also favoured. In 1996 the ceiling was 21% and it was gradually increased to 40% in the last 
license of 2003 (see Annex 8, Table 63 for details). That is another measure taken to ease the 
costs for programming. The national license of ITV has the highest obligations for original 
productions (80%), as the national service‟s main purpose is the broadcast of a national news 
programme. 
 
As in the case of the hourly quotas, the digital BBC channels are the only channels with additional 
proportional quotas (albeit not listed in Table 10; see Annex 8, Tables 58 to 60). While all the other 
digital broadcasters have to comply with the 10% independent content legal obligation, the BBC 
agreed to extend the same 25% independent content obligation to the BBC 3, BBC 4, CBBC and 
Cbeebies. Interestingly, these four digital channels have higher European requirements than all the 
other FTA broadcasters, varying from 70% to 90%. In addition to those quotas, the BBC‟s digital 
channels (including BBC News and Parliament) also have to comply with regional production and 
original productions quotas. 
 
At this point it is important to remark that the regulation does not insist that independent content 
has to be of British origin. Albeit there is no such explicit obligation (only that the production 
company has to be independent from a British broadcaster),
130
 original content has to be 
commissioned or produced by British broadcasters for first viewing in the UK. Thus it is most likely 
that those programmes will be produced in the UK.
131
 Additionally, perhaps the British legislation 
does not worry about the country of origin of the content because, as will be seen in detail in 
Chapter 8, the television industry is historically strong. This flexibility on nationality is a 
                                                          
130
 Statutory Instrument 1991 No. 1408, The Broadcasting (Independent Productions) Order 2004 (as 
amended by the Statutory Instrument 1995 No. 1925), indicates that any programme is considered 
independent to which broadcasters contributed less than 25% of the production costs (s2.1) and that are 
produced by companies where one broadcaster has less than 25% of shareholding or two broadcasters have 
less than 50% of shareholding (s3.4). The Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1672, The Broadcasting 
(Independent Productions) (Amendment) Order 2003, clarifies that the shareholding limit only applies to 
British broadcasters. Therefore, a company owned by another European broadcaster would be considered as 
independent. 
131
 Statutory Instrument 2004 No. 1652, Broadcasting (Original Productions) Order 2004, s3, states that 
original productions are European programmes “commissioned by or for a licensed public service channel 
with a view to their first showing on television in the United Kingdom.” 
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considerable difference between the two European countries studied, as will become clear in the 
next section. 
 
7.7.2 The French infra legal obligations 
While content obligations are set under broadcasters‟ licenses for the British case, the obligations 
in France are stated in the broadcaster‟s Convention, Cahier des Charges (similar to the BBC‟s 




In the case of the PSB France 2 (the former Antenne 2) and France 3 (former France Regions), a 
further analysis on the Cahier des Charges approved by the Decree 87-717 indicates that 
additional specific content obligations, such as art (Art. 30) or varieties (Art. 35), could be set by 
annual dispositions agreed internally by the broadcaster for the execution of the Cahier des 
Charges. However, as those were internal decisions and not publicly available (at least not found in 
the sources used in this research), those „obligations‟ cannot be quantified. Fortunately, from the 
year 2000, as a result of an amendment on the Decree 87-717, content obligations are all made 
public in the Bilan, the yearbooks, which the regulator publishes for each of the main terrestrial 
broadcasters and, more recently, for relevant digital channels. 
 
Two characteristics which distinguish the French quota setup from the British are the increased 
importance of regulations both for the broadcasting of films on television services and for the 
production of films with revenues diverted from broadcasters. It is important to remark that this 
„diversion‟ is a legal levy on broadcasters‟ revenues collected by the CNC and totally independent 
from broadcasters‟ commissioning. Those financing regulations have been object of continuous 
adjustments and modifications of scope. Figure 9 shows the changes of broadcasters‟ contributions 
towards the production of programmes and films. 
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 The enactment of the „licenses‟ is either by ministerial Decrees or by Decision of the French broadcasting 
regulator CSA. 




Figure 9 – Legal contributions towards the production of audiovisual (AV) and film content in 
percentage of broadcaster‟s revenues 
Source: Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67. 
 
The previous Figure 9 shows that the majority of the contribution is directed towards the production 
of television content. Data shows that while for commercial broadcasters (TF1, Canal Plus and M6) 
the contribution towards the production of television content has diminished, the PSB‟s channels 
had their levy continuously increased. Also reflecting Canal Plus‟ special focus on films (and 
sports), the subscription-to-air broadcaster has the smallest obligations towards the production of 
television content (3.6%) while the others contribute between 12.5% and 18.5% of their revenues. 
The figure also demonstrates that the contribution towards film production augmented through time 
for all channels. While in 1987 there was no cross-contribution at all, since the year 2000 the three 
most viewed channels (TF1, France 2 and France 3) have been obliged to contribute. Currently, all 
but France 5 contribute.
133
 In regards to film, the most relevant contribution at present is made by 
Canal Plus. While the subscription-to-air channel contributes with 12% of their revenues, the other 
private channels contribute with 3.2% and the ones from France Televisions, slightly higher, 3.4%. 
 
A closer look at the regulations of these obligations reveals that the investment is directed into 
specific sub-categories. Usually, two thirds (2/3) must be invested in the production of independent 
productions, French and European works and original works (normally 2/3 or up to 3/4 of the total 
obligation) (see Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67). 
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 Probably France 5 is the only channel that does not contribute because it is still related to the Arte channel 
(a joint venture with the German PSBs and therefore subjected to a different supranational regulation). 




The other set of obligations, stated as total hours per year are not as substantial at least for most 
French broadcasters as is the case for the British terrestrials. Table 11 shows the total amounts as 
in the latest configuration, since 2005. 
 
Table 11 – Total annual obligations for main terrestrial, total hours per year, 2009 
  FT 1 France 2 France 3 France 4 France 5 M6 
Children (hpy) 1,050 - - - - - 
News (hpy) 800 - - - - - 
French or EU original AV 
productions (hpy) 120 120 120 120 120 162 
French audiovisual (hpy) 66 - - - - - 
Arts & music (hpy) 22 40 40 40 40 (*) 
TOTAL 2,058 160 160 160 160 162 
Note: (*) Music obligations are expressed in % of total broadcasting time (a minimum of 24% of the total 
time, whilst a minimum of 50% shall be of French origin). Hpy = hours per year. 
Source: See Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67. 
 
The absence of more detailed specific content quotas, such as current affairs, education or 
regional news, indicates that the related socio-cultural objectives are not strongly emphasised by 
regulation in the French case. Instead, a concern with the nationality of the content and with the 
promotion of the arts is more prominent. That latter aspect of the content obligations will become 
clearer later on in this section. For the moment, it is important to highlight that Table 11 
demonstrates that, conversely to the British case where the biggest content obligations are applied 
to the PSB (the BBC), in France the main commercial channel (and prior to privatisation the main 
PSB channel), TF1, has the highest and most detailed obligations. This practice indicates that 
despite the French government having privatised the main PSB channel in the 1980s, the 
government regulates it more tightly. In that sense, TF1 is comparable to Channel 5 in Britain: both 
are the focus of tighter regulation. Publicly owned France Televisions receives fewer specific 
programme obligations, as is the case of Channel 4 in the UK, also a publicly owned channel. 
Figure 10 shows how the total quotas expressed in hours per year (Table 11) changed through 
time. 
 




Figure 10 – Total hours of quotas per year of French main terrestrial channels 
Source: Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates that the specific content obligations on TF1 have consistently increased over 
time, while at the same time the total quotas on France Televisions‟ channels remained steady or 
even decreased. It is important to note at this point that the decrease might be related to the fact 
that although France Televisions had to provide for more channels, there was no agreed raise on 
the value of the TV license.
134
 The PSB had to provide for more services relying on an increase in 
revenues from advertisement. 
 
The sharp drop in the obligations of France 5 between 2000 and 2005 shown in Figure 10  is due 
to a rearrangement that took place under digitalisation. Up to that year, in the analogue mode, the 
channel had to broadcast 910 hours of children and teenage (jeunesse) programmes (see Annex 
8, Table 64 for details), and the same channel was used for half of each day by the channel Arte. 
With digitalisation and the launch of France 4, the channel is now focused on documentaries and 
TV magazines (CSA, 2006e). Additionally, while France 5 was dissociated from Arte in the digital 
mode, the channel was also released from children and teenager obligations. The task instead was 
given to France 4 but re-focusing on younger adults for the “renewal of the interest on public 
television” (CSA, 2006d). 
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 In fact the TV license was maintained constant between 2002 and 2008 in €116 (Martin-Laland, 2008: 10). 
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Contrary to the British case where quotas for the BBC were sharply increased after 2005, in 
France, the obligations for each of the public channels did not rise. Instead, there was only the 
inclusion of obligations for France 4 and 5. Thus, overall, the obligations of the public channels 
were slightly increased without, possibly, major effects on the schedules of the main channels 
France 2 and 3. Another characteristic clearly identifiable from the graph is that all channels, 
excluding TF1, converged to the same level of total quotas obligations. In fact, currently, the only 
quotas in terms of hours are the obligations to broadcast French or European original content and 
music or art. Confirming that supporting role for the arts, there is an additional quota for PSBs to 
broadcast a minimum of 18 cultural spectacles per year (see Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67). In addition, 
channel M6 has music specific obligations, such as a quota for promoting new talents and for 
producing video clips (see Annex 8, Table 67). In summary, these quota suggest that regulators do 
not have a primary focus on supporting some of the socio-cultural goals of broadcasting such as 
diversity, democracy (PSB have no news obligation at all) and citizenship. French quotas are 
focused on supporting the arts and with it French culture, but most significantly in financing 
production, particularly films. Another main concern present in French policy regards to the 
nationality of the content. 
 
Since the 1980s French legislation has provisions with regards to, both, French and European 
content. The Decree 90-66 initially set that obligation as 50% (and at least 60% of European 
content), later reduced to 40% (and at least the majority of European content), probably as a 
rearrangement due to the enactment of the TWF Directive (FoCA as consolidated in 1994, Art. 27.2 
and Decree 90-66, Arts. 5 and 8). These quotas explicitly include films (again a strong protection of 
the national film industry) and television programmes, including musical clips from French authors, 
as in the already mentioned case of the originally music-specialised M6 channel. 
 
The fostering of national films is, in fact, not only restricted to establishing minimum percentages to 
be followed or to diverting revenues from broadcasters. Regulation also dictates the maximum 
number of films that can be exhibited on television. Canal Plus is limited to 500 films per year, while 
the others to a maximum of 192 films (see Annex 8, Tables 64 to 67). However, the films cannot be 
broadcast on Wednesday and Friday evenings, anytime on Saturdays, or on Sundays before 20.30 
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(Decree 90-66, Art. 10). According to these dispositions, French regulators protect cinema 
theatres, reserving days where television cannot compete with cinema, even in an era of multi-
channel (besides indicating which are the days French citizens should go out!). Not surprisingly, 
French football competitions usually take place on Wednesdays (French Cup) and Saturdays 
(Championship). 
 
It is worth mentioning that French regulation not only secures „no-film‟ days on television but also 
assures that a proper proportion of national films hit the theatre screens. As discussed in Chapter 
3, while the UK dropped the screen quota obligation during Thatcher‟s reforms, France maintains 
the policy without, actually enforcing it. According to Lee (2009), the latest French screen quota is 




According to Hayward (2005: 50) the vitality (and concentration) of the current French cinema 
industry is anchored in two main tools: quotas and subsidies. However, according to Lee (2009), 
the screen quotas are not currently being enforced. One of the reasons for this attitude might be a 
perception, by some, of a lack of effectiveness of that tool. The head of the CNC recognised that 
instead of screen quotas, agreements with cinema operators with regards to the diversity of 
screened films as introduced in France (such as the maximum number of screens that can exhibit 
the same film) proved to be more effective (Garandeau, 2011b).
136
 Ulf-Moller (2001: xxii) more 
emphatically notes, screen quotas may be “deceptive, as they are based on the false assumption 
that all films have equal attendance.” Sharper is the conclusion offered by Morrison and 
Compagnon (2010: 68) which argue that the French system created a protected market, with 
clientelistic practices and generating a large army of elitist, Paris-centric and self perpetuating 
cultural bureaucrats. However, screen quotas might be regarded as having an important role just 
by assuring a minimum space for national content, as they oblige cinema distributors to at least 
include in their yearly offerings some national works. I will return to that benefit when discussing the 
Brazilian case. While the screen quota guarantees a minimum availability of national products, it 
might have a similar impact as the broadcasting quota: no obligation will guarantee a viewer but if 
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 In fact the Decree 53-1294, last modified in 1964, stipulates that French films shall be screened at least 
during five weeks per trimester (three months), which corresponds to the figures reported by Lee. 
136
 Those agreements are foreseen in the Decree 2010-781 which stipulates that cinema operators have to 
submit the yearly plan to the CNC guaranteeing a “diversity of works[.]” 
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there is no domestically produced content available, then there is no national content as an option 
for viewers. 
 
7.7.3 The Brazilian-quasi-absent content obligations 
As already discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 the Brazilian approach towards broadcasting is 
effectively laissez-faire, as the minimal quotas in place are widely acknowledged as being hardly 
ever actually complied with. In addition, as all commercial channels are subjected to the same legal 
quotas and there are no additional conditions set on broadcasters‟ licenses, regulators do not seek 
to regulate for diversity or complementarities between the different FTA channels. 
 
As noted in Chapter 7, the minimum legal obligations for all channels are 5% of news programmes 
(Broadcasting Code 1962, Art 38.g) and five hours per week (equivalent to 260 hours per year) of 
educational programmes (Decree-Act 1967, Art. 16). The only channel that has specific content 
obligations is the federal PSB, TV Brasil, which has to broadcast 10% of regional programmes and 
5% of independent productions (PSB Act 2008, Art.8.IV). 
 
In principle the legislative obligations may seem, surprisingly, even higher than the ones set for 
France in some cases, as the European country does not have, for instance, specific educational 
or news quotas on some of their main terrestrials. Additionally, the educational quota is higher than 
for some of the British main terrestrials. However, the fundamental difference between the 
countries lies in the compliance. There is a common perception that these educational quotas are 
generally ignored (Lima, 2010). Brazilian broadcasters are not listed companies and hence do not 
have any obligation to publish reports on their accounts and programme policies.
 
Nevertheless, in 
order to offer evidence on the perceived non-compliance, an analysis of the weekly TV listings has 
been carried out. Table 12 shows the total hours of broadcasting of the different kind of 
programmes during a normal one week period. 
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Table 12 – Total amount of different types of programmes broadcast by Brazilian main terrestrials 



















Globo 06:30 27:32 15:25 13:40 00:35 02:35 
Record 00:00 35:20 11:40 01:30 00:00 02:35 
SBT 00:00 14:00 56:30 01:30 00:00 00:55 
Band 00:00 38:10 00:00 16:30 05:00 03:25 
TV Brasil 20:42 11:50 31:35 02:30 02:45 13:25 
Note: Totals calculated from analysis of weekly TV listings in the city of Sao Paulo as published by blogs. 
Period used for Globo was 08/08-14/08/2009; Record and SBT 31/08-06/09/2009; Band 07/09-13/09/2009; 
TV Brasil 03/05-09/05/2009. (*) – No legal obligation. 
Source: (__________, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e) 
 
The figures in Table 12 corroborate the general idea that broadcasters, with the exception of Rede 
Globo and TV Brasil, do not comply with educational quotas. The 5% news quota should result in 
at least one hour per day or seven hours per week of news programmes (considering a minimum of 
20 hours of daily broadcasting time). This obligation is accomplished by all broadcasters. Table 12 
also show the different socio-cultural focus of the broadcasting channels. SBT and TV Brasil both 
promote children and family programmes. However, the analysis of the listings has also shown that 
whilst SBT relies on imported cartoons, such as Tom & Jerry (MGM) and Justice League (Warner), 
and children‟s soaps like Chavo del Ocho (Televisa), TV Brasil relies on national content, some of it 
generated by public broadcasters with educational objectives, such as Castelo Ra-tim-bum (TV 
Cultura) and Um menino muito maluquinho (TVE). 
 
The other specific content identified in those listings are current affairs and religion. Interestingly, 
Record, owned by a Pentecostal group, as mentioned in Chapter 5, does not broadcast religious 
programmes but Band, not owned by religious groups, does. This difference might be explained by 
the assumption that for a religious group to use a public service for the promotion of its own 
interests and points of view could be contentious. Besides, a widespread broadcast of those 
programmes could result in labelling the network with a certain religious philosophy, which could be 
negative for attracting certain advertisers and audiences. Band network, on the other hand, as it 
does not have any apparent religious attachment, is free to open its schedules to different 
congregations which, in practice, results in leasing slots instead of relying on advertisements. 




As a final comment on the practices of the main terrestrials, the analysis of the weekly TV listings 
corroborated the general impression that commercial broadcasters rely heavily on entertainment. In 
general, countries do not adopt quotas for this kind of content as those programmes are developed 
because they naturally appeal to audiences. Telenovelas, perhaps the most well-known 
characteristic of Brazilian television, are highly culturally relevant for Brazilian audiences. As the 
most watched content in that country they will come into sight in Chapter 8, when audiences‟ 
preferences are analysed. 
 
Although establishing the types of content scheduled could be easily done by self-declaratory 
reports to be checked by authorities (as happens in the UK and France), content obligations or 
scheduling practices do not seem to be a matter of concern for the Ministry of Communications or 
any other authority. Apart from the protection of minors, currently supervised by the Ministry of 
Justice, commercial broadcasters may operate virtually free of obligations and restrictions. They 
are even allowed to, in practice, lease slots. That practice could be interpreted as a „sub-licensing‟ 
of an original license and could lead to legal actions or the imposition of fines. However, to 
introduce any kind of control over broadcasting is extremely contentious in Brazil. For instance, 
when the government under the presidency of Lula proposed the creation of the Ancinav (a 
regulatory agency that would be equivalent to a combination of the French CSA and CNC), in 
2004, the proposal was openly criticized by media groups, especially Rede Globo (Fernandes, 
2010; Ramos & Haje, 2011). The proposal was said to amount to a re-introduction of censorship. 
 
With the enactment of the PA 2011 and the introduction of quotas on paytv, the cinema agency, 
Ancine, was included in the audiovisual regulatory sphere. According to the dispositions of this 
latest Act, content-related regulation is shared between the Ministry of Communications (overall 
licenses compliance), the Ministry of Justice (protection of minors) and Ancine (responsible for the 
promotion of national content). The discussion about the promotion of national content on paytv 
services was a major point of controversy for the introduction of that law. After four years of 
negotiations, the Brazilian PA 2011 established that a mere 3.5 hours per week of “qualified 
content” shall be produced in the country and half of this by independent producers (Art. 16). By 
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„qualified content‟ Brazilian regulators used a similar criteria to that used in the European directive, 
i.e. excluding content such as news, sports and advertisements. Translated into percentages, that 
national content obligation represents only a small 2% quota. Far smaller than the European 
obligation, which sets out that “where practicable... broadcasters reserve for European works a 
majority proportion of their transmission time” (European Parliament, 2007: Art. 4). Although the 
Brazilian quota might be considered by some as almost irrelevant, it might also be considered as a 
policy breakthrough in directing broadcasting services, which could be passed on to the FTA 
service in the near future. 
 
A second significant advance of the PA 2011 is the creation of a quota for Brazilian channels in all 
paytv offers. By that rule, a minimum of twelve channels must be owned by Brazilian nationals (Art. 
17).
137
 At the same time that this channel quota creates a demand for more Brazilian broadcasters, 
the disposition also dictates that at least two of those channels have to be independent from FTA 
broadcasters and broadcast at least 50% of Brazilian content. That latter rule gives an exact point 
for comparison with the AVMS directive. While the European „where practicable‟ rule is applied to 
at least „all main terrestrial channels‟, the Brazilian content rule applies only to two channels and is 
valid for paytv services only. These two approaches give us two different angles of observation. 
European traditional terrestrials (and the associated digital channels of the PSBs) broadcast a 
majority of European content possibly due to regulation, and Brazilian broadcasters do not have to 
comply with any national content quotas. On the other hand, European channels broadcast by 
paytv systems are freed from that regulation, while Brazilian regulation dictates that at least two of 
these channels must have a majority of national content. The impact on viewers of regulating only 
two paytv channels in the middle of hundreds of others could be insignificant and certainly, it would 
be more effective to regulate the main terrestrials, the most viewed channels. However, the policy 
can also be regarded as enabling a minimum distribution outlet for national content in paytv 
systems. 
 
Although the main terrestrials are not obliged to include national content in their schedules, it does 
not imply that viewers of FTA services do not have access to Brazilian content. Commercial 
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 Actually the rule mandates that one third of the channels must be nationally owned, but it also included a 
maximum cap on the obligation of twelve channels. 
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broadcasters of that country do promote national content substantially, as the next chapter will 
show. As a quick note, according to Conversani and Botoso (2009), in the 1982-1997 period, 37% 
of the miniseries exhibited by FTA broadcasters were based on Brazilian novels. Rede Globo 
alone, in the 1984-2003 period, produced 31 miniseries, 28 of them based on Brazilian authors 
(Brasil Junior et al., 2004). However, the lack of legally enforced financial contributions (as in 
France) or of strong independent quotas (as in the UK) produced a heavily concentrated production 
industry centred on commercial broadcasters, as will be shown in the following chapter. In addition, 
this lack of regulation in a (paradoxically in this case) licensed service may also have 
consequences on a low commitment towards fulfilling socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting 
services. 
 
The quota analysis has shown an increasing concern with securing distribution windows for 
national and independently produced television programmes and films, although Brazilian 
regulators do not actively promote media plurality in the production activities. For the particular 
case of films, at this point it is important to remind the reader that Brazil, like France, still adopts 
screen quotas (for cinemas), although substantially reduced in recent years. Despite the quota 
being reduced to one fifth in 2009, and the fact that only two national films per year are required to 
be exhibited, two years after those new levels were put in place, 41% of the cinemas audited by 
Ancine, almost half the exhibitors, failed to comply with the quota (Ancine, 2011c: 1). Brazilian 
cinema exhibitors do not even include at least two films in their yearly exhibitions and there is a 
general perception that it is extremely difficult for national films to stay on screen for more than one 
week. As Brazilian production by far exceeds two films, as Chapter 8 will show, it is either the case 
of a weak regulator or an inadequate regulatory framework. As in the case of the British Channel 5, 
when content regulations were eased, Brazilian cinemas‟ failure is another example of a regulation 
that has no force to change deeply rooted commercial practices. 
 
The film maker Paulo Thiago (cited in Nagib & Rosa, 2002: 480-1) attributes the lack of presence 
of national films on cinema screens to insufficient investment in media distribution campaigns. 
Moreover, the director claims that screen quotas alone are inefficient to break the distribution 
bottleneck imposed by international distributors operating in the country with significant market 
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power. With a complete opposite point of view, the Brazilian association of cinema multiplex 
operators claims that there are simply not enough attractive films to comply with the quota, as 75% 
of the films produced are low budget and based on authorial concepts incapable of attracting mass 
audiences (Abraplex, 2005). As such, the association regards the screen quotas as “a harmful 
futurology-exercise imposed to the market” by a “demagogic threat” which “violates basic principles 




The reality is that in Brazil there are no national equivalents in size and wealth to the French 
distributors (and studios) UCG, Gaumont or Pathe which could force the inclusion of Brazilian films 
within their catalogues. Globo Filmes could be regarded as the exception to this rule. In fact, as 
remarked by Fonseca (2003), Rede Globo‟s films arm was responsible for 80% of the cinema 
tickets for Brazilian films in 2003. The Brazilian case clearly shows that the French diversity 
regulation for cinema screens, highlighted earlier on, would be necessary in that country. At this 
point it is important to remind the reader that, although an evaluation of the cinema distribution 
activity could offer important findings for this research, for practical reasons that activity will not be 
covered. That investigation and its relationship with the fostering of national content is another field 
for possible further research. 
 
As with the other quotas, to establish a proper number of national films to be shown on the big 
screen seems to be a difficult task. While screen quotas might be „deceptive‟, as regarded by Ulff-
Moller, or inefficient, the Brazilian case shows that national films simply do not reach the screen if 
not actively promoted and quotas are not actively enforced. 
 
7.7.4 Quotas for non-linear (VOD) services 
The appearance and increasing popularisation of the new non-linear modes of distribution of 
content, such as VOD or IPTV (as mentioned in Chapter 2) arouse the attention of legislators in all 
countries studied. At the European level, during the 2007 revision of the TWF, then re-baptised 
AVMS Directive, non-linear services were included in its scope. However, as the new Directive 
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 Original quote: “Um danoso exercício de futurologia imposto anualmente ao mercado”, “demagogica 
ameaca” and “viola princípios básicos como a insofismável relação entre oferta e procura.” 
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exempts those services from a mandatory quota obligation, Member States deal with the matter 
differently (Schneider & Bossche, 2008: 257). 
 
At this point it is important to remark that a quota on non-linear services would be ineffective as 
users could always skip or avoid the content promoted by the quota. A quota, if imposed over a 
catalogue, could be ineffective, as it would suffer from the same kind of limitations of the cinema 
screen quotas. Some content could just be ignored by users. In traditional and linear television 
(without the advent of the PVRs)
139
 it may be argued that there is no possibility of skipping the 
content, only swapping to a different channel offering imported content or, even, switching the 
television off. 
 
With regards to our two European case studies, the UK decided to minimally regulate non-linear 
services without specifying a quota (De Vinck & Pauwels, 2008: 284; UK, 2009). British obligations 
relate only to harmful material, advertising, sponsorship and product placement (CA 2003, s368A 
to s368R). The BBC, however, agreed to include the 25% independent production quota in their 
iPlayer, the BBC on-line service (see Table 60). France, on the other hand, included a levy on 
these services, which is directed to their audiovisual fund Cosip (CSA, 2009c: 21). In addition, the 
CNC, as already commented earlier on in this chapter, have specific financing schemes for the 
development of innovative formats and distribution technologies. As there are specific legal 
contributions and public programmes for these new services, the potentialities of the internet and of 
digital convergence for the production of national content seem to be more deeply incorporated into 
the French policy. 
 
In the Brazilian case, as already noted in Chapter 6, since the PSB Act 2008, the public 
broadcaster has the obligation to develop interactive content for the internet. However, the 
regulation of the new media was not further embraced for the other services. Similar to the British 
case, Brazil with the PA 2011 also exempted non-linear paytv services from national quota 
obligations (Art. 19.vi). 
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 Personal Video Recorder, a set-top box with recording capabilities. 
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These „light touch‟ approaches are in agreement with regulatory stakeholders‟ tendencies, at least 
in the EU, of regulating more strictly core broadcasters than marginal services (Storsul & 
Syvertsen, 2007). The loose obligations, or even a regulatory forbearance (when governments 
refrain to impose rules on specific markets), are often regarded as necessary in order to encourage 
investment and innovation in new technologies and services, as is the case with non-linear 
services (Boyfield, 2006: 11). It seems that as long as those services are still developing and have, 
in comparison to linear services, less attention from users, they will continue to be exempted from 
quotas. The market analysis of the next chapter, while showing the take-up of those services, will 
clarify where they are positioned in the current broadcasting space. Additionally, the next step 
should also indicate how important the phenomenon of digital convergence is for the distribution 




Throughout the analysis of the case studies, I have shown the differences and similarities in each 
of the broadcasting legislations of the countries under study. While Chapter 6 analysed how the 
legislation shaped the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting, this chapter has focused on the 
regulatory framework used for sustaining those goals and the production and distribution of 
national content, the „push-pull‟ policies. 
 
The tools regulating the relationships between the audiovisual industries showed different 
tendencies among the case studies. More related to sustaining diversity, citizenry and democracy, 
the European countries have a greater concern with the access and coverage of FTA 
broadcasters. In Brazil, policymakers favoured broadcasters in the digitalisation process not 
requiring specific investment for these issues. Ownership tools which relate to plurality and cultural 
relevance also received different treatment. Britain has a liberalised approach towards foreign 
ownership, whilst France and Brazil hold more explicit restrictions. 
 
The increasing importance of regulating the commercial relations between the holders of 
broadcasting rights to „listed events‟ and broadcasters also varied between countries. Britain opted 
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for a more liberal approach, where the regulator can decide which events should be more closely 
regulated and allowed for more events to be broadcasted with exclusivity. Conversely, France 
prevented more events to be offered only on paytv services and listed those by Decree. Brazil 
opted for a laisez-faire approach and that content is monopolised by Rede Globo, although with 
signs of loosening uncontested dominance. A second matter concerning the regulation of 
broadcasting rights is the relationship between producers and broadcasters. The UK is regarded as 
having implemented regulation that has boosted their independent production. 
 
The regulatory tool used for the assessment of the nationality of content showed a tendency to 
consider the production of content mostly as a matter of economic activity. During this analysis I 
highlighted the fact that in order to sustain the socio-cultural objectives of broadcasting and of 
cultural industries overall, the definition of what constitutes national content should be more 
balanced between socio-cultural values and the industrial aspects of content production. 
 
In relation to the funding available for national content, the research has shown that all three 
countries have a comprehensive set of financing schemes („pull‟ policies). Some differences may 
be extracted though. The production industries of the UK and France mainly rely on broadcasters‟ 
commissioning. However, in France there is also a tax on broadcasting and telecommunication 
services which provides a „structured financing system‟ for the production of content. That taxation 
and the mandatory contributions (working as a minimum obligatory commissioning) result in 
broadcasters subsidising the film industry. In the same vein as in the French system, Brazil also 
uses public subsidies for the production of national content. Nevertheless, the timid incentives, and 
the lack of independent production quotas for commercial broadcasters, leave the Brazilian 
audiovisual industry too concentrated on the main networks. It is important to stress, as the other 
examples have shown, that to design a regulatory framework for the production of national content, 
excluding financial contributions or commissioning demands from commercial broadcasters, as is 
the Brazilian case, will deprive the system of its potential biggest contributors. 
 
With regards to quota, of the three countries studied, the UK may be regarded as the most 
„dirigiste‟. On the other hand, in France there are stronger specific obligations towards arts and 
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films. As a result of the French approach, not only are films substantially funded by public subsidies 
they are also assured substantial distribution opportunities. 
 
This chapter has also shown that France has the biggest concern with regards to the origin of the 
content. At least 60% of films and television programmes shown on television have to be European 
and 40% French. Britain, on the contrary, does not adopt any nationality restriction besides the 
TWF/AVMS rule that obliges a majority of European content. The independent production quota 
also shows differences. France opted for a 10% expenditure of the programming costs while 
Britain, instead, opted for a 25% quota in terms of hours. As a result, in the UK, not only do 
considerable resources go from broadcasters to independent producers, but also a high proportion 
of the content is produced beyond broadcasters‟ „arms‟. 
 
Brazil, in a different approach, mainly because of the political power of commercial broadcasters, 
has „light‟ content obligations or quotas, which moreover are not enforced. However, the significant 
use of own-produced domestic productions - especially telenovelas, news and football - could be 
regarded as a negative blow for those advocates of national quota policies. This case proves that 
national content can be produced without the aid of quotas. Having a strong national group in FTA - 
at the expense of pluralism - as is the case of Rede Globo, it seems, can suffice to generate 
national content. 
 
Finally, in times of multi-channel television and increasing popularity of paytv systems, the 
regulation for the promotion of national content still extends to the theatre distribution window. In 
France this protection is carefully designed, evidencing a high inter-dependency between the film 
and television industries (and even football with regards to cinema going). This matter might also 
be regarded as controversial, as Jackel (1999: 181) also highlighted, as it is debatable whether 
screen quotas have a steering impact on film production. 
 
The next chapter will conclude the three-step analysis designed to identify the key aspects for the 
promotion of national content. The first two steps have scrutinized the socio-cultural objectives of 
communication services and the corresponding regulatory tools. The next chapter will perform the 
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third and last step of this research, the market analysis. That investigation will help to identify which 
legislative tools appear to be more successful in supporting the production of national content and 





CHAPTER VIII                                                                                                                
STEP 3: NATIONAL CONTENT MARKET ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Just as water, gas and electricity are brought into our 
houses from far off to satisfy our needs in response to a 
minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or 
auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a 
simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a 
sign...I don‟t know if a philosopher has ever dreamed of 
a company engaged in the home delivery of Sensory 
Reality. 
Paul Valery in “The Conquest of Ubiquity”, 1928 




This chapter completes the three step approach devised for evaluating how the production and 
distribution of national content is affected by legislation in the digital era. The first step of this 
research evaluated how the socio-cultural objectives were addressed in regulation. Together with 
the second step, the analysis of the regulatory tools, the research showed which goals regulators 
emphasize and prioritise in each country‟s audiovisual legislation and how they shape the 
broadcasting services overall. Additionally, the second step closely scrutinised the specific content 
obligations, giving some evidence on how and where the production of national content is directed 
by regulators. In this last step, performing a market evaluation, I will reveal the effects of these 
regulations on the different segments involved with the production and distribution of national 
content. Key data on the film and independent television production, broadcasters and distribution 
activities will be analysed. In addition to the research on these activities, this step will also evaluate 
how the behaviours and preferences of audiences have changed after liberalisation, digitalisation 
and the, possibly promoted by regulators, emergence of digital convergence. 




Moving on to the outline of this chapter, sections 8.2 and 8.3 will focus on the film industry and 
independent producers. Completing the activities involved with the production of national content, 
in section 8.4 I will examine national broadcasters, the biggest financers and producers of 
programmes. Broadcasters, as will be seen in that section, have more potential to be affected by 
liberalisation (through the introduction of more channels), digitalisation (again through a massive 
multiplication of channels) and digital convergence (through the inclusion of the telecommunication 
operators and information technology companies as direct competitors) than the other producers. 
The broadcasters‟ analysis will detail the global picture and analyse how the main terrestrials of 
each country are situated in comparison with the global media players and, with digital 
convergence, with the companies from the neighbouring and newly overlapping sector of 
telecommunication. Because of limitations of time and space, the information technologies‟ 
industries will only be assessed topically. 
 
After having analysed the main suppliers and distributors of audiovisual content as well as the 
newcomers enabled by digital convergence, section 8.5 will investigate the possibilities of further 
growth for the different media services and how communication services in each country could 
develop in the near future and hence where media policy should go. 
 
Finally, the third step will look into one of the main reasons for the very existence of regulation: 
audiences. Using secondary sources, section 8.6 will explore audience figures and viewing habits 
and suggest that, even in times of digitalisation and the resulting enhanced offers, content 
produced nationally is still highly attractive. With those findings the research offers some valuable 
justification for the maintenance and improvement of policies for the promotion of national content. 
 
On a final note, as the reader will notice, throughout this chapter the periods of analysis and the 
sources used vary between countries. This is due to the unavoidable differences in the years 
covered by the different sources used for this analysis (see Chapter 4 for a detailed explanation on 
the methodology and selection of sources used for this step). 
 




8.2 Film production 
The economic power of the film industry is widely recognised by policymakers, scholars and 
economists. The institute Oxford Economics (2007: 32) estimates that “[t]he core UK film industry 
contributes overall around £3 billion a year to UK GDP, taking into account direct, indirect and 
induced impacts – equivalent to 0.3% of UK GDP” and “helps to support 67,000 [full-time 
equivalent] jobs.” Obviously, as with any other industry, the film industry induces job creation in 
other sectors of the economy. For instance, the film industry has a capacity to generate revenues 
in the computer industries, with computer-generated imagery, or in the tourist industry with the 
creation of new film-tourism circuits. Most probably, the bigger the production sector, the bigger the 
activity and contribution towards the national economy (for details on the economic implications of 
the film industry see Avery & Holmlund, 2010: 26-9; Henry, 2007: 89-92; OECD, 2008: 80-5; 
Oxford Economics, 2007). 
 
A comprehensive economic assessment of the film industry should include the analysis of several 
activities such as job creation, training, ticket-office performance, exhibitors‟ practices, distribution 
companies, merchandise and much more. However, for practical reasons, I will not enter into the 
details of all direct and indirect activities impacted by film productions. Because films are an 
important ingredient of broadcasting schedules, as will be seen later on during this chapter, and 
depend on broadcasting for their financing, as seen in the previous chapter, I will limit my analysis 
to the most obvious interface with this thesis, which is the production of films. 
 
Figure 11 shows the total number of films produced from 1987 to 2010 in the selected countries. In 
the case of the UK, the graph shows two different stats because the BFI tracks all British 
productions excluding co-productions, while the UKFC is concentrated on films that used public 
funds, including co-productions. The figures are not accurate though, as these numbers are 
revisited by newer compilations. Therefore, the total numbers sometimes slightly change within the 
same agency depending on the year of the report used. 
 




Figure 11 – Total films produced per year 
Source: (Ancine, 2010a; BFI, 2006: 342; 2011: 146; CNC, 2011c; Earp & Sroulevich, 2009) 
Notes: 
 UK: 
(1) amendment in the Film Act 1985, mandating that the majority of the production 
costs should be spent in Britain regardless the film’s location; 
(2) sale & leaseback peak; 
(3) introduction of the Finance Act 2006 and the cultural test. 
 France: 
(4) Plan Lang and the introduction of the Decree 90-66, setting proportion of 
workforce and national and EU quotas; 
(5) introduction of the cultural test; 
(6) enactment of the Decree 99-130 introducing selective & automatic financing for 
film production; 
(7) enactment of the financing Decrees establishing television contributions towards 
film and audiovisual production; 
(8) amendments of the levels of the contributions of the financing Decrees. 
 Brazil: 
(9) extinction of the film agency Embrafilme; 
(10) enactment of the Audiovisual Act; 
(11) creation of the cinema agency Ancine. 
 
The points marked on the preceding graph and detailed on the notes illustrate the regulatory 
milestones, discussed in the previous steps of this research. Before re-visiting these milestones, 
there is one important peak point that needs to be highlighted that cannot be related to changes in 
the legal instruments analysed but to a policy decision nevertheless. In the UK, in the 1996-1997 
period, there was a peak in production due to a policy choice to use lottery funds for financing films 
through awards administered by the nation‟s arts councils. As remarked by Hjort and Mackenzie 
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(2000: 148-149), Kim (2003), Hill (2005: 228) and others, the funding was responsible for an 
upsurge of regional projects (with special success in the Scottish case). That trend was stopped 
with the launch of the UK Film Council and the amendment of the Film Act in 1999 (point 1 in the 
graph), which focused on tax benefits for those films which were produced (not necessarily filmed) 
in the UK. The second peak (2) was the reported misuse of the „sale and leaseback‟ system.
140
 The 
introduction of the cultural test (3) may be regarded as beneficial as the total production figures 
halted their declining curve. The last peak in 2009 is explained by a highest influx of inward 
productions, as noted by the Guardian (Mark Brown, 2010).
141
 This claim can be corroborated in 
the BFI Yearbook 2011, which shows an increase of ten more inward productions in that year (BFI, 
2011: 146). 
 
The French curve, in addition to showing the highest production of all three countries, shows an 
enviable continuity in growth in the period analysed. The major alterations in legislation (points 4 to 
8) were responsible for bringing the production to new and higher levels, with curiously small 
spikes after the introduction of new schemes. The Plan Lang (4) certainly stopped a steady decline 
in production. The introduction of the selective and automatic financing (6) and the compulsory 
contributions from the television sector (7 and 8) increased French production levels even further. 
At least from these figures, the French solutions show irrefutable consistency and success. 
 
The Brazilian case shows a very similar pattern to the French case although on a different scale. 
After the initial downturn, where the extinction of the film agency led to zero productions (point 9), 
production was somehow restored with the enactment of the Audiovisual Act 1993 (10) and its 
financing schemes. However, it was only with the start-up of the new cinema agency, Ancine (11), 
which brought Brazilian levels to more robust figures. Currently, Brazilian production doubles that 
of the pre-Ancine era. 
 
At this point it is important to remark that the analysis of the total number of productions only tells 
half the story with regards to the strength of the film production industry. In order to have a more 
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 See Chapter 7 for details on that system. 
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 Foreign productions attracted to be produced in the country. See note in Chapter 7 for a more detailed 
definition. 
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adequate economic picture of this particular industry, the total production costs need to be 
analysed too. Narrowing the gap to the last decade only, Figure 12 shows the total number of films 
produced and their corresponding production costs. 
 





Figure 12 – Total films produced per year and total production costs (in million £) 
Source: (Ancine, 2010a: 8; BFI, 2011: 138; CNC, 2011b: investiss; 2011c: visas) 
Note: Total costs for Brazilian production are estimated from the amount of public resources given. Brazilian 
legislation allows the raising of funds, which are the figures monitored by the cinema agency, up to the 
proportion of 80% of the total cost of the project up to a ceiling. As the major part of Brazilian productions 
are of low budget, I considered for the total cost an increase of 20% on the totals monitored by the agency. 
 
As already noted in the discussion of Figure 11, the graph at the top of Figure 12 clearly shows 
three different patterns. During the last decade, France has constantly increased its comparatively 
already high volume of works; Britain has a more erratic volume of production due to variations in 
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the numbers of the „inward productions‟ and; Brazil has grown its volume more vigorously (an 
average increase of 15% per year over the decade, against 6% of the UK and 3% of France). 
 
The analysis of the graph at the bottom of Figure 12 shows new interesting points for comparison 
though. The overall costs of Brazilian production are far smaller than those of the other two 
countries and this is also mirrored in the average costs per film as Figure 13 reveals. The Brazilian 
industry operates on a different scale compared to the European countries. This reflects the 
differences in the available amount of public funding, for the case of France, and foreign 
investments, in the case of Britain. The total production costs of French works have been 
increasing throughout the decade. This could indicate that the overall increase in the contributions 
from broadcasters and other telecommunication services towards audiovisual and film production, 
undoubtedly, supports the film production industry. On the other hand, Figure 13 indicates that as 
the average production cost has not increased significantly throughout the decade, public funds 
distribution is not an object of further concentration (the average production cost is approximately 
£4m). This contradicts suggestions of critics of the French system, who advocate that the system 
favours large productions only, as mentioned in Chapter 6. 
 
Returning to the analysis of the graph at the bottom of Figure 12, the British sharp increase and 
drop between 2004 and 2006 corroborates with the claims of excessive usage and lack of control 
of the „sale and leaseback‟ practices stopped by the Finance Act 2006. The second sharp decrease 
experienced by both the UK and France in 2009 may be a reflection of the 2008-2009 economic 




When discussing the total production values, it is also important to mention the exports achieved by 
national films. The disparities are substantial. While France and Britain have similar total production 
costs, the UK achieved almost ten times more revenues from exports in 2009. According to 
national reports, as a sign of an exporting policy orientation, the UK exported films with a value of 
£1.5 billion (BFI, 2011: 190) but France of only £121m (CNC, 2011a: 38). Unfortunately there is no 
film specific published data on Brazilian film exports. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Industry and 
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 Data from the World Bank indicators available from Google Public Data Explorer (World Bank, 2011). 
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Commerce (MDIC) reports on foreign trade on cultural and recreational services, which include film 
and television services. In 2009, the MDIC (2010) reported a total of £50m for the country‟s foreign 
exports of those goods (I will return to this foreign trade figure later on in this chapter). Another 
estimate can be made from the plans made by the exports promotion agency Apex-Brasil. Being 
extremely optimistic, considering the lack of consistent cases of success of Brazilian film exports, 
the agency set a target of cinema exports of approximately £40m for 2011 (Apex-Brasil, 2010), a 
third of French export revenues. 
 
The export performances do not indicate the reasons for the failures or successes of national films. 
However, the cultural discount factor mentioned in Chapter 2 certainly favours British films, 
produced in the global lingua franca. Moreover, the considerable number of inward productions 
should positively reflect on foreign trade results. The low exports of France indicate the difficulties 
of trading national products, even in cases where there is a well structured and strong national 
industry, which leads me to believe that it will be extremely difficult for Brazil to achieve 
considerable growth in exports in that activity in the near future. 
 
If from one side the investments in productions do not necessarily translate into exports, film 
production costs may exert some influence on bringing audiences to the cinemas. Figure 13 
illustrates the relation between production costs and audience. 
 




Figure 13 – National film average production cost (left) and number of national films viewed per 
capita at cinemas 
Source: Annex 9, Table 83. 
 
Figure 13 shows that consistently throughout the decade, UK productions have larger budgets than 
the French, despite the latter‟s existing comprehensive governmental funding. This may be due to 
„inward productions‟, as acknowledged by the BFI‟s (2011: 145) report. In 2009, those films 
represented 75% of the production activity (ibid). Noteworthy is that despite the lower production 
costs, cinemagoers in France go more often to the cinema to watch national films (at least once a 
year) than those in Britain (less than once a year). That average suggests that French society 
benefits from those subsidies. Perhaps French films arouse more interest in national markets 
because they might be more culturally relevant than those produced for export. Alternatively, or in 
addition, the interest might also be due to the availability of more films to choose from. The 
Brazilian case shows both the lack of interest of American studios and a low public subsidy, as the 
production costs are far smaller than of the other cases. Still according to Figure 13 Brazilians also 
go less to the cinema to watch local productions. However, before drawing conclusions about the 
relative success, or cultural relevance, Figure 14, showing the market share of national productions 
in relation to the total number of films released in cinemas, has to be noted. 
 




Figure 14 – National market share of national films (%) 
Source: Annex 9, Table 83. 
 
The French average for the decade (39%) is higher than the British (26%), which in turn is higher 
than the Brazilian share (13%). However, as Brazil produces far fewer films (see Figure 12) the 
impact of each Brazilian film in the market share is the highest of the three (0.2% against 0.13% 
per French film and 0.14% for the British ones). This analysis suggests that Brazilian productions, 
despite being small and poorly funded, attract the attention of Brazilian cinemagoers more, possibly 
because they are more culturally relevant than imported films or, alternatively, because being 
relatively rare they are particularly welcome. 
 
This attraction of indigenous productions, as will also be noted when discussing television 
audiences‟ preferences, is also recognised by the already mentioned institution Oxford Economics. 
The institute suggests that (compared to imported films) “a film‟s office receipts in the UK will be 
30% higher than otherwise would be the case given its general appeal if it is UK-made” (Oxford 
Economics, 2007: 51). 
 
This section has shown how regulation impacted on the levels of film production. The three 
countries showed different results. The French „structured financing system‟ appears consistent 
and supportive: both the number of productions and the overall resources involved are constantly 
growing. French figures have also shown that the average productions costs were maintained 
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relatively steadily, suggesting that in that country the regulatory setup does not favour big budget 
films only. Moreover, the analysis suggests that targeted regulation has a positive impact on 
production. The discussion has also shown that national films are attractive, and the fostering of 
film production cannot be solely regarded as industrial investments for producing wealth, jobs and 
cultural products that audiences are not interested in. As an additional benefit, the local production 
of films guarantees a continuous supply of national content to the ever increasing number of 
broadcasting channels, always eager for new content. 
 
A second category of contributors to national content on television are the independent producers. 
The next section will analyse how changes in regulation have impacted on this sector. 
 
 
8.3 The independent production sector 
As already discussed in Chapters 5 to 7, the UK and France have long lasting European and 
national regulations supporting the independent production and distribution of national content. 
Brazil, on the other hand, is starting to follow this path. Just as a reminder to the reader, the quotas 
in the UK are 25% of the viewing time for the main terrestrials and 10% for the digital only 
channels; in France 10% of the total programme expenditure; and, in Brazil, 5% for the PSB and 
1% for paytv channels. As a result of those differences in the scale of the regulatory obligations, 
the independent production sectors of the European countries are significantly wealthier. One of 
the consequences of that strength is that the British and French production sectors are more 
diverse and plural than the Brazilian sector, which is concentrated in the hands of commercial 
broadcasters. Nevertheless, Brazil is starting to experience some cases of independent producers 
being commercially successful and even exporting products, such as the animation cartoons 
Princesas do Mar (Sea Princesses), Meu AmigãoZão (My Big Big Friend) and Peixonauta 
(Fishtronaut) (Carneiro, 2011). 
 
A closer look at a presentation given by the Brazilian independent TV producers‟ association 
(ABPI-TV) shows that the most representative association of that segment has just over one 
hundred companies as members (Dias, 2010). The association reports that 22 companies have 
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revenues between £350,000 and £1.75m and 21 over £1.75m. As there are no other widely 
reported statistics for evaluating that sector in Brazil, performing an average estimate, those 





An interesting comparison with Brazilian ABPI-TV figures can be done by analysing the French 
Sofica outcome. As explained in Chapter 7, the Sofica are companies specially set up for financing 
film and audiovisual production. While the associates of Brazilian ABPI-TV are production 
companies for television, the Sofica companies finance both film and television programmes. 
However, as a common characteristic they have to invest at least 50% in independent productions. 
Therefore a closer look at the investments of the Sofica companies will give us an indication of the 
size of French independent producers‟ activities. Data available from CNC indicates that in 2010, 
twelve Sofica were registered and invested £55m, of which £33m went to independent producers, 
resulting in 130 films and 24 television programmes (CNC, 2010a). Those total investments may 
suggest a similarity in sizes between France and Brazil. However, not all independent producers 
are associated with ABPI-TV nor is all independent production financed by Sofica schemes. A 
considerable number of independent productions in these countries are financed by governmental 
grants and also, in the case of France, by broadcasters‟ commissioning. 
 
If from the private sector there is no comprehensive data available about the Brazilian independent 
sector, from the federal film agency Ancine, which administers the audiovisual sector fund (FSA) as 
explained in Chapter 7, the total amount of financial incentives given are publicised. During the 
three years of the fund‟s existence the investments were: £7.1m in 2008, £6.9m in 2009 and 
£19.6m in 2010 (Ancine, 2011a).
144
 It is important to note that, most likely, the revenues of the 
independent sector, as informed by the already mentioned association, include within their figures 
the amount of public subsidy. Therefore, if it is estimated that the independent turnover in 2009 
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 Numbers are reported in Brazilian currency Real (R$). Sixty four (64) companies are reported to have 
revenues lower than R$ 1m. Twenty two (22) companies are reported with revenues between R$ 1m and 
R$5m and twenty one (21) above R$ 5m. Considering an average income of £0.5m for the small companies, 
£3m for the medium sized, and £7m for the bigger companies, I estimated a total revenue of R$ 245m 
(64x0.5+22x3+21x7=R$ 245m, or £85m. Currency exchange rate used from Brazilian central bank, available 
at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/Resultado.asp?idpai=convmoeda, accessed on 12/10/2011 
144
 Original figures are reported in Brazilian currency (R$ 24.5m in 2008, R$19.7m in 2009 and R$50.2m in 
2010). Currency converted as mentioned in the previous footnote. 
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was approximately £85m, almost £7m of that amount may have been as a result of the public 
subsidy given by Ancine, through the FSA. Although the data available should only be considered 
as indicative, the amount (£85m) shows an enormous disparity with the one generated by national 
broadcasters in that country (£8 billion as will be seen later on in this chapter when discussing 
Table 13). 
 
The weak results of the Brazilian independent sector may be regarded as a consequence of the 
small legal obligations for broadcasting independent content in Brazil. However, it has to be 
remarked that the new Paytv Act included a new contribution to the FSA fund, namely and mainly 
by a levy to the telecommunication providers. As reported in the proceedings of the bill, echoed by 
the press (Mazza, 2007) and by academics (Ramos & Haje, 2011), the levy will contribute 
approximately £110m per year to the fund to be used for the production of independent content. 
The CNC in France, in comparison, contributes nearly £160m per year towards the production of 




Although these resources might be considered weak by some as they represent less than 2% of 
the revenues of commercial broadcasters, they will constitute unprecedented level of resources to 
Brazilian audiovisual industries. However, the independent content quota in terms of hourly output 
is far too small when compared to the British. There could be at least three possible outcomes to 
that situation. First, the independent sector could receive „soft money‟ in excess leading to 
inefficient production as there is a small quota. Secondly, the production could be efficiently made 
but with no distribution opportunity because the quota is smaller than the amount of content 
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 According to CNC‟s figures the aid towards audiovisual production totalled €197m in 2008, €198m in 
2009 and €197m in 2010. 
146
 In fact the annual telecommunication inspection fees which are historically collected by the government 
and were partially diverted towards the audiovisual sector are repeatedly used for the purposes of financing 
the federal governmental budget and for generating primary surplus, as widely acknowledged by the press. 
According to the telecommunications providers‟ union, SindiTelebrasil, up to 90% of the fees are diverted 
from the telecommunication agency Anatel (Telebrasil, 2010). The association reports that, in 2009 the fees 
collected totalled R$4.9 billion (£1.7 billion) and only R$400m (£140m) were used by Anatel for the original 
purposes. 
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Alongside public subsidy, the main financers of independent producers in the UK and in France are 
the broadcasters, by means of their direct commissioning. In the case of France, as detailed in 
Chapter 7, broadcasters have different contributions towards the financing of independently 
produced audiovisual content. The annual report from CSA states that the total investment by 
broadcasters in independent audiovisual production in 2009 (including the legal contributions) was 
£570m, of which, only £30m were added by other paytv chains apart from the ones related to TF1 




Fortunately for this research, data for the European countries is more widely available than in the 
Brazilian case. In order to situate the strength of French independent production sector, the 
European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) yearbooks have valuable data, as Figure 15 shows. 
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 Figures in the report in Euros: €651m and €35m respectively. The amount derives from the obligations set 
by regulation, as detailed in Chapter 7, which currently dictates that France Televisions has to contribute 18% 
of its revenues, TF1 9.375% and Canal Plus 3.155% towards the production of independent content. Using 
data from the annual report, as France Televisions‟ revenues were €2.6 billion and had to contribute 18% 
towards independent production, its share would be €460m. Accordingly, TF1 contribution would be €130m 
(€1.4 billion x 9.4%) and Canal Plus €57m (€1.8 billion x 3.2%). 





Figure 15 – Number of British and French production companies in the top 50 leading production 
companies in Europe according to the European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) 
Note: Top graph divided between independent producers and media groups (with other interests) and bottom 
graph shows those two categories added. 
Source: (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2003: 114, T25.3; 2006: 114, T9.2; 2010: 226, T9.2). 
 
The graph on the top of Figure 15 shows that despite the contributions from broadcasters and the 
other subsidies given by the CNC, there is a bigger presence of British companies among the 
leading production companies in Europe. Moreover, while the number of British companies is 
maintained the French share of leading companies is diminishing. The graph on the bottom of 
Figure 15 suggests that despite an initial increase in the number of British independent companies, 
from 2002 to 2005, as a possible outcome of the introduction of the CA 2003, these companies 
were either consolidated into bigger groups or replaced by other emerging media corporations, 
resulting in a group of so-called „super-indies‟, as noted by Chalaby (2010). A closer analysis of 
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these references shows that consolidations occur in profusion (for instance Hit Entertainment, RDF 
Media, Tiger Aspect and The Mersey Telev. Comp. were all incorporated into bigger companies). 
 
This list does have some flaws though. TXTV is a company listed on the EAO (2010: 226) 
yearbook as being number 9
th
 in that rank, with £130 million turnover which could place them in the 
top positions of Broadcast magazine‟s list. However, the company is not listed in later publications. 
These facts show the difficulties and inaccuracies of doing research in the area. Available lists and 
associations cannot possibly grasp the whole activity. There are differences in the definitions of 
independency used by the different publications, and there will be companies that for some 
particular reason stay off the „radar‟ or cannot be properly addressed. As a remark to the reader, 
few companies like to make their revenues public. 
 
Notwithstanding those gaps, the league published by the Broadcast magazine may be regarded as 
representative of the British industry by the notoriety of the magazine in the industry. Since 2003 
the magazine started to publicise the Indie Survey collecting revenues, hours of production and 
other basic statistics from the sector. A compilation of those surveys is presented in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16 – Revenues and total hours of produced programmes of the top UK’s independent 
production sector 
Source: Table 84. 
Note: „Top 10‟ and „Top 20‟ refer to the biggest independent companies in Britain in terms of annual 
revenues.  
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A remarkable difference between the Brazilian and British revenues figures is that, unlike in the 
broadcasting and telecommunication activities where the overall revenues are comparable (as will 
be shown later on when discussing Table 13), the British independent sector is on another scale. 
While the revenues of Brazilian independent TV producers were estimated here at around £85m, 
their British counterparts are in the scale of billions. Consistent with the fall in revenues of 
commercial broadcasters after the enactment of the CA 2003 (as will be shown in Figure 19 when 
discussing the broadcasters‟ activity), and particularly in the case of ITV, the graph shown in Figure 
16 indicates a steady growth in the revenues of the independent sector. Since 2003, when the new 
terms of trade were introduced (see Chapter 7), several authors acknowledged the fact that „super 
indies‟ were formed in the search for economies of scale and scope in a consolidation process “not 
unfamiliar in the media industries in general” (Haynes, 2005: 99). However, assuming that the 
information of the Broadcast magazine relates to national operations only, the preceding graph 
shows that the growth of the sector is not completely monopolised by those top companies. In fact, 
while in 2003 80% of the sector was generated by the „top 20‟ (and two thirds (66%) by the „top 
10‟), from the year 2007 onwards the same group of companies achieves less than half of the 
revenues of the sector (and around 35% in the case of the „top 10‟). This diminishing in importance 
is also reflected in the amount of content produced by that group of companies. At the same level 
that the overall sector is growing, the number of hours produced by those „super indies‟ production 
decreases. This could be an indication that in times of diminishing advertisement revenues, 
broadcasters are looking for alternative, and possibly, cheaper suppliers. After an initial period of 
consolidation, which resulted in „super indies‟ with global operations, there might be the case of a 
return of the attractiveness of small companies. 
 
While in France investment in independent production is backed by partially diverting broadcasters‟ 
revenues, in Britain these productions are mainly fostered by the 25% quota obligation for the main 
terrestrials, lowered to 10% for the digital channels. According to Ofcom‟s report, of the £2.3 billion 
the main terrestrials have invested in production, £1.1 billion (47%) was commissioned to 
independent broadcasters. That percentage is bigger than any of the percentages mandated by 
French regulation to invest in independent productions. British broadcasters‟ investment doubles 
that of French broadcasters reported earlier on during this chapter (£570m). Interestingly the figure 
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reported by Ofcom is only half of the overall sector activity as reported by Broadcast magazine. 
The nearly one billion extra reported in Broadcast is likely to come mainly from exports. The UK 
Television Exports Survey collated from information given to PACT by their associates, states a 
total £1.3 billion in exports, in 2009 (UKTI, 2010). A closer look at the 2008 PACT report (PACT, 
2008) indicates, of a total export of £980m, that the biggest stake of the exports is due to finished 
television programmes (48%), seconded by licensing and formats (31%).
148
 In 2010 these figures 
increased to a total export of £1,418m whilst finished television programmes accounted for 46% 




Comparing these figures with French exports, Chalaby (2010) reports that already in 2007 Britain 
was exporting nearly eight times more (approximately £760m against £100m). The CSA recognises 
this weakness, noting that during the decade ending in 2007 French exports diminished by 6%, and 
hints that one of the reasons could be the importance given by regulation to the expression of the 
French language which is spoken less worldwide (CSA, 2009c: 12). Chalaby (2010) instead 
attributes British success to “Britain‟s imperial legacy” and the “understanding of the importance of 
trade for the cultural industries [.]” France, he says, regulates the media and television based on 
political and elitist views. The reality shows that, according to the CNC, in 2008, exports diminished 
to below £100m, with the most successful genres being precisely those who depend the least on 
the production language, i.e. animation followed by documentaries (CNC, 2009).
150
 Barthel-
Bouchier (2011) also notes that French exports are strong when appropriate niche marketing is 
applied. Formats, one reason of the successes of British television exports, are responsible for only 
12% of French trade (ibid). 
 
After analysing the three countries‟ independent production sectors, some conclusions can be 
drawn. First, the broadcasters‟ financial contribution is sound both in France and Britain. While the 
British broadcasters‟ commissioning is substantially greater than that of their French counterparts, 
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 The 2008 total figures are £980m exports, with television programmes being responsible for £469m, 
licensing £215m and formats £92m. 
149
 The Pact report indicates the following break-up: television £657m (46%); DVD £181m (13%); digital 
rights £10m (1%); co-production £34m (2%), format £115m (8%), licensing/miscellaneous £329m (23%), 
production (new commissions) £11m (1%) and production (UK formats) £81m (6%). 
150
 CNC reports, of a total of €110 million exports in 2008, €31 million in animation, €29 million in 
documentaries, €27 million in fiction and € 13 million in formats. 
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French legislation complements commissioning with other schemes such as CNC grants and 
Sofica. Brazil does have similar contributions and schemes to those in France, although on a 
smaller scale. More recently, the Paytv Act 2011 has opened the possibility of increasing public 
funding. However, the most substantial tranche of financing is not being considered in that country; 
commercial broadcasters do not have any substantial obligation to finance independent production. 
 
Another aspect that draws attention in this survey is the success of British independent 
broadcasters‟ exports. While some argue that the success is due to changes in legislation 
introduced by the CA 2003, French regulation, as Chapter 7 has shown, also has similar 
instruments in place. Therefore, there might be other cultural and industrial reasons for that 
difference. Notoriously, within these cultural discount factors is the language. 
 
Having discussed the major contributors to the production of national content „at an arm‟s length‟ of 
broadcasters, the next section will discuss the most important agents in this supply chain, at least 
in terms of their combined revenues: the national broadcasters. 
 
 
8.4 National broadcasters, global media and ‘convergent’ 
telecommunication groups 
As this thesis is concerned with the production of national content in times of digital convergence, 
and thus of media globalisation, the discussion in this section will compare national broadcasters‟ 
relative size and importance not only in the national context but, also, with regards to global media 
groups. 
 
8.4.1 The global players 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, global media groups and telecommunication operators detain 
positions in several activities and markets worldwide, competing locally with the biggest national 
and traditional broadcasting companies. Figure 17 shows, in the top graph, the relative position in 
the worldwide rank of the biggest media groups and in the bottom graph the same order but in 
terms of revenues. 







Figure 17 – Ranking by audiovisual turnover of the main global media corporations by position (top) 
and by revenues (Euros thousand) (bottom) 
Source: (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) 
 
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 17, positions and revenues changed significantly during 
the last decade for some global media groups. Those differences may be partially explained by 
changes in ownership of parts of those media groups, as widely reported by press economic 
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analysts, but also due to other major events and failures or successes of the strategies followed. 
Without wanting to exhaustively explain the reasons for all fluctuations, I will illustrate some events 
in order to suggest to the reader the kind of influences and consequences created in the local 
scene by global media. 
 
According to the press, Vivendi‟s drop in 2004 and 2005 is a reflection of the selling of the 
Universal brand to the American network NBC, due to the group‟s financial difficulties. Analysts 
widely attributed the downsize to the high level of debts that Vivendi incurred when it acquired that 
company years before, while trying to significantly break into the American market (see for instance 
Goldstein, 2005). Viacom‟s drop was due to CBS‟s acquisition of its broadcasting activities (see 
Szalai, 2006 for details on the deal). Sony‟s drop in 2004 may be attributed to the creation of the 
separate company Sony-BMG, a joint venture between Sony Music and Bertelsmann. In 2008 that 
partnership ended and the music company was fully owned by the Japanese group (for business 
news analysis see Nakashima, 2008). The traditional American media groups Time-Warner, Walt 
Disney and NBC managed to maintain their revenues during these decades, showing that their 
business-model of owning studios, broadcasting channels and worldwide distribution outlets has 
proven successful, even with the advent of new more comprehensive „digital convergent‟ 
companies. 
 
Of that list, the only company that did not have any significant increase in revenues during the 
decade was Bertelsmann. According to information in the press (see for instance Sweney, 2011), 
originally a publishing house, the company‟s major asset in media is the RTL group which owns 
almost fifty channels across Europe and is one of Europe‟s largest production conglomerates, 
owning several production companies, including FremantleMedia and Grundy. The steady 
revenues achieved by Bertelsmann are reflected in the bottom graph of Figure 17. As the German 
conglomerate is failing to increase revenues as much as their competitors, they are constantly 
loosing positions in the rank. The biggest winners of the decade are DirecTV (5 positions), Sony (3 
positions) and News Corp (2). Important to remark is that two of these winners are paytv 
companies and US based. Adding Vivendi to the role of paytv companies, both the French 
conglomerate and News Corp also have significant telephony operations. 




Another interesting point to be noted from the list of the major global media companies of Figure 17 
is that only one company is originally from one of the countries of this case study (Vivendi, France), 
while the majority of the companies might maintain interests, or operate, in all the three countries 
under scrutiny. However impressive that list of global media corporations might seem, and however 
tiny national broadcasters might be, compared with those corporations, digital convergence brought 
in another set of strong competitors. As will be illustrated shortly, ICT companies, ranging from 
telecommunication providers to computer (software and hardware) and electronic manufacturers, 
are, in terms of revenues, as big as or even much bigger than those well established and 
recognised global media companies. Figure 18 shows the main convergent companies operating in 
Europe in 2009 as listed by the EAO yearbook (2010: 10). 
 
 
Figure 18 – Revenues of main convergent players in Europe in 2009 
Source(European Audiovisual Observatory, 2010: 12, T2.5) 
 
The figure shows the top nineteen companies plus the first broadcaster-only in the European „top 
50‟ list, which is the BBC, in 23
rd
 position. The power of these „convergent‟ companies is 
undeniable. Considering the European revenues only, Deutsche Telekom displaces Sony, which 
was the biggest global media company in the rank of Figure 17. Vivendi (the 6
th
 global media 
company) falls to the 12
th
 position, followed by Newscorp (originally 4
th
) and Walt Disney 










 in the previous one). 
 
The list, however, fails to reveal the relative importance of the audiovisual business (units) in the 
overall performance of those conglomerates. Although a comprehensive look at all the units of 
these companies of that list would be impractical for this research, I will detail Vivendi as an overall 
example. According to their corporate report (Vivendi, 2011a), video games (Activision Blizzard) 
accounts for 12% of their revenues, music (Universal) for 15%, mobile and ISP for 58% (SFR 
(44%), Maroc Telecom (10%) and (Brazilian) GVT (4%)) and paytv and cinema for 16% (Canal 
Plus). The example is emblematic. Although originating in the media sphere and an important 
producer of content,
151
 currently the newer business of telephony and internet provision represent 
Vivendi‟s main business. I will return to this cash generating power later on, but for now I will return 
to the analysis of Figure 18. 
 
The list is symbolic of the differences. The British PSB has revenues of one third (1/3) of the 
preceding company on the list, a videogame industry, and less than 10% of the first of the list, 
Deutsche Telekom. Telecommunication companies, notably telephony operators, have 8 positions 













), Telecom Italia (11
th
) and BT (15
th
)) plus one main supplier of mobile 
equipments (Nokia (7
th





) and Google (18
th
)), plus one from the gaming industry (Nintendo (19
th
). Traditional and 





). Although nearly all companies on the list are regarded as 





) are, most probably, the only companies whose main business is not the 
provision of telephony. Even Sony, the world‟s leading media company, which owns several media 
labels, including Columbia and BMG, is second on the European list. 
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 Although it is well known that the origins of the conglomerate can be traced to the water utility company 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (see for instance Wikipedia). 
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As telephony companies account for almost half of the revenues of the list, the cash generating 
power of those operators clearly shows the economic power of these new competitors in the field of 
audiovisual media. For instance, in the UK, while the TV license generates nearly £12 per month 
per household (Ofcom, 2010c: 133), paytv‟s average subscription is nearly £30 per month (ibid: 
137) and each mobile generates £16 monthly (IP Network, 2011: 578; Ofcom, 2010c: 13, 281). The 
total cash generated by those services are £2.7 billion for TV license (Ofcom, 2010c: 134) (used by 
the BBC), £8.5 billion (nearly three times more of the BBC‟s income) for paytv (ibid: 135) (mainly 
shared by BSkyB and Virgin) and £15 billion (nearly five times more of PSB‟s income) for mobile 
communications (ibid: 260) (mainly shared between T-mobile, Orange. O2, and Vodaphone). This 
disparity in earnings brings attached players with different purchasing power to the activities of 
production and distribution of content which, in turn, could jeopardise traditional broadcasters‟ 
production activities and the possibility of their acquiring the most desired content. 
 
The possible implication of this discrepancy could become visible in content prices where and 
when telecommunication operators start to buy content. For instance, if football rights experienced 
a considerable increase in value when paytv operators started to acquire the distribution rights, as 
discussed in previous chapters, telephony operators have economic strength to pose an even 
bigger threat to traditional broadcasters. That fear can be seen in the recent Brazilian Paytv Act 
(PA) 2011 dispositions, as commented on in Chapter 7. In a move that clearly protects national 
broadcasters, telecommunication providers are explicitly forbidden to contract Brazilian actors for 
producing audiovisual content or to acquire events of national interest (PA 2011, art. 6). The 
Brazilian regulation suggests a policymakers‟ dilemma as brought by digital convergence. To have 
relevant and national broadcasters with significant market power was preferable to allowing 
wealthier and global telecommunication players to dominate the content market. 
 
8.4.2 Global versus national players 
Narrowing down the analysis from global and regional to the major players in each country, the 
next graphs in Figure 19 display only the British, French and Brazilian media companies ranked in 
the list of the „top 50‟ world companies as listed by the EAO yearbook. 
 






Figure 19 – Ranking of the main media companies in the UK, France and Brazil by position (top) and 
by revenues (Euros billions) (bottom) 
Source: (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) 
 
The list of the companies shown in the previous graphs indicates that only one company is based 
in Brazil, Organizacoes Globo, and the others are split equally between the UK (News Corp – 
partially owner of BSkyB, BBC, ITV and Channel 4) and France (Vivendi, France Televisions, TF1 
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and M6). That list shows a surprising symmetry. The biggest companies in the UK and in France 
are the main paytv operators (Newscorp and Vivendi), with each country‟s PSBs (BBC and France 
Televisions) in second place, followed by the main commercial broadcasters (ITV and TF1). 
 
Although Vivendi has other interests than paytv, the power of the subscription model over the TV 
license and advertisement-based model is again obvious in the bottom graph of Figure 19. While 
paytv operators are constantly increasing their revenues, the levels of the TV license are 
maintained (with a slight increase on account of the expenses due to the digital switchover), and 
advertising revenues, commonly related to overall economic activity, are either constant or 
declining (most significantly in the ITV case). 
 
In the ranking positions shown in the top graph of Figure 19, there are two clear tendencies. First, 




). This rise must take into 
account the reflection of the national economic scenario. According to the World Bank, during that 
period, Brazilian GDP grew 38%, against 18% for the UK and 14% for France.
152
 Another 
economic reason reflected mainly in the relative increase of French companies‟ revenues is the 
devaluation of the British and Brazilian currencies (-29% and -26% respectively) against the Euro, 
the currency used on the graph.
153
 On the other side, steadily losing positions in the ranking since 
2004, are ITV and Channel 4. In the decade analysed they decreased 24 and 14 positions 
respectively. 
 
These broadcasters‟ tumble is most noticeable from the year 2004 onwards, when the new British 
rules disaggregating the commercialisation rights imposed by the Communications Act 2003 
allowed producers to keep hold of secondary rights, as discussed in Chapter 6. This graph in 
conjunction with the analysis of the independent production sector earlier on, suggest, that the 
measure had a negative impact on commercial broadcasters. Channel 4, for instance, is entirely – 
and legally - dependent on independently produced content. Following the same tide, ITV‟s biggest 
hits in 2009 were the independent formats Britain‟s Got Talent and The X Factor, as I will discuss 
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 See Annex 9, Table 85 for details. 
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 According to the Brazilian central bank public database available at 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/Resultado.asp?idpai=convmoeda, accessed on 11/10/2011 
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later on in more detail.
154
 Hence, at this point, I would like to remark that the highly consolidated 
independent production sector in Britain, with companies which often have other interests in other 
countries, should not be regarded as small players compared to broadcasters. Regulators should 
distinguish between producers which are truly national and independent from global companies – 
and therefore needing the extra attention and incentives from regulation - from those who are part 
of bigger groups either locally or internationally. In highly consolidated markets the concept of 
independence should, therefore, be re-assessed. 
 
The figures revealed in this section have suggested that broadcasters, despite roughly maintaining 
their revenues, are challenged not only by global media companies but also by ICT industries, 
including telephony operators. By a combination of measures and circumstances, Rede Globo is 
recording a growth similar to that experienced by Vivendi. The commercial broadcasters of the 
European countries, who did not have protective clauses in regulation, are suffering the 
consequences of new players and increased competition. 
 
8.4.3 Local operations of global companies 
Even though local operations of global companies benefit from global gains of scale, and also from 
possible direct investment from profits elsewhere, there are critics of these global comparisons. 
They may argue that revenues made in other countries are not actually fully transferred to local 
operations. In addition, sometimes global companies only partially own local operations.
155
 Figure 
20 indicates the total revenues of the main operators due to the operations in the country only. 
Their „national size only‟ is compared to the total revenues of the main commercial and the PSB. 
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 According to BARB top audiences for one episode reached 18.2m for Britain’s Got Talent and 14m for 
The X Factor. Those formats were developed by the independent producer Simon Cowell. In contrast, other 
ITV-owned long lasting hits, such as Coronation Street, achieved around 11 million viewers. Audiences 
available at http://www.barb.co.uk/report/weekly-top-programmes-overview?, accessed on 11/10/2011. 
155
 For instance, as widely reported by newspapers, News Corp owns less than 40% of British BSkyB 
(Guardian, 2011) and Sky Brasil is 97% owned by Directv (Rosa, 2010). 




Figure 20 – Revenues due to local operations only in representative media operators 2009 
Notes:  
1) Distribution technologies: BSkyB (DTH), Virgin (cable), Canal Plus (multiplatform paytv), 
Numericable (cable), Net (cable), Sky Brasil (DTH). PSBs: BBC, FT (France Televisions) and 
TV Brasil. Main commercial FTA broadcasters: ITV, TF1 and Globo. 
2) The graph indicates local operations‟ revenues for global groups BSkyB (owned by News 
Corp), Canal Plus (Vivendi), Numericable (multinational group), Net (Telmex) and Sky Brasil 
(Directv) and the total revenues of national FTA broadcasters. 
3) National broadcasters‟ overseas operations‟ are included in the reported revenues. 
4) PSBs figures relates to their budget and revenues (BBC TV license income is approximately 
£2.7 billion (Ofcom, 2011: 98)) 
5) Brazilian Net and Sky revenues reported from blogs reproducing corporate announcements. 
6) Budget for TV Brasil was assumed as being the total budget of EBC (the state-owned company 
that produces the PSB channel) as reported from newspaper Estadao. 
Sources: BSkyB, Virgin and Canal Plus (Ofcom, 2010c: 136); Numericable (2010); BBC, ITV, TF1, FT, 
Globo (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2010: 10); Net (Telesintese, 2010); Sky Brasil (Sirlordalecio, 
2009) and TV Brasil (Tosta, 2009). 
 
Figure 20 indicates the financial strength of the main paytv operators when compared to the main 
commercial and the PSB of each country. The BBC, relying on the TV license and exports, has 
higher revenues than the local operations of News Corp. However, considering the TV license only 
(£2.7 billion, see Ofcom, 2011: 98), the BBC and ITV combined have less revenue than the main 
paytv competitor (£5.4 against £8.5 billion). This situation is not repeated in the other countries, 
which indicates that in the UK, competition between services is more intense. In France the 
commercial broadcaster has comparable revenues with the major paytv (Canal Plus) and more 
than doubles the main cable distributor. Not surprisingly in Brazil it is the commercial broadcaster 
Globo that has higher revenues than the paytv companies. In fact, Globo is the only broadcaster 
CHAPTER VIII- STEP 3: NATIONAL CONTENT MARKET ASSESSMENT 
238 
 
that has greater revenues than the overall sum of the local operations of the main paytv 
companies. 
 
The levels of revenues of the main paytv operators in the UK suggest that competition has already 
reached a point where those companies cannot be regarded as minor competitors or minor players 
in the broadcasting scenario. While the FTA broadcasters have high levels of content obligation, 
the paytv companies, despite having the financial capacity, do not have any obligation towards the 
production of national content. This dual system of regulation results in asymmetrical treatment. In 
France, that situation is addressed by regulation, as the distributors do compulsorily contribute 
towards the production of national content. In Brazil the regulatory burden is diametrically opposed 
to the size of the revenues. The commercial broadcaster Globo, which has the biggest revenue 
generating power, is the least regulated. Conversely, the PSB has the biggest regulatory load, but 
has the least resources of them all to accomplish the attributed tasks. Currently, with the Paytv Act 
2011, paytv operators have obligations towards the financing and distribution of independent 
content while the biggest national players do not have any deverticalisation rule imposed. 
 
Detractors of increasing obligations for the market leaders could argue among other things that 
those players already contribute towards the generation of national content, as is the case of 
BSkyB which produces channels in the UK with nationally produced content (such as Sky 1) or 
Globo, whose overwhelming output is national. However, in this thesis I am suggesting that the 
main players should financially contribute significantly more towards the generation of national 
content, spreading the wealth concentrated in the hands of a few. The more balanced situation in 
France indicates that the financial contribution towards the production of national content 
generated a market where local players and FTA broadcasters hold a stronger position, even in a 
competitive market. 
 
As with the other segments of the audiovisual industries already discussed (film and independent 
producers) more production could have significant impact on exports. Although I already pointed 
out that cultural discount factors may hamper the sale of nationally produced products elsewhere, 
there are several examples of series and formats that were a great success outside their country of 
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origin. Britain, perhaps, is the most relevant case with its success in the format industry. Ofcom 
(2010c: 63) reported £1.3 billion in British television exports compared to £173m or, according to 
CNC £120m, of France (CNC, 2011f). 
 
As in the case of Brazilian films, there is little concrete information on Brazilian television exports. It 
is well known that Globo exports its telenovelas worldwide. Although Globo does not publish 
financial reports, Bortoloti (2006) estimates that Globo exported £20m per year in the mid-2000s. 
As commented earlier on in this chapter, according to Brazilian authorities the country exported 
£50m in relation to all cultural products, which indicates that Globo figures could represent a high 
fraction of those exports, as expected. The low result in terms of broadcasting exports in the 
Brazilian case is even more significant when compared with the overall trade as registered by the 
MDIC.
156
 At the same time that the country had such a low performance, the authority also reported 
imports of £590m giving a substantial overall deficit of £540m with cultural products. 
 
8.4.4 Alternative sources of funding for national content 
The Brazilian figures show one effect of liberalisation which is shared by the other countries. At the 
same time that international media players are introduced on the national market with considerable 
revenue generating power, they also contribute to an increase in the imports of audiovisual goods 
in the country which increases the deficit of foreign trade. Therefore, besides the production of 
national content, which develops the national economy with a potential for exports, the scheduling 
of more national content (and hence less imported content being used) has a positive impact on 
foreign trade. Additionally, if a levy on paytv operators diverts parts of the profit that would 
eventually be sent abroad towards the production in the country, the negative impact of paytv in the 
cultural products‟ balance of trade would be diminished. 
 
Certainly, as the paytv platforms are the biggest beneficiaries of liberalisation, as their increasing 
revenues have shown, these are the companies that have the most resources to finance the 
production of additional national content. The analysis of audience shares later on in this chapter 
will show that, although the main traditional broadcasters managed to slowly delay their decay by 
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 The authority in charge of the industry and commerce mentioned previously. 
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adding spin-off channels, the increase of advertisement revenues for commercial broadcasters will 
become extremely difficult. Likewise, for social reasons, to substantially increase the value of the 
TV license would be contentious. The Brazilian case is slightly different, as already mentioned, due 
to the recent growth in the economy and the locks contained in regulation. However, in the not 
impossible case that competition is further liberalised in Brazil, national broadcasters and Rede 
Globo will face the same fate of their European similar. Therefore, if there is a political concern with 
the maintenance in the levels of production of national content, a new source of financing is 
needed. The most natural target would be those profiting from distributing content, i.e. the paytv 
platforms and the telecommunication services (able to distribute audiovisual content). Although 
partially addressed in the case of France (with the COSIP and the financing contributions) and in 
Brazil (with the very modest contributions towards the PSB and audiovisual fund), in the UK, paytv 
platforms do not contribute with levies or with regulatory obligations towards the production of 
national content. The revenues indicate that there is room for a levy on those operators which 
could be added to the „pull‟ range of policies. 
 
A key question remains though, if the levy is collected, who would be the beneficiary: the PSBs and 
the other main terrestrials? A viable alternative would be independent producers (in the revised 
sense) both for television and film, and the production to be used by paytv operators as there are 
already substantial quotas on FTA. It is in practice a deverticalisation procedure not much different 
from enforcing an independent quota to those operators. The difference is that the levy reverts 
revenues, and most probably profit originally destined to foreign owners, to the production of 
national content. 
 
There is another source of income for paytv platforms which is partially responsible for imbalances 
in the national mediaspace and which could also be the object of financial levies. As already 
discussed in previous chapters, sports coverage constantly fetches increasing values as these 
events are key for securing viewers. A levy on these deals could also be diverted towards the 
production of national content. Certainly that contribution would bring criticism from the clubs 
which, ultimately, would receive less revenue from the paytv operator, sport fans, other viewers not 
concerned with the issues of national content and certainly from liberals who simply will oppose 
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any form of intervention in the markets. Although these new resources certainly could be used in 
medical care or education, the move could bring some form of re-equilibrium to the broadcasting 
environment and some extra resources towards the production of national content. 
 
Moving on from these proposals and returning to our third step, no market assessment on the 
communication industries would be complete without an analysis of the current levels of 
development of broadcasting and telecommunication services. That evaluation would bring 
important insights as to where the industries are well developed and mature in term of market 
uptake, and where there is still room for growth. This appraisal on future directions will be 
beneficial, both for media policy scholars, as it helps to understand the development of 
communication markets, and for policymakers, as it will indicate points for possible legislative 




8.5 The take up of digital communication technologies 
Complementing the panorama already given in Chapter 5, this section will highlight the main facts 
usually used by regulators for comparing the inter-related broadcasting, telephony and internet 
access sectors; all services capable of delivering audiovisual content. 
 
Initially I would like to comment on the uptake of bundled packages which could be regarded as 
one indicator of digital convergence (in complements). According to Ofcom, packages are 
becoming increasingly common in the UK with almost half (46%) of the households using this 
provision (Ofcom, 2009a: 20). The CSA (2009b: 25) reports that there are 46m television sets in 
France, 9m mobile TV devices and 300,000 PCs enabled with viewing cards. The number of non-
traditional TV, more than 9m, indicates that at least one out of five viewers can access audiovisual 
content from new convergent platforms. In Brazil the panorama is slightly different. As already 
seen, Brazil has relatively low broadband and paytv penetration. From the existent 33m fixed 
telephone lines in operation in the country, eight million have broadband access (24% in 
comparison with 44% of the UK). In contrast, the eight million cable TV customers are responsible 
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for three million broadband connections. The biggest cable operator in Brazil is reported to have 
400,000 triple-play customers out of their overall 3.7m customers (10% of their base) (Anatel, 
2010; Singh et al., 2010). Although more data is needed in order to evaluate the extent of digital 
convergence, those figures suggest that convergence in complements is occurring in considerable 
proportions in all three countries. 
 
Table 13, extracted from Ofcom‟s yearly International Communication Market Report (Ofcom, 
2011: 11), presents the key facts of those convergent industries of the countries of this study, plus 
the USA. The inclusion of the latter country in the following table is justified by it being the biggest 
market and industry, serving as a market benchmark. 
Table 13 – Key facts on audiovisual and telecommunication services in 2010 
 UK FRA BRA USA 
Television and audiovisual 
TV industry revenue  (£b n) 11.3 10.4 10.6 94.0 
Change in revenues (%,YOY)  8.5 8.8 17.6 6.3 
Revenue per capita (£) 181 160 53 304 
Largest TV platform DSat DTT DSat DCab 
Largest TV platform  (% of homes) 42% 38% 39% 39% 
TV viewing per head (mins/day) 242 212 222 283 
Digital TV take-up (%) 97 93 59 87 
Pay TV take-up (%) 52 57 18 88 
Digital switchover date 2012 2011 2016 2009 
Internet and web 
People online  (m) 38.7 40.6 44.9 199 
Fixed BB connections per 100 HH 74 77 25 70 
Mobile BB connections per 100 HH 8 4 n/a n/a 
Mobile-only broadband HH (%) 5 2 n/a 6 
Internet access via a mobile (%) 46 39 n/a 41 
Telecommunications 
Telecoms service revenues (£b n) 27.2 31.8 34.2 188.2 
Telecoms revenues per capita (£) 434 486 169 608 
Fixed lines per 100 population 53 33 21 48 
Monthly outbound fixed-line minutes per capita 172 145 87 148 
Mobile connections per 100 pop. 130 99 100 98 
Monthly outbound mobile minutes per capita 170 132 102 603 
Fixed broadband connections per 100 pop. 31 33 7 27 
Source: (adapted from Ofcom, 2011: 11). 
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The analysis of Table 13 shows some remarkable similarities. The absolute wealth of both 
broadcasting and telecommunication industries of the three countries is similar. While television 
has revenues of around £10 billion, telecommunications are around £ 30 billion a year. The 
absolute numbers of internet users are also similar; around 40 million people are connected. While 
the revenues indicate that the overall sizes of those markets are similar, the per capita indicates 
that, apart from terrestrial broadcasting, communication services have a smaller intake in Brazil. 
While FTA TV penetration is comparable, paytv subscriptions, DTV, broadband connections and 
fixed and mobile telephony per inhabitant is as low as one third (for internet connections) of the 
European levels for the South American‟s country. This is a reflection of the well known inequalities 
of Brazilian society. For instance, as reported by Brazilian official institute of statistics (IBGE, 2010: 
96), while 97.2% of urban households have a television set (similar to 98.5% in France and 96.7% 
in the UK (IP Network, 2011: 164, 578)) only 39% have a computer (against 67% and in France 
and 80% in the UK (ibid)) and, even less, 32%, an internet connection (against 64% and 67% 
broadband connections in France and the UK (ibid)). A summary of the inequalities may be given 
by a single statistic given by IBGE. Although the figures doubled from 2004, in 2009, only 21% of 
Brazilian households had public electricity, fixed telephony, internet access, computer, fridge, 




While the preceding Table 13 shows synthetically all three segments‟ main indicators, it fails to 
indicate the uptake of the different broadcasting technologies. The following Table 14 shows the 
breakup of the penetration of the different distribution platforms. 
 
Table 14 – Penetration of the different broadcasting services in 2009 
Service UK France Brazil 
FTA 48% 43% 82% 
Satellite (DTH) 37% 23% 5% 
Cable 14% 14% 8% 
IPTV 1% 18% 0% 
Other paytv 0% 2% 1% 
Source: UK and France (Ofcom, 2010c: 160); Brazil (Annex 9, Table 86) 
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 There is also a major national divide, according to the same statistics the lowest figures are in the North 
region (7.5%) and the highest in the South East (28%), where the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo 
Horizonte are located. 
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Table 13 had already shown that paytv uptake in Brazil was far smaller than the other services and 
that analogue TV was the biggest platform with 56% of the shares. Table 14 however shows that 
FTA is more popular than that in Brazil. Figures in Table 14 indicate that both cable and DTH have 
a smaller intake than in the European examples but also that FTA television is overwhelmingly 
more popular in Brazil. There are several possible explanations for that considerable difference in 
penetration. Initially, it is due to the already discussed socio-economic differences of the country 
which result in fewer resources available for spending on paytv services. Other reasons may 
include the lack of a TV license fee, the practically unregulated construction of commercial national 
networks and the development of highly popular, carefully produced and cultural relevant 
programmes, namely the telenovelas. All those aspects were already discussed throughout this 
thesis.
 
However, there is another technical issue which is hidden in those percentages and which 
should be measured differently by regulators around the different countries: the free satellite 
reception. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 5, international statistics do not properly account for free satellite 
services. In a country with huge continental distances and still with ten million rural residences 
(IBGE, 2010: 80), free satellite became an important distribution platform for commercial 
broadcasters for reaching those scattered audiences.
158
 It is difficult to account for the precise 
number of these unlicensed and unsubscribed viewers. Castro (2007) estimates up to 15 million 
households. A cross examination of IBGE‟s and Ofcom‟s data indicates that free rural satellite 
alone could contribute from 4 to 7 million households, adding to the FTA service from 7 to 12% 
penetration (see Annex 9, Table 86). 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to remark that free satellite reception is not really a unique Brazilian 
characteristic. After the national regulations that standardised the decoders in the EU (see Levy, 
1999: 68-70 for details),
159
 as long as users pay for the TV license, they are allowed to receive 
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 However, it is important to remark that satellite reception is widespread in urban areas with deprived 
infra-structure, which in the Brazilian case adds significant contingents of users for this service. 
159
 Member States‟ regulations are based on the 1995/47 Directive on the use of standards for the 
transmission of television signals. 
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hundreds of channels depending only on the direction they chose for their satellite dish.
160
 Brazilian 
users, on the other hand, can receive all main terrestrials and other minor networks from the 
several satellites that „beam‟ to or near the territory. The uniqueness (at least for this case study) of 
the Brazilian case is the regulatory arrangement. While in the EU the service is regulated and both 
broadcasters and users need to be licensed, in Brazil it runs as a free service. Neither viewers pay, 
as in Brazil there is no TV license, nor do broadcasters need to license satellite channels. The only 
license needed is for the satellite operator, as an operator of a satellite for transporting 
telecommunication signals (Anatel, 2000).
161
 As a result, FTA broadcasters can freely agree with 
satellite operators the distribution of their signal, and commercialise specific advertisements for 
those (mirrored from terrestrials) channels without the need of (paying for) a license. 
 
While free satellite represents an important ally to commercial networks, it may also represent a 
barrier to an increase in the uptake of paytv systems in Brazil. It is true that the figures in Table 13 
indicate that paytv subscriptions have room to increase in the three countries while compared to 
the USA (90%), or at least for Brazil to pass from the current 14% to the levels of the European 
countries (over 50%). However, the countries‟ mediaspace and viewer options are different. The 
UK and France have rolled out a DTV system with multiprogramming which, together with the 
already mentioned European set-top box regulation, enables viewers to access a considerable 
number of channels without the need for subscription fees. Brazil has the free satellite option which 
rivals small paytv offers, a significant option in a country with such levels of inequality of income. 
 
What would be more likely to become a reality in the Brazilian case is the increase in the uptake of 
broadband internet. The figures of the European countries already achieved the same levels of the 
USA (around 70%) and Brazil is still around 20%. There are several indications that the increase in 
broadband is a matter of state policy in Brazil and numbers are constantly increasing. For obvious 
practical reasons I will not enter into an in-depth analysis of the broadband programmes and 
initiatives in the country. However, it is important to give at least an indication of why it is more 
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 For instance, Freesat, the equivalent to the UK‟s FTA DTV platform Freeview, offers more than 150 
channels to their subscribers. 
161
 In fact there is a hole in the legislation, as the requirement dictates that satellite operators can carry any 
telecommunication licensed operator. Therefore, as long as broadcasters hold a simple telecommunication 
license, they can be carried by satellite operators. From the “Code for right of usage of satellite for the 
transport of telecommunication signals”, annex to the Resolution 220, 05/04/2000 from Anatel. 
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likely that broadband will increase in that country. In what could be regarded as a response to a 
formal indication of the Brazilian parliamentarian Lower House to roll out a national broadband 
plan,
162
 the federal government revived the extinct Telebras, the state-owned telecommunication 
operator that existed before the privatisation of the 1990s, in order to champion broadband infra-
structure in Municipalities with fewer economic resources (Lustosa, 2009). Since 2009 broadband 
penetration increased from 21% to 25% (Ofcom, 2009b: 12; 2011: 11). 
 
This section has shown that digital services have a significant uptake among viewers, and that 
although there is still more room for paytv and broadband connections to grow, it was suggested 
that, most likely, broadcasting will still maintain the lead in the near future. So far the market 
assessment has looked into the production and distribution aspects. The final aspect of the market 
analysis will investigate the viewers. 
 
 
8.6 What audiences are watching in digital times 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed some of the implications of bringing together the broadcasting 
and telecommunication spheres as enabled by digital convergence. From the user perspective, one 
of the implications of the new digital capabilities is the change in the relationship between users 
and media in general. Before, audiences needed to turn on the television set, possibly in the living 
room, and tune into the broadcaster‟s „domains‟. Today, users select content from different 
suppliers while commuting to work or waiting in a queue. Similarly, broadcasters have to compete 
for the attention of this new nomadic viewer with other media (for a more in-depth analysis on this 
topic see Jenkins, 2006: 243). As pointed out in Chapter 1, it might be logical to expect that as 
more services are offered and as newer and „digital generations‟ become the majority, audiovisual 
content will be consumed differently and distributed not only via traditional broadcasting. For 
example, user-generated content (UGC) might even rival in importance content originally created 
for television. Nevertheless, there are robust indications that television viewing is still important. 
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 The Lower House Camara dos Deputados by its committee High Studies and Technological Evaluation 
Council (Conselho de Altos Estudos e Avaliacao Tecnologica) elaborated a report Alternativas de Politicas 
Publicas para a Banda Larga (Public Policies Alternatives for broadband) with several indications to the 
federal government, including the creation of national authority for the coordination of the broadband 
initiatives. 




8.6.1 The continued importance of television and of the main terrestrials 
Figure 21 shows that, over nearly the whole last decade, UK viewers have been spending 
approximately the same amount of time watching television, around eight times more than surfing 
the web. During the analysed period, there has only been a difference of 7 minutes (less than 
0.5%) between television‟s best and worst year, and there is no clear sign of decaying popularity 
for the old medium. 
 
 
Figure 21 – Average time spent using communication services at home for UK users, including an 
exponential trend line for the internet and mobile services
163
 
Source: Annex 9, Table 68 
 
Ofcom‟s research found the same constancy for the French and Brazilian cases as well. In France, 
data from 2005 to 2009 shows 205 minutes viewing time on average with a variation of only 3 
minutes throughout the period (maximum of 207 and minimum of 204 minutes). Brazil has only two 
years available, 2008 (225 minutes) and 2009 (227) (see Annex 9, Table 69 for details). 
 
Returning to the analysis of the UK and the graph contained in Figure 21, mobile and (fixed 
access) internet show a clear increase in popularity but still are on a different scale to television. 
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 An exponential regression fits an exponential trend in the mathematical form of y= ke
mx
. Refer  to Annex 
9, Table 5 for details on calculations and year extrapolations. 
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Users still use the television, approximately, five times more than the internet and mobile phones 
combined. The figures and the tendencies depicted in the graph suggest that television will remain 
important even with digital convergence, for some time. Possibly the pace of the growth in 
importance of the internet will be conditioned by the renewal of the population. In that sense, the 
importance of broadcasting in European countries, with older and ageing population, may remain 
for longer than in others with higher demographic growth such as Brazil.
164
 Perhaps amongst youth 
it is more certain that the internet will gain in importance faster. According to research firm 
Attentional, “conventional viewing among 16 to 34 year-olds has been declining faster than other 
age groups” (cited in Pennington, 2009). Moreover, in 2010, Ofcom (2010c: 236) reported that in 
France, Germany, Italy, the USA and Japan more people used the internet for watching UGC than 
for watching television (catch-up and broadcaster sites).
165
 That finding may suggest that internet 
users spend more time with UGC than television while surfing on the web. On the other hand, in 
the UK more internet users used the web to watch television-related sites than UGC. 
 
Although Figure 21 and the figures on France suggest that broadcasting will remain important for 
the foreseeable future, in the case of Brazil it would be even more certain that television will remain 
important in the following years as broadband penetration figures are still far smaller than 
broadcasting. Moreover, that preference in the South American country is even more noticeable as 
according to IBGE (2010: 96) there are more television sets than fridges in Brazil, and it is 
reasonable to infer that family viewing still plays a greater role at least for those with fewer 
economic resources and relies on television as the sole source of information. Moreover, in fact for 
all three countries, broadcasting viewing could be even bigger when compared to the USA, as was 
shown in Table 13 earlier on during this chapter. In that country, the average viewing time per day 
is one hour on top of the current levels of the countries of this research. 
 
In times of digitalisation, plethora of channels and, to some extent, digital convergence, another 
question needs to be addressed: do the main terrestrials - whether over-the-air or on-line - still 
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 According to World Bank statistics (available in Google Public Stat Database, 2011), in 2010, all three 
countries have declining population growth rates (UK, 0.67%; France 0.52% and Brazil 0.88%). 
165
 According to the report, in France 19% of the users use the web for watching TV and 28% for viewing 
UGC. In Germany, 10% and 22%; Italy, 15% and 28%; the USA, 22% and 29% and; Japan, 9% and 32%, 
respectively. British consumption shows the opposite direction (24% and 22%, respectively). 
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need to be regulated? Do they still attract significant audiences that justify a push from the 
government for the delivery of socio-cultural goals and a pull for driving economic development? In 
order to address those questions, this discussion should start with the evaluation of the audience 
shares achieved by those channels. The following graph shows how the audience shares have 
changed in recent times. 
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Figure 22 – Viewing shares of main channels 
Note: Indicated on vertical dashed line the DTV launch. 











An undeniable common characteristic of all three countries as shown in Figure 22 is the declining 
audience share of the main terrestrials and the increasing importance of the „Others‟ category. In 
the UK, in 2004 the sum of the other channels‟ audiences surpassed the viewing shares of the 
most watched channel, BBC 1. In France it was in 2009 that the accumulated others outdid the 
channel with the largest audience share, TF1. In Brazil, that hypothetical year is still to come and 
seems still quite far away. In the UK, the milestone was achieved two years after the launch of the 
digital platform Freeview and in France four years after the launch of their digital system, la TNT. 
Brazil only launched their DTV services in December 2007, without multiprogramming for 
commercial broadcasters, as noted in Chapter 5. Therefore, the „Others‟ channels curve can only 
increase with an increase in the uptake of paytv or free satellite. In fact, a closer look at the 
Brazilian graph shows that from 2008 to 2010 the increase in the „Others‟ channels curve is at the 
expenses of a decline in, mostly, Globo and SBT, which suggests that the main terrestrials are 
losing audiences to these other platforms. A report from Brazilian agency Anatel indicates that 
paytv subscribers are increasing at a rate of nearly one million new subscribers per year, which 
could explain the downturn in the viewing shares of FTA broadcasters (Anatel, 2010: 12).
166
 Free-
satellite is more difficult to trace in Brazil, though, but is believed to be significantly increasing in the 
country. However, as all major networks are present on the main satellites, there is no reason to 
suppose that the importance of national commercial broadcasters would be diminished as a result 
of foreign-based channels, mainly from Pan American countries which are, also, broadcast in a 
different language.
167,168
 Although free-satellite is an important service, especially in a country with 
continental dimensions, for practical reasons and due to the lack of relevant reliable data available 
the analysis of that modality is compromised and, therefore, will not be fully assessed in this thesis. 
 
Returning to the analysis of the preceding graphs, while a decreasing preference for the main 
terrestrials is shown, the graphs do not show which are the new channels diverting the attention of 
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 According to the report, in 2007 there were 5.3 million subscribers, followed by 6.3 in 2008, 7.4 in 2009 
and 7.9 in 2010. 
167
 Although it must be noted that satellite technology allows the broadcasting of the same channel in more 
than one language. 
168
 In the case of France, however, because of the higher immigration levels, foreign-based satellite channels 
are more important. According to a study from the company Solis while 82% of Arab African immigrants 
watched the main terrestrials in France, 72% also watches at least one channel in the Arab (or Berber) 
language (Strategies, 2011). 
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the viewers. Breaking down the numbers of the broad category „Others‟, Figure 23 shows that, in 
Britain, spin-off channels from the main broadcasters are responsible for a substantial part of those 
figures, in accordance with other scholars‟ perceptions, noted in Chapter 1. Figure 23 shows a 








Source: Annex 9, Table 73. 
 
Figure 23 shows two important facts worth discussing. First and most importantly, the main 
terrestrials‟ strategy of launching niche channels (or digital channels) proved to be successful, as 
each of their combined share actually rises instead of being in decline as the graphs in Figure 22 
suggested. The second fact is the power of the Sky produced channels (selected in this case as 
being the biggest non-main terrestrial broadcasters in terms of audience shares according to BARB 
figures). Extracting the dozens of Sky channels available from the segment „Others‟, the graph 
clearly shows that the late entrant digital broadcaster is an important deliverer of audiovisual 
content with audiences comparable to those achieved by the Channel 4 and Channel 5 families. 
However, Sky channels‟ audiences are clearly declining. That downturn may be an indication of the 
success of Freeview and the increase of the „long tail‟ in all distribution platforms. According to 
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 Include the following channels per broadcaster: BBC (1, 2, 3 &4, News, Parliament, Cbbc, Cbeebies, and 
BBC HD), ITV (1, 2, 3 & 4 and News), Channel 4 (E4, Film 4, Kiss, Magic and More 4) and Channel 5 (5 
USA and 5*). Also include the channels differed in one hour (+1). Audience shares from the first week of 
September. 
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Ofcom‟s (2010a: 158) report, from 2004 to 2007, Freeview take-up increased, approximately, from 
four million to ten million households, while Sky subscriptions rose only from four to six million in 
the same period. Another important fact that emerges from Figure 23 is that the segregation of the 
Sky channels and the grouping of the spin-off channels restored the supremacy of the BBC, lost in 
2004 to the „Others‟ line. This re-grouping shows that instead of the traditional broadcasters having 
a total viewing share of 58.6% in 2009, as the graph in Figure 22 indicates, the traditional 
broadcasters, in fact, attracted the attention of 69.9% of the television audiences. Therefore, the 
level achieved in 2009 by the „bouquet‟ of the main terrestrial broadcasters is in fact only 8% points 
below the audience share obtained by those broadcasters before the launch of DTV in 2002. 
 
In France a similar pattern can be identified. Since 2008, the yearbook Television Key Facts, 
published by the RTL Group‟s IP Networks, provides the audience shares of relevant digital 
channels. According to the 2011 edition (IP Network, 2011: 172), the most viewed digital channels 
in 2010 were TMC (partially owned by TF1), France 5 and France 4 (France Televisions), W9 (M6), 
Gulli and Arte (both partially owned by France Televisions). Figure 24 shows the further breakdown 
of the French audience shares including those relevant spin-off digital channels. 
 
 
Figure 24 – Audience share of French main broadcasters including their spin-off digital channels since 
starting of measurement 
Source: Annex 9, Table 74 
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Although the launch of new channels does not completely halt the general decline of the audiences 
of the main terrestrials, like in Britain, in France there is a diminishing importance of the „Others‟ 
category, as it descends from the first position with a 30% level in the audience share in 2009 
(Figure 22) to the third position in Figure 24 with an audience share in the region of 20%. 
Moreover, the „Others‟ category could be even smaller if the audiences of the other Canal Plus and 
other TF1 spin-offs were also published. However, the yearbooks used in this research do not 
report those audiences. 
 
As those breakdowns have shown, overall, the main terrestrials must still be regarded as important 
deliverers of broadcasting content. The era of multi-channels may have diminished the importance 
of the original terrestrials channels, such as ITV 1, TF1 or Globo but the original FTA broadcasters, 
using their portfolio of channels are still the most watched. Therefore, to include specific content 
obligations for the main broadcasters - a service that is still highly popular in times of digital 
convergence - still makes sense. It has a significant potential impact because it still reaches 
significant proportions of the population. Their popularity also means that, possibly, national 
content will reach wider audiences. Therefore, broadcasting services might still be regarded as 
important tools for the delivery and promotion of socio-cultural concepts, appropriate means for the 
distribution of national content and, not least, significant inducers of national production industries. 
 
Before concluding on the usage of the main terrestrials for the distribution of national content, two 
main questions still need clarification. Does national content draw the attention of the viewers? And 
what kind of programmes are the most viewed? The first question will indicate whether viewers 
actually watch national content and therefore if national pulling policies are justifiable, in terms of 
public investment in a (cultural) good that society actually uses and demands. The second question 
will point out whether the programmes produced to fulfil the quotas, such as educational, news and 
citizenry programmes, are in effect watched. This evaluation will assess the efficacy of mandating 
broadcasters to deliver specific kinds of content for fulfilling higher socio-cultural goals. 
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8.6.2 The attractiveness of national content to audiences 
To do a comprehensive assessment of the audience shares is extremely difficult because of the 
available data. There are several audience share lists that classify the most watched programmes, 
whether by category (recurrent programmes, such as series or soaps; or single programmes), by 
genre (entertainment, sports, etc.) or by period (the top of specific weeks or the most watched 
programmes of the year). However, none of these publicly available lists is comprehensive enough 
to draw a consistent conclusion on which kind of content is more popular: whether national or 
imported. Even so, I will attempt to draw my conclusions with the available data: „top ten of the year 
per genre‟, „top three programmes per channel of a specific week‟ and the „top twenty programmes 
of the year‟.
170
 The first obvious criticism of this analysis might be that although the „champions‟ of 
the week and of the year were the most watched content at that particular moment, a bigger 
proportion of the population was watching other content. In fact, as we will see later on, while these 
audience pullers of the year achieve roughly 30% of the shares, it means that 70% of the audience 
were watching other programmes. Perhaps more irrefutable evidence, which could indicate more 
accurately the comparative attractiveness of national content, would be to take a snapshot of the 
nationalities of the content being broadcast under a certain period of time on all the channels at the 
same time. For obvious practical reasons this is not a feasible option for this research. Certainly 
analysing the audience‟s attention based only on rankings that list a few programmes has the 
potential to distort a more accurate portrayal of viewing habits and preferences. Moreover, these 
rankings also distort the assessment of audiences‟ attraction, as different genres might attract 
differently according to the nationality. For instance, it is most likely that an imported film will attract 
more attention than an imported news programme. Therefore, I will start this discussion with the 
analysis of the relative attractiveness of the „top 10‟ programmes by genre, for the UK and France, 
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 As a reminder to the reader, audience figures are not openly available to the public in Brazil. One of the 
reports from the main audience measuring company IBOPE available to the general public is the „Top 5‟ 
weekly lists for some of the major cities. There are no other freely available reports from IBOPE ranking 
more programmes or publishing the „top ranking‟ programmes of the year. 
171
 No available data to include Brazil in this comparison. 





Figure 25 – Sum of the shares of the ten most watched programmes of the year per genre 
Source: Annex 9, Table 81. 
Notes: Adapted from International Television Key Facts yearbooks. 
 
The graphs of the UK and France contained in Figure 25 show that, divided by genre, the relative 
attractiveness of national content varies. Imported content in France reaches a higher proportion 
than in the UK. Additionally, the genre analysis shows that national films attract more attention in 
France, whereas in the UK the top pullers are national series and, in both, national sports. 
 
Hitherto those conclusions are based only on the list of the most watched programmes of the year 
per genre. Certainly the performance of national and imported content varies throughout the year 
and imported content would more certainly attract the attention of the viewers more often and in 
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higher proportions. Therefore, in order to give more evidence of the relative attractiveness of 
national content and verify if there is any significant difference in the proportions seen previously, I 
will now analyse the audience shares of the „top three‟ programmes of each of the main channels 
in a particular week (theoretically the list would be more diverse than the „top of the year‟ as it 
include programmes from all main channels). Figure 26 shows the total proportions achieved by 
national content of the weekly „top three‟ programmes per broadcaster, extracted from the „top 30‟ 
weekly list for the UK and France and „top 5‟ in the case of Brazil (Sao Paulo).
172
 It is important to 
note that this extraction from the „top 30‟ weekly list includes programmes broadcast by thirteen 
channels in the UK and eleven channels in France, more than only from the main terrestrials. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Total audiences (in millions) of the three most watched programmes of the thirty most 
watched programmes in a specific week and the corresponding proportion of audiences achieved by 
national content 
Source: Annex 9, Table 82. 
Notes: 
 UK: Adapted from Barb “Top 30 Weekly”, totalling the first three programmes of each 
broadcaster on the „top30‟ list. See Table 79 for programmes listings. 
 France: Reports from Relaxnews. See Table 80 for programmes listings. 
 Brazil: Used the same listings contained in Table 77 but totalling only the „top three‟ 
programmes. 
 
The size of the bubble indicates the total audiences achieved by the top three programmes of the 
week, and the vertical position corresponds to the proportion of the audiences that the national 
content attracted amongst the top three programmes of the week. Bubbles‟ positions show that in 
the UK and in Brazil national content was responsible for attracting the biggest proportion of 
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 See Annex 9, Tables 13, 15 and 16 for complete listings. 
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audiences. During that period, the „top three‟ programmes of each station that were nationally 
produced (22 programmes in the UK and 16 in Brazil) attracted the attention of 80% of the total 
viewers of all the top three programmes (30 programmes in total in the UK and 21 in Brazil). Whilst 
in France the proportion was more level, topping 50% (20 nationally produced programmes of a 
total of 33). The relative size of the bubble does not indicate any relevant tendency over time, 
which may suggest that the audience share of such small period depends more on the 
attractiveness of the specific content broadcast on that particular week. 
 
As with the relative attractiveness of the types of national content that were most viewed, a closer 
examination of the „top three‟ types of programmes also shows some differences. In order not to 
extend this discussion, I will focus on the year 2010 only (for the complete list of programmes see 
Annex 9, Table 77, Table 79 and Table 80). In the UK, „light entertainment‟, such as reality TV The 
X factor (ITV) and soaps (such as Coronation Street (ITV)), was most present in the list. „Light 
entertainment‟ and soaps appeared with eleven and eight titles respectively, all of them nationally 
produced (11/11 and 8/8).
173
 The list is followed by series, such as CSI Miami (Channel 5) (3/6), 
and films (2/4). Purely educational programme appeared only once in the list (Coast (BBC 2)). 
 
In France the list is more balanced towards films (6/12) and series (4/12), followed by „light 
entertainment‟ (4/4), news and educational (4/4) and sports (1/1). In Brazil the list is dominated by 
„light‟ entertainment (14/14), series (3/9), soaps (4/4), news (3/3), sports (2/2) and film (0/1). 
Although that classification gives us some perspective on broadcasting schedules, it does not 
indicate which kind of content attracted the most people. Hence, adding up the audiences, soaps 
were watched by 40.4m of viewers and in Britain „light entertainment‟ by 29m, all of these nationally 
produced. In France, series were extremely popular, attracting the attention of 45.8m viewers on 
that week (of these only 11.4m were attracted to national content), followed by films, 18.5m (10m 
watching nationally produced), and more closely followed by „light entertainment‟ 12.7m (all of it 
nationally produced). In Brazil (Sao Paulo only), the domination of „light entertainment‟ was, in fact, 
smaller, with 7.9m viewers and soaps (with only three Globo‟s telenovelas) attracting 5.7m and the 
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 The fraction indicates the number of national programmes in relation to the total. 
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three news programmes (two of them broadcast by Globo) topping 4m viewers; all of these were 
nationally produced. 
 
In summary, the analysis of that particular week indicates that national soaps and reality TV shows 
are more noticeable in the UK and Brazil, while imported series and films attract comparatively 
more views in France. Educational and other programmes with social missions were rare amongst 
the most popular in France and in Brazil. However, it must be pointed out that in the UK there are 
programmes in the list that were classified as entertainment but have embedded social values. 
Additionally there are other programmes that I might have classified as entertainment but that 
include citizenry issues. 
 
Where the relative attraction of national content varies according to the genres amongst the 
analysed countries, the popularity of football shows the most similarities. Analysing another set of 
rankings, the list of the „Top 20 of the year‟ (see Annex 9, Table 75, Table 76 and Table 77) shows 
that audiences are more attracted to football matches when a national team (or club) is involved.
174
 
It is important to mention that in this analysis I classified football matches as national content only if 
a national team (or club) was involved. Moreover, as an additional point of clarification, I would like 
to note that the list compiles only the top ranked episode of recurrent programmes. Therefore, 




In Britain, in 1998 (year of a World Cup), 2004 (European Cup) and 2010 (World Cup), football 
matches involving national teams (or clubs) attracted more than those without national teams (4/7 
(four times in seven occurrences), 4/5 and 4/6 respectively). A similar preference in France was 
also observed. For Brazil, as the selected week (first week of September) does not include any 
major football events, the effect was not noticeable. However, as already discussed in Chapter 5, 
the same levels of ratings could also be expected in Brazil, as well. In fact, the last match Brazil 
played in the 2010 football world cup drew the attention of 45% of households (IBOPE, 2010). 
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 I use the term national team (England, France, etc.) as opposed to national club (in England, for instance 
Arsenal, alternatively, in France, for instance, PSG). 
175
 All programme titles can be verified in the tables in Annex 8.  
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Three other kinds of content that appeared in the ranks contained in Table 75, Table 76 and Table 
77 of Annex 9 are worth commenting on: politics and news; soaps; and films. In tune with the 
considerable regulatory effort, in France programmes related to news and politics appeal to the 
public. News programmes also draw major attention in Brazil and, in both countries, substantially 
more than in the UK. While in Britain news reached, at a maximum, the 20
th
 place, in France they 
reached the 8
th
 place, on average, (and the discourses of prime ministers and presidents can also 




places. Important to notice that, while in 
France and in Brazil there are dispositions for the coverage of politics and news, in Brazil Rede 
Globo managed to create from their daily evening news, Jornal Nacional (or as Globo usually 




Soaps (and telenovelas) are also an important ingredient of television. In Brazil they are certainly 
top audience pullers with consistent figures throughout the period analysed. In the UK this kind of 
programme, is also an attractive content, still according to the „top 20‟ of the year, only losing to 
football and, in 2009, to the reality shows Britain‟s Got Talent and The X Factor. In France national 
soaps are not as popular as attention is mainly divided between series, imported (Dr House, CSI, 
Criminal Minds, Mentalist and Grey‟s Anatomy) and national (Navarro, Zodiaque, Une Femme 
D‟honneur and Clem), and feature films (discussed in more detail below). The understanding of the 
reasons why these kinds of programmes are so popular is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is important to remark that while these are entertainment programmes and not 
originally produced for the fulfilment of specific content quotas, such as citizenship or educational, 
they can be expected to be highly culturally relevant if produced locally. It may be argued that if 
Eastenders (BBC 1), Coronation Street (ITV), Passione or Caminho das Indias (both produced by 
Globo) were imported, or depicted foreign stories of everyday life, they would not be as popular. In 
fact, in 2010, there is only one imported soap, Neighbours (Australia), in the top list of the three 
countries and only occupying a meagre last position, in the least viewed channel, Channel 5. 
 
The third category of programmes worth remarking on by the audience shares‟ figures is film. 
Again, as expected from the structural regulatory effort for the promotion of the national film 
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 See for instance Chapter 5 when the repercussions of the debate between Lula and Collor in the 
presidential debate for the 1989 elections were discussed. 
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industry, and also confirming the country‟s preference for films, they achieved several times the top 
rankings in France. On those selected years there were, in total, thirteen national films and nine 
imported films on the „top 20‟ list. In the UK, on the contrary, there were only two national films and 
one imported. In Brazil, nine films were listed in the „top 5‟ list. Although it is not possible to identify 
the origin of the films, a report from Brazilian cinema agency, Ancine (2011a: 23), informs that 
almost 90% of the films shown on television are imported. Therefore the probability of these films 
being national is low. 
 
As already mentioned, because of the lack of diversity in terms of genres, and also of broadcasters 
(it is extremely difficult for less viewed channels to achieve a position on the top list of the year), 
probably, the „top 20 of the year‟ list is not the most adequate way to understand audiences‟ 
preferences. However, the „top 20‟ list shows the power of national content to attract the biggest 
audiences, and hence to be, potentially, the most bonding content. The following Table 15 shows 
the proportion of the audiences attracted to nationally produced programmes amongst the most 
watched programmes. 
 
Table 15 – Proportion of national content shares amongst the top programmes of main channels in the 
UK, France and Brazil (Sao Paulo) 
 





















UK 82% 92% 96% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 
France 82% 74% 80% 100% 44% 38% 62% 75% 
Brazil n. a. n. a. 70% 68% 79% 77% 100% 91% 
Source: Annex 9, Table 78. 
Note: 
 UK and France: Index resulting of adding of the audiences shares (in %) achieved by the „top 20‟ 
programmes in the country; 
 Brazil: Total audience (in millions) achieved by the „top 5‟ of the main broadcasters in the city of 
Sao Paulo only (the biggest metropolitan region of Brazil). 
 
Table 15 indicates the high attractiveness of national content in all the countries of this case study 
amongst the most watched programmes of the year. In order to eliminate possible distortions 
caused by football programmes, Table 15 separates the audiences in two different columns, one 
including all programmes and the other excluding football matches. Of these most viewed 
programmes of the year, a high proportion of that content was made locally in both cases. There 
CHAPTER VIII- STEP 3: NATIONAL CONTENT MARKET ASSESSMENT 
262 
 
are other tendencies depicted in Table 15 too. Contrary to what would be expected from the 
previous discussion of Figure 22 (decay in the audience share of the main terrestrials) and the 
long-tail phenomena enabled by digitalisation, the increase in competition did not affect the 
performance of national content as the most viewed programmes of the year. From 1998 to 2004 
(i.e. before and after DTV) the relative attractiveness of national content amongst the most viewed 
programmes of the year remained relatively constant in the UK. The same pattern was not followed 
by France though. After the launch of DTV, audiences switched more substantially to imported 
content. In 2009, Table 15 clearly indicates a significant drop in the relative attractiveness of 
national productions. However, in 2010, users were attracted back again to national content. This 
apparently cyclical pattern is similar to that experienced by Britain in previous decades, as 
remarked by Rixon (2006: 50-2).
177
 Unfortunately, there is no data for the late 1990s for the 
Brazilian case. 
 
At this point, it is important to comment on formats. A closer analysis of the programmes‟ titles 
shows that, at least in the countries studied here, the usage of imported formats does not add a 
significant proportion of audiences.
178
 This finding complements suggestions of academics, such 
as Chalaby (2010), who notes the predominance of Britain in the exports of formats and Esser 
(2010), who suggests that formats play a crucial role around the world. It is undeniably the 
commercial success of British formats, in a global industry that Chalaby (2012) remarks is worth 
almost £3 billion a year. The reasons for that proliferation are beyond the scope of this thesis (see 
for details Chalaby, 2010, 2012; Esser, 2010; Kunz, 2010; Moran & Keane, 2004; Waisbord, 2004). 
However, the findings suggest that imported formats, as they usually are „light entertainment‟, do 
not have a consistent power to displace other national content from the list of the most watched 
programmes yet. One reason may be that some of those programmes are not culturally relevant, 
and therefore do not attract as much attention as a programme originating from national culture. 
Certainly there are other preferences and countries‟ particularities which I do not intend to address 
in this short section, and there will always be the “nobody knows factor” alluded to by Grant and 
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 According to the author, from the 1960s to the early 1980s there was an increase in American imports, 
which again declined in the 1990s. 
178
 In the case of the UK, only one imported format (The Apprentice, USA) achieved a position in the „Top 
20‟ ranking. Survivor (UK) in the case of France. In the case of Brazil: Esquadrao da Moda (What not to 
wear, UK), Idolos (Idols, UK) Policia 24h, CQC and A liga (Argentina). All programme titles can be verified 
in Annex 8. 
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Wood (2005: 48-9). Arguably, „light entertainment‟ produced from imported formats might achieve a 
bigger preponderance as top audience pullers, in countries where national broadcasters have not 
developed a strong content genre and identity of their own. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out 





Those findings about formats do not mean that within the most watched programmes there are no 
national formats being watched. However, a closer look at the lists of the programmes listed in 
Table 75, Table 76 and Table 77 of Annex 9 shows that reality shows and formatted programmes, 
in our case studies, are only „top hits‟ in the UK. While in 1998 there were the originally British 
formats Who wants to be a millionaire?, Stars in their eyes and You‟ve been framed in the top list, 
totalling over 90 million viewers, in 2010, the list changed to other British formats, The X Factor, 
Strictly come dancing, Britain‟s got talent and I‟m a celebrity... reaching almost 100 million viewers. 
On the other hand, in France there are no reality shows in the top list of the selected years except 
for Survivor (UK) in 2009. Coincidentally or not, as noted in Chapter 7, those kinds of programmes 
are denied public subsidy from the Cosip in France. 
 
In Brazil, formats appeared later on. In the selected week of 2009 in 8
th
 (Idolos -Idols, UK) and 16
th
 







 (CQC, Argentina) and 19
th
 (A liga – La liga, Argentina) positions. The 
comparatively weak results in Brazil may be attributed to the fact that none of those formats where 
aired by Rede Globo, which still relies on the more traditional genre of telenovelas. 
 
Having discussed audiences‟ behaviours and preferences, the chapter, heading towards the 
conclusions, brings to a close the third and final step of this research, the market assessment. 
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 There are other difficulties worthy of mention when identifying formats. A national programme may be 
„based on‟ or „inspired by‟ a known format and not licensed. Some formats are segments within programmes, 
such as afternoon shows, and, as such, segments do not appear in TV listings. For instance in Brazil, 
Maratoma do Faustao (Wipeout, USA) is a segment of Domingao do Faustao a programme produced by 
Rede Globo. 




The market assessment conducted in this final part of the research looked into audiences, 
producers, broadcasters and telecommunication and ICT companies. While the first step of this 
research identified the socio-cultural concepts and goals contained in broadcasting regulation, the 
second step examined the regulatory tools for the production and distribution of national content. 
This third and final step was aimed at the identification of the possible impacts of these regulations 
on the development of the different activities of the audiovisual industry and on audiences. 
 
From the perspective of the development of the production industries, the obligations for financing 
and distributing national content have considerable economic impact when substantially applied. 
The UK and France have strong independent production companies in conjunction with a well 
developed film production industry. Albeit in Britain the independent sector is more prominent, 
whilst in France it is the film industry. Brazil, as a result of an excessive concentration on the 
means for the production of content and small obligations, has weak results, with the only relevant 
(in the global scenario) national producer of content being Organizacoes Globo. 
 
The market assessment has also shown that while strong regulation helps to develop a healthier 
and a more diversified range of national industries, the internal economic wealth does not 
necessarily imply successes in exports. The UK was the only country of these cases studies where 
foreign trade was substantial. The analysis has shown that the UK‟s achievement, as far as trade is 
concerned, is anchored not only in fewer cultural discount factors, above all the language, but also 
in attracting inward productions (mostly from the USA) and in developing formats. 
 
Furthermore, the research suggested that in times of digital convergence, telecommunication 
providers and paytv companies are relevant competitors for the distribution of audiovisual content. 
Moreover, their cash generating power is also substantially higher than that created by the TV 
license or advertisement. As they distribute more foreign content, which contributes negatively 
towards the balance of trade, and divert viewers from the main regulated channels, there is a 
justification to impose a financial compensation on their revenues to balance the loss of income 
generated by those services. For the same reason, a contribution taken from the ever increasing 
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sporting rights contracts, which also help increase the revenues of paytv companies, could also be 
imposed. 
 
Still with regards to distribution technologies, regulators should give more attention to free-satellite 
services, as they attract considerable fractions of the audiences, especially in rural and remote 
areas and amongst diasporic populations. In the Brazilian case it is even more important as 
broadcasters are competing for the attention of viewers and generate revenues without being 
explicitly licensed. 
 
This chapter also indicated that the internet will, most certainly, increase in popularity, whilst paytv 
may not necessarily do so. This research does not propose any alternatives for regulating the 
World Wide Web. However, some form of financial contribution from local operations could be 
introduced for the same reasons as in the paytv activity and with the same final objective, to 
strengthen the production of national content. Nevertheless, I also pointed out that such a volatile 
and borderless fast changing environment has a high probability of jeopardising any form of 
enforcement. 
 
When analysing audience behaviour and preferences, this chapter has shown that national 
television content and national broadcasters still play a significant role in attracting the attention of 
considerable proportions of the society. From the perspective of audiences‟ interests, the research 
has shown that the obligations on broadcasters, and especially on the main terrestrials, are still 
important ways of securing production means and of distribution of national content, while the 
fulfilment of the socio-cultural objectives of diversity, plurality, democracy, citizenship and cultural 
relevance is not so evident. 
 
This chapter ends the second part of this thesis, the three case study countries. Based on the 







THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH IS to understand the regulatory frameworks implemented in 
the recent years in the UK, France and Brazil for the promotion of nationally produced audiovisual 
content. My argument is that because communication services have both socio-cultural and 
industrial implications, governments and societies desire guiding principles for the promotion of 
nationally produced content. 
 
As this research has shown, since the 1980s broadcasting and the other audiovisual media 
services have undergone, albeit with different intensities amongst countries, at least three 
transformative moments: liberalisation, digitalisation and the ongoing digital convergence. Each of 
these changes had different implications for the production and distribution of national content. 
Most importantly this includes: the increase of competition for traditional broadcasters; audience 
fragmentation; and new opportunities for the distribution of content. Moreover, as a result of the 
current coexistence of national, international, public and private media owned by broadcasters or 
more „convergent‟ telecommunication groups, the regulation for the promotion of national content is 
becoming extremely intricate. Policy stakeholders have to accommodate in regulation the fulfilment 
of socio-cultural objectives, support for national broadcasters, development of local production 
industries, and the promotion of competition and viewers‟ interests. 
 
In this research I combined policy analysis with a market analysis of each country‟s television-
scape. The comparative approach allowed me to identify different perspectives and regulatory 
approaches to similar problems encountered in media regulation, and led to new understandings of 
particular policies, such as media ownership or the promotion of diversity. The exploration of 
market data, complementing the policy analysis, enabled the identification of effective policies for 




the different regulatory tools and approaches on the various activities involved (i.e. production, 
programming, distribution and viewers). 
 
Ideally, elite interviews would have complemented the regulatory analysis. These interviews would 
have brought different understandings and insights about the negotiation processes and objectives 
of particular rules provided in regulation. Interviews with policymakers from Britain, France and 
Brazil also could have revealed aspects that need better regulatory attention, and they could have 
corrected possible miss-interpretations of socio-cultural objectives or of targets and the effects of 
certain regulatory tools. However, within the timeframe of a PhD course, it would have been 
extremely difficult to design and conduct interviews with a balanced and representative sample 
from each of the three countries. As a result of the time restraint, the amount of legal and 
regulatory documents that needed to be analysed for the three countries and the human resources 
available, conducting interviews for this research in addition to the policy and the market analysis 
carried out, unfortunately, was hence not feasible. But the work provides a context which could 
inform later work utilising in-depth interviews. 
 
The exclusive document analysis approach to my research no doubt had drawbacks. The analysis 
has only one perspective, that of the researcher. The resulting potentially „narrow‟-interpretation 
may have jeopardized the identification of further important tools or objectives in regulation and led 
to miss-interpretations of the targets or effects of certain regulatory requirements. Additionally, as 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, besides the regulatory drive there are other factors which 
directly affect the production levels and viewing shares, such as overall economic growth, 
exchange rate and the relative success of certain types of content. To attribute those changes to 
regulation alone might be considered overly simplistic. To minimise these possible inaccuracies a 
market analysis was included to the research. The idea here was that changes in regulation affect 
industrial activities and viewing shares. Therefore, by replicating the regulatory and market analysis 
on three different countries throughout all the period of study helped to improve the identification of 





Main analytical findings 
The comparative analysis has shown that the regulation for the promotion of national content has 
both similarities and differences in the three case study countries. Moreover, because of the dual 
(socio-cultural and industrial) characteristic of audiovisual content, regulators more than often 
struggle to find an optimum balance. In the UK there is a bigger concern in sustaining diversity of 
broadcasting services, in promoting competition (in communication services overall), and in 
attracting foreign investment in cinema production. Diversity is promoted through comprehensive 
content obligations for all traditional broadcasters and by stipulating a considerable proportion of 
independent productions on broadcasting schedules. Competition amongst services, too, is 
promoted. The adoption of multiprogramming on DTV enabled the free-to-air service to be a 
competitor to paytv systems and channels are to be made available to the different distributors on 
fair and reasonable terms. Cinema production achieves strong production figures by attracting 
inward investment from overseas. The tax relief included in the legislation for that activity can be 
regarded as too focused on attracting these kinds of big budgets. 
 
In the case of France, this research suggests that the promotion of national content is too focused 
on cinema production and on the promotion of national culture and language. Broadcasting and 
telecommunication services, home-video distributors and cinemas, are all required to divert funds 
towards the production of audiovisual content. But most of this funding (administered by the CNC 
through the Cosip scheme) goes towards supporting film production. This French „structured 
financing system‟ is often criticised for being too biased towards cinema production and big 
national media groups.  
 
The difference in broadcasters‟ content commissioning practices between the two European 
countries is that in the UK the only legal obligation is the independent quota (and British 
broadcasters commission even more than the stipulated amount). In France, there is a smaller 
quota for independent production but there are legal contributions, i.e. levies, in place. Set as 
percentages of broadcasters‟ revenues, the contributions have to be invested in independent 
productions. There are explicit regulatory prescriptions dictating the amount of revenues that shall 




recent years and, as in the UK, more channels were given to the PSB in order to increase the 
presence of national content in the newly expanded services. By this approach, at the same time 
that more channels are open to the public, policymakers in both countries rely on the PSB for 
increasing the amount of national content on the screens. 
 
Brazil is perhaps the country were the concern with the promotion of national content is in the most 
early stages. That might be due to the fact that the traditional terrestrial broadcasters historically 
rely on in-house productions and paytv was, until the last couple of years, a timid competitor to the 
free commercial broadcasters. However, although the main terrestrials managed to block the 
adoption of multiprogramming, freezing the number of competitors in DTV, paytv is steadily 
increasing subscriber numbers (diverting the desired affluent audiences away from the traditional 
FTA broadcasters). This may be due to the recent changes in legislation which liberalised foreign 
ownership to those services. Most certainly, a possible rise in the viewing shares of international 
channels may raise the awareness that further protection is needed for the promotion of national 
content on television services overall. Another characteristic of the Brazilian mediaspace is that it is 
too concentrated on the companies related to Organizacoes Globo. Cinema production follows the 
same pattern. Apart from one big national producer, Globo Filmes, the national industry is 
restricted to small and authorial projects. One of the reasons for this monopolistic situation is that 
Brazilian regulators do not have supra regional agencies, which could help enforce competition and 
deverticalisation. Besides, there are strong ties between commercial broadcasters and politicians. 
As a result, the market is too concentrated on commercial broadcasters. The national content is 
promoted only to satisfy commercial needs, although highly culturally relevant, with a small stake 
from independent production. The PSB, as a complementary alternative, is not adequately funded 
and their share of the production and distribution of national content is very limited and mainly 
focused on the objective of promoting citizenship. 
 
In contrast to Brazil, European countries, most notably the UK, have encouraged the empowerment 
of independent producers to create a supportive environment for the production and distribution of 
national content. However, my research has also suggested that the focus on independent 




resulted in a decrease in the funds available for commissioning new content. In order to help re-
balance this situation, a re-definition of what constitutes independent productions should be 
introduced. In this respect, I would like to suggest that well established broadcasters and studios 
from other countries should not be considered as independent producers just because they do not 
directly own broadcasting channels in the country concerned. The definition of independent 
production should be changed in legislation; the overall global financial strength should be taken 
into consideration when establishing whether a media producer is independent or not. I will return 
to this again later, when summarising my recommendations. 
 
Equally important in regulatory attempts to sustain and support national production, with associated 
socio-cultural and industrial objectives, are the problems of paytv buying up sporting rights. 
Although the three countries regulate these deals with different intensity, as discussed in Chapter 
7, in all of them paytv now continuously secures these national championships. This process 
directly increases media concentration, as these annual events are big audience pullers and the 
difference in market power between broadcasters continues to increase due to these 
transmissions. As the economic resources for the production of content is becoming more 
concentrated, the production of diverse national content and plurality in distribution is hence 
hampered. The sporting events should, thus, be considered as an important source of funds for 
national content production and a regulatory remedy for the concentration of revenues should be 
introduced. I propose a levy on sporting exclusivity deals which could feed the production of 
nationally produced content, possibly to be used by „truly,‟ re-defined independent producers. 
 
In line with this discussion of the effects of media concentration on the production of national 
content is the debate on digital convergence. With this process, financially strong ICT and 
telecommunication companies are starting to compete with national broadcasters for the attention 
of viewers, posing a new challenge for the production and distribution of national content. The new 
distribution technologies divert viewers and revenues from traditional broadcasters and hence 
should also contribute with funds to the production of national content. This contribution, already 
adopted in France, should take into consideration the different financial strengths of the various 




broadcasting international channels), make a significant contribution to the negative trade balance. 
Taxation on that economic activity seems appropriate and justified. Additionally, the local 
operations of relevant internet companies should be included in the role of financers of audiovisual 
production. It is highly likely that ICT companies will have increasing importance in audiovisual 
production and delivery in all three countries. 
 
To summarise, the promotion of national content in current times has different challenges. The 
problem is embraced by the three countries with diverse approaches and regulatory tools. 
However, due to the dual socio- industrial characteristic of audiovisual media products, regulators 
more than often struggle to find an optimum balance. To support the development of a healthy 
audiovisual industry, which can supply all services with national content that also fulfils socio-
cultural objectives is not easy. I believe that at the heart of the problem of how to develop the 
national audiovisual industries in this dual respect is the definition of national content. 
 
A new definition for national content 
In my work I argue that the definition of what constitutes nationally produced content needs special 
attention from regulators and to support my claim I would like to briefly bring back some of the 
thoughts discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Drawing on the arguments sustained by Price (1995: 35-6), Murdock (2000: 55), Debrett (2010: 16-
19) and others, broadcasting should be considered a vital part of the public sphere, and as such 
needs to reflect and give opportunity of representation and of expression to all segments of society. 
Consequently, it is legitimate to consider that nationally produced television content should foster 
the promotion of socio-cultural values. If television is not required to contribute to supporting the 
healthy development of our societies it is more likely that the schedules will be mainly filled with 
mainstream programmes, or „more of the same‟ as many scholars have noted. This can happen 
even if regulation assures that the content is nationally produced. 
 
My argument, hence, is that the objectives of developing national audiovisual industries and the 




should not just be about the location of production or about the people working on it but it should 
also comply with explicit socio-cultural objectives if it is to benefit from legal schemes and receive 
public subsidies. My research has supported Ostergaard‟s claim (1998), that the way national 
content is defined by the current „cultural tests‟ set by European regulation mainly serves an 
„industrialist‟ approach (and by contrast, Brazilian regulation almost disregards these „industrialist 
issues‟). What seems to be more important, in my view, is to use public subsidies to support 
national cohesion, social life and wellbeing. This research has shown that policymakers have 
already included in broadcasting legislation the important socio-cultural objectives of supporting 
diversity, plurality, democracy, citizenship and cultural relevance. It is the task of regulators to 
incorporate those objectives into a more balanced set of dual socio-cultural and industrial 
obligations for broadcasting services. The fostering of content with socio-cultural objectives could 
be achieved alongside the development of strong audiovisual industries and the strengthening of 
national economies. 
 
One possible criticism of this linkage between socio-cultural goals and the production of national 
content is that it could be regarded as ineffective as the resulting content may achieve only poor 
audience ratings. Moreover, the link could be seen as ineffective as viewers, it is assumed, only 
reflect on and assimilate content that they identify with and that they are truly interested in. 
However, there are several examples of audiovisual works with socio-cultural and educative 
concepts that were/are successful with audiences, such as Globo‟s telenovela Mulheres 
Apaixonadas that treated the theme of alcoholism and BBC‟s Eastenders which has storylines 
which include domestic abuse and sexuality issues. Although these examples indicate that these 
kind of contents are already being used it does not make my argument invalid. Firstly, my second 
example is an influential, much loved programme provided by a public-service broadcaster. 
Secondly, at the moment that more content is needed to fill the „digital waves‟ and television 
audiences and societies, more generally, are becoming more fragmented, there are fewer public 
resources available to promote social cohesion and support democracy. Public monies and 





Another possible criticism to this linkage between national content and socio-cultural goals may be 
the association of this policy with excessive governmental interference or even to censorship in an 
extreme case. However, that is not the case. I am not suggesting a ban on content that does not 
promote socio-cultural goals. What I am suggesting is that if society still agrees that broadcasting 
services should fulfil socio-cultural goals, which the analysis of the regulation performed in Chapter 
6 has shown is still the case, then, national governments should focus on financing and supporting 
the production of programmes supporting diversity, plurality, democracy, citizenship and cultural 
relevance. Hence, a new definition of national content, including a re-balanced analysis of socio-
cultural concepts is needed. 
 
The discussion thus far has shown the complexity and contemporaneity of the theme of this thesis, 
how to use regulation for the promotion of national content in current times. I have also started to 
highlight some issues that, in my view, need better attention from policymakers and regulators. I 
want to end by summarising some policy recommendations. 
 
Policy recommendations 
As pointed out during this discussion, the research conducted identified four aspects of regulation 
related to the production of national content which could be better addressed, considering the 
current scenario of digital convergence. These are my recommendations: 
 
a) A re-definition of national content taking into consideration socio-cultural aspects 
As discussed in this conclusion, in order to better fulfil the socio-cultural goals of 
broadcasting services the regulation for the assessment of the nationality of the content 
should be more balanced towards diversity, plurality, democracy, citizenship and cultural 
relevance, especially for receiving public financing. The „cultural tests‟ should not be mostly 
orientated towards industrial aspects as it is currently the case.  
 





Because the internet and different telecommunication services are increasingly distributing 
audiovisual content, it is important to include these new services into the broadcasting 
regulatory sphere in practical terms. It may be argued that the fluidity of the internet could 
jeopardize regulation on that field or that mobile phones are services devoid of social 
obligations. However, as the copyright campaigning against illegal downloading has 
proven, regulators embraced the regulation of new services when prompted by market 
forces. Therefore, the inclusion of some level of obligations (for instance content 
obligations and funding), at least for relevant „web‟ or „mobile‟-broadcasters, should start to 
be considered. 
 
c) Levy on exclusivity deals supporting the production of national content 
Distributors making exclusivity deals should also contribute, through taxation, towards the 
production of national content with socio-cultural values. The money thus raised could be 
used by both independent producers and national broadcasters producing or 
commissioning programmes. Because the exclusivity of sporting events diverts viewers 
and revenues from free-to-air services (largest producers and distributors of national 
content) to paytv operators (largest importers of content), this levy would help re-balance 
the financial resources available for the production of national content and act as a remedy 
to the effect on media concentration. 
 
There is another crucial point related to the broadcasting of major events as pointed out in 
Chapter 7.4, which justifies this regulatory action. As these events are extremely popular, 
they have important implications for a channel‟s visibility and brand-building (not least vital 
for PSBs), which is paramount for sustaining strong national broadcasters in competitive 
markets. Therefore, this remedy could help to create other types of attractive content which 
could underpin traditional broadcasters in times of multichannel platforms. 
 
d) Re-definition of independent producers 
In markets with well-developed and consolidated independent producers, as in the case of 




As discussed in Chapter 8, „super-indies‟ related to transnational broadcasters (such as 
FremantleMedia owned by Bertelsmann) or other majors cannot receive the same 
regulatory treatment given to small businesses (or the small „crusaders‟, in the words of 
Ellis (2000: 151-2)), only because these groups do not act as broadcasters in the country 
considered. Criteria to establish whether a producer can be considered independent 
should consider the global interests and connections of the producer in question and not 
only if the company is related to a national broadcaster, as is currently the case. The 
special treatment foreseen in regulation should promote plurality, diversity and economic 
growth, not media concentration and transferral of resources from national broadcasters to 
other well-established media groups. 
 
Alongside these policy recommendations, the three step analysis conducted in Part Two enabled 
the creation of a regulatory toolkit for the promotion of national content, which is useful for 
policymakers, regulators and scholars of the media political economy and regulatory field. My 
toolkit builds up from the “cultural tool kit” proposed by Grant and Wood (2005: 153-6), listed in 
Chapter 3.7 and further details the general concepts outlined by those authors. My contribution 
also draws on Lee‟s (2009) study which was limited to the quota aspect. The seventeen tools which 
compose the kit may be classified under the following seven groups: i) access and DTV rules 
(dealing with issues of access, coverage, multiprogramming, set-top boxes and EPG); ii) quotas 
(national and regional, independent productions, specific programmes and the definition of 
nationality); iii) ownership (nationality and limits to concentration); iv) broadcasting rights (listed 
events, secondary rights); v) financing (levies and public financing); vi) internet and non-linear 
services; and vii) cinema (distribution and exhibition). As it would take up too much space to 
provide the whole toolkit here, the toolkit has been placed in Annex 1. It includes a detailed 
discussion of the regulatory purposes and effects of each tool. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The intricate regulatory framework related to the promotion of national audiovisual content proved 
to be a challenging field of research. The method of research here utilised, the resulting findings 




be used by policy scholars and regulators in different countries involved in the process of designing 
and analysing media policies. As an additional contribution, the original and up-to-date comparative 
panorama of the broadcasting services in Brazil, France and the UK offered (Chapter 5) has 
indicated the differences and similarities between the television-spaces of the three countries. The 
investigation has highlighted that, on the one hand, in today‟s world, television in countries as 
diverse as Brazil and the UK, have several aspects in common, such as coexistence of national 
and global players, and terrestrial and multichannel systems. Moreover, different agents with varied 
objectives and interests produce and distribute audiovisual content in each country. On the other 
hand, the research has also shown that countries have several lessons to learn from each others‟ 
successful experiences, such as the development of the independent production sector in the UK, 
the French structured financing system and the generation of the highly valued and culturally 
relevant genre of telenovelas in Brazil. 
 
Finally, this comparative media research on the regulation for the promotion of national content in 
digital times has raised some interesting points that should be expanded by further research. A 
rethinking of which are the main desired socio-cultural goals of broadcasting services, and the 
consequent proposal of new objectives and tools adequate to digital and convergent times are one 
possible field of research to be pursued. This additional perspective is important, considering the 
complexity and relativity of the concepts explored in legislation. Elite interviews with policy makers 
may prove useful here. Another area that could be examined in more depth would be the study of 
different media models, particularly in current times. This requires a complex and multidimensional 
analysis, which was not my major focus of attention. Media models are important for a deeper 
understanding of mediascapes and for identifying future trends. To study in more detail the different 
media systems models‟ of this and any other set of countries would no doubt be of value to media 
scholars. Related sectors, such as home-video and mobile TV, which are increasingly becoming 
part of the audiovisual industries, are important. Research on these growing segments would 
identify new relations and forces affecting the promotion of national content. Finally, a longer time 
span and additional countries, which could bring new understandings of the implications of certain 
kinds of regulations, is another important area that research could expand to. These are only a few 




thesis to explore. These aspects suggests that even in digital times of audiovisual abundance, 
regulation still drive broadcasting services and audiovisual activities and still needs to be studied in 
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This annex is a contribution to policymakers and scholars for the identification, analysis and possible 
adoption of regulatory tools - mainly focused but not limited to broadcasting services - for the fostering 
and development of national content. 
 
Because the different rules often apply to more than one activity (distributors, broadcasters and 
producers) the annex will be arranged by the type of rules analysed in this research. Thus, the 
sections will be arranged in the following order: access rules and DTV; quotas; ownership; 
broadcasting rights; financing; internet and non-linear services; cinema distribution and exhibition. I 
would like to clarify that although the cinema industry was only tangentially addressed by this 
research, there are few regulations discussed in this research that are worth mentioning at this stage. 
For each regulation there will be a brief explanation of the mechanisms involved, a comment on the 
implications for each activity (including viewers and national governments) and references to existing 
regulations. At this point I would like to note that the regulations here referred to were already 
discussed in this thesis in Chapters 6 and 7 and their summary is available in Annex 5. Additionally, I 
would like to remark that this research did not focus on competition rules and on competition legal 
framework. 
 
Before starting with the overview of the tools that can be used in a regulatory toolkit for the promotion 
of national content, Figure 27 shows the application range of the different types of regulations here 
suggested. 
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Figure 27 shows that there are different kinds of broadcasters and distributors, and regulators should 
bear in mind that the framework should target those agents accordingly. Figure 27 also indicates the 
overlapping reach of the regulatory rules that will be discussed, meaning that rules might either apply 
to more than one single activity or might regulate the interactions between them. Although consumer 
electronics, video-games and home-video are increasingly inter-related sectors with the production of 
content, those were not analysed in this research but were included in the figure as reminders of their 
interaction with the production and distribution of content. 
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Figure 27 – Different regulatory tools per involved activity 
Notes:  
 Broadcasters: ‘PSB’ (all channels of the Public Service Broadcaster); ‘Other FTA’ (all other terrestrial channels available to the public without subscription); ‘FT-
satellite’ (all other satellite channels available to the public without subscription); ‘paytv only’ (channels available only to subscribers in any distribution 
platform); ‘non-linear’ (paytv channels available in catalogues). 
 Distributors: ‘FTA (T & S)’ (platforms for the reception of free terrestrial (T) or satellite (S) channels); ‘Paytv’ (satellite, cable or other distribution network for 
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A1.1 - Access and DTV rules 
DTV triggered the deployment of a new range of regulations. For instance, the migration from 
analogue to digital is addressed by regulators to mitigate poor coverage and multiprogramming 
enables channels to share the same frequency spectra increasing competition. New digital services 
might favour certain broadcasters in detriment of others and set-top boxes compatibility and listings 
are significant ways of controlling viewers. This section will concentrate on the rules created by the 
introduction of terrestrial DTV. 
 
A1.1.1 - Access rules 
Explanation 
The access rules are divided into three categories: must-carry, must-offer and may-offer. Must-
carry rules determine that distribution platforms, such as satellite or cable, are obliged to include in 
their line-up the FTA channels. The must-offer rule determines that broadcasters have to offer the 
channels to all interested distributors, either free of charge or in isonomic terms. May-offer rules 
indicate that distributors can offer FTA channels from a different area as long as local channels do 
not oppose to (that is a regulation normally applied to federated or networked broadcasting 
systems in order to secure already acquired broadcasting rights). 
 
Implications 
These rules are beneficial for the subscribers, as viewers gain access to all FTA channels without 
the need of additional equipment for tuning the FTA channels. They are also beneficial for the 
broadcasters because they reach the viewers of paytv platforms. It is also beneficial for paytv 
operators because they have guaranteed the access - depending on the rule, even free of charge – 
to the main channels. On the other hand, to allow free access to the FTA channels also indicates 
that paytv operators do not remunerate FTA broadcasters for the usage of their channels and 
denies broadcasters extra revenues from distributing their channels in other platforms. 
Digitalisation and multiprogramming on the other hand may represent an obstacle for distribution 
technologies of small capacity as FTA channels may represent a big proportion of platform‟s 
capacity. 
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Table 16 – Examples of access rules 
UK Communications Act (CA) 2003: s64.3 (lists the must-carry channels: any BBC digital 
channel, digital Channels 3, 4 and 5); s272-274 (broadcasters must-offer the must-carry 
channels without any charge) and; s275 (must-provide those channels free-of-charge in 
certain areas). 
France Freedom of Communication Act (FoCA) 1986 (as consolidated): Art. 34-1, 34-2 and 96, 
98-1 (must-carry and must-offer digital channels). 
Brazil Paytv Act (PA) 2011: Art. 32 (must-carry and must-offer eleven public channels and local 
commercial channels only on the analogue mode; must-carry is transformed to must-offer 
in the digital mode). 
 
A1.1.2 - Coverage 
Explanation 




These rules are beneficial for the viewer because guarantees isonomic treatment, regardless of 
economic conditions, for all households in the area. Coverage obligations may be used as a driving 
force as they set a clear roll-out map to be followed by licensees and to be enforced by regulators. 
This has economic implications for the distributor as companies cannot target most attractive areas 
only and will have to deploy infrastructure in possible non profitable areas. 
 
Table 17 – Examples of coverage rules 
UK Broadcasting Act (BA) 1996: s8 (award of multiplex licenses will take into consideration 
the coverage area, the timetable and the diversity of services). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 96 & 96-1 (audiences‟ digital coverage at least 100% of the analogue 
mode within the original area). 
 
A1.1.3 - Multiprogramming 
Explanation 
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The technological facility enabled by DTV to transmit more than one programme in the same 
frequency slot, multiplying thus the number of channels available to the public. It might be also 
accompanied by a regulatory approach that separates the channel providers from the multiplex 
operating companies, which are only responsible for transmitting the different channels to the 
viewers at home, being completely dissociated from the content. 
 
Implications 
Beneficial for the viewer as it multiplies the number of channels, offering more diversity in FTA 
services. It is also beneficial because the offer of dozens of FTA channels competes with paytv 
platforms. Broadcasters have at least two opposite implications. On the positive side they receive 
more „space‟ to broadcast their content enabling to recycle their old content or to repeat time-
shifted („+1‟ channels) the original channel. On the negative side, the channel has to invest in new 
content to fill the increased air-time not necessarily with a proportionate increase in budget (for the 
case of PSBs) or revenues (for commercial broadcasters). For distributors, multiprogramming 
implies more expenditure to differentiate paytv offers from a free-to-view service. More HD and 3D 
content is needed as well as it is more important to secure broadcasting rights to major events (as 
will be discussed below). 
 
Table 18 – Examples of multiprogramming rules 
UK BA 1996: s1 (definition of multiplex services and digital programme services). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 30-1 (definition of terrestrial hertzienne digital television) and Art. 30-2 
(definition of multiplex operators and commercial distributors of digital terrestrial 
television). 
 
A1.1.4 - Compatibility of set-top boxes 
Explanation 
The legal obligation that tuning equipments (set-top boxes) should be compatible regardless the 
manufacturer or the distribution platform used. It may also allow paytv set-top boxes to be used 
without subscription to tune free channels. 
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Implications 
A beneficial rule for viewers as they can switch the broadcasting provider without needing to 
purchase different equipment. Beneficial for broadcasters as assures that their channels will be 
easily tuned regardless of the distribution company. As it allows more flexibility to the user, paytv 
operators suffer from higher rates of churn-out (users leaving the service) jeopardising investments 
in equipments and reducing loyalty to brands. 
 
Table 19 – Example of set-top boxes rules 
EU 1995/47 Directive on the use of standards for the transmission of television signal: Art. 4 
(ensures decoders compatibility between paytv systems and digital FTA broadcasters). 
 
 
A1.1.5 - Electronic programming Guides (EPG) 
Explanation 
The EPGs are the listings of channels on digital systems that indicate to the user what channels 
are available and which are the scheduled programmes. Regulations may include obligations to 
secure prominent positions for PSB and for the other main terrestrials. 
 
Implications 
In theory, by securing prominent positions for the FTA terrestrials, viewers could find more easily 
the PSB and the other FTA channels. Hence, the importance of these channels would not be 
diminished in digital systems as they would not be allowed to be placed in less viewed places (for 
instance, at the bottom of the list). However, if the regulation is not properly designed (loopholes in 
regulation), distributors might still offer other tailored listings (such as „suggested‟) where channels 
of their interest could appear first, regardless of their order in the FTA „dial‟. While securing the 
original numeration of the FTA could be beneficial for viewers and broadcasters from one side, 
from a different perspective, broadcasters willing to pay for a better position in the EPG are denied 
this business strategy. Accordingly, by setting rigid ex ante rules distributors are denied this 
additional tranche of revenues. 
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Table 20 – Examples of EPG rules 
UK CA 2003: s310 (set a code of practice for EPGs which shall provide prominence for FTA 
channels). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 34.4 (dictates that the FTA channels must be listed in the same order 
and in the same hundreds). 
Brazil PA 2011: Art. 32.6 (dictates that the FTA channels must be listed in the same order). 
 
 
A1.2 - Quotas and content origin 
Vital policies for the promotion of the production of national content are the quota policies. These 
obligations can stipulate the broadcasting (or cinema screening) of regional (as of a group of 
countries -as the EU- or of regions within a country), national and independent content. However, 
in order for those quotas to be correctly implemented the nationality of the works must be rightfully 
assessed by regulation. Another kind of quota that dictates the types of content that will be 
produced and, therefore, influences channels‟ identities are the specific content quotas. Regulators 
might dictate specific programmes to be produced, such as educational, children‟s or current 
affairs, steering the overall complementarities of the broadcasting landscape of a country. This 
section will focus on the rules that specify the types of content that shall be produced and how the 
nationality of the content is evaluated. 
 
A1.2.1 - National and regional content quotas 
Explanation 
Normally set in percentage of the air-time, these quotas determines a proportion of programmes to 
be of national or regional origin. Regional can be interpreted as regions within the country or a 
group of related countries, as is the case of the EU. 
 
Implications 
For viewers the broadcasting of national content has several socio-cultural benefits, such as 
contributing towards democracy, education and citizenry, already discussed in detail during this 
thesis. However, although this thesis has shown that national content considerable attracts the 
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attention of viewers, there will always be a proportion of the population not interested in watching 
national content. National broadcasters profit from this regulation as they are, potentially, the 
biggest, in terms of hours of output and possibly in terms of revenues, traditional producers of 
national content. Therefore, the inclusion of this policy places them in an advantageous position 
with respect to imported channels. Governments benefit in a double effect. Firstly, the policy 
promotes the national industry, with job and wealth creation effects in several other sectors such as 
film, information technology, tourism, etc. Secondly, the country also benefits because, as more 
national content is used, less imported content is used or imported. Hence, fewer imports of these 
cultural goods may lead to a smaller deficit in the balance of trade. With similar effects, regional 
quotas are beneficial for local viewers as they are better represented on broadcasters‟ services and 
the wealth generating power is geographically more evenly distributed. On the contrary, paytv 
operators and national broadcasters with smaller resources for producing and acquiring attractive 
national content cannot use imported content as an alternative to fill the airwaves. If quotas include 
paytv channels, paytv platforms may have to cease to distribute channels that do not fulfil certain 
quota requirements, impacting on viewers. Ultimately, the inclusion of disproportionate quotas on 
paytv-only channels may jeopardise the attractiveness of those services (for instance less channels 
available and less differentiation with regards to FTA services) and negatively impact the economic 
performance of the sector resulting in less taxation for governments. 
 
Table 21 – Examples of national content quotas 
EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS) 2010/13/EU: Art. 16 (“broadcasters 
reserve for European works a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding 
the time allotted to news, sports events, games, adver-tising, teletext services and 
teleshopping.”). 
UK CA 2003: s264.6.j, 286 & 288 (obligation for FTA channels to include an appropriate 
proportion of programmes made outside the M25 area). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 27.2 (FTA channels to broadcast a minimum of 60% of films and 
television programmes made in the EU and 40% made in France during prime-time), 
Art. 70 (the same quota is applied to any service that broadcast films). 
Brazil PSB Act 2008: Art. 8.ix (PSB shall broadcast a minimum of 10% of regional content). 
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PA 2011: Art. 16 (paytv channels shall include 3h30m per week of Brazilian works 
during prime-time); and Art. 17 (one third of paytv channels (up to a minimum of 12 
channels) to broadcast mainly Brazilian content). 
 
A1.2.2 - Independent production quotas 
Explanation 
This tool is in practice a de-verticalisation rule, intervening in broadcasters‟ activities and opening 
their schedules to independent production companies. By commissioning content, this intervention 
also implies the transferral of funds from broadcasters to those, usually, smaller firms. Crucial to 
this regulation is the meaning of independence. Usually, independence is defined in regulation as 
total or partial independence from national broadcasters but regulation can also assess 
independence with relation to foreign broadcasters or to telecommunication services. The 
assessment of the independence can also include the evaluation of the amount of purchases from 
a single broadcaster. Similar to the national quota, the independent quota sets a proportion of 
broadcasters‟ air-time reserved to programmes produced by independent companies. 
 
Implications 
Viewers gain from this policy as it enhances plurality and, possibly, local portrayals‟ in 
broadcasting. A well developed production industry may also be positive for national broadcasters 
as the increase in competition in the production sector may lead to more options of programmes of 
high standard and better prices. Accordingly, more channels with attractive content are also 
beneficial for paytv operators as they may increase channel line-up. Another possible outlet for 
independent productions that could benefit paytv operators is to offer that content on non-linear 
modes (such as pay-per-view or catalogues). On the downside, the imposition of independent 
quotas equates to intervening in broadcasters‟ business model and determining that a proportion of 
their revenues should be diverted to finance production elsewhere, possibly weakening national 
media groups. Loopholes in regulation (desired or not) may allow powerful groups in other 
countries to artificially operate as independent producers locally. 
 
Table 22 – Examples of independent content quotas 
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EU AVMS: Art. 17 (broadcasters shall reserve 10% of their transmission time or of their 
programming budget “for European works created by producers who are independent of 
broadcasters.”). 
UK CA 2003: s277 (“not less than 25 per cent. of the total amount of time allocated to the 
broadcasting of qualifying programmes included in the channel is allocated to the 
broadcasting of a range and diversity of independent productions.”) and; s309 
(diminishes the obligation to 10% for digital channels). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 71 (foresees the broadcasting rights‟ conditions for considering works 
as independent and points to the Decrees 2001-1330, 1332, 1333 & 2002-140 that 
establish the obligatory financial contributions (in terms of broadcasters revenues) 
towards independent productions). 
Brazil PSB Act 2008: Art. 8.ix (PSB shall broadcast a minimum of 5% of independent content). 




A1.2.3 - Specific content quotas 
Explanation 
Additional quotas may be included on broadcasters‟ licenses or agreements in the case of PSBs. 
By setting specific amounts of content to be broadcast regulators can create complementarities 
between the different broadcasting channels and services sustaining diversity. The quotas may 
include: arts, education, children, religion, national and regional news, current affairs and 
citizenship, regional programmes and sport. 
 
Implications 
To sustain diversity is the main purpose of this policy. By offering different kind of content, viewers 
have a comprehensive set of programmes available to choose from, and not only mainstream 
programmes, allowing the fulfilment of the traditional Reithian triad „to inform, to educate and to 
entertain‟. A well balanced line-up of channels is an important asset which could rival paytv offers. 
For these reasons distributors of paytv systems may be opposed to these obligations as they could 
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diminish the attractiveness of the „long tail‟ offers to subscribers. These prescriptions are potentially 
undesirable for broadcasters, as they can be regarded as a direct interference on their business; 
while regulators oblige them to broadcast certain content, possibly less profitable, in the name of 
fostering socio-cultural values. 
 
Table 23 – Examples of specific content quotas 
UK BBC Statement of Programme Policy and ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 licenses (see 
for instance BBC, 2007; Ofcom, 2003b respectively; 2004a, 2004b). 
France „Bilan‟ (similar to the BBC‟s statements) and „Autorisations‟ (licenses) for the main 
terrestrials FT, TF1, Canal Plus and M6 (see for instance CSA, 2010b; 2010c 
respectively; France, 1995b, 1996). 
 
A1.2.4 - Definitions of the origin of content 
Explanation 
The production of any content involves several activities and workforces. The result is a 
combination of, most likely, different nationalities including producers, directors, actors and 
technicians; and also studios, laboratories and shooting locations. Therefore, to correctly assess 
the nationality of produced content may take into account the nationality of the ownership of the 
companies involved as well as of the workforce. If the content passes the test, it will be eligible to 
be used for quota purposes and will entitle the production company to receive public subsidy, when 
available, and to be commissioned by broadcasters for quota purposes. 
 
Implications 
National and independent producers and local workers will benefit from a comprehensive 
assessment that values the production in the country. On the other hand, producers with significant 
market power may regard these tools as interference in their economic activity and if the test is too 
restrictive they might desist to produce in the country. For the government a correct assessment 
will result in well targeted expenditure, as public grants and subsidies are given according to rules 
for the production in the country, contributing for the generation of national wealth. The definition of 
national content should not have major implications for broadcasters that already rely on national 
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and their own productions. Similarly, for those who rely on imported content, the method of 
assessment is not crucial. However, for that latter category of channels – and for paytv distributors 
- the most important regulation in this field is the national content quotas. 
 
Table 24 – Examples of definition of origin rules 
EU European Convention on Transfrontier Television 1989 and Council of Europe‟s 
Convention on Cinematographic Co-production 1994 (sets the European test). 
UK Statutory Instrument 2006/3430 (definition of “British film”, sets a cultural test). 
France Decree 90-66: Art. 5 (defines French works as those produced in the French language). 
Brazil Ancine PM 2001: Art. 1.v (defines Brazilian works as those directed by Brazilian director 
and uses 2/3 of Brazilian actors and technicians). 
 
 
A1.3 - Ownership 
Ownership rules have two main different axes: the nationality of the ownership and the limits to the 
concentration of the media. With regards to media concentration, rules might include market 
assessments, such as maximum audience shares allowed, and include multimedia assessments, 
such as limiting radio, newspapers and telecommunication providers when acting as broadcasters. 
This section will focus on the rules regarding media ownership. 
 
A1.3.1 - Nationality of ownership 
Explanation 
Countries may allow different levels of foreign ownership of the media according to the type of 
media and to the type of broadcasting channel. Usually FTA services are more closed to foreign 




Foreign ownership can be regarded as positive by viewers and paytv operators as increases the 
number of channels operating in the country. On the contrary, more international channels might 
ANNEX 1 –A REGULATORY TOOLKIT... 
314 
mischaracterise national media, diminishing the sense of cultural identity and belonging. National 
broadcasters would oppose this liberalisation as it may bring global and financially more powerful 
companies to the local scenario. National producers may have mixed perceptions, as liberalisation 
brings more distribution opportunities for their content but on the other hand might bring channels 
which are closed to the introduction of national content. From the point of view of the public 
administration, to regulate international groups will imply a better regulatory framework, as those 
companies could be more independent to political pressures. 
 
Table 25 – Examples of rules regarding ownership nationality 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 38 (every person owning more than 10% of the shares shall be 
identified) and; Art. 40 (foreign nationals are limited to 20% of ownership). 
Brazil Federal Constitution 1988: Art. 222 (limits foreign ownership of news media and FTA 
broadcasting to 30%). 
 
A1.3.2 - Limits to the concentration of the media 
Explanation 
Concentration of the media, as it can jeopardise plurality, diversity and democracy, is regulated to 
varying extents, depending on the levels of competition existing in the country and on the strength 
of the regulatory institutions. There are several types of limits to media concentration: 
 Mono-media - limits the market power of companies in each specific activity and 
can be assessed locally or nationally. For instance, a limit on the maximum 
number of licenses or the maximum amount of audiences that the same 
broadcaster can hold. 
 Multi-media – limits the market power of companies in different broadcasting 
activities. For instance, the maximum number of radio stations that a television 
broadcaster can hold and vice-versa. 
 Cross-media – limits totally or partially certain economic activities operating in 
broadcasting. For instance, not allowing telecommunication providers to hold 
broadcasting licenses (as in Brazil) or limiting press conglomerates when acting as 
broadcasters (UK and France). 




From the perspective of the viewer as a consumer, limits to concentration increase competition. On 
the other hand, bigger conglomerates bring attached gains of scale. From the citizen perspective, a 
healthy and pluralist media may result in independent and more reliable media. For dominant 
broadcasters the regulations may limit the possibility of expanding their business and deny possible 
commercial synergies that, for instance, enable other groups in other countries. These limits are 
also prejudicial to the formation of strong national broadcasters which, in turn, would be able to 
compete with bigger companies from other areas brought by digital convergence, such as 
telecommunication operators, and from other parts of the world. For paytv operators, as they 
usually are related to companies with significant market power, those limits may also be regarded 
as negative for their businesses. 
 
Table 26 – Examples of rules regarding concentration of the media 
UK CA 2003: s350 (Schedule 14) (Channel 3 owners cannot hold national newspapers with 
more than 20% of the national circulation and vice-versa). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 39 (individuals cannot hold more than 49% of the shares of channels 
with more than 8% of audience shares and other intermediate sub-limits) and; Art. 41 
(and sub-articles) (sets limits of multi-media concentration (considering radio, 
newspapers and other distribution technologies) in the analogue and digital mode in the 
national, regional and local spheres). 
Brazil Decree-Act 1967: Art. 12.2. (individuals are limited to own 5 channels in the VHF band 
and 10 channels in total (including UHF band) and two channels per (Federation) State). 
 
 
A1.4 - Broadcasting rights 
With the digitalisation of content, works may be distributed by different platforms and services. 
Therefore, to secure attractive content is vital for differentiation in this highly competitive market. 
Exclusivity deals are one of the strategies used by broadcasters and distributors to secure that 
content. Because exclusivity deals may derive from anti-competitive practices and might lead to 
create a social divide between viewers of FTA and paytv subscribers, broadcasting rights are 
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increasingly the focus of attention regulators. This section will discuss some rules used for limiting 
the impact of exclusivity deals, especially on sporting events, and the regulations introduced for 
diminishing the market power of broadcasters when commissioning content from independent 
producers. 
 
A1.4.1 - Listed events 
Explanation 
This type of regulation dictates that the acquisition of exclusive broadcasting rights for major events 
(mainly sports) – also called listed events (as being published by the regulation authority) – shall 
follow specific rules. In one extreme, the rules may forbid certain events from being acquired with 
exclusivity. In the Brazilian case regulation forbids telecommunication providers to acquire rights to 
main events. At the other extreme there is a complete liberalisation and all events can be 
broadcast with exclusivity, either by one FTA channel or paytv channel. Intermediate positions are 
followed by the UK and France. In the British case, within the listed events, a set of „minor‟ events 
can be broadcast with exclusivity in one segment (FTA or paytv) if another channel in the other 
segment (FTA or paytv) has access to highlights or delayed coverage. For the most important 
events, British legislation may allow exclusivity deals for paytv if they were also offered to FTA 
broadcasters (or vice-versa) at fair, reasonable and non discriminatory prices. France opted for 
regulating more events, all of them as of major importance, allowing exclusivity deals in the same 
conditions as in the British legislation. Competition authorities may also impose other restrictive 
measures such as dividing the events in different lots allowing companies to partially purchase the 
event with exclusivity (for instance the „Monday nights‟ matches are exclusively broadcast on one 
channel while the Sunday matches on another). 
 
Implications 
Around the world exclusivity deals exclude the most important events from FTA, increasingly 
transferring the most attractive tournaments to the paytv segment. However, if from the FTA 
television viewers‟ point of view these deals are prejudicial, from the sports clubs‟ and associations‟ 
perspective they represent increased revenues which, in theory, allows them to be more 
competitive (new signings, better stadiums, etc). For paytv distributors, exclusivity deals also 
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represent increasing revenues as they hold some of the most attractive content, being decisive 
factors in viewers‟ willingness to pay for television services. As a consequence, broadcasters with 
less financial resources do not compete on equal terms. Therefore, regulations imposing limits for 
the exclusivity deals are welcomed by viewers that do not wish to pay for watching that content 
(albeit implicitly agreeing that the clubs would receive less revenues) and from those broadcasters 
with less available income, usually national broadcasters and PSBs. Alternatively, paytv distributors 
and broadcasters with significant market power would oppose to restrictions in their businesses 
strategies. Not less important, in the case of exclusivity deals fetching lower values because of 
restrictive regulations, national administrations could lose revenues from taxation (considering that 
national administrations are efficient in collecting those related due taxes). 
 
Table 27 – Examples of rules regarding listed events 
EU AVMS: Art. 14 (events of major importance for society not to be broadcast on an 
exclusive basis depriving a substantial proportion of the public of following such events 
by live coverage or deferred coverage on free television. 
UK CA 2003: s299-301 (foresees a Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated 
Events enacted by Ofcom (2008a), which allows Group A events to be broadcast with 
exclusivity after approval of the regulator and Group B that do not need approval as long 
as there is alternative coverage (highlights or deferred). 
France FoCA 1986: Art. 20-2 (events of major importance cannot be prevented to be followed 
by FTA audiences). 
Decree 2004-1392 (list the events and sets the offering conditions for broadcasting 
deferred or highlights of those events by FTA channels). 
Brazil PA 2011: Art. 6 (prohibits telecommunication providers from acquiring broadcasting 
rights to events of national importance). 
 
A1.4.2 - Secondary rights of independent productions 
Explanation 
These tools regulate the relationship between broadcasters and independent production 
companies. Because broadcasters may have significant market power when commissioning 
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content from independent producers, regulators may impose a fairer code of practice. With the 
objective of increasing competition and plurality of suppliers, the codes may enable independent 
companies to retain a fairer share of the revenues while producing content. British regulators opted 
for enacting a code of practice with a guiding principle which states that the contracts shall explicitly 
determine the different categories of rights purchased (for which markets and distribution windows) 
and the duration and exclusivity clauses to be contained in each contract. The French opted for 
more specific rules explicitly dictating ex ante the conditions. 
 
Implications 
A regulation enabling a proper de-verticalisation and diversification of suppliers of broadcasting 
content has a direct effect on viewers as it increases the diversity of broadcasting services. 
Independent producers are protected from possible monopolistic practices by companies with 
significant market power. A direct consequence for independent producers is that they are able to 
more clearly negotiate the value of their content for each distribution market, allowing them to sell 
only the primary right (to FTA services for instance) to the commissioner company and negotiate 
secondary rights (for instance paytv or international markets) with others. In the same vein, 
broadcasters do not need to pay for all the rights and acquire only the primary rights at a lower 
value. On the other hand, that segregation of rights implies that independent producers have to find 
additional revenues from elsewhere and not rely on broadcasters as their only source of revenues. 
However, independent productions have to be differentiated from simply outsourcing to „preferred‟ 
companies. If companies buy their independent productions from only few „selected‟ companies, 
competition is not fostered and again monopolistic practices are employed. That is the main reason 
for the French regulation that limits the proportion of content that can be purchased from one 
company. On the other hand, these rules should take into consideration the differences in sizes of 
the independent production companies. While bigger companies may easily find more 
commissioning companies, smaller firms, which often produce one or only a few products, will find 
difficult to sell their products to more than one broadcaster. Broadcasters with production facilities 
and significant market power may oppose these kinds of regulations as independent productions 
quotas will have to be complied within certain rules interfering, thus, with their businesses. On the 
other hand, with the increase in completion, broadcasters with fewer resources would be able to 
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commission content at lower prices. For distributors the growth in importance of the independent 
production activity could lead to a proliferation of broadcasters. On the other hand, as paytv 
operators more than often are also broadcasters with significant market power, they might also 
oppose those kinds of rules. 
 
Table 28 – Examples of rules regulating the commercial rights of independent productions 
UK CA 2003: s285 (foresees that broadcasters shall publish a code for programme 
commissioning to be approved by Ofcom that shall be transparent and clear about the 
prices, kinds of rights and the duration which is being paid for). 
France FoCA: Art. 71 (sets the general guidelines for considering companies as independent as 
commented on Table 22). 
Decrees 2001-609 (analogue FTA), 1332 (analogue air-paytv), 1333 (digital FTA) and 
2002-140 (cable and satellite): Details the conditions for commissioning from 
independent producers: exclusivity broadcasting rights must be acquired for less than 18 
months; only one additional distribution window might be purchased (secondary 
markets); not retain more than 15% ownership on the production company and; the 




A1.5 - Financing 
Probably the most extensive set of regulations developed for the production and distribution of 
national content is that related to funding. There are several tools for financing the production of 
content and this research analysed some of the alternatives. This section will focus on the 
alternatives of introducing financial levies on communication services, the „push‟ tools, and how 
public funding can be used for financing, the „pool‟ tools, the production of national content. 
A1.5.1 - Levy on communication services 
Explanation 
Levies works as a cross-subsidy with a specific purpose. Without entering into the rigorous 
terminologies of taxation, levies may be regarded as specific form of taxation – a levy - imposed on 
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certain activities, such as commercial broadcasters, paytv and telephony operators, and may be 
calculated as a proportion of the revenues or as a fixed price per activity. The product of that levy 
can be used for funding PSBs and the production of national content. 
 
Implications 
PSBs, as national and public companies with strong and accountable public remits, are probably 
the most suited companies for providing a wide range of attractive programmes, amongst them 
national content, to the whole society if adequately funded. Possibly, the TV license works well in 
countries with better social indicators. In countries such as Brazil, with high (but decreasing) levels 
of poverty, to impose a TV license would be extremely unfair and unlikely to be properly enforced. 
Therefore, in Brazil a levy with a fixed price per activity was imposed on the other communication 
services for financing the public broadcaster. In addition to these resources, the national budget is 
also used for funding the PSB. However, citizens may oppose the public financing of public 
channels as a diversion of funds from other activities, such as health care and education, might not 
be the preferred option for some. In the same vein, a levy for financing the production of national 
content can also be introduced. France, with the Cosip, and Brazil implemented this path, and the 
resources are managed by the cinema and audiovisual regulators (CNC and Ancine respectively). 
Obviously to impose a levy paid by the revenues of commercial companies will receive strong 
opposition from those affected. 
 
Table 29 – Examples of levies for financing production 
France Decrees 2001-609 (analogue FTA), 1332 (analogue air-paytv), 1333 (digital FTA) and 
2002-140 (cable and satellite): sets obligatory financial contributions (in terms of 
percentages of revenues) for financing films and television programmes produced by 
independent national and European companies. 
Brazil PSB Act 2008: Art. 32 (sets a fixed fee to be paid annually by companies capable of 
distributing audiovisual content, such as broadcasters, paytv companies and mobile 
operators, for funding the PSB). 
PA 2011: Art. 26 (same as above, however for financing the production of independent 
productions). 
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A1.5.2 - Public financing for the production of national content 
Explanation 
More often than not the production of national films and television programmes is funded by 
specific public funds. While the independent quota fosters broadcasters‟ commissioning, public 
funding is fed by taxation and levies applied on different communication services. In France a levy 
is imposed on broadcasters‟ revenues and diverted to a fund, the Cosip, controlled by the cinema 
and audiovisual agency, the CNC. The contributions applied to commercial and public service 
broadcaster varies from 3% to 20% of their revenues (see Chapter 7 for more details). In France 
those funds are applied in two different forms of financing: the „automatic aid‟ which allows a rolling 
flow of public financing to established producers and is based on past performances; and the 
„selective aid‟ which is an up-front loan for financing productions from new producers. The CNC 
have different methods for selecting the projects that will receive those funds, which may include 
economic and cultural assessments. In the UK, public funding is financed by a using a percentage 
collected by the National Lottery. In Brazil there is a similar levy to the French one (that described 
in the previous item), which feeds the cultural fund, FNC. However, this levy imposed on different 
communication services is smaller in scale, when compared to the French obligations, and is set as 
a fixed annual fee (i.e. a fixed amount and, therefore, not proportional to the revenues). 
 
Implications 
The usage of public financing for independent productions and film making might be contentious. 
Those opposed to any form of state intervention and increase in taxes will naturally oppose these 
rules. Critics may be opposed because the imposition of levies is ultimately, directly or indirectly, 
paid by subscribers and viewers. Therefore, there will be segments of the society that will prefer 
not to contribute towards this particular economic activity. As with the preceding levy, commercial 
companies will most certainly oppose this measure. Another contentious point is the transparency 
and accountability used by the public administration in the selection process. As, most probably, 
there are more projects applying for public financing than selected, the decision criteria might 
involve the use of discretionary powers. On the plus side, governments may direct the funds 
towards specific types of content in order to foster production where more specifically needed. 
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Table 30 – Examples of public financing for content production 
UK National Lottery etc Act 1993: s22 (20% of a distribution fund to be allocated for 
expenditure with the arts). 
Finance Act 2006: Schedule 5 (film producers receive back from the government, by 
means of tax reliefs, approximately 20% of what has been spent in the UK for the 
production of films). 
France Decree 95-110 (details the types of programmes and films eligible for receiving public 
grants); Decree 98-35 (extends public financing to television programmes); Decree 99-
130 (regulates the automatic and selective funding system for films and television 
programmes). 
Brazil Rouanet Act 8313/1991: creates a cultural fund that invests in audiovisual production, 
which receives donations and investments in return of income tax relief. 
 
 
A1.6 - Internet and non-linear services 
The popularisation of new services and networks (other than broadcasting services) for accessing 
films and programmes is directly dependent on the increase in the velocity of those technologies. 
Therefore, although the first web page was introduced nearly twenty years ago, fixed and mobile 
broadband nearly ten years ago and smartphones in less than a decade, the regulation of those 
new media now capable of distributing audiovisual content is less addressed by regulation. 
Currently velocity is less of an issue and operators are competing more directly with broadcasting 
services using the internet and mobile platforms. As a result an increase in the regulatory 
obligations for those new services might be expected in the near future. This section will show the 
„light-touch‟ regulation introduced in recent years for these new distribution facilities, generally 
classified as on-demand services. 
 
Explanation 
Non-linear services are those offered as a catalogue of programmes selected by a media service 
provider (such as paytv operators, broadcasters, websites or based on video-gaming consoles) 
where the airing moment is chosen by viewers and not scheduled by broadcasters as in (linear) TV 
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channels. To be considered as a service implies the payment of fees, therefore, sites (such as 
Youtube) or other possible free systems are left completely unregulated by the rules concerning 
audiovisual content. Regulations on these services may imply in the incidence of fees for financing 
the production of content, as is the case with the French Cosip; or quotas over the catalogue, as is 
the case in the BBC On-line service that has to maintain the 25% quota of independent productions 
on their catch-up website. In Brazil the PSB has a legal obligation to develop content for the 
internet without specifying any quota or expenditure. In France, PSB‟s content is freely available 
worldwide, whereas in the UK the BBC‟s iPlayer is restricted to local users only. 
 
Implications 
Internet and other forms of non-linear distribution of content are increasing in popularity although 
not strictly regulated yet. The „light-touch‟ approach, or regulatory forbearance to impose rules, is 
used as a means to encourage investment and innovation in the development of those new 
technologies and services. As the internet is mainly commercially driven, governments may use 
regulatory obligations to encourage PSBs to use the internet as a complementary form of 
distribution of national content. The usage of the internet should be strongly considered and 
financed hand in hand with the increase in digital convergence and the proportional size of younger 
„digital‟ generations. To open on-line services to worldwide use is a matter that will depend not only 
on site‟s popularity (and hence the infra-structure and budget needed) but most importantly on the 
willingness and capability to export the content produced by the PSBs. 
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Table 31 – Examples of regulations for on-line and on-demand media 
EU AVMS: Art. 3 and 12 to 15 (definition and protection of audiences against harmful 
content, extended the directive application to those services without enforcing quotas). 
UK CA 2003: s368A to s368R (similar provisions as in the EU directive). 
BBC Charter 2006: s4 (promotion of digital technologies). 
France FoCA 1986: Art.43-2 to 43-10 (extends the act to include non-linear services). 
Decree 95-110: Art. 4.iv (included the Cosip financing to non-linear services) and 
Decree 2010-1379 (sets the specific conditions to be followed by non-linear services – 
similar provisions as in the EU directive). 
Brazil PSB Act 2008: Art. 3.ix (PSB to promote interactive content). 
 
 
A1.7 - Cinema distribution and exhibition 
As mentioned in the introduction and in Chapter 8, the regulation of the cinema industries is quite 
extensive and is not the main focus of this research. However, cinema distribution and exhibition 
activities are highly inter-related with the production and distribution, in general, of national content. 
Therefore, this section will highlight two examples of regulations used by regulators to promote 
national content: screen quotas and a policy for the promotion of diversity in the cinema screens. 
 
Explanation 
Cinema screen quota for nationally produced films are used in few countries (17 countries 
according to Lee, 2009) around the globe including Korea, France (although not actively enforced 
according to Lee) and Brazil. The quotas specify a minimum number of films and of days in which 
national films shall be screened. The quotas are adjusted in the case of multiplex cinemas (the 
more screens the fewer minimum number of films and days required per screen). With regards to 
cinema operators, in France the government agrees with major cinema multiplex companies 
commitments for supporting diversity of films. For instance, UCG agreed to not exhibit the same 
film in more than three screens and more than 30% of the cinema sessions during the same week 
and not to exhibit more than two films in more than two screens (Garandeau, 2011a). 
 
Table 32 – Examples of screen quotas and distribution rules 
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France Decree 53-1294: Art. 2 (French films shall be screened during five weeks per trimester – 
screen quota). 
Decree 2010-781: Art. 13 (cinema groups shall homologate with the cinema agency a 
programming commitment which shall promote the diversity of films). 
Brazil Decree 7061/2009: Annex (screen quota varies according to cinemas‟ number of 
screens; cinemas with one screen shall exhibit 2 national films during 28 days and larger 




A1.8 - Some concluding remarks on applying the regulatory toolkit 
The discussions of the selected regulations for the promotion of national content have shown that 
the inclusion of rules can have both a negative and positive impact, depending on the activity. As a 
general rule the introduction of measures to increase competition or de-verticalise the broadcasting 
industries, obviously, is not welcome by dominant companies. On the other hand, these measures 
might be welcomed by viewers and citizens. One additional aspect that must be taken into 
consideration by policymakers when introducing those kinds of measures is which are the 
competitors introduced with potential new regulations. For instance, the introduction of an 
independent quota may introduce strongly established foreign broadcasters which might be 
independent from national broadcasters. However, as part of a bigger group they do not 
necessarily need to be incentivised by quotas or, even worse, brought to divert revenues from 
national groups. Hopefully, the explanations of the implications of the tools of this toolkit will give to 
the reader some indication of which rules could be most effective for the purposes of fostering 
national content depending on the existing situations. 
 
In this toolkit I divided the audiovisual industries into three major activities: producers, broadcasters 
and distributors. However, there are several sub-categories of activities as shown in Figure 27 and 
regulators have different tools at their disposal to be calibrated accordingly to each reality. For 
instance, global studios might be independent producers (from national broadcasters) in the 
country under analysis. However, they are situated at a different economic level when compared to 
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other national producers. Therefore, the introduction of regulatory tools must take into 
consideration the different economic realities of the agents that will benefit from that particular 
regulation. 
 
As stated in the introduction, this toolkit is focused on seven main areas of regulation and I have 
discussed seventeen different types of tools. All of those tools can be broadly categorised either as 
„push‟ or „pull‟ tools. Most certainly, the most difficult regulatory task is to find an optimum balance 
between the obligations and the incentives contained in the regulatory framework. I highlighted the 
different market implications of each of those rules and, regulators must bear in mind that 
depending on the „calibre‟ of those tools the market can be directed towards promoting more 
strongly one activity than the other, and sometimes even to the detriment of some activities. Still 
with regards to economic promotion, this research has shown that some degree of prominence for 
national groups might be required in order to sustain a strong national media sector in times of 






ANNEX 2 - TECHNICALITIES OF DIGITALISATION, BANDWIDTH AND 
COMPRESSION TECHNIQUES 
 
In order to understand why FTA was a limited resource in the analogue „world‟ (and, therefore, the 
licensing of broadcasting channels more strictly controlled by governments) and why digitalisation 
changed this paradigm, it is necessary to discuss, in a summarised form, the technicalities involved 
with the transmission of television signals. 
 
The spectrum, or frequency bandwidth or even simpler the „space in the dial‟, needed for the 
transmission of one television channel varies depending on the media used for the transmission (if 
through the free air or guided as in cable) and on the adopted norm. For instance, the European 
PAL system uses between 4 and 6 MHz per channel, the picture has 625 lines divided in two 
frames and is refreshed at a 50Hz rate. When transmitted through the free air it is reserved 2MHz 
more between the channels for reducing interference, totalling up to 8Mhz bandwidth per channel. 
French Secam uses either 5 or 6 MHz and has the same number of lines and frequency span as 
PAL. Paytv systems normally use a 6MHz channel size (or slot) derived from the USA‟s NTSC 
television system that has, on the contrary to the European system, 525 lines (divided in two 
frames) and 60Hz span (Jack, 2007: 265-291). 
 
FTA television has two reserved frequency bands called VHF and UHF with variations in channel 
numbering and frequency ranges between countries (Tozer, 2004: 166).
180
 In order to avoid 
interference between channels transmitting from different locations, spectra administrators 
determine the frequency (and hence the channel number) accordingly. This spectra management 
avoids that two stations reach the same area in the same frequency causing interference (such as 
„ghost images‟). Therefore, in the same locality analogue television can only cope with six or seven 
channels in the VHF band without interference. When the VHF band is full, the regulator have to 
                                                          
180
 Usually the VHF band is allocated for channels 2 to 13 and the UHF band for channels 14 to 68. 
According to the author the UK uses the UHF band for channels 21 to 68 only. 
 ANNEX 2 – TECHNICALITIES OF DIGITALISATION... 
328 
license additional channels (or repeaters) in the upper and more attenuated (hence worst) band, 




When DTV started, and because the analogue will continue to run until it is permanently switched 
off (a period called simulcasting), the new digital channels were licensed in the UHF band, where 
slots are normally still available. Important to note at this point is that in digital television as the 
signal is coded it is more robust and can be reconstructed effectively even if highly attenuated. 
Therefore, the usage of the UHF band, which was a problem for the analogue service, does not 
constitute such a serious drawback for digital signals and more channels can be used in the same 
geographical area. 
 
In order to maintain compatibility with the analogue service during the period of simulcasting, DTV 
uses the same amount of spectrum as the former analogue channels. However, since bits are 
transmitted and not analogue signals, the bandwidth and capacity is usually measured in terms of 
bits or Mbps as opposed to MHz. As traditionally channels had slots of 6 MHz, due to the physics 
involved with the transmission, the maximum amount of bits that can be broadcast in 6 MHz is 
around 40 Mbps, in the cable case, and 20 Mbps through the air (Fischer, 2010: 3). As there is this 
physical maximum throughput limitation (in terms of Mbps), compression techniques are used in 
order to carry more information with the same number of bytes. As those techniques are constantly 
evolving, more channels or higher quality channels in the same available frequency slot are 
increasingly offered, the so-called multiprogramming feature of DTV. That feature enabled an 
approximately tenfold increase in the number of channels available to the public in the digital mode. 
At this point it is important to remark that the option for multiprogramming is at the expense of more 
quality of the image, which in digital transmission equals to the number of lines of which the image 
is composed. If in FTA DTV allowed the multiplication in the number of channels, a bigger effect 
was enabled in the more controlled environments of paytv platforms. Therefore, in those systems, 
digitalisation enabled the offering of hundreds of channels to the viewers. Digitalisation thus 
practically ended with the paradigm of scarcity for broadcasting services (although to a minor 
extent in the case of FTA). 
                                                          
181
 Due to the increased attenuation of the radio waves at higher frequencies, those channels deliver a poorer 
quality image and therefore are less valued by broadcasters. 
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The digital equivalent of an analogue channel with around 500 lines is the standard definition 
television channel (SDTV). By contrast, high definition television channels (HDTV) have up to 1020 
lines and require more bandwidth to be transmitted. If it was to increase a channel definition to the 
high definition standard (HDTV) by using analogue transmission, as the Japanese did with the 
project MUSE in the 1970s, up to 100 MHz would be needed per channel (Ciciora: 73) and, hence, 
the transmission of HDTV would be incompatible with the traditional 6 (or 8) MHz transmission 
channels. As the digitalisation of the signals enables the usage of compression software, 
eliminating repetitions between frames etc, the same signal can be digitally transmitted using less 
spectra or alternatively, more information (or more channels) can be sent in the same bandwidth. 
Using the MPEG-2 video compression standard and the same frequency bandwidth of the 
analogue system, it can be carried in cable up to 18 channels with the same definition of the 
original analogue channels (transmitted in SDTV) or up to 3 HDTV channels (Ciciora, 2004: 74-75). 
Through the air those limits are lowered. One HDTV or up to 10 SDTV channels are reported as 
the current maximum multiprogramming capacity using MPEG-2 in the free-air (Fischer, 2010: 3). 
The MPEG-4 evolution is reported to achieve up to 70% higher compression rates than MPEG-2 
(Costa & Lucena Junior, 2008). Fischer (2010: 138) quotes a reduction from 2 up to 7 Mbps for one 
SDTV using MPEG-2 to 1.5 up to 3 Mbps with MPEG-4, and for HDTV, a reduction from 10 up to 
20 Mbps. In other words, one digital channel using MPEG-4 could carry through the free-air up to 
14 SDTV or nearly two HDTV programmes simultaneously. 
 
With mobile TV for handhelds the carrying capacity and transmission rates are different. As 
screens are smaller the spectrum needed is significantly less. For instance, the DVB equivalent for 
handhelds, DVB-H, uses 120 to 130 kbit/s per channel which enables it to carry up to 40 channels 
in one traditional channel slot (Berger & Schoenthal, 2005: 42-43). Certainly tablets will require a 




ANNEX 3 – ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON METHODOLOGY 
 
This annex, divided in three sections, details three methodological aspects highlighted in Chapter 4: 
the differences of the legislative amendment process of the three countries, the different usages of 
the concepts of diversity and plurality; and the sources used on the regulatory analysis and on the 
market research. 
 
A3.1 Differences of the legislative amendment process 
The research has revealed that the British legislative procedure is the most difficult and unclear of the 
three countries. Firstly, new Acts are enacted without repealing the old ones. As a result, parts of the 
Broadcasting Act (BA) 1990 and 1996 are still valid besides the whole Communications Act (CA) 
2003. Therefore in order to understand, for instance, current ownership restrictions, the three Acts 
need to be read and interpreted side-by-side and complementarily. Secondly, sections of the old Act 
are amended by different parts of the newer instrument. For instance, Part III of the BA 1996 is 
entitled “Amendments of the Broadcasting Act 1990” but other parts of the newer Act also amend the 
BA 1990 (for example Schedules 2 and 11). Thirdly, new sections may amend single words or 
expressions of an existing clause making it more difficult to understand the resulting wording of the 
amended clause. Concluding this note on the British law-making process, the legislative website 
maintained by The National Archives, www.legislation.gov.uk, understandably, has a substantial 
backlog of consolidations to be made, notably in the CA 2003. Brazil and France, on the contrary, 
adopt a procedure that consolidates the ongoing Act and modify entire sections, avoiding partial 
alterations. Therefore their legislative sites, legifrance.gouv.fr and planalto.gov.br, have up to date, 
reliable, and consolidated legislation available for consultation. In that sense the understanding of the 
latter countries‟ legislation is much facilitated. It may also be said that the legal procedures of those 
two countries, by being clearer, make the legal system more democratic, open and transparent and 
consequently easier to research. On a practical aspect, this comment is an important warning to 










A3.2 - Different (and conflicting) definitions for diversity and plurality 
Table 33 – The different usages of the concepts of diversity and plurality by selected scholars 
Concept My usage (Baker, 2007) (Price, 1995) 
(McQuail & Siune, 
1998) 
(Croteau & Hoynes, 
2006) (Levy, 1999) (Kuhn, 1995) 
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A3.3 - Sources used for the market analysis and their limitations 
Although for understanding the regulatory developments that led to the current regulatory 
framework it was necessary to go back to the liberalisation period of the 1980s there was no 
available and uniform data for all the activities analysed in this research as early as that period. In 
this section I will further detail the sources used and the time-period limitations of this research. 
 
The European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) and the Television International Key Facts 
yearbooks used for analysing broadcasting and telecommunication figures are available from the 
year 1995 and 1993, respectively. The Survey of the UK‟s Independent TV Producers only started 
on the year 2003. As for the Brazilian cinema data, Ancine‟s reports start their series in 2005. 
 
With regards to the quota obligations the analysis varies according to the electronic availability of 
broadcasters‟ licenses. The oldest licenses available electronically for research in the British case 
are from 1993 for ITV, 1996 for Channel 5 and 2002 for Channel 4. Due to the same availability 
constraint, the analysis of the French case will start in 1987. For the Brazilian example, as there 
are no quotas in broadcasters‟ licenses, the obligations will be those stated in legislation. 
Additionally, the analysis has shown that the quotas are not changed every year. Therefore the 
indicated years in tables and graphs are those where the obligations where modified. 
 
While analysing broadcasters‟ schedules for the purposes of identifying the nationalities of the most 
watched programmes, I used different databases available on the internet from the BFI, the French 
independent initiative Allocine, own broadcasters‟ information and, lastly, by user-generated 
initiatives such as IMDB and Wikipedia.
182
 As final resource individual pages such as blogs or news 
were used for identifying the origin of the content and, lately, of the formats. Each source is 
referenced on the Tables of Annex 9. 
 
Another point that needs explanation is the periods and the audience shares lists used for the 
analysis. As this thesis is mainly focused on the understanding of the implications of digital 
                                                          
182
 BFI‟s system is available at http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/searches.php (last visited in 03/10/2011). Allocine is 
available at http://www.allocine.fr/recherche (last visited in 03/10/2011). The IMDB search engine is 
available at http://www.imdb.com (last visited in 03/10/2011). 
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convergence for the production of national content, the market analysis will concentrate on the last 
decade onwards. Another fact that justifies that period is the poor availability of aggregated data, 
especially for the Brazilian case. The audience shares for the Brazilian case are only publicly 
available from the year 2004 onwards. Of the three countries under study, the UK is the only one 
which has a publicly open internet-based database for the retrieval of audience information, the 
BARB initiative. France and Brazil, on the other hand, have commercial companies specialised in 
audience measurement, therefore free information on those countries is limited. For the French 
case the available data from companies such as Puremedia, Ozap or Mediametrie, either are in the 
form of a „top ten‟ yearly list per broadcaster or an overall „top 100‟ list which ranks, on a yearly 
basis, the hundred most viewed programmes of broadcasting services. Brazilian commercial 
agency, Ibope, on the other hand, only provides freely the list of the „top 5‟ programmes per week 
with no overall yearly rank. Because of the different methods of publications I decided to compare 
Britain and France by the yearly „top ten‟ and the „top ten per genre‟ lists given by the International 
Key Facts Television yearbook and Britain and Brazil by the weekly „top five‟ rank as available from 
BARB and Ibope. In addition I compared the European countries by a third list, adapted from Barb 
and other internet sources, which compared the „top 3‟ programmes of each of the main channels 
in a determined week. In order to avoid holidays and finals of major sporting competitions the 




ANNEX 4 – THE DIFFERENT MEDIA SYSTEMS OF THE UK, FRANCE AND 
BRAZIL ACCORDING TO THE MODELS OF SIEBERT, PETERSON & 
SCHRAMM AND HALLIN & MANCINI 
 
 
In the beginning of Chapter 5 I ranked the countries of this case studies based in the exclusive 
criteria of governmental influence. The media, however, varies also due to several other aspects 
which are characteristic of each country. Browne (1989: 60) acknowledges the existence of basic 
factors (geography, demography/linguistics, economy, culture and politics) but also “the manner in 
which systems are financed, administered, governed and influenced [by other countries.]” 
Moreover, there are several classifications of media systems that can be used in media studies. 
Earlier on, in times of political bipolarisation between communism and capitalism, immediately after 
the creation of the BBC in the late 1920s, the broadcasting systems could be classified as 
commercial (the American model), state-controlled (Soviet or Fascist) and independent (British). 
Moreover, those systems where replicated in other parts of the world according to economic 
relations and influences. Whereas in former European colonies PSBs were set up, communist 
countries had state controlled channels. In Latin America a mixed model, with American and 
European influences and some state intervention, was adopted (Coleman & Rollet, 1997: 111-3; 
Newcomb, 2004: 199; Waisbord, 2000: 50). At this point I will introduce two more elaborated 
models widely discussed by media scholars. The ones proposed by Siebert et al. and later 
expanded on by Hallin and Mancini. 
 
Siebert et al. (1963: 1-7) proposed the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and soviet-
totalitarian categorisation. The author explains that the soviet-totalitarian and social responsibility 
models are in fact an evolution of the first two systems, the authoritarian and libertarian. In the 
authoritarian model, „truth‟, or the content that the broadcaster decides to produce, is decided by “a 
few wise men that were in a position to guide and direct their fellows.” Media in that model is 
closely related to the centre of political power and its usage is somehow limited by government. 
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Conversely, in the libertarian model man is no longer guided and is capable of judging „truth‟. In 
that system, media is used to inform but also to entertain and to advertise products and brands. 
Moreover, government has limited control over the economic exploitation of the media. In the social 
responsibility model, media, on top of the characteristics of the previous system, incorporates 
spaces for debates and for the discussion of social interests‟ topics. Government may also interfere 
in order to ensure the continuity of the public service. All three countries focused in this research 
could be fitted into the social responsibility model as government has institutionally delimited 
control over the PSBs. On one hand, the countries have, albeit to different degrees, a buffering 
body between broadcasters and government, which somehow restricts government direct 
interference. On the other hand, in the case of Brazil, as broadcasting licenses for educational 
purposes (but not the commercial ones) are still granted by political acts and, at the same time, 
commercial broadcasters have a disproportionate influence over regulation, traces of authoritarian 
and libertarian models can still be identified. In France and in the UK as PSBs still play a significant 
role in each country‟s media scene and are eventually, arguably, controlled by the government 
(certainly by the appointment of their directors) it is reasonable to affirm that the authoritarian 
model can still be identified. 
 
Forty years after Siebert‟s group seminal work, Hallin and Mancini (2004: 66-7), while comparing 
democratic media systems divided those into three other categories: polarised pluralist (integrating 
media and politics), democratic corporatist (coexistence between commercial and political 
organisations) and liberal (mainly dominated by market mechanisms). Hallin and Mancini classify 
the British system as liberal, but recognising the strong role of the BBC; and the French as pluralist. 
From the concepts given by the authors for each model, I would personally fit Brazil amongst the 
liberal system as well, mainly because of the preponderance of self-regulated commercial media. 
In addition, the clientelistic practices, known as coronelismo eletronico, still present to some extent 
in Brazil, as acknowledged by Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) and Sinclair (2010: 512), 
reinforce the positioning of Brazil within that category. 
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This summarised comparative analysis of the media systems of our case studies has shown that 
as the media models are fairly similar, it is reasonable to infer that regulations are comparable and 





ANNEX 5 – SUMMARIES OF THE CLAUSES OF THE LEGISLATION USED IN 
THE CONCEPTUAL (STEP 1) AND TOOLS (STEP 2) ANALYSIS 
 
 
This annex lists the regulations used for the analysis of Chapter 6 and 7. In the following tables the 
actual text of the clauses of legislation have been synthesised and interpreted for easier 
understanding. The pieces of legislation are presented in chronological order of enactment per 
country. The reference to the clause of legislation where the summary has been extracted from is 
indicated between parentheses. For instance, (2.2.b) indicates extracted from Section (2), sub-
section (2), paragraph (b); Sc stands for Schedule. 
 
A5.1 - United Kingdom 
Table 34 - Broadcasting Act 1981 
Diversity ¬ Programmes with proper balance and wide range (2.2.b) 
¬ Channel 4 with a proportion of programmes to appeal to tastes and interests not generally 
catered for by ITV (11.1.a) 
Plurality ¬ Channel 4 with a suitable proportion of programmes supplied by other companies (12.3.b) 
Democracy ¬ News presented with due accuracy and impartiality (4.1.b) 
Citizenry ¬ Provide television for disseminating information, education and entertainment (2.2.a) 
¬ Nothing is included which offends good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite crime 
or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling (4.1.a) 
¬ Proportion of educational programmes in Channel 4 (11.1.b) 
¬ Programme contractors (ITV) providing local news (22.a) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Secure wide showing for programmes of merit in broadcasting (2.2.c) 
¬ Proper proportions of programmes to be of British origins and of British performance (4.1.c) 
¬ Proportion of programmes to appeal to the tastes and outlook of persons served (4.1.d) 
¬ Events of national interest secured to the BBC (30.1) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ No cross-ownership between TV and radio in local areas (20.3.a) 
¬ Television programmes can only be supplied by EU national or resident in the UK (20.6.a.i/ii) 





¬ Proper proportion of matter to be of British origin and performance (4.c) 
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Table 35 - BBC Agreement 1981 
Diversity ¬ Provide a balanced service with a wide range of subjects, serving the tastes and needs of 
different audiences (Annex) 
Democracy ¬ Controversial subjects to be treated with due impartiality (Annex) 
¬ No provisions for independence 





¬ Proper proportion of matter to be of British origin (Annex) 
 




¬ British film is when the maker is EU and the studio is from the Commonwealth and 75% of the 
labour costs (discounting  one person not being the maker) or 80% (discounting actors) are paid to 
EU or Commonwealth Citizens (Sc.1.4,7) 
Funding ¬ End of the levy on cinema tickets (up to 12m£) (2) 
¬ Financial assistance can be given in terms of grants or loans for British films (5) 
 
Table 37 - Broadcasting Act 1990 
Diversity ¬ Provision of services with high quality and wide range of programmes to appeal to a variety of 
tastes and interests (2.2.b) 
¬ Programmes in Channel 4 to appeal to tastes and interests not generally catered for by ITV 
(25.1.a) 
Plurality ¬ 25% of independent productions in ITV (16.2.h), C4 (25.2.f), Channel 5 (s29.2.b) &  BBC (186.1) 
¬ Channel 4 not to be involved in the making of programmes (25.5) 
¬ Competition promoted by the BBC for independent productions analysed by the Fair Trading 
(186.4) 
¬ Regional news for Channel 3 to be produced by independent body (32) where no person can 
hold more than 20% of the body and no more than 50% of Channel 3 (32.9) 
Democracy ¬ News to be presented with due accuracy and impartiality (6.1.b) 
¬ Due impartiality with matters of political or industrial controversy (6.1.c) 
¬ Sufficient amount of time to be given to news and current affairs (16.2.a) 
¬ Sufficient news and current affairs of high quality on Channel 4 (25.2.d) 
¬ High quality national and international news programmes for Channels 3 & 5 (31.1.a) 
¬ Party political broadcasts to be included in Channels 3, 4 & 5 (36.1) 
¬ No undue prominence to be given to matters of political or industrial controversy in licensable 
programme services (6, 47.5) 
Citizenry ¬ Fair and effective competition in the provision of services (2.a.ii) 
¬ Nothing to be included which offends against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or 
incite crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling (6.1.a) 
¬ Due responsibility given to religious programmes (6.1.d) 
¬ Range of regional programmes and news of particular interest for the area (16.2.c.i/ii) - ITV, C5 
¬ Sufficient time for religious and children‟s programmes on Channels 3 & 5 (16.2.e) 
¬ Channel 4 as a public service for disseminating information, education and entertainment 
(25.2.a); with a proportion of educational programmes (25.2.c) 
¬ Channels 3, 4 & 5 with a suitable proportion of school programmes (34.1) 
¬ Code needed for broadcasting standards of violence, sex, taste and decency by the 
Broadcasting Stand. Council (152), which should also monitor the service (153) 
¬ Foreign satellite services most not offend good taste or decency or are likely to encourage or 
incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling (177.3) 
Ownership ¬ Licence to highest cash bid (17.1) 
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rules ¬ Non-domestic satellite means a service transmitted with a frequency allocated to another country 
even if the programmes are transmitted from the UK for general reception in the UK (43.2) 
¬ Licenses only granted to EU nationals or residents in the UK and with no political or religious 
connections (Sh.2,P.II.1, 2) 
¬ Licenses not granted to bodies with undue influence which are adverse to the public interest 
(Sh2.PII,4) and advertising agencies (ibid.6). 
¬ Any person can hold only 2 regional Channel 3 licenses, 1 national Channel 3 or 1 Channel 5 
(Sh.2.P.III.2) 
¬ Holders of a national or regional Channel 3 or Channel 5 can only hold up to 20% interest in the 
other categories (Sh.2.P.III.4) 
¬ Owner s of non-dom. satellite distribution platform cannot hold more than 20% of Channel 3 or 5 
licenses (Sh. 2. P.III.6.2) 
¬ Proprietor of newspaper cannot hold more than 20% of Channel 3 or 5 licenses (Sh.2.P.IV.2.1), 
only allowed if it is a local newspaper in other area (ibid.2) and vice-versa (ibid.3) 
Funding ¬ 14% of the revenues of Channels 3 & 5 financing Channel 4 (26.2) 
Commercial 
rights 
¬ Programme listings to be available for publishing (176) 
¬ Listed events not to be shown on pay-per-view (182) 
Rules of 
access 
¬ New category of licensable programme services (by telecom services, other than wireless) (46) 
and local delivery services for provision of any broadcasting channel by wireless (relays) (72) 
¬ Must-carry obligation for BBC, Channel 3 & 4 (Sh.12.4.2) 
Universality ¬ License of local delivery services to the highest cash bid or to substantially greater coverage 
(76.4) 
 
Table 38 - Broadcasting Act 1996 
Diversity ¬ Same as previous act 
¬ Public interest with regards to the opinions expressed on television or radio or in newspapers” 
Sc2.11 amending BA 1990.13.1.a.ii 
Plurality ¬ Digital channels shall include a proper proportion of EU programmes and 10% of a range and 
diversity of independent productions (19.2) 
¬ Public interest with regards to plurality of ownership between broadcasting and newspaper 
industries (Sc.2.11 amending BA1990.(13)) 
¬ No person can hold more than 20% of the regional news provider for Channel 3 [repealed 
restriction to ITV cross-ownership] (32.9) 
¬ National news provider appointed by regional Channels 3 (74,75) 
Democracy ¬ Sections 6 to 12 of BA 1990 also to apply to digital channels 
Citizenry ¬ Sections 6 to 12 of BA 1990 also to apply to digital programme services 
¬ Substitution of the former Council by a Commission (the Broad. Standards Commission) with 
roughly the same roles (107,8) 




¬ Multiplexers not to undue discriminate broadcasters (12.e) 
¬ Allow of change of control of regional C3 licenses (78) 
¬ No more than two licenses for those with more than 15% of audience (Sc.2.10, amending 
BA1990.(Sh.2.III.2)) and included those persons with +20% participation as holding interest 
(ibid.(2.5)) 
¬ No person can hold a national Channel 3 & 5 (ibid.(4)) 
¬ Maximum ownership of multiplex is 3 (ibid.(5)) 
¬ No national newspaper with +20% market share may hold Channel 3 or 5 licenses (Sc.2.11, 
amending BA1990.(4.1)) 
¬ No regional newspaper with more than 20% market share may hold regional Channel 3 licenses 
(ibid.(4.2)) 
¬ No local newspaper with +20% market share can hold a license for digital channels in the same 
area (ibid.(3)) and vice-versa (ibid.(5)) 
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¬ Channels 3 & 5 licenses cannot be granted against the public interest (ibid.(9)) 
¬ Public interest for promoting economic benefits (when newspaper proprietor owns Channels 3 or 




¬ Proper proportion of EU content (19.2.a) 
¬ Proportion of programmes are of EU origin ITV (16.2.g), C4 (25.2.e) and C5 (29) 
Funding ¬ Channel 4 funding also included revenues from multiplexers (82) 
Commercial 
rights 
¬ Multiplexers must allow channels to share capacity (12.f) 
¬ Listed events of national interest, divided in two categories, one that should be free on BBC, 
Channels 3 or 4 and the others (98) 




¬ Separation of multiplex services (transmission) from digital programme services (content) (1) 
¬ It is reserved space in multiplexes for Channels 3, 4 & 5 (28.2) 
¬ Must-carry for BBC1,2, Channels 3 & 4 (91.2, amending BA1990.(Sh.12.III.4)) 
¬ Allows the separation of BBC's transmission network (operation of own multiplex) (131,2) 
Universality ¬ Award of multiplexes calculated in terms of coverage, speed and capacity of development (8.2) 
¬ Digital local delivery services shall carry the BBC, Channels 3 4 & 5 (91.1, amending 
BA1990.(78A)) 
¬ Digital transmission system complies with EU Directive (142) 
 
Table 39 - BBC Charter and Agreement 1996 
Diversity ¬ Wide range of subjects (Agreement.3.1), sports (ibid.3.2.d) and children programmes (ibid.3.2.f) 
¬ Properly balanced service of a wide range of matters (5.1.a) 
Plurality ¬ Independent corporation for providing broadcasting in all matters (Charter foreword & Agreement 
2.1) 
Democracy ¬ Due accuracy and impartiality with matters of public policy or of political or industrial controversy 
(5.1.c) 
Citizenry ¬ To provide information, education and entertainment, funded by advertisements, or any other 
mean (Charter.3.c) 
¬ Public service for disseminating information, education and entertainment (Agreement.3.2.a) 
¬ Serve the tastes and needs of different audiences (Agree.5.1.b) 
¬ Not to include programmes that offends against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage 
or incite to crime or lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling (Agree.5.1.d) 
¬ Not involve improper exploitation of religious programmes (Agree.5.1.e) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Stimulate performing arts (Agree.3.2.b) and programmes which reflect the lives and concerns of 
both local and national audiences (Agree.3.2.g) 
 
Table 40 - Communications Act 2003 
Diversity ¬ Section 2 of BA1990 repealed 
¬ Availability of a wide range of services with both high quality and calculated to appeal to a variety 
of tastes and interests (3.2.c) 
¬ Public service remit of Channels 3 & 5 is the provision of high quality and diverse programming 
(265.2) 
¬ Public service remit should include the provision of a wide range of subject-matters and satisfy 
many different audiences (264.4.a,b) 
¬ PSBs (from this act the BBC and Channels 3,4 & 5) should stimulate diverse cultural activity 
(264.6.b) 
¬ PSBs should assure that services are properly balanced satisfying the interests of audiences 
(264.4.c) 
¬ PSBs should include appropriate proportion of original productions (278) and news and current 
affairs (279) 
Plurality ¬ Ofcom to maintain plurality of providers of different services (3.2.d) 
¬ Every PSB shall broadcast 25% of a range and diversity of independent productions (277.1); and 
the BBC (338,Sh12.1) 
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¬ Channel 4 not to be involved in programme making (295) 
¬ Digital television programme services (the other digital channels, not PSBs) should include 10% 
of a range and diversity of independent productions (309) 
¬ Plurality of views in broadcasting should be taken into consideration when occurring media and 
newspaper merges (375.1) 
¬ Drop of the one person +20% ownership limit to the appointed news provider for Channel 3 
Democracy ¬ The standards and codes for broadcasting should guarantee an appropriate level of freedom of 
expression (4.g) 
¬ PSBs should facilitate civic understanding by providing fair and well informed debate on news 
and current affairs (264.6.c) 
Citizenry ¬ Sections 6-12 BA1990 repealed 
¬ Function of Ofcom to further the interests of citizens in relation to communication matters and of 
consumers in relevant markets (3.1) 
¬ Codes for public protection  from offensive and harmful material (3.2.e) and standards against 
unfair treatment and infringements of privacy (3.2.f) 
¬ Ofcom must regard the desirability of promoting the fulfilment of the purposes of PSB (4.a) 
¬ Ofcom must promote media literacy (11) 
¬ Created a content board within Ofcom with functions in relation to matters that concern 
broadcasting content (13.2.a) 
¬ Local digital television services should broaden the range of programmes to bring economic and 
social benefits and catering for the tastes interests and needs (244.5) 
¬ PSBs for the dissemination of information and provision of education and entertainment 
(264.6.a) 
¬ PSBs to include a suitable range of science, religion, social issues matters of international 
significance or interest and matters of specialist interest (264.6.f) 
¬ Suitable range of local programmes in regional Channel 3 of particular interest to persons living 
within that area or community (287.2.a,b) 
¬ Channel 4 with a suitable proportion of school programmes(296) 
¬ Unacceptable foreign television if offends taste or decency (the only time decency appears in 
this act) (329) 
¬ Code by Ofcom shall prevent material to encourage or to incite to crime or to lead to disorder to 
be included in television (319.2.b); news with due impartiality (c) and accuracy (d), responsibility 
with religious programmes (e) and do not involve abusive treatment of religious views and beliefs 




¬ PSBs should reflect the different communities and cultural interests and traditions within the UK 
(264.6.i) 
¬ Public service remit of Channel 4 is the provision of a broad range of high quality and diverse 
programming with innovation, appeals to tastes and interests of a culturally diverse society, 
educational programmes and a distinctive character (265.3) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ Due to EU framework, Ofcom must promote competition in the provision and availability of 
electronic communication networks and services (4.3.a,b) and develop EU internal market but 
promoting the interest of all EU citizens (4.5) 
¬ Ofcom can impose conditions to bodies who have significant market power in relation to a 
market (77); one condition (regulatory regime) may include fair and effective competition in the 
provision of licensed services (316) 
¬ Ofcom, before exercising Broadcasting Act powers for competition purposes, must considered 
first if it is most appropriate the usage of the Competition Act 1998 (317.2) 
¬ Foreigners can hold licenses (348.1); religious bodies cannot hold licenses of Channel 3 & 5 
(348.2); local authorities can broadcast (349) 
¬ drop of the rule to be a EU national or UK resident (281.2.a) 
¬ License holding restrictions were relaxed instead Sh14 was put in place (350) which dictates: 
newspapers with more 20% market share cannot have more than 20% of Channel 3 in the same 
area (Sh14.2.1) and a Channel 3 holder cannot hold more than 20% of a national newspaper 
¬ Media mergers involving 1/4 of newspaper circulation or of broadcasting audiences triggers 





¬ PSBs should use a suitable range and proportion of programmes from outside M25 (264.6.j,  
286.1, 286.3 & 288) 
Funding ¬ Repealed the financing from IVT to Channel 4 
Commercial 
rights 
¬ Programme commissioning should follow a code (285), approved by Ofcom (285.5.b), stating 
with sufficient clarity the different categories of rights to broadcast that are being disposed of 
(285.3.b), transparency about the amounts to be paid for each category of rights (c) and 
satisfactory arrangements about the duration and exclusivity of those rights (d) 
¬ Amended the listed events into categories A (most important) and B; A events must be offered, 
to PSBs and exclusivity rights might be granted if the other segment (paytv or vice-versa) did also 
acquired rights; B events may have exclusivity rights if secondary coverage (highlights or delayed 
coverage) was given to the other segment (299-302) 
Rules of ¬ Must-carry any digital PSBs (64.3) 
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access ¬ Definition of television licensable content services, EPGs (232) 
¬ Must-offer the must-carry channels to all services (272) including satellite (273) 
¬ must-provide any digital PSBs free-of-charge (274.3.a, 275) 
¬ Ofcom should foresee a degree of prominence for PSBs in EPGs (310.2) 
 
Table 41 - Finance Act 2006 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Cultural test for assessing the nationality, among other criteria: British set, at least one of the 3 




¬ Cultural test for assessing the nationality, among other criteria: British set, at least one of the 3 
main characters is British, British story, British language (SI 643/2006.4A) 
Funding ¬ Tax relief of the expenses made in the UK for British content (Sh.5) 
 
Table 42 - BBC Charter and Agreement 2006 
Diversity ¬ Public services: BBCs 1-4, Cbeebies, CBBC, News, Parliament, BBCi (Agreement.11) 
¬ Changes in services subjected to approval by a Public Value Test (Agr.23) 
¬ Appropriate proportion of original productions (Agr.49) 
Plurality ¬ The BBC shall be independent (Charter.6) 
¬ Quota for independent productions as in Communications Act 2003 (Agreement 52) 
Democracy ¬ Due accuracy and impartiality for controversial subjects (Agr.44) 
¬ Appropriate proportion of news and current affairs (Agr.47) 
Citizenry ¬ Public purposes of the BBC: sustaining citizenship, promoting education, stimulating creativity, 
representing the UK, bringing the UK to the world, promoting digital technologies and leading 
digital switchover (Char.4 & Agr.6-10) 




¬ Suitable proportion of programmes from outside the M25 (Agr.51) 
Commercial 
rights 
¬ Code relating to programme commissioning (Agr.61) 
Universality ¬ BBC must do all reasonably to ensure that viewers are able to access (Agr.12.1) 
 
 
A5.2 - France 
Table 43 - Audiovisual Communications Act 1982 
Democracy ¬ Public service for the public interest ensuring honesty, independence and pluralism (5.1) 
¬ Right of response for all persons (6) 
¬ High Commissioner of Audiovisual Communication for guaranteeing the independency of PSB 
(12) 
¬ PSB shall broadcast electoral campaigns (33) 
Citizenry ¬ Public service for providing education, entertainment and culture (5.2) 
¬ PSB for the formation of cultural, social, professional and philosophical communities (5.4) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ PSB promoting the French language (5.6) and diffusing French culture worldwide (5.7) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ Only one license is allowed per person and the same person cannot hold managerial positions in 
other licensees (80) 
¬ Local channels are limited to 25% share for one single person (81) 
 
Table 44 - Freedom of Communications Act 1986 
Diversity ¬ PSB offer: one national channel, one regional channel, one for French overseas (44) 
¬ Freedom of communication protecting plurality of opinions (1) protected by the Communication 
and Freedom National Commission (3). 
¬ TF1 shall ensure plurality of information and of programmes (62.2.1) 
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Plurality ¬ Privatisation of TF1 (58) 
Democracy ¬ Commission guarantees pluralist expressions notably in political programmes (13) 
¬ TF1 with obligations of news and current affairs (64.6) 
Citizenry ¬ Commission guaranties to the citizenry access to free communication (3) 
¬ PSB with educational, cultural and social missions (48) 
¬ Religious programmes on Sundays morning (56) 
¬ TF1 broadcast cultural and educational programmes (64.1) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Commission defence of French language (3) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ All holders of +20% of shares must be identified (38) 
¬ Foreigners cannot hold +20% of shares of channels (40) 
¬ TF1 privatisation model: 50% block to one group, 10% employees, 40% public offering (58) 




¬ TF1 shall broadcast works of French original expression with first broadcast in France (64.2) 
¬ The majority of films broadcasted have to be from the EU (70.2) 




¬ Must carry free-to-air channels since 1990 (34.1) 
Universality ¬ Obligation of maintaining the same coverage for privatized TF1 (62) 
 




¬ French works in French language, scenario and script (5). 
¬ Considered EU works if produced by EU company, +50% EU financing, 2/3 production cost, 
artists and studios in the EU. 
¬ 60% EU & 50% French content on television (7&8) 
¬ Dec. 92-279 included countries signing EU convention TFTV (6) and deferred to an Ordinance of 
Ministry (cultural test) [Arrêté du 21 Mai 1992] the conditions for assessment of French origin. 
¬ Dec. 92-279 diminished French content obligation to 40%. 
¬ Dec 2001-1330, included different level of quota for film channels and premiere film channels 
limiting the number of films to be broadcast and diminishing on those channels the quota to 50% 
EU and 35% FR works. (6-2,6-3&7) 
¬ De. 2001-1330 cable and satellite can diminish FR quota if investing in independent productions 
(13) 
 
Table 46 - Freedom of Communications Act 1986 (as amended in 1994) 
Diversity ¬ CSA fostering competition and diversity (1) 
¬ PSB channels same as previous version of the act (44) plus both parliamentarian houses 
channels (45-1) 
Plurality ¬ Same as previous version of the act but by the new CSA (1) 
¬ CSA fostering competition (1) 
¬ CSA to determine the expenditure on independent productions (3) 
Democracy ¬ Independence and impartiality of PSB 
¬ Same as previous version of the act (13) 
Citizenry ¬ Same missions as previous (48) and religious (56) 
¬ TF1 same as previous version of the act 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ CSA for the defence of French culture and language (1) 
¬ TF1 same as previous version of the act 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ Same as previous version of the act (38 and 40) 
¬ Only one license in the same area per person and cable limited to 8M (million) inhabitants per 
holder (41) 
¬ One person cannot hold +49% of a national channel (39.i); if holds +15% in one channel cannot 
hold +15% of another; if holds +5% in two channels, cannot hold +5% in a third (ii); cannot hold 
+50% of a satellite license; cannot hold +50% of a channel in an area of +0.2M-6M inhabitants (iii) 
¬ Foreigners cannot hold +20% of FTA (40) 
¬ Only one national license pp; if owner of satellite only 2 channels; local channels limited to 6M 
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audience; if 1 cable + 1 channel with more than 8M audience, cannot receive a new one (41) 
¬ Only one license for (2 cases allowed): holders of a television license for an area of +4M, cable 
for +6M or newspapers with more than 20% of national circulation (41-1) 
¬ Local licenses for (2 cases allowed): not holders of local or cable licenses or editor of local 
newspaper (41-2) 




¬ Audiovisual communication for the development of national audiovisual production industries (1) 
¬ Of the broadcasted works, 60% must be EU and 40% French  (27.2&70) 
¬ Broadcasters must disclosure the % of French original expression with first broadcast in France 
(28.2) that was broadcast and the educational and cultural actions (28.3) 
Funding ¬ Disclosure of expenditure in French films (28.4) 
¬ TF1 same as previous version of the act 
Rules of 
access 
¬ Same as previous version of the act (34.1) 
Universality ¬ TF1 same as previous version of the act 
 
Table 47 - Decrees regulating the financial contribution towards production 
Funding ¬ Dec. 2001-609 for analogue channels: investment of 3.2% of revenues to EU and 2.5% to 
French (FR) films (3); +3/4 to independent productions (indie) (6); and for audiovisual works (AV) 
16% in FR (8) and 2/3 in indie (11) 
¬ Dec. 2001-609 for terrestrial digital paytv the contribution is higher than for FTA (20&24) 
¬ Dec.2001-1332 for terrestrial analogue paytv channels: for those who spend 20% in films, at 
least 12% in EU origin & 9% FR and 3/4 in indie; for those who spend +4.5% in AV, 2/3 in indie. 
¬ Dec.2001-1333 for digital terrestrial channels: investment of 3.2% in EU & 2.5% in FR films (4); 
3/4 indie (7) (indie if -15% [no -80% obligation]); for AV 16% (9) FR& 2/3 indie (12) 
¬ Dec. 2002-140 for satellite and cable: same as DTV 3.2%EU + 2.5%FR (films), 3/4 indie; 16% 
FR AV, 2/ indie 
Commercial 
rights 
¬ Dec.2001-1332, A cinema product is considered indie if rights deals are shorter than 18 months 
and the broadcaster did not acquired secondary rights for cinema, videogames, other channels, or 
international (6) and if the audiovisual work is -15% owned by broadcaster and -80% hours 
purchased by the broadcaster (11) 
 
Table 48 - Freedom of Communications Act 1986 (as amended in 2004 or 2006 as indicated) 
Diversity ¬ Changed the aim of communication services for the development of audiovisual production (1) 
¬ PSB channels same as previous version of the act, including digital (44) and Arte (45) and 
changed the Parliamentary channel (LCP) (45-2) 
¬ PSB should celebrate agreements (previously were reports only) including the objectives, 
commitment with diversity and innovation, investments with French works (53) 
Plurality ¬ CSA guaranteeing free competition and non-discriminatory relationship between broadcasters 
and distributors (3-1) 
¬ Broadcasters should invest in independent productions without indicating a quota (71) 
Democracy ¬ CSA guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of PSB (3.1)  
¬ Same as previous version of the act (13) 
¬ PSB ensuring honesty, plurality of information and pluralist expressions of thought and favouring 
the democratic debate(43-11) 
Citizenry ¬ CSA for the social cohesion and reflect the social diversity (3.1) 
¬ Anti-doping programmes (20-3) 
¬ PSB for “promoting social cohesion” and fighting against discrimination and delivering 
programmes reflecting the cultural diversity” and for civic economic, social, scientific and technical 
knowledge (amendment 2006, 43-11) 
¬ PSB ensuring honesty, plurality of information and pluralist expressions of thought; diversified 
offer of information, culture, knowledge, entertainment and sport (amendment in 2006, 43-11) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ CSA for the defence of French culture and language (3-1) 
¬ French language is obligatory except in original works (20-1) 
¬ PSB for the promotion of French and French culture (43-11) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ One person cannot hold +49% of a national channel with more than 8% of audience (39.i); same 
restrictions as previous classes for +15% ownership, satellite and +5% but restrictions only apply 
to analogue channels (39). 
¬ Same previous restriction for foreigners (40) 
¬ Only one regional license for those national channels with -8% audience; maximum 7 digital 
channels; if owner of satellite only 2 channels; local channels limited to 12M audience; only one 
digital per zone; mobile TV limited to holders of -20% of total licenses audiences (41) 
¬ Only one license for (2 cases allowed) for: holders of a television license for an area of more 
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than 4M, or newspapers with more than 20% of national circulation (41-1 [ana] &41-1-1 [dig]) 
¬ Local licenses for (2 cases allowed): not holders of national licenses in the area or editor of local 
newspaper (41-2 [analogue] &41-2-1 [digital]) 
¬ Competition advice from the CSA improved (but same as previous version of the act) (41-4) 




¬ Same as previous version of the act (27.2&70) [cable and satellite can be partially exempted if 
investing in independent productions (Decree 2001-1330.13) ] 
Funding ¬ Same as previous version of the act (28) 
¬ PSB agreement need to detail financing activities (53) 
Rules of 
access 
¬ Major events cannot be commercialised with exclusivity if FTA cannot broadcast (20-2) [but have 
to be offered in equal, reasonable and non-discriminative prices (Decree 2004-1392)] 
¬ Independent productions will be assessed according to the duration of the purchasing of the 
rights, extent of the secondary rights, economic participation of broadcaster (Amendment in 2001, 
71) 
Universality ¬ Definition of digital multiplex (30-2) 
¬ Must-offer PSBs and must-carry free PSBs and HD if available (34-1&2) 
¬ Included simulcasting in 2007 (96, 98-1&2) 
¬ EPGs must include FTA channels grouped in the same hundred (Art.34.4, amended in 2009) 




A5.3 - Brazil 
Table 49 - Broadcasting Code 1962 and Decree-Act 236/1967 
Democracy ¬ Quota of 5% of news (38.h) and political campaigning for 90 days (39) 
Citizenry ¬ Information, entertainment and adverts are subordinated to educational and cultural goals of 
broadcasting aiming to the higher interests of the country (38.d) 
¬ Violation of rules if inciting crime, rebellion or indiscipline, against national defence, honour, war 
propaganda, offend family and society morals and decency (53) 
¬ Created educational channels with no adverts (DA.13) 
¬ Quota of 5h per week of educational programmes for commercial broadcasters (DA.16). 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ Managers, editors and technicians shall be nationals and residents (38) and not politicians (38.u) 
¬ Only government, universities, organisations and societies with 100% BR shares can be licensed 
(DL.4) 
¬ Maximum of 10 channels in different locations, of those only 5 in VHF, are allowed (DL.12.2) 
¬ Educational channels only for government, universities and organisations (DL.14) 
 
Table 50 - Federal Constitution 1988 
Plurality ¬ Social communication shall promote independent productions (221) 
¬ Broadcasting shall be complementary between private, public and government (223) 
Democracy ¬ Censorship forbidden in all forms (220) 
Citizenry ¬ Television shall comply with preference to educational, artistic, cultural and informational goals 
and respect to ethical and social values of people and families (222) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Social communication shall comply with the promotion of national and regional culture, (and art 
and news) (220) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ Foreign ownership limited to 30% but managerial and editorial positions are reserved to nationals 
(222) 
 
Table 51 - Cultural policy – Sarney Act (SA) 7505/1986, Rouanet Act (RA) 8313/1991 and 
Audiovisual Act (AVA) 8685/1991 (and 1993 amendment) 
Plurality ¬ Independent producers are those with no relations with broadcasters and cable (AVA, 1, referring 
to the act 8401/92.2) 
Citizenry ¬ National cultural programme for the access of cultural sources and for the exercise of cultural 
rights (RA, 1.i) 




¬ National cultural programme for the stimulation of regional and local cultural and artistic 
production (RA, 1.ii); protect cultural expressions of the groups that formed society and responsible 
for national cultural pluralism (1.iv); save the survival and flourishing of creation and lives of society 




¬ National content produced by Brazilian companies with 1/3 of actors and technicians (AVA, 7) 
¬ National work if produced by Brazilian company under national management (SA, 4) 
¬ Audiovisual work may be produced by a Brazilian company or in co-operation (AVA, referring to 
the act 8401/1992, 3) 
Funding ¬ Cultural investor may receive a tax rebate up to 80% (individuals) or 40% (plc) of donations (RA, 
26) 
¬ Investments in films deducted from income tax (3% persons, 1% companies( AVA, 1) and in 
television content (4% persons and 6% companies) (AVA 1-A) 
 
Table 52 - Cable Act 1995 
Plurality ¬ Purpose of cable for diversity of sources of information (3) 
¬ 30% of cable capacity to be offered to tier services (24.II), (5.X) [never regulated] 
Democracy ¬ Cable with purpose of promoting political pluralism (3) 
Citizenry ¬ Service for the promotion of universal and national culture, leisure, entertainment and social and 
economic development (3) 
Ownership 
rules 
¬ 51% of shares with nationals (7), not with politicians (9), telecommunication providers only if no 




¬Obligation to broadcast national independently produced films (31.IV) 
Funding ¬ Purpose of development of film industry (10.vii) 
¬Obligation to co-produce national films (30.V) 
Rules of 
access 
¬ Notion of one shared multipurpose network (4.1) 
¬ Must-carry obligation for FTA and other government and public channels only existing in cable 
(23) 
 
Table 53 - Ancine Provisional Measure (PM 2.228-1) 2001 








¬ National production company if +50% Brazilian shares and director and 2/3 of artists and 
technicians  are Brazilians (1.v) 
¬ Agency for the promotion of Brazilian production in different markets [segments] (2.ii) 
Funding ¬ Agency for the promotion of national culture and language and stimulate national AV industries 
(2.i) 
¬ Exception of registration fees [certificates] for the works whose right owner invest 3% of the 
exported revenues in independent productions (39.x) 
Tax rebate for those whom acquire shares in independent productions (50, referring to the AV.1] 
and 70% tax rebate for investing in independent productions (50, referring to the AV.3) 
 
Table 54 - PSB Act 2008 
Plurality ¬ PSB for the access to information by plurality of production sources (2.II) 
¬ Complementarities between private, public and government broadcasting systems (2.I) 
¬ Quota of 10% of regional and 5% of indie programmes for PSB (8.ix) 
Democracy ¬ PSB with autonomy from the government with participation of civil society in its control (2.viii, ix) 
¬ Space for debate and for democracy consolidation (3) 
Citizenry ¬ Educational, artistic, cultural, scientific and informational goals (2.iii) 
¬ No discrimination by religion, political, philosophical, ethnical or sexual option (2.vi) 
¬ Develop critical conscience of citizens by educational, artistic, cultural, informative, scientific and 
promoter of citizenry programming (3.ii) and, as a minor objective, entertainment (8.iv) 
¬ Direct its production by the principles of promoting education, art, culture, information, scientific, 
citizenry but searching for audiences (3.vii) 




¬ Promotion of national and regional culture (2.iv, v) 
Funding ¬ 10% of telecommunication services annual inspection fees to finance PSB (32) 
Rules of 
access 
¬ Develop interactive content for the internet (3.ix) 
 
Table 55 - Paytv Act 2011 
Diversity ¬ Promotion of diversity of culture and of information (3.ii) 
¬Reception of the Unesco's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (3.1) 
Plurality ¬ Promotion of "diversity" of production sources (3.ii) 
¬ Stimulus of regional and independent production (3.iv) 
¬Minimum 1h45min., weekly, from independent producers (16) 
¬Minimum two channels have to be produced by independent broadcasters (17.4) 
Democracy ¬ If one news channels is offered it has to be offered a second one (18) 
Citizenry ¬ Every offer has to include educational, university, legislative, community, citizenship channels 
and governmental channels (10 in total) (32) 
Cultural 
relevance 
¬ Promote national culture and the Portuguese language (3.iii) 




¬ At least 70% of the shares of production companies and of broadcasters have to be hold by 
Brazilian nationals to be considered national (2.xviii) 
¬ Free and fair competition without monopolies or oligopolies (3.vi) 
¬Broadcasters cannot hold more than 50% of telecommunication companies and 




¬ Broadcasters managers to be Brazilian nationals (10) 
¬ A minimum of 3h30min, weekly, of content has to be Brazilian in main paytv channels (16) 
¬A third of the channels (max 12) has to be of Brazilian content (17) 
Funding ¬Telecommunication fee to finance production of national and independent content (26). 
¬10% of the funding applied to channels produced by communities and universities (27). 
Commercial 
rights 
¬Telecommunication companies cannot acquire content rights of events of national interest (6). 
Rules of 
access 
¬ Non-linear services exempted of national content quotas (Art. 19.vi) 
¬ Must carry FTA and additional governmental channels (32) 
¬ Must carry channels to be offered in the same sequential order as in FTA services (Art. 32.6) 
¬ Must carry channels offered free of charge only in the analogue mode and must-offer 





ANNEX 6 – OWNERSHIP RULES 
 
 
This annex contains detailed information on the developments of mono-media and cross-media 
ownership in our case studies. In the UK, it may seem that ownership regulation is always related to 
Murdoch‟s acquisitions and moves in that country. In the early 1970s, when the media mogul acquired 
an ITV license in the London area whilst owning a radio station and newspapers in the same region, 
the regulatory agency, because of a loose ex post existing regulation, was criticized for being too 
inactive (Collins & Murroni, 1996: 66-7). In the following years, the agency was again criticised this 
time for being too strict, because it decided not to allow any further ITV changeovers during the period 
of the license (ibid). As a consequence, in the 1980s legislation was introduced to clarify the matter. 
The BA 1981 prevented ITV holders (Channel 3 “programme contractors”) of acting “contrary to the 
public interest” (s23.1) when associated with newspapers but without setting an actual limit for that 
cross-ownership. More clearly than with the newspaper market, the act did not allow cross-ownership 
at all between commercial television and radio in the same geographical area (s20.3.a). By avoiding 
cross-ownership on those primal services, a minimum plurality objective was sustained by legislation. 
 
Subsequently, in order to deal with those past critics towards the dithering attitudes of the regulatory 
agency, the BA 1990 introduced a complicated series of explicit cross-ownership rules giving precise 
limits to the regulatory agency in order to prevent concentration of the media beyond certain levels. 
Among other limitations, the act ordered that local, regional and national newspapers could not hold 
more than 20% of the shares of Channel 3 or 5 in the same area or nationally (Schedule 2, Part IV, 
s2.1). Once again, those and other intricate and rigid rules quickly became object of criticism in times 
where media was consolidating simultaneously in other countries. Then a new „de-regulatory‟ act was 
introduced. 
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The BA 1996 released Channel 5 from cross-ownership limitations. However the act also returned to 
the vague philosophy by dictating that Channel 3 and 5 licenses could not be granted against the 
“public interest” which included the promotion of plurality, diversity and “economic benefits”, such as 
employment (Schedule 2, s11 amending the BA 1990, Schedule 2, Part IV, s13). With the CA 2003 
those rules where simplified once more and, as a general principle, for the same area, newspaper 




Limits to mono-ownership in broadcasting were also object of constant regulatory concern. While the 
BA 1981 did not have any ex ante regulation regarding mono-media concentration, the BA 1990 
allowed a maximum of two regional Channel 3, the national Channel 3 or one Channel 5 license to be 
held by the same company (Schedule 2, Part III, s.2). By the BA 1996 the criteria for establishing 
concentration changed to audience shares. Only two licenses were allowed for those controllers of 
channels with more than a 15% share of the national audience (Schedule 2, s10, amending the BA 
1990 Schedule 2, Part III, s.2). The CA 2003 further relaxed those series of rules to an ex post 
regulation and almost returned to the BA 1981 scenario. The difference with the old setup is in the 
tools the regulatory agency has at their disposal for regulating and intervening. Using the CA 2003, 
Ofcom can impose disclosure of accounts on bodies with significant market power in relation to a 
market (s77), ensuring that those companies operate with “fair and effective competition in the 
provision of licensed services” (s316). The act also states that in order to enforce competition in 
broadcasting services the agency should always first consider to apply the Competition Act (s317.2). 
 
Although the CA 2003 gives power to the regulating agency to open the accounts and verify 
commercial practices of dominating companies, the asymmetry of information is regarded as 
indomitable in broadcasting services (Tambini, 2009). Therefore, while the new regulatory framework 
may be regarded as being better equipped than the older one set by the BA 1981, currently, when 
media groups have higher degrees of consolidation and, hence, economic and lobbying power, to 
regulate and impose „fair‟ competition could be even more difficult. For example, it could be argued 
that the acquisition of the remaining shares of BSkyB by Murdoch‟s News Corp in 2011 was only 
                                                          
183
 In addition the act also dictates that all media mergers involving more than one quarter (1/4) of the 
circulating newspapers or of broadcasting audiences in a “substantial” area can be object of attention of the 
Secretary of State, in the name of the “public interest” following advice from Ofcom (s378). 
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aborted because of the News of the World phone hacking scandal and not because of regulators‟ 




Media concentration and cross-ownership rules, on the other hand, varied little through time in 
France. By the amendments introduced in 1994, the FoCA measures concentration in terms of 
population coverage, thus different to the UK‟s BA 1996 which used audience shares as a parameter. 
Additionally, and also different to the British case, limits were set to the coverage of cable and satellite 
distribution services.
185
 Those limits were successively changed by the several amendments made 
between 2000 and 2009. The amendments introduced measurement of concentration through a 




Several other clauses were introduced and services‟ limits were re-regulated by the already 
mentioned amendments. Currently, owners of printed media with more than 20% national circulation 
and broadcasters with more than four million inhabitants cannot receive further national licenses (Art. 
41-1 and 41-1-1). Conversely, no printed media owners and national broadcasters are allowed to 
receive licenses for local services (Art. 41-2 and 41-2-1).
187
 By those rules regulators protect local 
services to be controlled by the local press but at the same time the growth of regional channels is 
                                                          
184
 In that episode, while the conglomerate made an offer for acquiring the remaining shares of the paytv 
distributor BSkyB, News of the World (a newspaper part of Murdoch‟s conglomerate) was facing accusations of 
hacking phone conversations. The acquisition was initially given the go ahead by the British government 
dismissing claims that it would hamper plurality and endangers competition in broadcasting services (see for 
instance The Guardian 2011). UK‟s culture secretary did accept Sky‟s own suggestion to reduce their own 
participation on Sky News channel (which achieves derisory viewing shares) and that it should be run 
independently, as a regulatory remedy. 
185
 The amendments, limited the ownership of local terrestrial channels to areas with less than six million 
inhabitants, satellite television broadcasters could only own one radio station and cable licenses where limited to 
areas up to eight million inhabitants (Art. 41). 
186
 With the introduction of digitalisation, in 2004, in order to receive additional broadcasting licenses, 
broadcasters could not exceed a maximum limit of 8% of national audience share and possess more than seven 
digital television licenses (Art. 41). Additionally, the amendments that introduced the maximum cap for national 
audience share also increased the level of concentration allowed, as the six million inhabitants rule was doubled 
to twelve million. 
187
 Additionally, the last amendment regarding to ownership, from 2004, determines the following restrictions 
(Art. 39): no company can hold more than 49% of the shares of a channel with more than 8% audience share; no 
holder of more than 15% of the shares of one analogue channel may hold more than the same percentage of the 
shares of another analogue channel and no holder of more than 5% of the shares of two analogue channels may 
hold the same percentage of the shares of a third analogue channel. Accordingly, the same article set other limits 
for analogue satellite television channels owners. No holder of more than 50% of the shares of one analogue 
satellite channel  may hold another analogue satellite channel; if holder of one third can hold up to one third on 
another channel and if less than 5% in two channels may hold up to 5% of a third channel. 
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also limited. The French government is concerned with the survival of local media but does not allow 
them to be major national players. 
 
The amendments to the FoCA have shown that instead of de-regulating or liberalising the ownership 
rules, like in the British case, the French continued the approach of setting ex ante rules. By including 
the new distribution services into the existing rules, regulators avoided, thus, from the onset, 
undesired media consolidation and foreign ownership. 
 
In Brazil a mosaic of regulatory instruments dictates the ownership rules and the concentration 
allowed in broadcasting services. In terms of concentration, for commercial FTA, since 1967 only five 
licenses can be held by the same group in the VHF band, plus another five in the less viewed, and 
hence less valuable, UHF band (Decree-Act 236 1967, Art. 12.2).
188
 However, there are no 
restrictions for relay-stations ownership or networking arrangements.
189
 Therefore, as a result of those 
simple ownership restrictions, as shown in Chapter 5, Brazil has a highly consolidated broadcasting 
market and FTA is dominated by four major Brazilian commercial networks (Globo, SBT, Record and 




The educational FTA channels on the other hand, can be run by governments, universities and other 
organisations (Decree-Act 236 1967, Art. 14). While those latter channels may be state-owned (at the 
Federal, State and Municipal level), as discussed in Chapter 5, politicians, as individuals, can be 
owners of commercial broadcasting channels (although not managers). On the other hand, politicians 
were prevented from being licensees of cable services (Cable Act 1995, Art. 9), which was later 
scrapped by the PA 2011. Therefore, in Brazil there is a peculiar situation where the different 
governmental spheres, obviously headed by politicians, act as (state-owned and educational) 
                                                          
188
 Brazilian legislation only stipulates limits on channels called “generators” which are stations licensed to 
generate programmes of their own. Relay channels cannot include different programmes or advertisements 
(unless in border zones) and there is no ownership limits for those stations. Rede Globo, for instance, covers 
practically the whole country while only owning, actually, five broadcasting licenses (Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, 
Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. See Annex 2 for more details on the VHF and UHF bands.  
189
 By that arrangement, similar to the American system, networks coverage is achieved either by associated 
„generators‟ that reproduce partially the network‟s content or by relays that reproduces integrally the content of 
a „generator‟. According to Anatel there are currently 300 generators and more than 9,000 relays operating in 
the country (cited in Ancine 2011: 73). 
190
 Such as Rede TV! and Rede Gazeta (commercial), TV Brasil (PSB), TV Cultura (owned by the Sao Paulo 
state) and Rede Vida (catholic organisation). 
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broadcasters and other politicians may act as commercial broadcasters. However, it must be 
remarked that although there is a close relationship between politics and electronic media, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, apparently, the big commercial networks are not owned by members of the 
congress. As such, at least with regards to ownership, the Brazilian mediaspace is less politically 
contaminated than in other countries, such as Italy where Silvio Berlusconi was prime-minister for 
decades while being the major broadcaster in the country. 
 
Cross-ownership between broadcasting and newspaper in Brazil is not a matter of regulatory concern, 
arguably because of market reasons. While one of the most read Brazilian newspaper, Folha de Sao 
Paulo, has 300,000 readers daily in average (ANJ, 2010), and the most read magazine Veja has, 
arguably, one million copies per weekly edition for the whole country, Rede Globo evening news 
broadcast, Jornal Nacional, although with declining rates over the decades, is, according to UOL 
news website (Feltrin, 2010), watched daily by 1.6 million households in the city of Sao Paulo only 
(23% audience share).
191
 Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming interest on FTA amongst viewers, it 
is worth noticing that the major Brazilian commercial broadcaster has also interests in the printed 
media market, as, conversely, the major publishing house of Latin America, Grupo Abril, also 
operates in the paytv sector and act as broadcaster. Cross-media ownership occurs in Brazil, it is just 
not addressed in legislation. 
 
The French and the British legal developments with regards to mono and cross-ownership, have 
shown that, while in Britain there has been a complete cycle from ex post, to ex ante and returning to 
a liberal ex post regulation, in France regulation stood, in comparison, rigid and ex ante. In France, 
new technologies were added to existing regulation whilst, overall, the same principles were 
maintained. In Brazil there is a rigid set of rules for avoiding FTA concentration but legislators opted 
not to assess audience shares or impose more elaborated controls on the media. 
 
 
                                                          
191
 Audience shares in Brazil are measured in some capitals only. The Great Sao Paulo city has 20 million 
inhabitants and 7 million households. Brazil has approximately 190 million inhabitants and 53 million 
residences. Therefore, extrapolating the Sao Paulo figures to the rest of Brazil, the audience could reach a 




ANNEX 7 –ASSESSING THE NATIONALITY OF FILMS 
 
 
This annex details the methods implemented by policymakers of the case studies for assessing the 
nationality of the films. These rules are implemented for two main purposes: grant access to public 
funds and to count for quota purposes. The methods of each country will be detailed in individual 
sections. 
 
A7.1 - British ‘seesaw’ 
The Films Act 1985 besides abolishing the Eady Levy
192
 (s2) introduced the analysis of economic 
aspects for assessing the nationality of films. The act, besides determining that the “maker” of the film 
should be a person (or company) resident in a Member State (of the EU), established that the studio 
used in the making of the film should be located in the Commonwealth or the Republic of Ireland and 
that not less than 75% or 80% of the labour costs were paid to Commonwealth or Member States 
citizens (Schedule 1, s4 and s7). The first percentage applied if the labour costs for one foreigner (for 
instance one leading American actor) were discounted and the second if two people were discounted 
(for instance two actors or one actor and a producer). The act also determined that not more than 
7.5% of the playing-time could be filmed in a non-UK studio and no more than 20% filmed outside the 
country. The amendment of the act in 1999 introduced more economic assessments and eliminated 
those playing-time rules. To be considered British the film should had a total expenditure of 70% in 
the UK (Schedule 1, s4.3). Additionally, in order to level the percentages described in legislation, 
labour costs obligations were slightly reduced to 70% and 75% for the cases of one or two foreigners, 
as described before. 
 
In 2006 the Films Act was once more modified, by the Finance Act 2006 (and regulated by the 
Statutory Instrument 2006/643), and a form of cultural relevance was reintroduced by means of a 
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 In place since 1957, the Eady Levy was a compulsory fee on cinema admissions (for details see Hill 1996: 
100-2). 
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„cultural test‟. The previous percentages and definitions introduced in 1999 were scraped. In the new 
version the “maker of the film” should be a person (or company) resident in the EU (the reference to 
the Commonwealth was eliminated). There were specific tests for films, documentary and 
animation.
193
 A work would be considered as „British‟ if it was awarded 16 points of the maximum 32 
foreseen. Up to four points could be achieved with respect to the content (set in Britain, characters 
depicted as British, British story, English language), 15 points with respect to work aspects if carried 
out in Britain (photography, visual effects, post production, etc) and 13 points with respect to the 
usage of British personnel (director, actors, scriptwriters, etc). 
 
Less than one year after the test was in place it was substantially modified and since that reform 
much emphasis is diverted to content requisites (by the Statutory Instrument 2006/3430). The test, 
still used, reduces the total of points to 31 and gives to the same previous categories a new balance 
of points. Content related items are augmented to a maximum of 16 points, work related aspects are 
reduced to three points and personnel are diminished to eight points. Additionally, the new test 
includes a new category which allows four more points depending on “the contribution of the film to 
the promotion, development and enhancement of British culture.” 
 
A7.2 - French approach: ‘man the barricades’ 
Detailing the concepts of „French expression‟ foresee in the FoCA 1986, the Decree 90-66 defined 
European works as those produced by a European company (or EU national) and where the financial, 
technical and artistic decisions were taken under final responsibility of EU citizens. Furthermore, the 
decree determined that EU works should be 50% funded by EU companies and that two thirds (2/3) of 
the production cost should be spent in the region. In terms of personnel, the Decree stated that those 
works should employ at least two thirds (2/3) of European actors, technicians, authors, directors, 
scriptwriters and other professionals and that the works should be performed in EU studios and 
laboratories in the same proportion (2/3). As can be seen from those rules, the French setup in the 
early 1990s was very similar to the one that reigned in the UK until 1999. However, the French 
approach to the definition of the nationality changed in 1992. After the political momentum that 
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 For the purposes of this discussion I will concentrate on the films‟ test only. 
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followed the introduction of the TWF Directive in 1989 and in times of the GATT negotiations,
194
 the 
decree and the parameters where changed. 
 
In 1992 instead of stating a fixed proportion of minimum expenditure or of European personnel by 
Decree the decision on the assessment was transferred to the Ministry of Culture and of 
Communication. In a move that opened space for using discretionary powers, and hence to make a 
political decision, the Ordinance of 21/May/1992 established the first „cultural test‟. The new rule 
introduced the following scoring scheme: director (3 points); setting (2); other authors (1); main actor 
(3); second actor (2); 50% of expenditure of other actors (1); image (1); sound (1); editing (1); 
decoration (1) and laboratories (2). Of a total of 18 points, the work would qualify as European if 
achieved 13 points in the case of audiovisual works and 14 for films. That test with the same weights 
is still in place. It is important to note that those French rules were quickly adopted by the 
aforementioned Council of Europe‟s convention of 1994 and were inserted within an overall policy of 
boosting the production of European content. 
 
The subsidies given by French legislation for the production and distribution of films and audiovisual 
works are set by the Decree 99-130 with the latest modification introduced in 2006. The CNC film 
agency has a comprehensive test that includes individual assessments for the production company, 
the studios and the laboratories and the application of the „European test‟ (bareme europeen) and the 
„financial support test‟ (bareme du soutien financier) (CNC, 2011d). In order to be awarded points, the 
production company, the studios and associated laboratories need to be established in France and 
managed by French or European citizens. In the case of the European and funding tests, the 
nationality of each of the companies involved with the production is also evaluated and the project can 
achieve French or European status accordingly.
195
 It is only when the film passes this extensive 
assessment that the project will be entitled to receive public funding. Those additional evaluations 
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 See Chapter 3 for more detail on GATT negotiations. 
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 In the case of a fiction film, for instance, the „European test‟ is equal to the one with 18 points described 
previously and the work has to score the same amount, 14 points. However, the difference lies in the other 
assessment, the financial test. In order to be classified as European, the film has to score 25 out of 100 points 
available in the following broad categories: production company (10); language (20); authors (10); actors (20); 
creative technicians (14); technicians (6); location and post-production (20). While the items production 
company and language are awarded fully or not, depending if the company is European and the language is 
French, the other categories are further sub-divided. For instance, authors (10 points) is divided into: director 
(5); author, adapter and script (4) and; composer (1) (for full details see CNC 2011). 
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performed by a selecting committee of the CNC and the consequent public funding available 
differentiate the French from the British financing mechanisms. 
 
A7.3 - Brazil: one step behind 
According to the so-called Sarney Act 7505/1986,
196
 to be considered as „national‟ any cultural work 
(the act applied to any form of art) had to be produced by a Brazilian company under the managerial 
control of Brazilian citizens (Art. 4). Later on, when the cinema agency was created, the Provisional 
Measure (PM) 2228-1/2001 considered that only the works that were produced by a Brazilian 
company (more than 50% of the company should be owned by Brazilian nationals) and under the 
managerial control of a Brazilian citizen would be considered as Brazilian (Art. 1.v). Moreover, 
according to that regulation, works should be written by Brazilian authors, directed by nationals, and 
should use at least two thirds (2/3) of Brazilian artists and technicians. In the following year the 
instrument was amended (by the act 10454/2002) in order to include co-productions. Also within 
those amendments, productions are currently considered national if directed by a Brazilian director, or 
a foreigner having resided in the country for at least three years. By that amendment the act also 
dropped the obligation of a work to be based on a Brazilian author. The act thus allows „imported‟ 
stories to be nationally adapted. The new act maintained the same proportion of actors and 
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 The act was nick-named after the former President‟s surname. 
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 The regulation also detailed that in the case of co-productions with countries with whom Brazil does not have 





ANNEX 8 –THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT QUOTAS 
 
 
This annex contains all the compiled quotas for each of the main terrestrials of our cases study. As 
guidance to the reader, an explanatory note is included after each of the following tables which 
summarises the main points for each broadcaster. 
 
General note: hpy – hours per year 
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A8.1 - UK 
Table 56 – BBC 1 output of specific content and stipulated content quotas as stated in Statement of 
Programme Policy 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Category / Obligation 















Arts (including music) (hpy) (1) 11 21 25 122 45 45 45 
Education (factual prog.) (hpy) 280 125 91 650 650 650 700 
Children (hpy) (1) 694 853 671 400 400 500 750 
Religion (hpy) (1) 126 95 106 80 80 80 55 
National news (hpy) 417 1179 1361 570 1380 1380 1380 
Regional news (hpy)  1687    3920 3920 
Current affairs / citizenship (hpy) (1) 1095 1129 92 80 90 273 182 
Regional programmes excl news (hpy) 
(1) 
     693 467 
Regional programmes including news 
(hpy) (1) 
     3290 3135 
Sports (hpy) 887 657 863 260 260 260  
TOTAL (hpy) 3510 5746 3209 2162 2905 11091 10634 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Category / Obligation 















Independent (%)  25 25  25 25 25 
Original productions (%)     70 70 70 
Regional production in the area (%)      95 95 
Producing programmes outside the 
M25 area (£%/h%) (2) 
35 35 43 33  30/25 30/25 
 
Notes: 
(*): in 1986, 1993 and 1996 there were no specific content quotas stated in the annual reports, instead of 
quotas the table uses television hours of output.  
(**): Quotas stated in the Statement of Programme Policy of the indicated years. 
(1) - BBC 1 & 2 share the obligation in 2009-2011, indicated half of the total obligations. 
(2) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total 
broadcasting hours. 
Sources: (BBC, 1987: 50-3; 1994; 1997: 65, 94-6; 2003: 122; 2004: 140; 2006: 144; 2007, 2009a) 
 
Summary: 
The main changes that occurred in 2006 and the increase in the obligations from 2005/2006 onwards 
are due to the beginning of the new charter. Regional obligations started during that charter and an 
explicit quota for sports programmes was abandoned for the period 2009/2010. By the diversity of 
obligations BBC 1 can be classified as a generalist channel with strong focus on news. 
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Table 57 – BBC 2 output of specific content and stipulated content quotas as stated in Statement of 
Programme Policy 
 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Category / Obligation 















Arts (including music) (hpy) (1) 144 53 169 200 200 200 200 
Education (factual prog.) (hpy) 1331 841 2502 500 500 500 520 
Children (hpy) (1) 36 242 717 100 100 500 750 
Religion (hpy) (1) 21 34 16 20 20 20 55 
National news (hpy) 464 258 634 100 100 100   
Regional news (hpy)   1687           
Current affairs / citizenship (hpy) (1) 312 1187 86 230 240 423 182 
Regional programmes excl news (hpy) 
(1)           693 467 
Regional programmes including news 
(hpy) (1)           3290 3135 
Sports (hpy) 910 963 890 430 430 430   
TOTAL (hpy) 3218 5265 5014 1580 1590 6156 5309 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Category / Obligation 















Independent (%)     25   25 25 25 
Original productions (%)         70 70 70 
Regional production in the area (%)           95 95 
Producing programmes outside the 
M25 area (£%/h%) (2) 52   43     30/25 30/25 
 
Notes:  
(*): in 1986, 1993 and 1996 there were no specific content quotas stated in the annual reports, instead of 
quotas the table uses television hours of output.  
(**): Quotas stated in the Statement of Programme Policy of the indicated years. 
(1) - BBC 1 & 2 share the obligation in 2009-2011, indicated half of the total obligations. 
(2) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total 
broadcasting hours. 




See comment on Table 56. Additionally, the obligations for BBC 2 indicate that the channel could be 
classified as generalist. 
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Table 58 – BBC 3 & BBC 4 stipulated content quotas as stated in Statement of Programme Policy 
 
a) quotas in terms of hours 















Arts (including music) (hpy) 50 50 35       100 
Education (factual prog.) (hpy) 30 50 125       110 
Religion (hpy) 15             
Current affairs / citizenship (hpy) 15 15 15         
TOTAL (hpy) 110 115 175 0 0 0 210 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 















Premieres of new intern. Films 
(number)         20 20 20 
Independent (%) 25 25 25       25 
Original productions (%) 80 80 70 70 70 70 70 
Producing programmes outside the 
M25 area (£%/h%) (1) 33 30/25 30/25     30/25 30/25 
European origin (%) 90 90  70 70   
 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Sources: (BBC, 2003: 122; 2004: 140; 2006: 144; 2007, 2009a) 
 
Summary: 
The obligations shows that BBC 3 is more linked towards education and citizenry objectives and 
should use a high proportion of European content. BBC 4 on the other hand has an artistic orientation 
where national content could be more widely used and geared towards the screening of original films.  
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Table 59 – CBBC & Cbeebies stipulated content quotas as stated in Statement of Programme Policy 
a) quotas in terms of hours 















Arts (including music) 
(hpy) (1) 50 50 35       
 Education (factual prog.) 
(hpy) 30 50 125  550     
 Religion (hpy) 15           
 Current affairs / 
citizenship (hpy) 15 15 15  85     
 TOTAL (hpy) 110 115 175 635 0 0 0 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentage 















Independent (%) 25 25 25       25 
Original productions (%) 80 80 70 70 70 70 70 
Producing programmes outside the 
M25 area (£%/h%) (1) 33 30/25 30/25     30/25 30/25 
European origin (%) 75 75 75  90 90 75 
 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Sources: (BBC, 2003: 122; 2004: 140; 2006: 144; 2007, 2009a) 
 
Summary: 
The obligations, more detailed for the CBBC channel, indicate that more socio-cultural objectives are 
foreseen for that service. The Cbeebies is more generalist as it is intended for the youngest audiences 
and, because of that, there are no obligations for specific kind of programmes. 
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Table 60 – BBC News, BBC Parliament, BBC HD & BBC on-line stipulated content quotas as stated 
in Statement of Programme Policy 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Obligation BBC News BBC 
Parliament 
BBC HD BBC on-line 
2002/ 2004 2005/ 2006 2007/ 2008 2009/ 2010 
Arts (including music) (hpy) 50 50 35   
Education (factual prog.) (hpy) 30 50 125   
Religion (hpy) 15       
Current affairs / citizenship (hpy) 15 15 15   
TOTAL (hpy) 110 115 175 0 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligation BBC News BBC 
Parliament 
BBC HD BBC on-line 
2007/ 2010 2007/ 2010 2009/ 2010 2009/ 2010 
Independent (%) 25 25 25   
Original productions (%) 80 80 70 70 
Producing programmes outside the M25 area 
(£%/h%) (1) 33 30/25 30/25   
Max. Sports and first running films (%)     20   
Budget spent on independent content (%)       25 
 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Sources: (BBC, 2003: 122; 2004: 140; 2006: 144; 2007, 2009a) 
 
Summary: 
This group of channels started to be regulated later on during the last charter approved in 2005 and 
there were no significant changes on their statutory commitments with regards to programme 
obligations. The news channels are obliged to transmit a high proportion of live news whereas the HD 
channel cannot concentrate mainly in sports and films having educational and current affairs 
obligations as well. BBC on-line‟s objective is to mirror the output of all of BBC‟s channels output, 
within practical limits. However, the broadcaster shall ensure that the capacity limitations do not affect 
the proportion of independent content available on the web and hence the quota. 
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Table 61 – ITV (ITV-1) stipulated content quotas as stated in the licenses 
 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Channel / Obligation License 1991-2004  License 2004- 
1993 1995 1996 1999 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008 2009 
Regional ITV (*) 
Regional news (hpy) 208 208 208 208 365 365 365 365 365 365 
Regional current affairs (hpy) 52 65 52 52 78 78 78 78 78 43 
Regional programmes (news/ current affairs/ 
other) Total (hpy) 416 416 416 248 419 312 442 364 338 208 
Non-regional prog.: entert./sports/educ./art (hpy) 130 110 130 130             
Religion (hpy)         104           
Children (hpy)         391           
REGIONAL SUB-TOTAL 806 799 806 638 1357 755 885 807 781 616 
National ITV (*) 
National news (hpy) 
 
330 330 330 260 260 260 260 260 260 
National current affairs (hpy) 
 
130 130 130 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Non-regional prog. (entert./sports/educ./art) (hpy)  37 37 37             
Religion (hpy) 
 
5 5 5             
Children (hpy) 
 
220 220 220             
SUB-TOTAL NATIONAL   722 722 722 312 312 312 312 312 312 
TOTAL REGIONAL AND NATIONAL 806 1521 1528 1360 1669 1067 1197 1119 1093 928 
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b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Channel / Obligation License 1991-2004  License 2004- 
1993 1995 1996 1999 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008 2009 
Regional ITV (Company: London Weekday)  
Independent productions (%) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Original productions (%) 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Regional production (outside M25) (£%/h%) (1)           40/33 40/33 50/50 50/50 35/35 
ITV National (Breakfast) 
Independent productions (%) 
 
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
 Original productions (%) 
 
80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
 
Note: 
ITV National (broadcaster Breakfast) license's variations occurred on 1994 (a1), 2001 (b1) and 2011(c1). 
(*) Regional licensee used is broadcaster London Weekday and national licensee is Breakfast. 
 (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of 
hours with relation to the total broadcasting hours. 
Source: (ITC, 1991, 1995, 1996b, 1999b, 2001, 2002b; Ofcom, 2003a, 2004a, 2006a, 2008d, 2009c) 
 
Summary: 
The table is divided between the regional and the national ITV obligations (during certain periods of the day the regional ITV channels must network the programme 
generated by the national ITV broadcaster). The total hourly obligations of national ITV, around 1,000 per year indicates that the regional companies have to 
broadcast approximately three hours of national content. The obligations indicate that ITV is a generalist channel with news obligations. However, those obligations 
are far smaller when compared with the BBC 1. All the other specific programmes obligations where dropped in the renewal of the license. The independent 
productions obligation for the national ITV is doubled, possibly as a remedy to the concentration enabled on the ITV companies, where ITV Plc owns the national 
and 12 of the 15 regional licenses.
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Table 62 – Channel 4 stipulated content quotas as stated in the licenses 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Obligations Old licenses New license 
1993 1996 2000 2003 2004 2005 2010 
Schools (hpy) 
 
337 330 330 330 330 0.5 
Education (hpy) 364 364 364 364 365     
News (hpy) 
 
208 208 208 208 208 208 
Current affairs (hpy) 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
Religion (hpy) 52 52 52   52     
Multicultural (hpy) 
  
156   156     
TOTAL       1110 1319 746 416.5 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligations Old licenses New license 
1993 1996 2000 2003 2004 2005 2010 
Independent (%) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Original commissions (%) 
  
60 60 60 60 56 
Producing programmes 
outside the M25 area 
(£%/h%) (1)   -/30 -/30 30/30 30/31 35/35 
Max. Repeats (%)    40     
 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Source: (Channel 4, 1994, 1997, 2001; ITC, 1991, 2002a; Ofcom, 2004b, 2010d) 
 
Summary: 
Originally intended to be geared towards minorities and to be an innovative channel, the obligation to 
broadcast multicultural programmes was scrapped during the renewal of the license. In fact, the 
renewal also represented lighter regulatory obligations in terms of hours of specific programmes. 
Education and schools‟ programmes obligations where virtually scrapped (only ½ hour was left). 
Probably as result of economic underperformance, the original commission obligation was eased 
allowing for the usage of more repeats.  In fact, the repeats‟ limit was eventually scrapped. 
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Table 63 – Channel 5 stipulated content quotas as stated in the licenses 
a) quotas in terms of hours 
Obligations 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
News (hpy) 312 440 440 572 469 469 469 
Current affairs (hpy) 91 250 250 260 130 130 130 
Education (hpy) (1) 330 330 290 290 156 156 156 
Religion (hpy) 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Children (hpy) 495 800 800 870 1088 1088 1088 
Drama/Enter/Sport/Arts 
(hpy) (1) 7190 6870 6960 6710 116 116 126 
TOTAL 8470 8742 8792 8754 2011 2011 2021 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligations 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Independent (%) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Repeats (%) 21 21 30 30 36 40 40 
Original productions (%) 57 57 54 51 55 53 51 
Producing programmes 
outside the M25 area 
(£%/h%) (1)         10 10 10/10 
 
Note: (1) £% - indicates the minimum percentage of expenditure outside the area compared to the overall 
programming costs; h% - indicates the minimum percentage of hours with relation to the total broadcasting 
hours. 
Source: (ITC, 1996a, 1997, 1999a, 2000, 2001, 2002c; Ofcom, 2003b) 
 
Summary: 
Originally devised as a competitor to ITV, the obligations agreed for Channel 5 shows the generalist 
purpose of the service. Hourly obligations were also significantly eased in 2001, the most substantial 
being the more costly drama, entertainment, sports and arts. Another indication that the commercial 
performance is being sustained (and helped) by regulation is the constant increase in the limit of 
repeats. 
 
 ANNEX 8 –DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTENT QUOTAS 
368 
A8. 2 - France 
Table 64 – France Televisions main terrestrials stipulated content quotas as agreed in their Cahiers de Charge – France 2 (former Antenne 2), France 3 
(former France Regions), France 4 and France 5 (carrying Arte schedule during day-time). 
a) quotas in terms of hours (and number where indicated) 
Obligations France 2 France 3 France 4 France 5 
1987/ 
2000 2000 2005 2009 
1987/ 
2000 2000 2005 2009 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 
Max. Number of films (number) 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 52   51 192   
Spectacles (number)   15 18 18   15 18 18 50 18     18 
French and EU audiovisual works (hpy)  120 120 120  120 120 120   120   120 
Original French audiovisual works (hpy) 300     120              
Original French and EU audiovisual works 
(hpy)  96 -    96 -           
Youth (hpy)                910    
Music (hpy) 18 40 40 40 18 52 52 40 48 40   40 
Total (hpy) 318 256 160 160 138 268 172 160 48 160 910  160 
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b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligations France 2 France 3 France 4 France 5 
1987/ 
2000 2000 2005 2009 
1987/ 
2000 2000 2005 2009 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 
European films & audiovisual (%) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
French films & audiovisual (%) 50 40 40 40 50 40 40 40 40 40 60 40 40 
Proportion of in-house production (%) 50     70              
Revenues to production of French & EU 
audiovisual (AV) (%)  17.0 18.5    17.5 19.0           
Revenues to production of French 
audiovisual (%)   16.0      16.0   14.0   15.0 16.0   
Revenues to original AV production (%) (1)   13.9      14.3   4.7    12.0   
Revenues to production of indie AV (%) (2)   11.5 12.3 18.5   11.5 12.7 18.5 9.3 18.5 10.0 10.7 18.5 
Revenues for production of films (%)  3.0 -    3.0 -           
Revenues for production of EU films (%)   3.2 3.4    3.2 3.4   3.2     
Revenues for production of French films 
(%)   2.5 2.5    2.5 2.5   2.5     
Revenues for production of indie films (%)  75.0 75.0    75.0 75.0           
 
Notes: (1): Fr 2 & Fr 5 obligation is 3/4 of total av. contribution, Fr 4 is 1/3; (2): 2/3 of total av. contribution, from 2009 is an 18.5% contribution. 




Contrary to the British case, the hourly obligations of the French PSB were not raised through time. There are no substantial obligations for specific types of 
programmes. The focuses of the obligations are the broadcasting of European and national television programmes and films. However, even for those cases the 
obligations shifted towards an approach of introducing more financing contributions. The easy in specific programme obligations may also be explained by the fact 
that more services where launched without an increase in revenues.
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Table 65 – TF1 stipulated content quotas. 
a) quotas in terms of hours (and number where indicated) 
Obligation 1987 1996 2000 2005 2009 
Films (number) 170 192 192 192 192 
News (hpy) 670 800 800 800 800 
Current affairs (hpy) 405 0 0 0 0 
Children (hpy) 64 1050 1050 1050 1050 
Original French audiovisual (hpy) 350 0 0 0 0 
Arts & music (hpy) 60 0 0 22 22 
French or EU original AV productions (hpy) 0 0 0 0 120 
Total hours obligations (hpy) 1549 1850 1850 1872 1992 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligation 1987 1996 2000 2005 2009 
European films & audiovisual (%) 70 60 60 60 60 
French films & audiovisual (%) 
 
67 40 40 40 
Original French audiovisual (%) 
   
66 66 
Revenues to production of French audiovisual (%) 15 15 15 16 11.25 
Revenues to production of audiovisual (%) - - - - 12.5 
Revenues to indie production of French AV (%) (1) 7 (3) 10 10 11 9.375 
Revenues to original productions of Fr AV (%) (1a) - - - 11 8.33 
Revenues to animation production (%) (4) - 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Percentage of investments in HD production (%) - - - - 80 
Revenues for production of French films (%) - 3 3 2.5 2.5 
Revenues for production of EU films (%) - - - 3.2 3.2 
Revenues for production of indie films (%) (2) - - 75 75 75 
 
Notes: (1) included in the overall 15% contribution; (1a) 2/3 of the total investment; (2) from the overall film 
investment (3%); (3) obligation was of investing 380mF in the former Societe Francaise de Productions, by 
average, translated to a percentage; (4) from 2005 the obligation is 2/3 of total investments in indie 
productions. 
Sources: (CSA, 2001e, 2006g, 2010d; France, 1987b, 1990a, 1990b, 1996) 
 
Summary: 
As can be seen from the total hourly quotas, the main commercial broadcaster has more generalist 
obligations than any of France Televisions‟ channels. The level of hourly obligations is comparable 
to British Channel 5‟s. Moreover, contrary to the British cases of ITV and Channel 5 the obligations 
were not eased. On the contrary, the financial contributions towards the production of content 
increased through time as is the case with the other French channels. 
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Table 66 – Canal Plus (paytv-air-channel) stipulated content quotas. 
a) quota in terms of number 
Obligation 1986 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Max number of films 364 365 365 500 500 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligation 1986 1995 2000 2005 2009 
EU films and AV (%) 60 60 
 
60 60 
French films and AV (%) 50 40 
 
40 40 
Revenues for film acquisition (%) (2) 20 20 20 - - 










Revenues for French or EU AV prod. (%) (1) 
 
2.5 2.75 4.5 3.6 
Revenues for indie French or EU AV prod. (%) 
 
1.7 2.75 3 3.155 
Revenues for EU film prod. (%) - - - 12 12 
Revenues for French film prod. (%) - - - 9 9 
Indie proportion of films (%) - - - 75 75 
 
Notes: (1) to invest 2.5% from the 20% overall quota; (2) 20% resulted in a reduction from a 25% original 
quota. 
Sources: (CSA, 2001a, 2006a, 2010a; France, 1986; 1990b: Art. 10; 1995a: Art. 10; 1995b; 2009: Art. 11) 
 
Summary: 
As the obligations show, the first „subscription-to-air‟ French channel is highly focused on films, 
both distribution and production. Although the financial contributions where slightly lowered, 
channel‟s contributions towards film production are the highest of the French scenario. Additionally, 
despite the increase in the maximum number of films allowed, three out of four screened films must 
be independent productions. 
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Table 67 – M6 (former music channel) stipulated content quotas. 
a) quotas in terms of hours (and number where indicated) 
Obligation 2000 2005 2009 
Max. Number of films 192 192 192 
Min. production of French video clips (number) (1), (2) 150 150 120 
Min. production of new talents video clips (number) (1) 30 30 70 
French and EU audiovisual works (hpy) (1) 100 100 162 
 
b) quotas in terms of percentages 
Obligation 2000 2005 2009 
European films & audiovisual (%) 60 60 60 
French films & audiovisual (%) 40 40 40 
Proportion of programmes in HD (%) 
  
30 
EU animation (%) (1) 50 50 50 
Music total/French (%) (1) 30/50 30/50 24/50 
European programmes (%) (1) 70 
  Revenues to production of French & EU audiovisual (AV) (%) 
 
18 15 
Revenues to production of French audiovisual (%)  13.5 9.45 
Revenues to original AV production (%) (3)  12 10 
Revenues to production of indie AV (%) (3)  9 9 
Revenues to production of French & EU animation (%)  1 1 
Revenues for production of indie animations (%) (3)   0.7 
Revenues to AV production in HD (%)   50.0 
Revenues for production of EU films (%)  3.2 3.2 
Revenues for production of French films (%)  2.5 2.5 
Revenues for production of indie films (%) 75 75 75 
 
Notes: (1): from 2009 the obligation is in HD also; (2): there is also an obligation to invest in music 
programmes; (3): 2/3 of the total AV obligation. 
Sources: (CSA, 2001d: 9-10; 2006f: 12-3; 2010c: 11-2) 
 
Summary: 
M6 was originally French‟s answer to American MTV. The channel now is more generalist 
although not as a result of different obligations. The channel still has music-related quotas not found 
for the other French channels. The same kind of financial contributions towards the production of 
content were found for this channel as well and in the same levels as for TF1. Recently the channel 
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Table 68 – Average time per day spent using communication services in the UK (in minutes) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Exponential 
regression 





minutes Television 218 224 224 222 219 224 218 225 225 
Fixed internet 19 6 9 12 21 14 24 25 27 y = 8.1344e0.1316x 2020 2025 
Mobile 3 5 6 6 3 2.7 10 11 13 y = 2.767e0.1442x 2026 2031 
Source: (Ofcom, 2006b: 39; 2007a: 17; 2008b: 28; 2009a: 18; 2010a: 19) 
Notes: 
 Exponential regression fitted as calculated by MS Excel, where y represents the minutes and x the year. 
 To calculate the year the inverse formula is x = ln(y/8.1344) / 0.1316 
 Year forecasted by the inverse formula, adding 2000 to the result. 
o For 112.5 minutes (half the current consumption of television) the calculation for „fixed internet‟ is x = LN(112.5/8.1344)/0 .1316 + 2000 = 2020 
 In an attempt to predict future figures for those new services, considering that the time spent on the internet and on mobiles will increase exponentially, with no 
saturation (a maximum growth scenario), an exponential regression based on those previous year‟s figures, as shown in the graph on Figure 21, estimates that 
internet and mobile users will spend half of the time currently spent on television (112.5 minutes) by the years 2020 and 2026, respectively, and to the current levels 
(225 minutes) only by 2025 and 2031. 
 
 
Table 69 – International television viewing time (in minutes) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
UK 219 216 218 225 225 
France 206 204 207 204 205 
Brazil n. a. n. a. n. a. 225 227 
Source: (Ofcom, 2006c: 30; 2007c: 126; 2008c: 139; 2010c: 13, 163) 
 
 ANNEX 9 –AUDIENCE SHARES AND RANKINGS... 
375 
Table 70 – Audience share of main broadcasters in the UK (in millions) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BBC 1 29.5 28.4 27.2 26.9 26.2 25.6 24.7 23.3 22.8 22.0 21.8 20.9 20.8 
ITV 31.7 31.2 29.3 26.7 24.1 23.7 22.8 21.5 19.6 19.2 18.4 17.8 17.0 
Channel 4 10.3 10.3 10.5 10.0 10.0 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.8 8.8 8.2 7.5 7.0 
BBC 2 11.3 10.8 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.0 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.5 7.8 7.5 6.9 
Five 4.3 5.4 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.4 5.7 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.5 
Others 12.9 14.0 16.6 19.6 22.1 23.6 26.2 29.6 33.3 36.5 38.8 41.4 43.7 
Source: (BARB, 2011) 
 
 
Table 71 – Audience share of main broadcasters in France (in millions) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TF1 34.8 34.9 33.1 32.3 32.3 30.6 31.8 32.4 31.7 30.8 27.4 26.1 24.5 
France 2 23.4 23.3 23.3 22.2 22.0 20.8 21.7 20.9 20.3 19.2 18.5 16.7 16.0 
France 3 17.2 16.4 16.9 17.3 16.6 15.5 15.5 15.0 14.9 14.4 13.6 11.8 10.7 
M6 12.3 12.9 11.9 12.7 12.5 12.6 11.9 12.0 12.1 11.3 11.0 10.8 10.4 
Canal Plus 4.7 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.6 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 
Arte 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.6 4.1 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.1 1.7 1.6 
Others 4.0 4.1 7.0 8.2 8.9 10.6 10.2 11.3 12.7 16.3 22.0 29.8 33.7 
Digital only (1)  
TMC            2.6 3.3 
France 5           4.1 3.1 3.2 
W9            2.5 3.0 
Guilli            1.8 2.2 
France 4            1.1 1.6 
Other 
digitals           22.0 18.7 20.3 
Source: (IP Network, 1999: 144, 388; 2000: 106, 253; 2001: 136, 295; 2003: 114, 273; 2004: 122, 281; 2005: 157, 412; 2006: 165; 2008: 166; 2010: 173, 438; 2011: 172, 
591) 
Note: (1) From „Others‟ 
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Table 72 – Audience share of main broadcasters in Brazil (in millions) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Globo 51.9 51.9 47.6 44.3 45.2 43.2 
SBT 19.4 16.1 14.6 14.3 13 12.7 
Bandeirantes 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.1 
RedeTV! 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 
Record 9 10.9 14.6 16.7 16.1 16.5 
Others 13.1 14.7 16.4 17.5 18.1 20.1 
Source: (Grupo de Midia, 2009: 215; 2011: 293-4) 
 
 
Table 73 – Audience share of the bouquet (including spin-off channels), grouped by main broadcasters – 
UK (in millions) 
 2004 2007 2009 
All BBC 29.6 28.9 30.2 
All ITV 19.1 20.7 21.9 
All Channel 4 7.6 12.8 12 
All Channel 5 5 5.5 5.8 
All Sky 12.2 8.4 7.7 
Others 26.5 23.7 22.4 
Source: (BARB, 2011) 
Notes: Grouped the audience shares of the following channels: 
 BBC: 1, 2, 3 & 4, News, Parliament, Cbbc, Cbeebies, BBC HD; 
 ITV: 1, 2, 3 & 4, News and +1s; 
 Channel 4: E4, Film 4, Kiss, Magic, More 4 and +1s; 
 Five: 5 USA, 5* and +1s 
 Sky: all Sky branded channels, including films, sports, news, etc. 
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Table 74 – Audience share of the bouquet (including spin-off channels), grouped by main broadcasters – 
France (in millions) 
 2008 2009 2010 
TF1 + TMC 27.4 28.7 27.8 
France 2-5 & Gulli 36.2 34.5 33.7 
M6 + W9 11.0 13.3 13.4 
Canal Plus 3.4 3.1 3.1 
Arte 4.1 1.7 1.6 
Others 22.0 18.7 20.3 
Source: (IP Network, 2010: 173, 438; 2011: 172, 591) 
Notes: Grouped the audience shares of the following channels: 
 TF1: TMC (according to Wikipedia owned by TF1); 
 France Televisions: FT 2, 3, 4 & 5, Gulli (according to Wikipedia partially owned by FT and Lagerdere 
Active ); 
 M6: W9 – name W9 as „the mirror‟ of M6  - (according to Wikipedia owned by M6); 
 Arte: bi-national channel owned by France (50% - FT (22.5%), State (12.5%), Radio France (7.5%) 
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Table 75 – Audience and nationality of the top programmes of all channels - UK 
1998 
Rank Channel Programme Audience 
(%) 
National 
1 ITV FBAL W.CUP ARGENTINA-ENGLAND 45.9 y 
2 ITV FBAL W.CUP POST MATCH 37.5 y 
3 ITV FBAL W.CUP ROMANIA-ENGLAND 37.4 y 
4 BBC 1 FBAL W.CUP COLOMBIA-ENGLAND 36.5 y 
5 ITV CORONATION STREET 36.4 y 
6 ITV WHO WANTS TO BE A MILLIONAIRE? 33.9 y 
7 ITV HEARTBEAT 33.7 y 
8 BBC 1 EASTENDERS 32.8 y 
9 ITV CELEBRITY STARS IN THEIR EYES 30.9 y 
10 BBC 1 FBAL W.CUP BRASIL-FRANCE 30.5 n 
11 BBC 1 CASUALTY 30.1 y 
12 BBC 1 MEN BEHAVING BADLY 29.4 y 
13 BBC 1 FBAL W.CUP FRANCE-CROATIA 29.2 n 
14 BBC 1 FORREST GUMP 28.8 n 
15 ITV GOODNIGHT MR TOM 28.3 y 
16 ITV FBAL W.CUP BRAZIL-NETHERLANDS 28.1 n 
17 ITV YOU'VE BEEN FRAMED 26.8 y 
18 ITV EMMERDALE 26.6 y 
19 ITV DIANA: SECRETS OF THE CRASH 26.5 y 
20 ITV FBAL W.CUP CORONATION STREET SPECIAL 26.2 y 
  Total Audiences 635.5  
  Nationally originated 518.9  
  Imported format 0  
  Imported 116.6  
  National proportion 82%  
  Nationally originated proportion 82%  
Source: (IP Network, 1999: 388) 
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...continuing Table 75 
2004 
Rank Channel Programme Audience 
(%) 
National 
1 BBC 1 FBAL EU CHMP PORTUGAL-ENGLAND 38.5 y 
2 BBC 1 FBAL EU CHMP CROATIA-ENGLAND 34.7 y 
3 ITV FBAL EU CHMP FRANCE-ENGLAND 33.4 y 
4 ITV CORONATION STREET 31.1 y 
5 ITV I'M A CELEBRITY- GET ME OUT OF HERE! 28.9 y 
6 BBC 1 EASTENDERS 28.1 y 
7 ITV A TOUCH OF FROST 27.1 y 
8 ITV FBAL EU CHMP ENGLAND-SWITZERLAND 26.3 y 
9 BBC 1 THE VICAR OF DIBLEY 24.1 y 
10 ITV EMMERDALE 23 y 
11 BBC 1 STRICTLY COME DANCING 22.6 y 
12 ITV HEARTBEAT 22.6 y 
13 ITV CHRISTMAS LIGHTS 22 y 
14 ITV MIDSOMER MURDERS 21.5 y 
15 BBC 1 FBAL EU CHMP PORTUGAL-GREECE 21.4 n 
16 ITV LIFE BEGINS 20.9 y 
17 ITV DOC MARTIN 20.4 y 
18 BBC 1 CASUALTY 19.7 y 
19 BBC 1 BBC NEWS 19.6 y 
20 ITV THE ROYAL 19.2 y 
  Total Audiences 505.1  
  Nationally originated 483.7  
  Imported format 0  
  Imported 21.4  
  National proportion 96%  
  Nationally originated proportion 96%  
Source: (IP Network, 2004: 281) 
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...continuing Table 75 
2009 




1 ITV BRITAIN'S GOT TALENT 33.4 y  
2 ITV BRITAIN'S GOT TALENT 29.3 y  
3 ITV THE X FACTOR 29.2 y  
4 ITV THE X FACTOR 24.2 y  
5 ITV CORONATION STREET 22.3 y  
6 BBC 1 THE ROYLE FAMILY 22 y  
7 BBC 1 DANCING WITH THE STARS 21.7 y  
8 BBC 1 EASTENDERS 21.3 y  
9 ITV I DREAMED A DREAM - THE SUSAN BOYLE 21.2 y  
10 ITV DANCING ON ICE 21.1 y  
11 ITV DOC MARTIN 20.1 y  
12 BBC 1 DOCTOR WHO 19.8 y  
13 BBC 1 JONATHAN CREEK 19.5 y  
14 ITV I'M A CELEBRITY - GET ME OUT OF HERE! 19.4 y  
15 BBC 1 THE APPRENTICE 19.1 y y 
16 ITV WHITECHAPEL 18.7 y  
17 BBC 1 GAVIN & STACEY 18.7 y  
18 ITV THE ROYAL VARIETY PERFORMANCE 18 y  
19 BBC 1 CHILDREN IN NEED 2009 18 y  
20 BBC 1 NEW TRICKS 17.8 y  
  Total Audiences 434.8   
  Nationally originated 415.7   
  Imported format 19.1   
  Imported 0.0   
  National proportion 100%   
  Nationally originated proportion 91%   
Source: (IP Network, 2009) 
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...continuing Table 75 
2010 




1 BBC 1 EASTENDERS 28.8 y  
2 ITV THE X FACTOR 28.8 y  
3 BBC 1 FBAL W. CUP ENGLAND-GERMANY 27.7 y  
4 BBC 1 STRICTLY COME DANCING 24.9 y  
5 ITV CORONATION STREET 24.6 y  
6 BBC 1 FBAL W. CUP NETHERLAND-SPAIN 23.5 n  
7 ITV FBAL W. CUP ENGLAND-ALGERIA 23.1 y  
8 ITV BRITAIN'S GOT TALENT 22.4 y  
9 BBC 1 COME FLY WITH ME 21.7 y  
10 ITV FBAL W. CUP ENGLAND-USA 21.6 y  
11 ITV I'M A CELEBRITY GET ME OUT OF HERE! 21.6 y  
12 BBC 1 DOCTOR WHO 21.1 y  
13 BBC 1 FBAL W. CUP SLOVENIA-ENGLAND 20.3 y  
14 BBC 1 THE ROYLE FAMILY 19.7 y  
15 BBC 1 FBAL W. CUP GERMANY-SPAIN 18.4 n  
16 BBC 1 GAVIN & STACEY 18 y  
17 ITV DOWNTON ABBEY 17.8 y  
18 ITV EMMERDALE 17.5 y  
19 ITV A TOUCH OF FROST 17.4 y  
20 BBC 1 BBC NEWS 16.9 y  
  Total Audiences 435.8   
  Nationally originated 393.9   
  Imported format 0   
  Imported 41.9   
  National proportion 90%   
  Nationally originated proportion 90%   
Source: (IP Network, 2010: 438) 
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Table 76 – Audience and nationality of the top programmes of all channels - France 
1998 
Rank Channel Programme Audience 
(%) 
National 
1 TF1 FBAL. W.CUP BRASIL-FRANCE 41.4 y 
2 TF1 LA REMISE DE LA COUPE 40.3 y 
3 TF1 FBAL. W.CUP FRANCE-CROATIA 35.6 y 
4 TF1 LE COMTE DE MONTE CRISTO 27.9 y 
5 F3 FBAL. W.CUP FRANCE-SOUTH AFRICA 27.5 y 
6 TF1 JOURNAL FBAL. W.CUP 27.4 y 
7 F2 FBAL. W.CUP BRASIL-NETHERLANDS 26.8 n 
8 TF1 UN AMOUR DE COUSINE 26.4 y 
9 TF1 TF1 20 HEURES 25.5 y 
10 TF1 FBAL. W.CUP FRANCE-SAUDI ARABIA 25.2 y 
11 TF1 MRS DOUBTFIRE 24.8 n 
12 TF1 JULIE LESCAUT 24.8 y 
13 TF1 ELECTION DE MISS FRANCE/1999 24.6 y 
14 TF1 THE BODYGUARD 24.4 n 
15 TF1 LES TROIS FRERES 24.4 y 
16 F3 FBAL. W.CUP FRANCE-ITALY 24.3 y 
17 TF1 FBAL FRANCE-SPAIN 24.0 y 
18 TF1 PEDALE DOUCE 23.8 y 
19 TF1 DROP ZONE 23.0 n 
20 TF1 NAVARRO 22.9 y 
  Total Audiences 545.0  
  Nationally originated 446  
  Imported format 0  
  Imported 99.0  
  National proportion 82%  
  Nationally originated proportion 82%  
Source: (IP Network, 1999: 144) 
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...continuing Table 76 
2004 
Rank Channel Programme Audience 
(%) 
National 
1 TF1 FBAL EU CHMP SWITZERLAND-FRANCE 30.5 y 
2 F3 FBAL EU CHMP FRANCE-GREECE 29.5 y 
3 F2 FBAL EU CHMP CROATIA-FRANCE 28.2 y 
4 F2 FBAL EU CHMP CUP CEREMONY 27.5 n 
5 TF1 FBAL EU CHMP FRANCE-ENGLAND 27.3 y 
6 F2 FBAL EU CHMP PORTUGAL-GREECE 25.1 n 
7 TF1 TF1 20:00 24.6 y 
8 TF1 MONSIEUR BATIGNOLE 24.5 y 
9 TF1 JULIE LESCAUT 24.3 y 
10 TF1 FBAL EU CHMP PORTUGAL-ENGLAND 23.9 n 
11 TF1 ZODIAQUE 23.1 y 
12 TF1 ASTERIX ET OBELIX MISSION CLEOPATRE 23.1 y 
13 TF1 UNE FEMME D'HONNEUR 22.2 y 
14 TF1 FBAL CL AS MONACO-FC PORTO 22 y 
15 TF1 FBAL EU CHMP PORTUGAL-NETHERLANDS 21.5 n 
16 TF1 L'ENFANT DE L'AUBE 21.2 y 
17 TF1 PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH 21.1 y 
18 TF1 LES ENFOIRES DANS L'ESPACE 20.9 y 
19 TF1 NAVARRO 20.8 y 
20 TF1 MON VOISIN DU DESSUS 20.7 y 
  Total Audiences 482.0  
  Nationally originated 384  
  Imported format 0  
  Imported 98.0  
  National proportion 80%  
  Nationally originated proportion 80%  
Source: (IP Network, 2004: 122) 
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...continuing Table 76 
2009 




1 TF1 HOUSE MD 23.3 n  
2 TF1 LES ENFOIRES FONT LEUR CINEMA 21.7 y  
3 TF1 CSI: NY 20.8 n  
4 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP (QUAL.) FRANCE-IRELAND 19.6 y  
5 TF1 CRIMINAL MINDS 19.5 n  
6 TF1 ASTERIX & OBELIX MISSION CLEOPATRE 18 y  
7 TF1 WAR OF THE WORLDS 17.8 n  
8 TF1 SURVIVOR 17.4 y y 
9 TF1 CSI: MIAMI 17.4 n  
10 TF1 16 BLOCKS 17.3 n  
11 TF1 THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA 17.3 n  
12 M6 NAVY CSIS 17.1 n  
13 TF1 GREY'S ANATOMY 16.8 n  
14 TF1 TAXI IV 16.6 y  
15 TF1 ARTHUR ET LES MINIMOYS 16.4 y  
16 TF1 LA MAISON DU BONHEUR 16.4 y  
17 TF1 LE DINNER DE CONS 16.4 y  
18 TF1 INSIDE MAN 16 n  
19 TF1 MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE III 15.9 n  
20 TF1 FBAL W. CUP (QUAL.) SERBIA-FRANCE 15.7 y  
  Total Audiences 357.4   
  Nationally originated 140.8   
  Imported format 17.4   
  Imported 199.2   
  National proportion 44%   
  Nationally originated proportion 35%   
Source: (IP Network, 2009) 
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...continuing Table 76 
2010 




1 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP FRANCE-MEXICO 26 y  
2 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP FRANCE-URUGUAY 25.7 y  
3 TF1 BIENVENUE CHEZ LES CH'TIS 24.7 y  
4 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP NETHERLANDS-SPAIN 24.2 n  
5 TF1 LES ENFOIRES LA CRISE DE NERFS 20 y  
6 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP GERMANY-SPAIN 18.9 n  
7 TF1 TF1 20 HEURES 17.8 y  
8 TF1 
FBAL. W. CUP NETHERLANDS-SPAIN CUP 
HANDOVER 17.4 n  
9 TF1 ASTERIX AUX JEUX OLIMPIQUES 17.3 y  
10 TF1 MENTALIST 17.2 n  
11 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP NETHERLANDS-URUGUAY 16.7 n  
12 TF1 
FBAL. EU CHMP (QUAL.) FRANCE-
LUXEMBOURG 16.2 y  
13 TF1 CLEM 16.2 y  
14 TF1 INTERVENTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE 15.7 y  
15 TF1 DR HOUSE 15.6 n  
16 TF1 FBAL. W. CUP SPAIN-PORTUGAL 15.5 n  
17 TF1 
DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE 15.2 y  
18 TF1 FBAL. EU CHMP (QUAL.) FRANCE-BELARUS 14.9 y  
19 TF1 RATATOUILLE 14.8 n  
20 TF1 PAROLES DE FRANCAIS 14.8 y  
  Total Audiences 364.8   
  Nationally originated 224.5   
  Imported format 0   
  Imported 140.3   
  National proportion 62%   
  Nationally originated proportion 62%   
Source: (IP Network, 2010: 173) 
 ANNEX 9 –AUDIENCE SHARES AND RANKINGS... 
387 
Table 77 – Audience and nationality of the top 5 programmes of the main channels in the city of Sao 
Paulo - Brazil 
2004 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 




SABADACO 286 y FUTEBOL AO VIVO QA 640 y 
JOGO DA VIDA 243 y CIDADE ALERTA LOCAL 533 y 
BOA NOITE BRASIL 275 
y 








DOMINGO DA GENTE 516 
y 
VIDEOS INCRIVEIS NOT 248 n PROGRAMA RAUL GIL 517 y 
Canal 21 Rede Mulher 
MRBEAN 101 n CINE REDE MULHER SBM 26 n 
AFEITICEIRA 82 n MULHERES EM FOCO 9 y 
CINE21 60 n SESSAO CINEMA 7 n 
SEXANDTHECITY 41 n MESTRE CUCA NOT 7 y 
JORNALDEZ 49 y QUALIDADE DE VIDA VES 5 y 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
COCORICO SB 214 y EU VI NA TV 622 y 
CONTOS DE FADA VES 219 n PANICO NA TV 431 y 
RUPERT DM 175 n PANICO REPRISE 364 y 
TELETUBBIES SB 201 n SUPERPOP 252 y 
RUPERT VES 1 161 
n 





MESA REDONDA 131 y TELA DE SUCESSOS 1,221 n 





SESSAO DAS DEZ 1,189 
n 
MULHERES 59 y MEU CUNHADO 1,078 y 
PASSARELA DO SAMBA 64 y QUINTA NO CINEMA 974 y 
Globo    






TELA QUENTE 3,213 n    
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,680 y    
A GRANDE FAMILIA 2,681 y    
GLOBO REPORTER 2,704 y    
MTV    
TOP TOP MTV SX 1930 64 y    
VJS EM ACAO SG 2230 43 y    
TOP 20 BRASIL SB 1700 50 y  Total (millions) 28 




 National total (millions) 19 




 National proportion 69% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 39, 20/09-26/09/2004) 
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...continuing Table 77 
2005 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 




VIDEOS INCRIVEIS VES 385 n REPORTER RECORD SG 790 y 
JORNAL DA BAND 
365 y 
FUTEBOL AO VIVO QA - 
SANTOS X FLUMINENSE 590 y 
BRASIL URGENTE 2 353 y PROGRAMA RAUL GIL 607 y 
CINE BAND PRIVE 
333 n 
NOVELA DAS SETE - ESSAS 
MULHERES 637 y 
SABADACO 311 y TUDO E POSSIVEL 560 y 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
OS SETE MONSTRINHOS 
VES 1 218 n 
EU VI NA TV 
583 y 
CAILLOU E ANIMACOES VES 210 n PANICO NA TV 538 y 
VIOLA MINHA VIOLA MAT 229 y PANICO REPRISE 227 y 
RELIGIOSO MAT 211 y SUPERPOP 245 y 
CAMUNDONGOS AVENT 
VES 1 211 n 






SANTOS DM 1,408 y 
GAZETA ESPORTIVA 138 y TELA DE SUCESSOS 1,244 n 
TV CULINARIA 78 y CINE ESPETACULAR 1,145 n 
MULHERES 1 65 y TELE SENA 1,266 y 
AMIGOS DO FORRO 66 y RODA A RODA SSX 1,086 y 
Globo  
NOVELA III - AMÉRICA 4,378 y    
FUTEBOL VES - BRASIL X 
CHILE 3,027 y 
 
  
CASSETA E PLANETA 3,098 y  Total (millions) 31 
TELA QUENTE 3,148 n  National total (millions) 24 
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,911 y  National proportion 78% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 29/08-04/09/2005) 
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...continuing Table 77 
2006 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 




PROGRAMA RAUL GIL 488 y TELA MAXIMA DM 1,136 n 
MANDACARU 374 y O APRENDIZ 3 902 y 
TERRA SERTANEJA NOT 400 
y 




VIDEOS INCRIVEIS NOT 321 n DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 769 y 
NO CORACAO DO BRASIL 338 y SERIE PREMIUM 700 n 





PANICO NA TV 418 
y 
CYBERCHASE SSX 394 n PANICO REPRISE 431 y 
ZOBOOMAFOO NOT 364 n SUPERPOP 290 y 




A TARDE E SUA 176 
y 




FUTEBOL VES - SPORT 




MESA REDONDA 268 y DOMINGO LEGAL PSS 1,356 y 
GAZETA ESPORTIVA 250 y TOPA OU NAO TOPA 1,385 y 
MULHERES 3 147 y 8 E MEIA NO CINEMA 1,339 n 
GAZETA NEWS VES 147 y SUPER NANNY VES 1,014 n 
PROG NERIVAN SILVA 166 y CHAVES VES 952 n 
Globo  












A GRANDE FAMILIA 3,688 y  Total (millions) 35 
JORNAL NACIONAL 3,356 y  National total (millions) 27 
SPTV 2A EDICAO 3,026 y  National proportion 79% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 28/08-03/09/2006) 
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...continuing Table 77 
2007 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 




FAMILIA DINOSSAUROS 523 
n 





JORNAL DA BAND 464 y DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 1,132 y 
BRASIL URGENTE 2 487 
y 




BRASIL URGENTE 1 437 y TELA MAXIMA DM 974 n 
TERRA NATIVA NOT 459 y A TURMA DO PICA PAU 996 n 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
DE ONDE VEM NOT 374 y PANICO NA TV 601 y 
CYBERCHASE SSX 356 n PANICO REPRISE 377 y 
CHARLIE E LOLA 365 n TV FAMA SSX 276 y 
CASTELO RA TIM BUM NOT 316 
y 













GAZETA ESPORTIVA 219 y DOMINGO LEGAL PSS 997 y 
MESA REDONDA 235 y 8 E MEIA NO CINEMA 867 n 
MULHERES 3 145 y TELE SENA 884 y 
GAZETA NEWS VES 127 y A PRACA E NOSSA NOT 675 y 
MULHERES 2 99 
y 









 Total (millions) 
31 
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,790 y  National total (millions) 25 
A GRANDE FAMILIA 2,879 y  National proportion 85% 
GLOBO REPORTER 2,728 y  Format totals (millions) 1.0 
CASSETA E PLANETA 2,510 y  Format proportion 3% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 27/08-02/09/2007) 
Note: (*) Imported format 
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...continuing Table 77 
2008 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 




BRASIL URGENTE 2 457 y IDOLOS 1,087 y(*) 
BRASIL URGENTE 1 432 y NOVELA 2 - OS MUTANTES 
CAMINHOS DO CORACAO 
1,118 
y 




PROGRAMA RAUL GIL 334 y DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 957 y 
FUTEBOL VES 318 y SUPER TELA NOT 889 n 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
VIOLA MINHA VIOLA MAT 166 y PANICO REPRISE 373 y 
PINKY DINKY DOO VES 174 n PANICO NA TV 334 y 






ARTHUR VES 1 161 n DR HOLLYWOOD NOT 368 n 
QUAL E BICHO NOT 156 y FUTEBOL NOT 273 y 
Gazeta SBT 
GAZETA ESPORTIVA 219 y DOMINGO LEGAL PSS 1,167 y 
MESA REDONDA 137 y PANTANAL 1,056 y 
MULHERES 3 123 y TELE SENA 909 y 
GAZETA NEWS VES 122 y SUPER NANNY NOT 841 n(*) 







NOVELA III - A FAVORITA 3,056 y  Total (millions) 27 
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,300 y  National total (millions) 22 
A GRANDE FAMILIA 2,244 y  National proportion 90% 
NOVELA II - BELEZA PURA 2,094 y  Format totals (millions) 1.1 
GLOBO REPORTER 2,108 y  Format proportion 4% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 25/08-31/08/2008) 
Note: (*) Imported format 
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...continuing Table 77 
2009 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 
National 




FUTEBOL VES - SAO PAULO 
X PALMEIRAS 
541 y PROGRAMA DO GUGU 1,440 y 
FUTEBOL NOT - GREM 
BARUERI X CORINTHIANS 
457 y DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 876 y 
BRASIL URGENTE 2 367 y REALITY SHOW 1 912 y(*) 
BRASIL URGENTE 1 354 y DOMINGO AVENTURA 694 n 
JORNAL DA BAND 311 y SUPER MAQUINA 732 n 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
VIOLA MINHA VIOLA MAT 178 y PANICO NA TV 800 y 
DOUG VES 136 n PANICO REPRISE 484 y 
ARTHUR VES 128 n SUPERPOP 278 y 
RELIGIOSO MAT 119 y DR HOLLYWOOD NOT 301 n 
SOM NA CAIXA COM O DJ 
CAO NOT 
108 y BROTHERS 223 n 
Gazeta SBT 
GAZETA ESPORTIVA 226 y ELIANA 756 y 




ESPORTE INTERATIVO VES 121 y ESQUADRAO DA MODA 499 y(*) 
ESPORTE INTERATIVO 99 y CHAVES VES 510 n 
GAZETA NEWS VES 103 y ARNOLD 498 n 
Globo  
NOVELA III - CAMINHO DAS 
INDIAS 
3,935 y  Total (millions) 28 
JORNAL NACIONAL 3,038 y  National total (millions) 20 
A GRANDE FAMILIA 2,668 y  National proportion 78% 
TELA QUENTE 3,033 n  Format totals (millions) 1.2 
NOVELA II - CARAS E BOCAS 2,702 y  Format proportion 4% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 24/08-30/08/2009) 
Note: (*) Imported format 
 
 ANNEX 9 –AUDIENCE SHARES AND RANKINGS... 
393 
...continuing Table 77 
2010 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 
National 




POLICIA 24H 659 y(*) DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 1,225 y 
CQC 475 y(*) PROGRAMA DO GUGU 1,001 y 
A LIGA 458 y(*) 
CINE RECORD ESPECIAL 
NOT 
984 n 
FUTEBOL NOT - 
FLUMINENSE x PALMEIRAS 
429 y 
NOVELA 22H - RIBEIRAO 
DO TEMPO 
863 y 
BRASIL URGENTE 2 386 y REALITY SHOW - IDOLOS 810 y(*) 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
O PEQUENO GEORGE VES 182 n PANICO NA TV 621 y 
ARTHUR VES 177 n PANICO REPRISE 377 y 
DOUG 176 n DR HOLLYWOOD NOT 288 n 
CAMUNDONGOS AVENT 
VES 
137 n OPERACAO DE RISCO 286 y 
VIOLA MINHA VIOLA MAT 140 y TV KIDS NOT 223 n 
Gazeta SBT 




MESA REDONDA 163 y ELIANA 849 y 
MULHERES 2 80 y DOMINGO LEGAL PSS 707 y 
MULHERES 3 86 y A PRACA E NOSSA NOT 751 y 
MULHERES 1 67 y RODA A RODA JEQUITI 678 y 
Globo  
NOVELA III - PASSIONE 2,800 y  Total (millions) 25 
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,187 y  National total (millions) 20.8 
NOVELA II - TI TI TI 2,023 y  National proportion 91% 
A GRANDE FAMILIA 1,998 y  Format totals (millions) 0.6 
SPTV 2A EDICAO 1,936 y  Format proportion 7% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 30/08-05/09/2010) 
Note: (*) Imported format 
 
 ANNEX 9 –AUDIENCE SHARES AND RANKINGS... 
394 
...continuing Table 77 
2011 
Network / Programme Audience 
(thousands) 
National 




BRASIL URGENTE 2 518 y 
NOVELA 22H - VIDAS EM 
JOGO 
1,086 y 
POLICIA 24H 472 y DOMINGO ESPETACULAR 1,062 y 
FUTEBOL VES - CORITIBA X 
CORINTHIANS 
450 y A FAZENDA 964 y(*) 
FUTEBOL NOT - INTER X 
SANTOS 
459 y PROGRAMA DO GUGU 925 Y 
BRASIL URGENTE 1 411 y NOVELA REBELDE 860 y(*) 
Cultura Rede Tv! 
VIOLA MINHA VIOLA MAT 178 y PANICO NA TV 795 y 
SR BRASIL MAT 203 y PANICO REPRISE 357 y 
MESTRES DO RISO MAT 151 y DR HOLLYWOOD NOT 316 y 
PLANETA TERRA DM 139 n MEGA SENHA 260 y(*) 
RODA VIVA 107 y TV FAMA 220 y 
Gazeta SBT 




MESA REDONDA 132 y RODA A RODA JEQUITI 600 y 
MULHERES 3 95 y SE ELA DANCA EU DANCO 589 y 
EDICAO EXTRA 85 y 
SERIE TARDE - AS VISOES 
DA RAVEN 
552 n 
TV CULINARIA 72 y QUAL E SEU TALENTO 596 y 
Globo  
NOVELA III - FINA ESTAMPA 3,325 y  Total (millions) 27 
JORNAL NACIONAL 2,841 y  National total (millions) 24.3 
NOVELA II - MORDE E 
ASSOPRA 
2,680 y  National proportion 97% 
SHOW DE TERCA FEIRA 1 - 
TAPAS E BEIJOS 
2,516 y  Format totals (millions) 1.7 
SPTV 2A EDICAO 2,309 y  Format proportion 6% 
Source: (Ibope, 2012: week 35, 29/08-04/09/2011) 
Note: (*) Imported format 
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Table 78 – Total shares of the top programmes of main channels in the UK, France and Brazil (Sao 
Paulo) 
 






















Top total audience shares 635.5 364.2 505.1 350.8 434.8 434.8 435.8 301.2 
Nationally originated 518.9 335.4 483.7 350.8 415.7 415.7 393.9 301.2 
From imported format 0.0 0 0.0 0 19.1 19.1 0.0 0 
Imported programme 116.6 28.8 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.9 0.0 
National proportion 82% 92% 96% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 
'True' national 
proportion 
82% 92% 96% 100% 91% 96% 90% 100% 
France 
Top total audience shares 545.0 272.5 482.0 246.5 357.4 322.1 364.8 189.3 
Nationally originated 446.0 200.3 384.0 246.5 140.8 105.5 224.5 141.7 
Imported format 0.0 0 0.0 0 17.4 17.4 0.0 0 
Imported 99.0 72.2 98.0 0.0 199.2 199.2 140.3 47.6 
National proportion 82% 74% 80% 100% 44% 38% 62% 75% 
'True' national 
proportion 
82% 74% 80% 100% 35% 33% 62% 75% 
Brazil 
Top total audience shares n. a. n. a. 28 27.8 28 27.4 25 24.9 
Nationally originated n. a. n. a. 19.5 18.9 20.9 19.7 23.2 20.4 
Imported format n. a. n. a.  0.0 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.4 
Imported n. a. n. a. 8.9 8.9 6.3 6.3 2.2 2.2 
National proportion n. a. n. a. 70% 68% 79% 77% 100% 91% 
'True' national 
proportion n. a. n. a. 70% 68% 75% 72% 93% 82% 
Source: Table 75, Table 76, Table 77. 
Note: 
 „Top total audience shares‟, „Nationally originated‟, „Imported format‟ and „Imported‟ figures:  
o UK and France: Index resulting of adding of the audiences shares (in %) achieved by the „top 
20‟ programmes in the country; 
o Brazil: Total audience (in millions) achieved by the „top 5‟ of the main broadcasters in the city 
of Sao Paulo only (the biggest metropolitan region of Brazil). 
 Definitions: 
o „Nationally originated‟: programme produced in the country and not from an imported format; 
o „Imported format‟: programme produced in the country from an imported format; 
o „Imported‟: programme imported finished from abroad; 
o „National proportion‟: proportion of programmes produced in the country including those 
based on imported formats; 
o „„True‟ national proportion‟: proportion of programmes produced in the country excluding 
those based on imported formats. 
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Table 79 – Programmes and total audiences of the three top programmes per main channels in the UK 
during one specific week in September 
Week ending 7/Sep/2008 Week ending 6/Sep/2009 
Channel Programme m Nat. Channel Programme m Nat. 
BBC1 EASTENDERS (MON 1959) 8.98 y BBC1 NEW TRICKS (THU 2100) 8.53 y 
 
WHO DO YOU THINK YOU 
ARE? (WED 2100) 
6.44 y  EASTENDERS (THU 1929) 8.33 y 
 NEW TRICKS (MON 2059) 
6.23 y  
WAKING THE DEAD (SUN 
2100) 6.86 y 
BBC2 DRAGONS' DEN (MON 2101) 3.95 y BBC2 DRAGONS' DEN (WED 2101) 4.04 y 
 
THE HAIRY BAKERS (MON 
2030) 
3.44 y  COAST (TUE 1959) 3.92 y 
 
MOCK THE WEEK (THU 
2100) 
3.1 y  
LAST CHANCE TO SEE (SUN 
2002) 3.31 y 




9.36 y  
CORONATION STREET 
(MON 2028) 8.89 y 
 EMMERDALE (FRI 1903) 6.62 y  EMMERDALE (THU 2000) 6.83 y 
Channel 
4 BIG BROTHER (FRI 2159) 
5.17 y Channel 
4 BIG BROTHER (FRI 2201) 3.23 y 
 
THE SECRET MILLIONAIRE 
(TUE 2101) 
4.51 y  
JAMIE'S AMERICAN ROAD 
TRIP (TUE 2100) 3.16 y 
 UGLY BETTY (FRI 2101) 
3.12 n  
LOCATION, LOCATION, 
LOCATION (WED 1959) 3.05 y 
Channel 
5 CSI MIAMI (TUE 2102) 
2.7 n Channel 
5 CSI MIAMI (TUE 2102) 2.5 n 
 CSI - NEW YORK (TUE 2201) 1.64 n  THE MASK (SUN 2003) 1.76 n 
 NEIGHBOURS (MON 1729) 1.6 n  WARSHIP (MON 2102) 1.63 y 
ITV 2 XTRA FACTOR (SAT 1951) 1.44 y ITV 2 XTRA FACTOR (SAT 2035) 1.73 y 
BBC 3 EASTENDERS (TUE 2159) 0.98 y BBC 3 EASTENDERS (TUE 2201) 1.14 y 
 FAMILY GUY (SUN 2212) 
0.56 n  
FILM: NATIONAL TREASURE 
(2004) (SUN 1901) 0.93 n 
Dave QI (MON 2100) 0.59 y  FAMILY GUY (TUE 2324) 0.66 n 
E4 
BIG BROTHER'S BIG MOUTH 
(FRI 2301) 
1.19 y E4 HOLLYOAKS (THU 1900) 0.77 y 
 HOLLYOAKS (WED 1859) 
0.79 y fiver 
HOME AND AWAY (TUE 
1828) 0.68 n 
fiver 
HOME AND AWAY (WED 
1828) 
0.69 n ITV 2 
WHAT KATIE DID NEXT 
(THU 2100) 1.45 y 
ITV 2 THE X FACTOR (SUN 1759) 0.99 y  THE X FACTOR (SUN 1858) 1.19 y 
 
FILM: THE BOURNE 




FILM: DEATH WISH V: THE 
FACE OF DEATH (WED 
2247) 0.66 n 
ITV 3 
MIDSOMER MURDERS (SUN 
2003) 
1.1 y More 4 
COME DINE WITH ME (SUN 
1925) 1.28 y 
 TAGGART (SAT 2102) 
0.63 y Sky 1 
HOUSE SEASON 5 (SUN 
2103) 0.75 n 
 
INSPECTOR MORSE (THU 
2109) 
0.56 y 
     
More 4 
COME DINE WITH ME (SUN 
1850) 
0.68 y 
     
Sky 1 THE SIMPSONS (SUN 1831) 0.75 n     
Sky 
Sports 1 
LIVE US OPEN TENNIS 
FINAL (SUN 2129) 
0.67 n     
Total audience national programmes 
(millions / %) 
76.3 86% 
Total audience national programmes 
(millions / %) 
82.2 91% 
  
Total audience imported programmes 
(millions / %) 
12.4 14% 
Total audience imported programmes 
(millions / %) 
7.9 9% 
Total audience of top 3 programmes per 
channels + others (millions / %) 88.7  
Total audience of top 3 programmes per 
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...continuing Table 79 
Week ending 5/Sep/2010 
Channel Programme m Nat. 
BBC1 EASTENDERS (MON 2002) 8.77 y 
 CASUALTY (SAT 2046) 5.97 y 
 HOLBY CITY (TUE 2001) 5.7 y 
BBC2 COAST (WED 2002) 3.42 y 
 
THE GREAT BRITISH BAKE 
OFF (TUE 2002) 3 y 
 DRAGONS' DEN (MON 2102) 2.98 y 
ITV1 THE X FACTOR (SAT 1930) 11.69 y 
 
CORONATION STREET 
(MON 2031) 10.2 y 




(2007) (SUN 1820) 3.25 n 
 
ULTIMATE BIG BROTHER 
(WED 2203) 2.97 y 
 
LOCATION LOCATION 
LOCATION (THU 2000) 2.45 y 
Channel 
5 CSI MIAMI (TUE 2104) 2.32 n 
 
FILM: THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPYNESS (2006) (SUN 
2057) 1.92 n 
 NCIS (WED 2103) 1.67 n 
ITV2 XTRA FACTOR (SAT 2040) 1.69 y 
BBC 3 EASTENDERS (TUE 2202) 1.11 y 
BBC 3 
DON'T TELL THE BRIDE 
(TUE 2103) 1.1 y 
BBC 3 
EDINBURGH COMEDY FEST 
LIVE (THU 2100) 0.89 y 
E4 UGLY BETTY (WED 2104) 0.97 n 
ITV1 HD 
LOVE LIFE & PRISON (FRI 
2100) 0.71 y 
ITV1 HD 
COPS WITH CAMERAS (FRI 
2004) 0.67 y 
ITV2 
FILM: CASINO ROYALE 
(1967) (MON 2206) 1.04 y 
ITV2 
FILM: THE WORLD IS NOT 
ENOUGH (WED 2209) 0.95 y 
ITV2 THE X FACTOR (SUN 1845) 0.74 y 
ITV4 BENIDORM (MON 2133) 0.93 y 
More 4 
COME DINE WITH ME (SUN 
1816) 0.66 y 
Sky 1 SIMPSONS S21 (SUN 1802) 0.75 n 
Sky 1 LIE TO ME S2 (THU 2100) 0.74 n 
Sky 1 THE MIDDLE S1 (SUN 1832) 0.72 n 
Total audience national programmes 
(millions / %) 74.7 86% 
  
Total audience imported programmes 
(millions / %) 12.3 14% 
Total audience of top 3 programmes per 
channels + others (millions / %) 87.0  
Source: Barb 
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Table 80 – Programmes and total audiences of the three top programmes per main channels in France 










vouz 8.367 36.1 Wed, 21h33 n 
 Les Experts/A la carte 8.298 31.7 Sun, 20h52 n 
 L'affaire Bruay-en-Artois 6.486 27.5 Mon, 20h52 y 
France 2 Cold Case/Noir total 6.529 26.4 Mon, 20h49 n 
 Je vous trouve très beau 6.354 25 Sun, 20h54 y 
  Les années bonheur 4.38 23.1 Sat, 20h54 y 
France 3 Plus belle la vie 6.028 23.5 Thu, 20h22 y 
  Les incorruptibles 4.401 19.1 Tue, 20h53 n 
  Villa Marguerite 3.915 16 Thu, 20h54 y 
Canal+ Les guignols de l'info 2.414 10.7 Thu, 20h00 y 
 Le grand journal, la suite 2.108 8.4 Thu, 20h12 y 
  Le grand journal 1.559 8.9 Thu, 19h09 y 
France 5 
C'est dans l'air/Crise: Gare a la 
panique 1.162 11.1 Fri, 17h46 y 
  
Ripostes/Face à face avec Laurent 
Fab.. 0.915 7.7 Sun, 17h44 y 
  Les escapades de Petitrenaud 0.833 9.4 Sun, 12h06 y 
Arte Plein soleil 1.038 4.7 Mon, 20h59 y 
  Belle de jour 0.935 3.9 Thu, 20h59 y 
  French Cancan 0.931 3.6 Sun, 20h45 y 
M6 NCIS/La veuve noire 6.874 28.3 Fri, 20h51 n 
 Florence Foresti & Friends 4.254 18.9 Thu, 20h48 y 
  
Desperate Housewives/Les 
conseq... 3.745 16 Tue, 21h36 n 
Total national audience (million / %) 43.3 53%   
Total imported audience (million / %) 38.2 47%   
Total audiences (million) 81.5    
Source: (Relaxnews, 2008) 
Note: ...continued 
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TF1 Les aventuriers de Koh_Lanta/EP5 7.86 30.4 Fri, 20h51 y 
  Déclaration de Nicolas Sarkozy... 7.447 30.4 Wed, 20h05 y 
  
Les Experts Miami/Copies 
conformes 7.146 26.8 Tue, 20h50 n 
France 2 Apocalypse/L'enfer 7.87 31 Tue, 21h31 y 
  Cold Case/Le monde exterieur 6.073 23.1 Mon, 20h39 n 
  Déclaration de Nicolas Sarkozy... 4.673 19.1 Wed, 20h05 y 
France 3 Plus belle la vie 5.468 22.8 Thu, 20h11 y 
  Louis la brocante/Louis voit double 5.201 21.2 Thu, 20h37 y 
  
Inspecteur Barnaby/Meurte sur le 
green 3.473 13.7 Sun, 20h35 n 
Canal+ Les guignols de l'info 1.961 8.8 Wed, 19h58 y 
  Le grand journal la suite 1.917 7.7 Wed, 20h12 y 
  Canal Football Club 1.491 6.5 Sun, 19h33 y 
France 5 C dans l'air 1.092 10.6 Thu, 17h48 y 
  Les escapades de Petitrenaud 0.677 7 Sun, 12h04 y 
  Une réserve pour felins/La bande... 0.614 7.8 Sat, 16h57 n 
Arte Le grand sommeil 1.229 4.9 Mon, 20h46 n 
  Le Japon, l'Empereur et l'armee 1.052 4.3 Wed, 20h46 y 
  Comme une image 1.04 4.2 Sun, 20h44 y 
M6 NCIS/Retrouvailles 6.346 24.5 Fri, 20h46 n 
  
Un dîner vraiment parfait/Le 
combat... 4.375 18.4 Mon, 20h44 y 
  
Un dîner vraiment parfait/Le 
combat... 4.259 38.1 Mon, 22h53 y 
W9 Léon 1.079 4.3 Sun, 20h34 y 
  Les Simpson/Pour l'amour de Moe 0.95 4.1 Sun, 19h55 n 
  Opération dragon 0.838 3.5 Thu, 20h39 n 
Total national audience (million / %) 57.5 68%   
Total imported audience (million / %) 26.7 32%   
Total audiences (million) 84.1    
Source: (Gudella, 2009) 
Note: ...continued 
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TF1 Mentalist/L'Appat du gain 9.278 35.8 Wed, 20h49 n 
 Koh-Lanta/Episode 2 7.437 29.3 Fri, 20h49 y 
  Les Experts Miami/Poupée de son 7.154 27.3 Tue, 20h50 n 
France 2 Castle/La Malédiction de la momie 5.593 21.8 Mon, 20h39 n 
  
Prise directe/Héritage : Quand la 
vie bascule 3.595 14.3 Tue, 20h37 y 
  Indigènes 3.411 13.5 Sun, 20h36 y 
France 3 Plus belle la vie 5.179 21.1 Wed, 20h10 y 
 Mademoiselle Drot 3.595 13.7 Sun, 20h36 y 
 
Le déshonneur d'Elisabeth 
Campbell 3.372 13.8 Thu, 20h36 n 
Canal+ Les Guignols de l'info 2.183 10 Wed, 19h56 y 
 Le Grand journal la suite 2.045 8.4 Tue, 20h11 y 
  Canal Football Club 1.773 7.1 Sun, 19h37 y 
France 5 
C dans l'air/Seconde manif et 
après? 1.334 11.9 Thu, 17h49 y 
 
Soirée spéciale maladie 
d'Alzheimer : le debat 0.99 4.1 Tue, 21h34 y 
  Vivre avec la maladie d'Alzheimer 0.974 3.7 Tue, 20h41 y 
Arte Les Fantômes du Chapelier 0.909 3.8 Mon, 20h41 y 
 Trafalgar 0.797 3.7 Sat, 20h42 y 
  1870, la bataille décisive de Sedan 0.743 3.6 Sun, 21h35 n 
M6 NCIS/Une affaire de famille 5.443 21.4 Fri, 20h41 n 
  Bones/Le Boucher de Burtonsville 4.823 18.9 Thu, 20h42 n 
 Zone interdite 3.655 14.7 Sun, 20h46 y 
W9 les Sous-doués 1.298 5.3 Thu, 20h36 y 
  Les Simpson/Grève à la centrale 1.118 5.3 Sat, 20h35 n 
 Underworld 2 : Evolution 0.885 3.5 Sun, 20h37 n 
TMC 
La Ligue des gentlemen 
extraordinaires 1.44 5.8 Mon, 20h37 n 
 
Agence tous risques/Les 
Braconniers 0.957 4.4 Tue, 19h36 n 
 Navarro/Zéro pointé 0.945 4.4 Sat, 20h37 y 
France 4 Serial Noceurs 0.789 3.2 Mon, 20h36 n 
 Football/Lorient - Brest 0.708 2.8 Tue, 20h45 y 
 Le Cinquième élément 0.639 6 Sun, 22h32 y 
Gulli L'Instit/La revelation 0.79 3.1 Wed, 20h35 y 
 The Goonies 0.682 2.7 Tue, 20h36 n 
  Shuriken School 0.673 7.8 Fri, 17h27 y 
Total national audience (million / %) 42.9 50%   
Total imported audience (million / %) 42.3 50%   
Total audiences (million) 85.2    
Source: (Gudella, 2010) 
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Table 81 – Sum of the audience shares of the ‘Top 10’ programmes of the year by type and origin in the 
UK and France 
 UK France 
2004 2007 2009 2010 2004 2007 2009 2010 
National films 40 43.5 52 35 118 125.1 84 67 
Imported films 107 84.9 51 55 77 56.3 84 78 
National sports 150 100.3 96 107 192 216.4 116 112 
Imported sports 88 48.4 32 84 0 21.7 26 75 
National series 192 155.5 140 140 161 89.5 30 41 
Imported series 0 0 0 0 16 63 77 65 
 
Source: International Television Key Facts yearbooks (IP Network, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011) 
Note: The values expressed in % are the sum of the individual shares achieved by the „top 10‟ programmes and, 




Table 82 – Total audiences in million of the top three programmes in the UK, France and Brazil (Sao 
Paulo) 
 
2008 2009 2010 
UK National (m) 76.3 82.2 74.7 
 
Imported (m) 12.4 7.9 12.3 
 
Total (m) 88.7 90.1 87.0 
 
National (%) 86% 91% 86% 
 
Imported (%) 14% 9% 14% 
France National (m) 43.3 57.5 42.9 
 
Imported (m) 38.2 26.7 42.3 
 
Total (m) 81.5 84.1 85.2 
 
National (%) 53% 68% 50% 
 
Imported (%) 47% 32% 50% 
Brazil (Sao 
Paulo) National (m) 17.0 18.3 14.8 
 
Imported (m) 0.3 0.3 1.8 
 
Total (m) 17.4 18.6 16.6 
 
National (%) 98% 99% 89% 
 
Imported (%) 2% 1% 11% 
Source: Table 77 , Table 79 and Table 80. 
Note: For the case of Brazil, used the same programmes as listed in Table 77 (Top 5 of the week) and totalled 
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Table 83 – Film production costs and audiences in the UK, France and Brazil 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (calculations) / Sources 
Produced films (1) 
UK 130 116 133 160 171 172 142 154 105 152 189 (BFI, 2011: 138) 
France 230 216 210 238 264 264 275 286 283 315 297 (CNC, 2011c: [visas]) 
Brazil 23 30 29 30 49 45 72 78 79 84 75 (Ancine, 2010a: 8) 
Average UK= 149 FR= 265 BR= 57      Period average 
Average growth UK= 6% FR= 3% BR= 15%      Growth in the decade 
Total investments (2) 
UK 457 816 1048 758 1822 1635 862 918 981 652 1139.1 (BFI, 2011: 138) 
France 699 788 749 1003 912 1119 999 1045 1297 956 1440 (CNC, 2011b: [investiss]) 
Brazil   35 45 62 75 66 59 57 47 62 (Ancine, 2010a: 8) 
Average film production cost (£mm) -  (2) / (1) 
UK cost 3.5 7.0 7.9 4.7 10.7 9.5 6.1 6.0 9.3 4.3 6.0  
France cost 3.0 3.6 3.6 4.2 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.7 4.6 3.0 4.8  
Brazil cost   1.2 1.5 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8  
Audience of national films (mm) (3) 
UK  39 40 27 40 55 30 46 51 64 41 
Based on total admissions and 
UK market share (BFI, 2011: 9, 
15) 
France 48 78 65 61 76 65 85 66 87 75 74 (CNC, 2011c: [entrees ff]) 
Brazil  6.9 7.8 22 16.4 10.7 9.9 10.3 8.8 15.9 25.6 (Filme B, 2011) 
Audience of national films (per capita) (3) / population (a) 
UK  0.66 0.67 0.45 0.67 0.91 0.49 0.76 0.83 1.03 0.48  
France  1.27 1.06 0.98 1.22 1.03 1.34 1.03 1.36 1.16 1.14  
Brazil  0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.13  
National market share  
UK  25 23 16 23 33 19 29 31 37 24 (BFI, 2011: 15) 
France 28.5 41 35 35 38 37 45 37 45 37 36 (CNC, 2011c: [natio]) 
Brazil  9 8 21 14 12 11 12 10 14 19 (Filme B, 2011) 
Average UK= 26 FR= 39 BR= 13       
Note: National population taken from World Bank indicators (available at World Bank, 2011). 
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Table 84 – Total revenues and hours of programmes of independent producers in the UK 









 Top 10 (m£) 656 794 826 930 697 687 701 713 
Top 20 (m£) 802 977 1,025 1,183 914 907 930 950 
Others (m£) 199 423 475 557 1,056 1,063 1,090 1,270 














Top 10 (hh) 12,949 16,526 9,709 12,274 8,023 4,759 4,576 1,396 
Top 20 (hh) 14,159 18,185 10,787 13,200 9,144 5,807 5,923 3,036 
Others (hh)   5,213 5,800   14,393 14,376 
Total (hh)   16,000 19,000   20,316 17,412 
Source: (Broadcast, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) 
Notes: Top 10/20: ten (twenty) biggest companies in terms of revenues (expressed in millions of £) and in terms of produced hours. 
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Table 85 – GDP growth from 2000 to 2009 (%) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Overall 
growth 
3.9 2.5 2.1 2.8 3 2.2 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 18% 
3.7 1.8 0.9 0.9 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.3 -0.1 -2.7 14% 
4.3 1.3 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4 5.7 5.1 -0.2 38% 
Note: World Bank indicators (available at World Bank, 2011). 
 
 




% Calculation / Source 
1 Total households 58.6 100% (IBGE, 2010: 80) 
2 Households with television 55.4 95% (Grupo de Midia, 2010: 276) 
2.1 Urban households with television 48.4 87% (IBGE, 2010: 96) 
2.2 Rural households with television 7.0 12% (2)-(2.1) 
3 FTA viewers 47.9 82%  (2)-(4) 
4 Paytv subscribers 7.5 13% (Anatel, 2010: 12) 
5 Cable 4.4 8% (Anatel, 2010: 12) 
6 DTH 2.8 5% (Anatel, 2010: 12) 
7 Other 0.4 1% (Anatel, 2010: 12) 
8 Total FTA + paytv 55.4 95% (3)+(4) 
9 









 Free satellite estimate in literature 15.0 26% (Castro, 2007) 
 
 
 
